


COLERIDGE *and* ABHINAVAGUPTA

SHRIKRISHNA MISHRA



COLERIDGE AND ABHINAVAGUPTA

*A Comparative Study
of the Philosophy of Poetry
in the East and the West*

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Mithila University

Darbhangha

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TO MY PARENTS

*Rākāśaśināviva me pradyodayantau bhuvan̄ divan̄ pitarau
Nayatām lokottaratām grantham̄ tayorāśiṣā likhitam.*

*Vahantī sindūram pravara-kavarī-bhāra-timira-
Tviṣāṁ vṛndair bandikṛtamiva navīnārka-kiraṇam
Tanotu kṣemaṁ nas tava vadana-saundarya-lahari-
Parivāha-srotaḥ-saraṇiriva sīmanta-saraṇiḥ.*

Divine Mother !

May the vermilion line parting your hairs,
Shining like the first ray of the rising sun,
Imprison'd in the splendid dark of your
Cloud-like massive tresses, gushing forth the
Ever-ebullient beauty of your face,
Bless us all.

Śaṅkarācārya : *Saundaryalaharī*



*Puruṣa evedaṁ sarvaṁ
yad bhūtaṁ yacca bhāvyam.*

*Pādo'sya viṣvābhūtāni
Tripādasyāmṛtan divi.*

Rgveda, Puruṣasūkta

*Catvāri vāk parimitā padāni
Tāni vidur brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ
Guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti
Turīyam vāco manuṣyā vadanti*

Maho Devo martyān āviveśa.

Mahābhāṣya

*Tat karma Hari-toṣaṁ yat
Sā vidyā tan-matir yayā*

Śrīmad-Bhāgavata

All these—that has been and that may be—
Are the Omniform Himself.

All things in their entirety are
His foot ;
His (other) three feet are immortal and
Are in heaven.

Puruṣa-sūkta.

Word is measured four steps ;
Them know the Brahmans who meditate ;
Three steps lying hidden in the cave
Are invisible ; the fourth step
Covers the human speech.

The Great Logos entered the mortals.

Mahābhāṣya.

To please God is true work ;
To divinize the mind is true learning.

Śrīmad-Bhāgavata



Glory to Thee, Father of Earth and Heaven,
All-conscious Presence of the Universe,
Nature's vast ever-acting Energy,
In will, in deed, Impulse of All to All,

The Destiny of Nations, lines 459-62

Join with me, reader, in the fervent prayer that we may seek within us what we can never find elsewhere, that we may find within us what no words can put there, that one only true religion, which elevateth knowing into being, which is at once the science of being, and the being and the life of all genuine science.

Lay Sermons, p. 99.

Truth, virtue, and happiness may be distinguished from each other, but cannot be divided. They subsist by a mutual coinherence, which gives a shadow of divinity even to our human nature.

The Friend, p. 20.

It is impossible to pay a higher compliment to poetry, than to consider the effects it produces in common with religion... I have often thought that religion...is the poetry of mankind.

Shak. Crit, II. 111.

FOREWORD

Poetics is a branch of learning which requires a philosophically disciplined mind, a fine sensitiveness to nature, life and language, and a maturity of judgement. Writers on poetics are generally thinkers of very high calibre. In India and the West writers on this subject were men of stupendous scholarship and acute aesthetic sense. Sanskrit poetics is one of the most developed branches of learning. It had been so far neglected by the modern Western scholars mainly owing to its difficulties. Indian expositions on the subject by scholars like P. V. Kane, S. K. De, V. Raghavan and others were more or less presentations of the material in the Sanskrit works through the English medium. They are not quite intelligible to Western scholars who are not conversant with the subject in original Sanskrit.

A few scholars have in recent years tried to interpret Sanskrit poetics in the Western idiom of thought. But their works are too specialized and technical and have sectional appeals. It is for the first time that the author of the present work has attempted a serious and intimate comparison of the Western concepts of poetics with those of the Indian. The title of the work shows that only two critics, namely, Coleridge and Abhinavagupta, have been compared, but as a matter of fact it is a very comprehensive work and the author has dealt with almost all the great authors on poetics, Indian and Western.

This voluminous work is obviously an outcome of enormous industry, protracted study and hard thinking. The bulk of the work is apt to tire out one's patience, but the attractive and lucid style of presentation and the importance of the subject do not let the interest flag. The treatment of the subject is quite comprehensive and Dr Mishra shows erudition and originality in handling his material.

The work is divided into four books, each of which is again divided into several chapters. Book I is devoted to the study of Coleridge's works and the study is both intensive and extensive. The ample quotations from Coleridge, which comprise the main bulk of this section, are apt and apposite and give a clear outline of Coleridge's philosophy. Dr Mishra has achieved considerable success in his exposition of Coleridge's philosophy of poetry, and his analysis and assessment are thorough and correct. It is an unmistakable proof of his originality to show that Coleridge has transcended the scepticism of Kant though he adopted his transcendental aesthetic (theory of perception) and accepted his evaluation of time and space as forms of impression and as objectively unrealistic. Dr Mishra has the credit not only of presenting Coleridge's philosophy in an admirable manner but also of discovering for the first time the fundamental identity between Coleridge and Abhinavagupta. Coleridge's conception of the ultimate reality as 'I AM' is almost an echo of the Kashmirian Trika philosophy of *Aham* (I), true self-consciousness, which is the prism of all phenomenal creation. Both Coleridge and Abhinavagupta explain poetic creation and appreciation on the basis of their common philosophy of self-consciousness. To Dr Mishra belongs the credit of showing elaborately and unmistakably that the two thinkers are kindred spirits.

Book II is occupied with the exposition of the Trika philosophy of Kashmir. It is doubtless that this philosophy, of which Abhinavagupta is the leading exponent and staunch adherent, is the basis of his aesthetic speculations. So the dissertation is not an irrelevant introduction of an abstruse philosophy in a work of literary criticism. This school fully endorses the philosophy of the *Vaiyākaraṇas* so ably presented by Bhartṛhari in the *Vākyapadīya*, that word and meaning are ontologically the same thing and language and thought are inseparable. Barring terminological differences, theological

elaborations and shift of emphasis, the monistic philosophy of Kashmir has no fundamental difference from Vedānta as expounded by Śaṅkarācārya. The present author has shown his accurate scholarship in bringing out these similarities. His succinct exposition of the Trika philosophy in three chapters only is a *tour de force*.

Book III analyses the theory of *Rasa* as enunciated by Bharata in his famous dictum and elaborated by a long succession of Kashmirian writers, pre-eminently from Ānandavardhana down to Abhinavagupta and his followers. This is an able performance and the author gives proof of his concentrated scholarship and knowledge of Sanskrit poetics.

Book IV is occupied with the comparison of Abhinavagupta with Coleridge and makes an interesting and edifying study. The palm of superiority is accorded to Abhinavagupta and the present writer justifies his stand by logical and factual evidence alike. The advantage of Abhinavagupta lies not so much in his personal superiority as in the tradition built up by centuries of thought, which is fully utilized by him. India has the credit of having many schools of philosophy started by different sages and every school has the good fortune of having a succession of loyal followers, who do not make a fetish of originality. These writers are content with the rank of commentators. They meet the objections of hostile critics and contribute a quota of original thought. The result has been the emergence of a self-contained and consistent system with all its fundamental concepts made clear and unambiguous. Indian poetics also had this advantage. The *Dhvani* school reached its acme of perfection after centuries of speculation, discussion and exposition. That Abhinavagupta is clearer and consistent is due to the fact that he draws upon a tradition built up step by step by a long line of predecessors.

Coleridge rather stands alone like a solitary peak in the plain. Though he does not lack adherents, each writer is

anxious to stick out an original track and does not polish away the angularities and vaguenesses which are natural in the original promulgator of a new thought. Had Coleridge's idea been worked out, developed and elaborated by a succession of able scholars with undivided loyalty, the result might have been as stupendous as it has been in India. Coleridge is a wonderful personality and it is he who gave a philosophy of literary criticism in Europe and explained the mystery of poetry on its basis.

Dr Mishra's discovery of the fundamental affinity between Coleridge and Abhinavagupta is bound to prove a landmark in critical thinking on poetics as well as philosophy of poetry. The West will find Coleridge re-discovered and hail Abhinavagupta as a kindred spirit.

I congratulate Dr Mishra on his monumental contribution. It shows that India still has scholars who are astonishingly remarkable in original thinking. Son of the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Jayadeva Mishra, an authority on *Vyākaraṇa* and *Navya Nyāya*, brother of the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Umesha Mishra, a renowned scholar of Indian philosophy, and student of Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj, the great savant and sage philosopher, Dr Mishra carries on the tradition by establishing a unique record in the synthesis of Eastern and Western poetics. His wide and deep study of Indian and Western philosophies and English and Sanskrit literary works, both critical and creative, his catholic taste and mature judgement have helped him in producing a work of enviable scholarship.

Calcutta, November 1970

Satkari Mookerjee

PREFACE

In the Introduction to the book, *Literary Criticism: A Short History*, W. K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks say that "a history of literary ideas can scarcely escape being written from a point of view. It seems to us that on a strictly neutral plane there can be in fact no history of literary ideas at all, nor, for that matter, any direct history of literature." And they have suggested an alternative title to their book: *An Argumentative History of Literary Argument in the West*.

If a history of literary ideas cannot be written in a neutral style, much less a thesis that emphatically advocates a point of view on the subject. My book is an Argumentative Account of the Literary Argument in the East and the West within a limited range. There is only one debater on each side. The West is represented by Samuel Taylor Coleridge of England and the East by Abhinavagupta of India. The debaters do not oppose each other. Instead, they have been chosen because they support each other. Opposition has been given its representation but is not allowed to drift the main argument.

Thus the two parties have been closeted together for mutual understanding. India has a valuable tradition of literary criticism but the West seems ignorant of it. The fault is mainly ours. We have not displayed it to the West. The result has been that a truly universal system of literary evaluation has not emerged yet in literature, where the first lesson of initiation is to rise above the prejudices due to the differences of time and place.

The limited representation in the debate has been compensated to a great extent by the fact that the representatives on both sides are Brobdingnagians, whose long strides cover most of the field. Coleridge fathers the Western tradition in modern literary criticism, and Abhinavagupta is

still the leader in literary criticism in India, a position he established for himself during his life-time about a thousand years ago.

To reconcile two great authorities of two different traditions is a great delight. I have brought them together for the first time. I have taken sides no doubt. It became incumbent upon me because Coleridge abused Brahmans as Lilliputians dealing with Brobdingnagian subjects. I had to vindicate the Brahmanic standpoint. But I have tried to be unprejudiced. It is for my readers to decide whether I have succeeded in walking on the sword's edge.

A few words regarding how it came to be will not be out of place here. The conception of such a debate came to me as a matter of chance. A verse in King Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* describes *Rasa*, the poetic experience at its apex, as *abhimāna*, *ahoṅkāra*, the feeling of 'I am'; and I was struck by its resemblance to Coleridge's definition of Imagination, or the soul of poetry, in similar terms. I seized upon the idea. Reading Bhoja, however, I could not get the light to move on. I came to Abhinavagupta for guidance. His commentaries on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* cleared much of the mist on many problems of poetics, but the feeling of 'I am' still remained a mystery. All the light and the warmth poured in only through the opening of his philosophical texts: *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī*, *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī*, *Mālinīvijaya-vārtika*, *Parā-triṃśikā* and *Tantrāloka*.

Abhinava's philosophical works are no part of curriculum nowadays, and I had to do a lot of spade-work with self-help. But Coleridge and Abhinavagupta resemble each other so much that one helped me in understanding the other.

Here I must mention with gratitude the debt I owe to the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj, who led me into the Eden of the Indian idealistic tradition. I pointed out

the similarity between Coleridge and Bhoja to him and he confirmed it. His confirmation sustained me throughout my lone adventure to find out the celestial abode of the Muses.

I am grateful to Dr. Amalendu Bose, Professor and Head of the department of English, Calcutta University, now retired, for all his encouragement and appreciation. That made me bold in expressing my views. It was at his instance that I wrote the Interchapters.

Again, I gratefully remember the suggestions given to me by Professor George Whalley of Queen's University, Canada, in the early stage of my research during the fifties.

I am extremely indebted to Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, Professor of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, and Director, Nava Nalanda Mahavihar, for writing a Foreword to my book. I am extremely sad to learn that he is not alive to see it in print. It was at his bidding that I undertook the publication of this book. I am overwhelmed by his praise. As a matter of fact all his praise should go to the authors compared. They are the Himalayan peaks in literary criticism. I deserve congratulation only on keeping good company, which saves one from the pit-falls of self-complacency.

I thank the authorities of Patna University who conferred on me the D.Lit. degree for this work in 1970.

Last but not least I heartily thank Mr. N. A. O'Brien, Deputy General Manager, Oxford University Press, Calcutta, and his colleagues for the assistance they gave me in getting the book printed and published.

In presenting my book to the world of *litterateurs* I have the same feeling as Kālidāsa had in presenting *Abhijñāna-Śākuntalam* to his audience :

*Āparitoṣad viduṣām na sādhu manye prayoga-vijñānam
Balavadapi śikṣitānām ātmanyapratyañ cetaḥ.*

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1

- I Comparison of Coleridge and Abhinavagupta based on agreement in fundamentals. Coleridge's philosophy and his interpreters—I. A. Richards, D. G. James and Herbert Read. Comparison helps in understanding Coleridge and Sanskrit poetics.
- II Importance of comparative literary criticism.
- III *Imagination* and *Pratyabhijñā*, theories of perception, based on self-consciousness, unity of subject and object. Probably Pythagoras carried this concept from India. Coleridge is more Pythagorean and Platonist than Kantian. His denigration of Indian philosophy and religion.
- IV Abhinavagupta and Coleridge and Bhartṛhari as semasiologists. Vedic theory of the four states of word. Absolute self-consciousness, unity of word and meaning. Word as consciousness. Self-consciousness, mother of alphabet, creation and its knowledge. Subject and object related as word and meaning. The Roman alphabet unscientific. Indian philosophy not pantheistic.
- V Logical Positivism, an offshoot of Kantian philosophy. Its tenets : the noumenal world is imaginary, and metaphysics nonsensical ; meaning should be verified empirically ; tautologies alone are certain ; other empirical statements are probable ; ethics and aesthetics, like metaphysics, lack objective validity ; aesthetic questions have psychological and sociological answers. Abhinava and Coleridge differ from this. 'Symbol' and the 'suggestive word'.

- VI Similarity between Trichotomy and *Trika*.
- VII Both Coleridge and Abhinava correct half-truths of others and explain everything by trichotomic logic.
- VIII Both systems satisfy all genuine appetites of human nature and make rest the foundation of harmony.
- IX Identical definitions of Imagination and Taste, *Pratibhā* and *Rasa*. Its implications. I.A. Richards on Coleridge's shortcomings. Sanskrit poetics comprehensive and perfect.

INTERCHAPTER I

35

Similar evaluation of poetry and literary education by Coleridge and Abhinava. Philosophy of literature and semantics. Richardsian poetics. Sanskrit poetics and Coleridge's poetics.

BOOK I

COLERIDGE'S CONCEPT OF IMAGINATION

I COLERIDGE'S STARTING POINT

39

Coleridge's ambition. Plan of his *magnum opus*. His fragmentary writings. Philosophy and poetry and Coleridge. Imagination and Fancy. Wordsworth and Coleridge on Imagination.

II COLERIDGE'S CRITICISM OF THE ASSOCIATIONISTS

45

From poetic pleasure to epistemology. Materialist's theory wrong. Criticism of Locke. Law of Association.

Mackintosh wrong. Aristotle its author. His view summarized. Hartley and his followers refuted. Creative process not explained by Associationists. How thoughts and images are formed. Dualistic explanation wrong. Heterogeneous things cannot unite. Unity of subject and object. Matter, modification of intelligence.

III THE PERSPECTIVE CENTRAL POINT: THE ETERNAL I AM

59

Heterogeneous things can have no intercommunion. Truth is correlative to being. Difficulty of philosophy. Half-truths of others corrected. Materialists and Coleridge's philosophy. Philosophic consciousness and common consciousness. Organs of Spirit and organs of Sense. Method. Philosophy, the science of total being. Kant and Coleridge on Reality. Unity of subject and object, the first postulate of philosophy. Immediate and mediate knowledge. Philosophy starts with I AM. Individual and Universal Self. I AM, the ground of all existence and knowledge. Intelligence, a self-development, not a quality. Its centripetal and centrifugal powers. Synonyms of I AM. Philosophy, the ultimate ground of all sciences. Similarity between Platonic and *Trka* philosophies. Substantial and abstract knowledge. Idea and Law. Chemistry and Poetry. Realism and idealism not contradictory. Realism explained. Materialism and idealism criticized. Idealistic realism of Coleridge. Methodical education.

IV THE ORGANS OF SPIRIT AND THE ORGANS OF SENSE

82

Centripetal and centrifugal forces of self-consciousness. Philosophy contemplates intelligence in its

growth from birth to maturity. Science only presupposes intelligence. Ideas constitutive, not merely regulative. To understand phenomena one must first understand noumena. Plato's Idea explained. God, the highest Idea. Bacon's Law and Plato's Idea. Evolution of Intelligence. *Nomos* distinguished from *nous*. Mental faculties. Reason and Understanding. Similar *Trika* concepts of *Vidyā* and *Māyā*.

V THE SCIENCE OF METHOD : A SCHEME OF TOTAL EDUCATION

103

Methodical thinking necessary for true education. Education complete in attaining wisdom. Relations of Law, Mental Initiative, and Theory, corresponding to the faculties of Reason, Imagination, and Understanding. Imagination, the intermediate faculty. Four stages of cognition. Progressive transition, characteristic of education. To understand phenomena mind must rise above phenomena. Aversion to thinking is the mother evil. Four stages of mental development explained. Greek *Methodos* and *Trika Adhvā*.

VI THE PRIMARY IMAGINATION

112

Importance of mental initiative. Perception explained differently by Coleridge and Locke. Locke and Hobbes follow Aristotle. Erosion of the original meaning of 'idea' and denial of the *a priori* nature of knowledge. Coleridge restores it. The support of Plato and Bacon. Both idealism and materialism wrong. Knowing is resembling. Knowing explained on the analogy of sealing. Various types of resembling. Resemblance and *vṛtti*. 'Sensuous' not synonymous with 'real'. Valid and invalid knowledge. Process of

knowing. Plato and *Trika* on the importance of recollection in knowing. Word as focus. Word as *sphoṭa*. Logical positivism criticized. Omniformity of the original unity of word and meaning. Philosophy of word and meaning in India. Word as Platonic Idea. Self-consciousness as focus and mirror, as word and meaning. God's will, the primary focus. Identity of the percipient and the perceived necessary for perception. Primary Imagination necessary for understanding Secondary Imagination. Primary Imagination misinterpreted by Richards. George Whalley's interpretation. Primary Imagination explained.

VII THE SECONDARY IMAGINATION

128

Primary Imagination and Secondary Imagination. Poetry unites feeling with Reason. Fine Arts, different species of poetry. 'Feeling' and 'emotion' promiscuously used. Confused use of 'mind' and 'heart'. Necessity to desynonymize 'feeling' and 'emotion'. 'Passion' distinguished from 'feeling' and 'emotion'. Passion and Imagination. Passion explained. Cartesian view criticized. How feeling becomes passion. Coleridge explains it better than Eliot or Richards. Coleridge's first imaginative experience. The universal world of feeling. Genius combines the conscious with the unconscious, particulars with the universal. Process of Imitation. Unity in multitude, the principle of beauty and joy. Poetry is imitation of beauty or harmonized chaos. Joy, not beauty, the secret of poetic creation and appreciation. Primary and Secondary Imagination compared and contrasted. Poetic feeling and common feeling. Imaginative process. Illustrations. Poetic experience and poetic language. Imagination works through single words. Fanciful and Imaginative poetry illustrated. Ideas, not materials, predominate.

minant in poetry : Poetry is apotheosis of feeling. Representation of ideas, not presentation of facts, gives poetic pleasure. Illustrations. Passion, not images, the essence of poetry. Musical delight its essential character. Metre and rhythm. Pure passivity and pure activity. Perfection lies in their union in poetry, morality and life. Reason makes feeling powerful. Its spontaneous overflow through artistic emotions is poetry. Passion, the matter, and Imagination, the manner of poetry. Ben Jonson contrasted with Shakespeare. Imaginative experience affects body, mind and spirit. It views everything universally.

VIII THE SECONDARY IMAGINATION : A RESUME 170

Primary Imagination and Understanding. Secondary Imagination, Reason and Understanding. Aristotle and Coleridge and Abhinava on the poetic process.

IX FANCY

179

Fancy and Imagination differ in kind, says Coleridge. They differ only in degree, say Lowes and Abercrombie. Defence of Coleridge by Richards. Poetic process and the relative importance of the mental faculties. Fanciful and Imaginative poetry illustrated by Lowes. Illustrations do not support him. Coleridge and Aristotle on the poetic essence. A similar case in Indian poetics. Difficulty in distinguishing Imaginative from Fanciful poetry. *Don Quixote*. Poetry, a product of the balanced mind. It shows old things in a novel way. Genius is not madness. Fancy and Imagination. Fanciful images and Imaginative images. Truth is dynamic. Spenser's poetry imaginatively fanciful, that of Beaumont and Fletcher merely fanciful. Coleridge's comprehensive definition of poetry. Motion compared with *Guṇa* and Fancy with *Alaṅkāra*.

X GOOD SENSE

201

The body of poetic genius. Unity of word and meaning. Reason and Will, Consciousness and Self. Words and things. Omniformity of the Absolute. Reason and common sense. Value of Grammar, Logic and Psychology. Understanding also is important. Verity is no poetic principle. Neglect of Imagination, a defect. Neglect of Good Sense also a defect. Wordsworth's neglect of Good Sense. Richards defends Wordsworth. Eliot's criticism of *Hamlet* and Coleridge's concept of mental bombast. Longinus on bombast. Communication, spiritual, poetical and common. Richards' opinion of Good Sense not convincing. Good Sense and Imagination. Poetry and Propriety. Poetry and history. Propriety makes poetry useful.

XI ALLIED CONCEPTS

219

- 1 Meditation contrasted with observation. Two types of observation. Meditation, Imitation and Imagination.
- 2 Dramatic illusion. Imitation and the dramatic unities. The Shakespearian drama and the Greek drama. French critics, Dr. Johnson and Coleridge on the end of drama. Willing suspension of disbelief constitutes poetic faith. Dream and poetry. Stage illusion. Aristotle and Coleridge on probability.
- 3 Imitation, the fundamental poetic principle. Poetry converts a series into a whole. Poetry is imitation of *ēthē*, *pathē*, and *praxeis*. Coleridge explains *mimēsis* as a Platonist. Aristotle's *mimēsis* not a fully developed concept. Imitation, a work of Imagination. Indian critics on Imitation.
- 4 Judgement and Genius.
- 5 Taste and Genius. Sense organs. Taste and Imagination.

- 6 Beauty as a key concept in poetics introduced by Plotinus. The good, the agreeable and the beautiful. Beauty defined. Taste and Beauty. The good and the beautiful. Beauty, Taste and Imagination.
- 7 Joy, or pleasure, a key word of Coleridge's poetics. Four kinds of pleasure.
- 8 Poetry and Religion intimately connected. Great minds androgynous. Coleridge's concept of God and the Hindu concept of *Ardhanārīśvara*.
- 9 Poetry, metre and figures of speech. Metre and poetry. Wordsworth's view criticized. Language of poetry naturally figurative.

INTERCHAPTER II

249

Studying poetry Coleridge studied everything. Self-consciousness is his key concept. He is more a Pythagorean and a Platonist than a Kantian. Poetry and its appreciation, as reconciliation of opposites. Imagination, the intermediate faculty. True poetry is imaginative, false poetry fanciful. Value of poetry decided by the faculty used in composing it. The place of poetry in the scheme of total education. To know is to be, unconsciously in ordinary experience, consciously in poetic experience. Objective verification is a wrong method of knowing poetic truth. Self-consistency is a higher test. Poetic experience free from spatio-temporal tags. Value of feeling in knowing poetic truth. Poets imitate God. Poetry unsensualizes the mind by sensuous presentation. It intellectualizes and spiritualizes feeling and leads to wisdom, the ultimate goal of education. The value of imaginative experience for moral education. Abhinava improves upon Coleridge.

BOOK II

INDIAN POETICS : THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

I INDIAN POETICS : AN INTRODUCTION

259

Nāṭyaśāstra, the earliest extant work. Abhinava-gupta, its greatest commentator. Poetry is essentially dramatic, and education moral. Vedic discipline is difficult. *Purāṇas* have sectional appeal. Universal appeal of the theatre. Poetry studied from the listener's standpoint. *Rasa-sūtra*, the bed-rock of Indian poetics. The *Rasa* theory is superior to others. It accounts for the four aims of life. Abhinava is a great critic.

II TRIKA : A PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISTIC REALISM

269

The *Trika* philosophy. *Vedānta* and *Trika*. Consciousness not quality but power of Self. Self-consciousness, unity of existence (*prakāśa*) and consciousness (*vimarśa*). It is a self-conversing and self-duplicating reality. Freedom (*Vidyā*) and Limitation (*Māyā*), centripetal and centrifugal Powers of Self-consciousness. Its noumenal (*Śiva* and *Śakti*) and phenomenal (*Nara*) states. *Saccidānanda* as Self-consciousness ; as trinity of will, knowledge, and action ; as divine pentad (*Brahmapañcaka*). Self-consciousness, immanent and transcendental. Creation, divine and mundane. Everything is a unity of subject and object. Purity of object defined. The Absolute has no objectivity. Worldly subject-objects are limited. Freedom includes limitation. Branches of learning are different ways of knowing the Absolute. Can the knower be known ? *Māyā*, the principle of finite creation and limited knowledge. The end and means of knowledge. Creation, simulta-

neous and evolutionary. The theory of Manifestation (*Abhāsavāda*). How to remove appetency. Trinity of Śiva, Śakti and Nara. Pure and impure perception. Everything has life. Mind is an instrument, not the knower.

III TRIKA: A PHILOSOPHY OF WORD AND MEANING

290

Trika Absolute is Unity of word and meaning. Limitation, an aspect of Freedom. Means of knowledge establish only self-evident truths. To understand unity of word and meaning essential for understanding literature. Word is consciousness. Meaning cannot exist without word. All types of reality are verbal. Creation, a projection of Word. Unity of word and meaning explained. *Mantra*, the science of truth. *Aham* as pure Self-consciousness. Consciousness, the universal expression. Meaning is passive, word is active. *Aham* as the noumenal triangle of Creation. Word as creator and destroyer. Superiority of the Sanskrit alphabet. Translation of *mantra* not valuable. Letter, the primary word. *Mantra*, a noumenal ideal creation. Vowels as subjects. Consonants as objects. Letter as focus. The universal states of Word. Pure knowledge. *Bindu* and *Nāda*. Unity of word and meaning, the work of the Absolute, *Parā*. Concept, the universal language. Percept, the basis of concept. The form of pure perception. Concept, divine and human. Empirical verification no test of the truth of a concept. Word, a self-conscious unit. How letter sounds express meaning. Word or sentence is self-consciousness focussed by it. Self-consciousness, the life of letter-sounds, expresses the meaning. Word as divine Concept. Concept divine and worldly. Concept is the highest form of word in the phenomenal

state and the lowest in the noumenal. Self-consciousness, the ultimate form of word. Word and meaning separate in the phenomenal state. The mistake of logical positivists. Unity of word and meaning, the basis of *Rasa-dhvani*. Other ways to study self-consciousness.

IV TRIKA EXPLAINS CREATION

310

The Absolute is the identity of inner dualities. Creation is a concentric manifestation. The Absolute's omniformity. Noumena consist of self-evident realities. The male in the Absolute is passive, the female active. Self-evident realities of the divine world. Creation simultaneous and evolutionary. Limitations of the divine pentad. Unconsciousness is hiding of consciousness. Appetency, the material cause of phenomenal creation. Eternity can be regained by total surrender of one's desires. Space is continuity in the object. Time is continuity in the subject. *Prāṇa*, the first phenomenal expression of self-consciousness. Mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is development of *Prāṇa*. Mind is the universal of sensory and motor organs. Mind as *buddhi*, *ahankāra* and *manas*. Mind as *citta*. Creations of Limitation (*Māyā*). Folds (*kañcukas*) of the limited individual. Impurities (*malas*). *Kalā* and *vidyā*. *Prakṛti*, microcosmic and macrocosmic Appetencies. *Vidyā* and *buddhi*. *Ahankāra* and its evolutes. *Kalā* and *Vidyā*, pure and impure. Importance of literature as a way to overcome limitation

INTERCHAPTER III

326

Vidyā and *Māyā* explain everything. *Citta* and *prāṇa* are overcome in knowing Reality. Insufficiency of the mind. Total attention necessary for knowing Reality. Significance of beauty.

BOOK III

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S CONCEPT OF RASA

I THE THEORY OF RASA

331

Finite and infinite experiences. *Vidyā* and 'philosophic consciousness. Examples of total experience. *Rasa* is experience of a universal. *Rasa* explained and illustrated. Spectator's experience analysed. Poetic experience is total. Housman emphasizes its physical aspect. *Rasa* is spiritual secretion. *Rasa* is free from prejudices and spatio-temporal tags. Hero, the objective correlative of the basic feeling. Feeling and emotions, worldly and poetic. Eliot criticized. Subject and object of poetic experience. Feeling made valuable in poetry. One power behind poetic creation and enjoyment. Universalization. Poetic experience a bilateral affair. *Sahridaya Rasa*, experience of one's own feeling universalized, is free from obstacles. Objective correlatives remove obstacles. Objects subjectized in *Rasa*. Poetry restores mental health.

II THE PRIMARY RASA

347

Rasa as the Absolute. *Śānta Rasa*. Feeling and knowing. The basic feeling (*sthāyī-bhāva*), the object of *Rasa*. The basic feeling and the transient emotions (*vyabhicāri bhāvas*). The psycho-physical expressions (*anubhāvas* or *sāttvika bhāvas*). Aristotle's *ēthē*, *pathē*, and *praxeis* have similar connotations. Objects subjectized and the unpleasant made pleasant in a poetic experience (*Rasa*). Difference in taste constitutional. Everybody cannot enjoy *Rasa*. The basic feeling of *Śānta Rasa*. *Brahmāsvāda* and *Śānta Rasa*. Jagannātha's view criticized. *Śānta Rasa* also can be dramatized.

III THE CONCEPT OF PROPRIETY (*AUCITYA*) AND THE SECONDARY *RASAS* 362

Difference in taste. Poetry is not mental indulgence (*mithyācāra*). Richards' view criticized. Salvation the highest value. Propriety, or *Aucitya*. Impropropriety in poetic experience (*Rasābhāsa*). *Aucitya* and Good Sense. *Rasa* and *Rasābhāsa*. *Aucitya* or *Dharma*. Basic feelings, primary or important. Propriety and Impropropriety. Their significance.

IV OBSTACLES TO THE POETIC EXPERIENCE 378

Rasa, an experience without obstacles, Richards' similar view. Seven obstacles: 1 Improbability. 2 Inability to feel impersonally. 3 Mental preoccupation. 4 Uninteresting style. 5 Lack of histrionic aid. *Vṛttis* and *Pravṛttis* remove obstacles 4 and 5. 6 Neglect of the basic feeling. Bhoja's view criticized. 7 Doubt about the basic feeling portrayed.

V THE SATELLITES OF *RASA* 387

- 1 *Bhāva* and *Rasa*. States of *Bhāva*. *Bhāva* and *Rasa*, the only types of poetic experience.
- 2 *Guṇa*, *Doṣa*, and *Alaṅkāra*, the satellites of *Rasa*, *Guṇa* and *Alaṅkāra*. Only structural figures are ornaments. Coleridge's view. *Guṇa* explained. Milton on poetry. *Guṇa* and Motion. *Guṇa* and *Rasa*. No such distinction in the West, Kinds of *Guṇa*.
- 3 The two styles of writing, plain (*svabhāvokti*) and figurative (*vakrokti*). Bhoja's view criticized.

VI TOWARDS A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF POETRY 399

Rasa and *Bhāva* explained. *Rasa*, a continuous experience. Richards on the poetic experience. Poetic experience, a bilateral business. The poetic circuit.

Wimsatt on a scientific definition of poetry. Richards, Abhinava. Differentia of poetic or aesthetic experience. Examples of Vālmiki and Wordsworth.

VII POETRY AS DHVANI OR SUGGESTION 409

Rasa-dhvani based on the unity of word and meaning. Suggestiveness, the essence of poetic expression, discovered and established in *Dhvanikārikās*, *Dhvanyaloka* and *Locana*. The powers of word. Five meanings of *Dhvani*. *Vastu-dhvani*, *Alaṅkāra-dhvani*, and *Rasa-dhvani*. The ladder of poetic experience. *Rasa*, experience of unity in multitude, the soul of poetry.

VIII CLASSIFICATION OF POETRY 424

The predominant charming factor, the principle of classification. *Vyaṅgya* and *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*. *Vastu*, *Alaṅkāra*, and *Rasa*. *Dhvani*, the poetic essence. *Citra*. Sanskrit poetics comprehensive. Feelings and emotions the permanent stock of poetry.

IX A RESUME 431

Rasa-dhvani, *Rasa* and *Bhāva*. *Vastu-dhvani*, and *Alaṅkāra-dhvani*. *Vyaṅgya* and *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*.

INTERCHAPTE R IV 435

Śāstra and *Kāvya*. Subject and object, the opposites to be reconciled in poetry (*Kāvya*). Experience, ordinary and poetic. *Rasa*, the key concept in Sanskrit poetics. Poetry and the aim of education. *Cit*, *Ānanda* and *Rasa*. Importance of total attention. The poetic process. *Guṇa* and *Katharsis*. *Rasa* and *Guṇa*. Abhinava, the first to explain poetry satisfactorily. Poetic and aesthetic experience. Inconsistencies in Richards. Philosophy and poetry. The materialistic theory of poetry has to be inferential. The idealistic theory explains it better. The literary education total. *Śānta Rasa*.

BOOK IV

A COMPARISON

I PURE PERCEPTION AND THE PRIME PERCEIVER 445

Abhinava and Coleridge. The theory of Imagination criticized. Ideas, noumenal and empirical. Total perception. Perception through mind and *Sad-vidyā*. Mind is not the knower. Perception of universals cannot be ignored. Ordinary perception conceptual. No vital difference between *Trika* and *Vedānta*. True perception defined. *Mantra* explained. The Absolute declares its existence through all objects. True realism can be explained only ideally. Abhinava gives details of perceptive reality. *Nirvikalpaka* and *Savikalpaka* explain perception better than Coleridgean Imagination. The theory of Imagination criticized,

II MIND : A MATERIAL INSTRUMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 460

Coleridge does not explain how mental faculties are derived from the Absolute Self-consciousness. Duplication in Coleridge's system. Other reasons for rejecting the intermediate faculty of Imagination. Difference among Coleridge's interpreters due to Coleridge's own mistake. The theory of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* more reasonable. The Indian concept of mind. Knowing is the repetition of *Sadvidyā*. Knowing through mind. Total attention, secret of overcoming limitation. The Indian concept of mind better than Coleridge's.

III POTENTIAL UNIVERSALS AND MANIFESTED PARTICULARS

466

Noumena, the key to phenomena. Both are products of imagination (*Kalpanā*). Coleridge's agreement with *Abhāsavāda*. Reality is verbal. Changes in the nature of word responsible for different forms of reality. Continuity and individuation, the two poles of manifestation. Pure consciousness, the stuff of noumena. Hierarchy in the divine pentad (*Brahmapañcaka*). How to overcome Limitation (*Māyā*). Fallacy in empirical perception and conception. Self-development a better explanation of creation than causality. Subject, not the object, the true referent in verification of perception. Total attention to a concept the secret of overcoming limitation. Attention, the measure of a percept or a concept. Unity of impression and *Śānta Rasa*. Simultaneous experience of psychic sleep and spiritual awakening. Three types of experience. The secret of poetic delight, mental purity and perfect action. Total self-consciousness the key to genius. Coleridge's phrase 'unconscious activity' criticized. Abhinava explains the folds of mind; Coleridge does not explain. *Trika* philosophy a great help in reconstructing Coleridge's philosophy.

IV REALITY IS VERBAL AT EVERY STAGE

484

Coleridge's concept of word found in a more developed form in *Trika*. Verbal nature of reality explained. The universal language of consciousness. The superiority of the Sanskrit alphabet. Letter, the primary word. Logical positivism is wrong. Poetic truth. The universe is only a conceptual reality.

V RASA IS FEELING IMPREGNATED WITH REASON 489

Truth defined. Scientific truth inferior to poetic truth. Poetic experience explained best as *Rasa*. Reason, the prime perceiver. Coleridge's weak points. Abhinava's superior analysis. The noumenal, the phenomenal, and the poetic. The relation of word with meaning in poetry. *Guṇa* a better concept than *Katharsis*. Literary education. Stability of feeling essential for poetic experience. The relative importance of the basic feelings. Poetic faith. *Rasa*.

VI VALUES IN POETRY 506

Poetry transforms life. Abhinava's analysis. Feelings, emotions, and objects, poetic and ordinary. Poetic truth. Aurobindo's theory of poetry as *mantra*, and *Rasa*. Aurobindo and Richards. Universal self-consciousness alone can hold consciousness and unconsciousness together. Richards' partial acceptance of Coleridge's view unjustified. Richards' 'standard' poetic experience and 'universal' poetic experience of Coleridge and Abhinava. Mental balance and *Śānta Rasa*. *Mantra* and poetry distinguished. Poetry both material and spiritual.

VII TRAGEDY AND RASA 524

Richards on Tragedy and Imagination. Coleridge's view. Richards criticized. Tragedy teaches morality negatively; *Rasa*, positively. Poetry is one despite different genres. *Rasa* and Tragedy compared and contrasted. *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Hamlet*. Sen Gupta's analysis criticized. *Rasa* is poetry of ideal living. *Guṇībhūta-vaṅgya*. *Śānta Rasa*. How poetry betters life.

VIII THE MEASURE AND SUBDIVISIONS OF POETRY

538

Poetry, true (Imaginative, *Dhvani*, *Vyāṅgya*) and false (Fanciful, *Citra*). Further classification by Indian critics. Subdivisions of *Vyāṅgya*. *Guṇībhūṭavyāṅgya*. *Citra*. The superiority of the Indian theory.

IX CONCLUSION

542

Body and soul of Poetry. *Rasa* or 'Passion' is feeling impregnated with Reason. Worldly emotion and poetic passion. The process of purification (*Kathārsis* or *Prasāda*) of mind, melting (*druti*) or blazing (*dīpti*). Poetic experience is inferior to purely spiritual experience. Abhinava's explanation of the intermediate nature of poetic experience more correct. *Guṇa* explains mental purification better than *Kathārsis*. Cathartic and poetic experience distinguished. The meaning of 'heart'. Pure and impure feeling and knowing. *Brahma*, *Śiva*, and *Rasa*. The body of Poetry. Coleridge's idea of the poetic word. Empson's theory of Ambiguity and its weakness. Superiority of the *Dhvani* theory. *Svabhāvokti* and *Vakrokti*. Schools of *Rīti* and *Vakrokti* criticized. Coleridge and Abhinava are kindred souls. Difference between the Western learning and Indology. Abhinava is the greatest literary critic of the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

557

INDEX

565

Atrārūḍhadhiyām pramāṇa-mahimā viśvādvayoddāmito
Bhātīti svayameva satyahṛdayā jñāsyanti kiṁ ślāghitaiḥ.

Abhinavagupta, *Mālinīvijayavārtika*, II 332

“.....I bring the Results of a life of intense study and
unremitted Meditation....”

S. T. Coleridge, *Letter* 731

INTRODUCTION

Is it not arbitrary to compare Coleridge with Abhinavagupta, Imagination with *Rasa*? I begin by answering this preliminary question.

One hears of Coleridge as a critic and takes up his *Biographia Literaria*, his most easily available work, gets the term Imagination and seizes it as the Coleridgean discovery. The long introductory chapters and the cryptic summary disposal of the main thesis, however, make the reader dissatisfied, and in vain does he hunt for a full-fledged discussion of the subject in his *Shakespearean Criticism*, *Miscellaneous Criticism*, *The Friend*, the *Philosophical Lectures*, or the *Notebooks*, that are not yet completely published. *Letters* only tell us that Coleridge yearned to write his *magnum opus* in a comprehensive way under the title 'Logosophia', but did not write it. His interest gradually shifted to the science of method and a correct theory of knowledge¹.

Coleridge was fond of raising fundamental questions². Already in 1801 he had formulated his opinions about "the affinities of the Feelings with Words and Ideas" and thought of writing his book "under the title of 'concerning poetry & the nature of the pleasures derived from it'".

He stated with confidence: "I have faith, that I do understand the subject, and I am sure, that if I write what I ought to

1. See J. A. Appleyard : *Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature*, pp. 155-6.
2. Among numerous references to be found almost everywhere in his writings we may note one, namely, Letter 1125, *Collected Letters*, IV, 847-8.

do on it, the work would supersede all the Books of Metaphysics hitherto written and all the Books of Morals too."³ In 1815, Coleridge wrote: "The *Autobiography* I regard as the main work...because it will be an important pioneer to the great work on the *Logos*, Divine and Human, on which I have set my heart and hope to ground my ultimate reputation."⁴ The great sorrow of Coleridge's life was that he was unable to write this great work owing to either anxieties⁵ or indolent nature.⁶ None the less, Coleridge stated his main thesis, the foundation, on which he was to build a superstructure.⁷ According to Coleridge himself, his best essays on his philosophic standpoint are his essays in the third volume of

3. Letter 378, dated 3 Feb. 1801, to Humphry Davy, *C. L.*, II, 671.
4. Letter 974 dated 17 Sept. 1815 to J. M. Gutch, *C. L.*, IV, 585.
5. "I have now but one sorrow relative to the ill success of my literary Toils (and Toils they have been, tho' not undelightful Toils) and this arises wholly from the almost insurmountable difficulties which the anxieties of The To Day oppose to my completion of the Great Work, the form and materials of which it has been the employment of the best and most genial Hours of my last twenty years to mature and collect." Letter 1155. *C. L.*, IV, 889.
6. Letter 1208 to J. H. B. William, 20 Oct. 1819, "...a certain Indolence of Nature must subtract two-thirds from the praise that my philosophy might claim". In Letter 1055 to Thomas Curtis, 29 April 1817, Coleridge says: "For such is my *nature*, i.e., that which from complex causes, partly constitutional, partly inflicted or acquired *ab extra*—to my own unhappiness and detriment—that I can do nothing well by *effort*. Hence it is that I often converse better than I can compose; and hence too it is that a collection of my letters written before my mind was so much oppressed would, in the opinion of all who have ever seen any number of them, be thrice the value of my set publications". *C. L.*, IV, 728.
7. Cp. Letter 783, 9 Oct. 1809: "...it is essential to my plan, that I should first lay the *foundations* well, but the merit of a foundation is it's depth and solidity—the ornaments and conveniences, the pictures, and gilding, and stucco-work, the Sunshine and the sunshiny Prospects will come with the superstructure, if it be the will of Providence that I should live and possess the means of carrying the work forward". *C. L.*, III, 237.

*The Friend*⁸. But the "Chapter of Requests" in the *Biographia* corrected in accordance with the suggestions given in Letter 1145⁹ may be taken as a useful starting point. The one advantage of the theses in the *Biographia* is that they have not been written in the diffuse popular style, against which Muirhead complains.¹⁰

Coleridge calls his "system" "the Doctrine of Life".¹¹ From his philosophic standpoint he explains all aspects of life and nature,¹² literature and religion.¹³ Quite early in his

8. In Letter 1152 to Derwent Coleridge of late Nov. 1818, Coleridge refers to his eleven essays in the third volume of *The Friend*, three on morals and religion and eight on method, and says that they "in point of value...outweigh all my other works, verse or prose". *C. L.*, IV, 885 and footnote 1.
9. Coleridge said in a *Table Talk*: "The metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume...is unformed and immature; —it contains fragments of the truth, but it is not fully thought out". (28 June 1834), Fn. 2, Letter 1145, *C. L.*, IV, 874. He suggested improvement in this letter.
10. "The difficulty (in presenting Coleridge's 'far more coherent body of philosophical thought than he has been anywhere credited with') consisted not merely in the wide diffusion of the sources from which, in his published works, his philosophical opinions had to be gathered, but in the popular character of the writings in which the more explicit statements of them were contained." Muirhead: *Coleridge as Philosopher*, Preface, p. 15.
11. "I cherish, I must confess, a *pet* system, a bye blow of my own Philosophizing; but it is so unlike to all the opinions and modes of reasoning grounded on the atomic, Corpuscular and mechanic Philosophy, which is alone tolerated in the present day, and which since the time of Newton has been universally taken as synonymous with Philosophy itself—that I must content myself with caressing the heretical Brat in private—under the name of the Zoodynamic Method—or the Doctrine of *Life*." Letter 1205 to the Editor of 'Blackwood's Magazine'. Oct. 1819, *C. L.*, IV, 956.
12. "...the whole process is cyclical tho' progressive, and the Man separates from Nature only that Nature may be found again in the higher dignity in the Man. For as the Ideal is realised in Nature, so is the Real idealised in man." Letter 1077 of Sept. 1817 to C. A. Tulk, *C. L.*, IV, 769.
13. Letter 956, dated March 7, 815, to Joseph Cottle, and 388, dated March 28, 1801, to Poole.

life he formed his idea about Life and made it the key to his philosophy. In his twenty-fifth year he tells us: "On the whole, I have rather made up my mind that I am a mere apparition—a naked spirit. And that Life is I myself I which is a mighty clear account of it."¹⁴

This standpoint is so similar to that of Abhinavagupta, the greatest critic of India, that one acquainted with both these critics is tempted to compare them. Such a comparison of the two great philosophical critics of the East and the West is pregnant with far-reaching consequences for mutual understanding and improvement.

But there are critics who are avowed enemies to philosophical criticism. We may easily ignore them who¹⁵ poohpooched the metaphysical disquisitions of Coleridge. We quote here the remarks of two important critics. T. S. Eliot says:

14. Letter 170 of 31 December 1796 to John Thelwall, where after refuting many accounts of life by other writers, Coleridge makes this statement. *C. L. I*, 295.
15. F. L. Lucas and Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, for example. F. L. Lucas says: "Coleridge's whole theory seems to me an example of that barren type of classification so dear to those who believe that if they can invent a few transcendental pigeon-holes the Holy Spirit of poetry will descend to nest in them". *The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal*, p. 180. Quiller-Couch speaks of the "ludicrous dilatoriness" (p. XXIII) of the *B. L.* "The *Bio. Lit.*", says Mr. Arthur Symonds (Introduction in Everyman's Library) "is the greatest book of criticism in English, and one of the most annoying books in any language". It annoys, of course mainly by its disconnectedness, to which Coleridge himself pleaded guilty by calling it an "immethodical miscellany" (p. XXXIV). Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch thinks that "next to spring hats and parlour games, systems of philosophy are perhaps the most fugacious of all human toys" (Introduction to George Sampson's edition of *Biographia Literaria*, chapters I-IV, XIV-XXII, and Wordsworth's Prefaces and Essays on Poetry, 1800-1815, Cambridge, 1930, p. XXXI). He has been severely criticised by I. A. Richards for that. See *Coleridge on Imagination*, 3rd edition. pp. 8-9. George Sampson excludes chapters five to thirteen of the *Biographia Literaria* from his edition as he considers them unnecessary.

"He established the relevance of philosophy, æsthetics, and psychology; and once Coleridge had introduced these disciplines into literary criticism, further critics could ignore them only at their own risk".¹⁶ I. A. Richards is more emphatic: "What has been done by people who have found themselves discussing Coleridge has been, usually I think, to put a ring-fence round a very small part of his thought, and say, 'We will keep inside this and leave the transcendental and analytic discussions to someone else'. But this practice results in what is essentially a fraud. The thought so fenced off ceases to be Coleridge's and becomes something much less interesting."

But even the interpreters who took him as a whole instead of taking him in a conveniently selected part of his thinking hardly do him full justice.

Take Richards himself. He says: "I propose here to take all the parts of Coleridge's thinking that seem to me relevant to his criticism and to treat them as an exercise ground for interpretation", for "Coleridge's great merit as a critic—a merit unique among English critics—is the strenuous persistence with which he reflected philosophically upon criticism".¹⁷ But the conclusion the learned doctor comes to is not so flattering to Coleridge. Here is Richards' judgment:

"Coleridge was not, I suppose, a good philosopher; he made too many mistakes *of the wrong kind*. He mixed with his philosophy too many things which did not belong to it; he let accidental and inessential prejudices interfere too much. In spite of them he took the psychology of the theory of poetry to a new level. For causes whose force will be experienced by anyone who follows Coleridge with any closeness he could not help adding into and developing again out of this relevant psychology a huge ill-assorted fabric of philosophic and theological beliefs which is not, I think, a relevant part of it. But it is, as I see it, an elaborated, transformed *symbol* of some

16. "The Frontiers of Criticism", *English Critical Essays*, 20th Century, 2nd series, ed. by Derek Hudson, p. 35.

17. *Coleridge on Imagination*, 3rd ed., p. 5.

parts of the psychology. And here is the modern reader's difficulty with Coleridge; that neither as theology (supposing him to admit such a subject as more than a study of symbolisms) nor as symbol, is this fabric satisfactory, or even intelligible, to him. Coleridge constantly presents it as though it were the matrix out of which he obtained his critical theories. But the critical theories can be obtained from the psychology without initial complication with the philosophical matter. They can be given all the powers Coleridge found for them, without the use either literally, or symbolically, of the other doctrines. The psychology, and the metaphysics (and theology) are independent. For Coleridge's own thought, they were not; they probably could not be; to a later reader they may, and, as a rule, will be."¹⁸ He accounts for the mixture of this irrelevant matter and complexity in Coleridge's thought on the basis of "special historical circumstances, temporary local conditions". Most probably he has in his mind the Hartley-to-Kant progress of Coleridge's thought, which provoked Miss Coburn's "quarrelling".¹⁹

I do not say that Coleridge made no mistakes. Indeed one of the reasons for my comparing him with Abhinavagupta is to show the limitations of Coleridge. But to say that Coleridge was a great critic because "he reflected philosophically upon criticism" and conclude that he made "too many mistakes" as a philosopher and that his philosophy is "irrelevant" to criticism is to take away by the left hand what is given by the right. It is certainly not a sincere praise.

The reason for Richards' conclusion is not far to seek. It lies in Richards' standpoint, which is totally different from Coleridge's standpoint. Coleridge divided mankind between Aristotelians and Platonists; Mill, between Benthamites and Coleridgeans; and Richards, between Materialists and Idealists. Richards remarks: "It may be argued that these two opposite-seeming types of outlook are complementary to

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

19. Miss Kathleen Coburn's Foreward to *Coleridge on Imagination*.

one another: that in the history of thought they have been dependent upon one another so that the death of one would lead by inanition to the death of the other; that as expiration is only one phase in breathing so the two philosophies in their endless antagonism are a necessary conjoint self-critical process. But since to hold neither is to have no view to offer, exposition requires a temporary choice between them. I write then as a Materialist trying to interpret before you the utterances of an extreme Idealist and you, whatever you be by birth or training, Aristotelian or Platonist, Benthamite or Coleridgean, Materialist or Idealist, have to reinterpret my remarks again in your turn".²⁰

But reading Richards' materialistic interpretation of Coleridge's theory we fail to appreciate the Coleridgean standpoint. We hardly get a satisfactory answer to the question, why Imagination is the soul of poetry. Richards states²¹ that Imagination without permanent passions is of little use for poetry. Richards developed his psychological theory of poetry without the aid of the Coleridgean Imagination. He utilises the idea of the reconciliation of opposites, a characteristic of the Coleridgean Imagination, for his theory of poetry as a combination of conflicting impulses in a stable poise.^{21a} But he does not accept the metaphysical foundation of Imagination as the prime agent of all human perception. By making such a use of Coleridge, Richards has emasculated the Coleridgean discovery. D. G. James has taken him to severe task for doing so.²² Richards' psychological theory of poetry can hardly explain why or how conflicting impulses are balanced in poetry.²³ We are

20. *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 19.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

21a. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 243.

22. *Scepticism and Poetry*, Ch. 2, "A Denial of the Prime Agent".

23. D. G. James is rather too severe in his criticism of this aspect of Richards' theory. "The whole regard of this aesthetic is away from the object to its results; his concern is not with the beholdment of an object but with the trains of results set up by the 'stimulus'. Hence

not concerned here with Richards' own theory, but we justifiably hesitate to accept Richards' explanation of the Coleridgean theory after his proclaimed bias and denigration of the Coleridgean philosophy as a whole. Miss Coburn points out Richards' mistake regarding Coleridge's progress of thought from Hartley to Kant—a mistake to which even Richards' critic, D. G. James, falls a prey.

D. G. James hardly differentiates Coleridge from Kant. Kant showed the limits of human knowledge and thought that the ultimate reality, the thing-in-itself, could never be known. This view, as we shall see later, Coleridge discarded. Hence the result of a Kantian interpretation of Coleridge has been that Coleridge's "great optimistic, organic dynamic view of poetry", as Miss Coburn aptly describes it,²⁴ has been turned into a sceptical view of poetry. James ends his exposition of Coleridge's view of poetry with the following remarks :

"But if science is unable to solve for us the problem of life, we have also to remember that poetic imagination cannot hope to shake itself free of scepticism. I have argued that it is impossible to claim that the imagination can give us what can be known for truth, or what may, in all strictness, be called knowledge".²⁵

Mr. Richards' love of poetry may be said to be of the cupboard variety ; it is a means to an experience which is valuable for life. And his interest in poetry is therefore but an interest in one particular means by which such 'experiences' can be produced, for presumably a 'balance and reconciliation of impulses', such as great poetry is said to afford, might conceivably be produced by a harmless drug, in which case poetry and drugs are alike stimuli productive of valuable experiences such as it is the business of the critic apparently to judge. Accordingly what has happened in Mr. Richards' aesthetic is that poetry has simply fallen out of it, and it has become one stimulus among many which can produce desirable results. The qualifications for a poetry-critic and a drug-critic would be on Mr. Richards' showing identical..." *Ibid.*, p. 57.

24. *Op. cit.*, p. XIX.

25. *Op., cit.*, p. 273.

I will show that this is a wrong interpretation of Coleridge, who was as much an idealist as a realist.

Herbert Read's interpretation of Coleridge as an existentialist does not note the subtle difference between the existentialists and Coleridge. The fundamental position of the existentialists is that there is first pure Existence and anything can be attributed to it only later on; that Being is primary and knowing is secondary. The first postulate of Coleridge is self-consciousness, which is simultaneously the ultimate ground of both knowledge and existence. He thinks of nothing prior to it as existent.²⁶ Moreover, there is much difference among existentialists themselves. Some like Jespers and Gabriel Marcel are religious, others like Jean Paul Sartre and Heidegger are atheists. Consequently, interpreting Coleridge in the terms of Sartre or Kierkegaard will have the same fate as interpreting him in the terms of Kant. We can detect such a mistake very easily in Herbert Read's interpretation of Coleridge. While he begins by saying that "one of my main objects is to defend the philosopher in Coleridge", though he accepts his incapacity "to defend Coleridge's philosophy as such",²⁷ he concludes his essay with the remarks that Coleridge like Kierkegaard "had a horror of any kind of self-consistent system".²⁸ As a matter of fact, Coleridge understood "philosophy in its highest sense as the science of ultimate truths"²⁹ and said: "It is the essential mark of the true philosopher to rest satisfied with no imperfect light as long as the impossibility of attaining a fuller knowledge has not been demonstrated".³⁰ Coleridge believed against Kant that Reality could be known and the mystery of existence and

26. "The transcendental philosopher does not inquire, what ultimate ground of our knowledge there may be out of our knowing, but what is the last in our knowing itself, beyond which we cannot pass."

B. L., I, 186.

27. 'Coleridge as Critic' in *The True Voice of Feeling*, p. 160.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

29. *B. L.*, I, 163.

30. *Ibid.*, I, 167.

knowledge could be unravelled. He struggled throughout his life to unravel this mystery and succeeded. He did believe in a system and spoke of it. But he could not get the "auspicious moment"³¹ for writing his whole philosophy, for fully explaining his system.

One of the reasons why I compare Coleridge with Abhinavagupta is that Abhinava wrote his philosophy completely and on its basis explained poetry. He did it some eight hundred years before Coleridge and his German teachers.³² Abhinavagupta's philosophical standpoint is so similar to Coleridge's that often it becomes difficult to distinguish between the two. Abhinava's greatness as a critic is hardly surpassed by any other Indian critic, and the eulogy may be extended beyond India's frontiers. An attempt is here made to justify this remark by comparing him with Coleridge.

Moreover, by making such a comparison, I make Sanskrit poetics intelligible to Western scholars. India's contribution to poetics is still unacknowledged by the West. And what may be the probable reason except their ignorance of Sanskrit poetics? To present it in the Western idiom of thought is the most important task before the Indian critics today; and no method better than the comparative may be thought of for the purpose.

II

Such a comparative study as mine has also the sanction of renowned critics. T.S. Eliot says in his essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent": "No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and

31. Herbert Read, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

32. For Abhinavagupta's biography see K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta : An Historical and Philosophical Study*.

artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him for contrast and comparison among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism".^{32a} "Whatever the difficulties into which a conception of universal literary history may run", writes Rene Wellek in his *Theory of Literature* (p. 49), "it is important to think of literature as a totality and to trace the growth and development of literature without regard to linguistic distinctions. The great argument for 'comparative' or 'general' literature or just 'literature' is the obvious falsity of the idea of a self-enclosed national literature". He adds: "Literary history as a synthesis, literary history on a super-national scale, will have to be written again. The study of comparative literature in this sense will make high demands on the linguistic proficiencies of our scholars. It asks for a widening of perspectives, a suppression of local and provincial sentiments, not easy to achieve. Yet literature is one, as art and humanity are one; and in this conception lies the future of historical literary studies". (p.50).

These remarks of two important critics of our age show that a comparative study of the Eastern and the Western poetics is the need of the hour. It cannot be looked down upon as a merely pedantic endeavour. As a simultaneous discussion of many critics may not be helpful for a clear understanding of the points of comparison and contrast. I have chosen the two critics who are of like minds and are, at the same time, very able representatives of their traditions. Other critics that have been brought in have not been given the same prominence in the discussions.

It is neither possible nor desirable to present Sanskrit poetics in its details in such a comparative essay as the present one, for that will blur the common points. I, therefore, will lay stress on the fundamentals alone. Nothing, however, will be twisted to suit the comparison. To guard against such a temptation I have chosen to compare and contrast the

32a. *Selected Prose* ed. by John Hayward, Penguin Books, p. 23.

views of the two writers only after presenting them separately. A few common points may, however, be stated at the outset to hold the reader's attention to the subject.

III

Coleridge and Abhinavagupta are not for nothing the greatest critics of their respective countries. It is not a matter of chance that they have a common standpoint in metaphysics and poetics. It is my contention that a correct theory of poetry must have a correct philosophical standpoint. These two writers of the East and the West have it, and hence are so great. It will be a wrong assumption that poetics may have any type of metaphysical basis,³³ or may be explained without any metaphysical basis at all.^{33a} Truth is one, though it may be explained in different ways. But an explanation may be acceptable only if it is faithful both to the fact to be explained and to the standpoint accepted for explanation. Any torturing of fact or shifting of the accepted standpoint makes the explanation worthless. The difficulty about poetry is that it is something ideal. But there have been Lockean and Platonic explanations of ideas. And all the trouble arises on account of there being equally strong protagonists of these two views. Poetry also seems to be ideal in both the senses. We shall see that Coleridge is conscious of the superiority of his philosophy of poetry³⁴ and so is the Trika philosopher of that of his own.³⁵

33. One of the most difficult problems in literary appreciation is the variability of taste based on the relativity of criteria of truth and relevance, says Richard McKeon in "The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism", *Critics and Criticism*, abridged, p. 194.

33a. As I. A. Richards suggests in *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 11 :

"But the critical theories can be obtained from the psychology without initial complication with the philosophical matter".

34. Letter 378 quoted before.

35. See *Pratyabhijñā-Hṛdaya*, pp. 16-20, where Kṣemarāja, a student of Abhinavagupta (p. 54), compares other philosophies with the Trika and shows its superiority.

Coleridge's philosophical standpoint will be analysed in detail in the ensuing chapters. What I wish to state here at the outset is that he thought that the true key to the mystery of the universe lay in a correct theory of knowledge or perception; that first and foremost we must explain how mind and matter, apparently heterogeneous, could have any meeting point. He learnt from the philosophers of the Ionic school, that is, of Thales, that "there is no action but from like on like, that no substances or beings essentially dissimilar could possibly be made sensible of each other's existence or in any way act thereon." Thus he came to realise the essential "sameness of the conceiver and the conception, of the idea and the law corresponding to the idea."³⁶ He was enamoured of Pythagoras because he "supposed"³⁷ that what in *men* the ideas were, as we should say, those in the *world* were the laws; that the ideas partook according to the power of the man, of a constitutive character, in the same manner as the laws did in external nature."³⁸ Coleridge was fond of Plato and Bacon because they stated the same truth from two different standpoints. "Plato...often denominates Ideas living Laws in and by which the mind has its whole being and permanence;...Bacon, *vice versa*, names the Laws of Nature, Ideas."³⁹ Coleridge thought that Bacon did for the natural philosophy what Plato had done for the spiritual philosophy. It is on the essential unity of the subject and the object that Coleridge based his theory of Esemplastic Imagination, which is primarily a theory of perception, of a meeting of subject and object.

The Indian theory of *Pratibhijñā* or Recognition is based similarly on the essential unity of subject and object.⁴⁰ All kinds of knowledge are of the nature of recognition, for if

36. *Philosophical Lectures*, p. 114.

37. Coleridge so supposed, Miss Coburn suggests in Note 45 to Lect. II, *P. L.*, p. 403.

38. *P. L.*, pp. 107-8.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

40. See Book II, ch. 2.

subject and object are essentially identical and united at a primary timeless stage, all perceptions are bound to be recognitions.⁴¹

I do not suggest that Coleridge borrowed the idea from Abhinavagupta, though there is every likelihood that the basic idea of the impossibility of a union of totally different things was taken to Greece by Pythagoras from India. Pythagoras, whom Coleridge gives the credit of being the first philosopher on account of his realisation of the essential unity of mind and matter, subject and object, had really come to India as Coleridge himself says.⁴² There is every likelihood that Pythagoras learnt the essentials of this old Śākta philosophy in India. The idea of the essential unity of subject and object is not the discovery of Abhinavagupta. It belongs to the Āgama literature of the hoary past.^{42a}

There is an illuminating paragraph in Jawaharlal Nehru's *Discovery of India* (pp. 160-61) about the contact between Greece and India in the ancient times.

"Greece and India were in contact with each other from the earliest recorded times, and in a later period there were close contacts between India and Hellenized Western Asia. The great astronomical observatory at Ujjayini (now Ujjain) in Central India was linked with Alexandria in Egypt. During this long period of contact there must have been many exchanges in the world of thought and culture between these two ancient civilizations. There is a tradition recorded in some Greek book that learned Indians visited Socrates and put questions to him. Pythagoras was particularly influenced by Indian philosophy and Professor H.G. Rawlinson remarks that 'almost all the theories, religious, philosophical, and mathematical, taught by the Pythagorians, were known in India in the sixth century B.C. A European classical scholar, Urwick, has based his interpretation of the 'Repub-

41. *Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsinī*, I, pp. 1-44.

42. P. L., Lect. 2, p. 101.

42a. See *History of Philosophy ; Eastern and Western*, pp. 393-4, 401-2.

lic' of Plato upon Indian thought.⁴³ Gnosticism is supposed to be a definite attempt to fuse together Greek Platonic and Indian elements. The philosopher, Apollonius of Tyna, probably visited the University of Taxila in north-west India about the beginning of the Christian era."

Nehru quotes Professor Taru: "Considered broadly, what the Asiatic took from the Greek were usually externals only, matters of form; he rarely took the substance—civic institutions may have been an exception—and never spirit. For in matters of spirit Asia was quite confident that she could outstay the Greeks, and she did". Again: "Indian civilization was strong enough to hold its own against Greek civilization, but except in the religious sphere, was seemingly not strong enough to influence it as Babylonia did; nevertheless, we may find reason for thinking that in certain respects India was the dominant partner."

Greece influenced Coleridge more than Germany. Coleridge is more a Platonist than a Kantian. Abhinavagupta lived in the latter half of the tenth century A.D.^{43a} William Jones, Henry Thomas Cole-Brooke and others did a lot to make Sanskrit literature available to the English readers in the last decade of the 18th century. Cole-Brooke wrote "essays on philosophy and religious life, on grammar, astronomy, and the arithmetic of the Indians". He "amassed an exceedingly diversified collection of Indian manuscripts", which he presented to the East India Company. William Jones translated Kālidāsa's lyric poem, *Ṛtusamhāra*, in 1792. In 1794 appeared the translation of *Manusmṛti* under the title, "Institutes of Hindu Law or the Ordinance of Manu".⁴⁴ Coleridge read the

43. Zimmern in his 'The Greek Commonwealth' refers to Urwick's book, 'The Message of Plato' (1920)—Nehru's footnote.

43a. K. C. Pande in *Abhinavagupta, An Historical and Philosophical Study* says that Abhinava "was born between 950 and 960 A. D." (p. 8) and that his "last available dated work was completed in 1014-15 A. D." (p. 144).

44. See *A History of Indian Literature* by M. Winternitz, Introduction.

latter work,⁴⁴ as also a translation of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.⁴⁵ Though he was a voracious reader and read so much of Sanskrit literature and philosophy through translations or reports that he was compelled to remark that "In Egypt, Palestine, Greece and India, the analysis of the mind had reached its noon and manhood while experimental research was still in its dawn and infancy",⁴⁶ yet it can be safely said that he had no grasp of any branch of the Hindu philosophy. His disparagement of Indians in general and Brahmans in particular shows his ignorance of their greatness as thinkers. "There is in almost all the Sanskrit philosophical and religious writings as far as they have fallen under my notice a character which, it seems to me, might be plausibly accounted for on the supposition of childish intellects living among gigantic objects, of mean thoughts and huge things—living Lilliputs among inanimate Brobdingnags". Thus he wrote of the Brahmans of India. The reasons he adduces for his opinion clearly show that he did not understand the Brahmanical thought. He remarks: "Thus their Pantheism or visible God, God, proved to them, not from, but in and by the evidence of their senses, taken in conjunction with the languor of a relaxing climate and the lulling influence of a deep, sombre and gigantic vegetation, seems to me a natural result of an imbecile understanding producing indistinction half from indolence and half intentionally by a partial closure of the eyelids, and when all hues and outlines melt into a garish mist deeming it unity".⁴⁷

Coleridge passed these unjust remarks on the practice of Yoga as advocated in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.⁴⁸ The present essay will amply vindicate the Brahmanic standpoint. On the basis

44a. Letter 152, C. L., I, 252.

45. P. L., pp. 127-9.

46. B. L., I, 66.

47. Extract from the Huntington manuscript published as Appendix C in *Coleridge as Philosopher* (p. 283). Prof. Muirhead says that the discussion of Brahmanism came as an attempt to explain the existence and attributes of God on the ground of direct intuition. (p. 269).

48. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, ch. VI, verses. 11-14.

of his ignorance of the Sanskrit language and the Brahmanic philosophy betrayed in his wrong judgments and poor opinions, one can be sure that Coleridge learnt nothing from the Hindu philosophy. His philosophic standpoint was a result of his study of the Western thinkers, especially those of Greece and Germany, though he read every writer who fell within his ken. To this vast study, as is shown by his *Notebooks* and *Letters*, he brought a freshness of outlook by his own deep meditation, by his love of nature and sense of beauty in forms and sounds.⁴⁹ I do not intend to go into the details of the question of Coleridge's supposed plagiarism.⁵⁰ He has been amply defended by able critics.⁵¹ I only wish to draw the reader's attention to Coleridge's own view on the subject.

Coleridge radically discusses it in a letter. He divides minds into two classes; calls them by metaphorical names of Springs and Tanks; suggests that the latter can hardly gain by theft, while the former do not need it; and that "several persons, and these too persons of education and liberal minds, at several times, and without any knowledge of each other's opinions, have been struck with this general resemblance and have expressed themselves more or less strongly on the subject". He gave his verdict that "He who can catch the Spirit of an original, has it already."⁵² Coleridge's studies only confirmed what he had already felt without the aid of others.^{52a} He was a very serious student of Kant and learnt from him his characteristic method "to treat every subject in reference to the operation of the mental faculties, to which it specially appertains and to commence by the cautious dis-

49. *B. L.*, I, 10.

50. Rene Wellek in his *History of Modern Literary Criticism* tries to show that Coleridge borrowed almost every idea from the German Philosophers, esp. Schelling.

51. J. Shawcross in his Introduction to *Biographia Literaria*, Miss Kathleen Coburn in her Introduction to Coleridge's *Philosophical Lectures*, I. A. Richards in *Coleridge on Imagination*, and Herbert Read in *Coleridge as Critic* have ably defended Coleridge.

52. Letter 845, *C. L.*, III, 358, 361.

52a See *A. P.*, p. 106.

crimination of what is essential, i. e. explicable by mere consideration of the Faculties in themselves, from what is empirical, i. e., the modifying or disturbing Forces of Time, Place and Circumstances.”⁵³ And with this mental discipline, Coleridge independently came to his conclusions. The question of plagiarism [whether of German, Greek or Indian origin is irrelevant.

IV

“He was a semasiologist aware as few have been, that to ask about the meanings and words is to ask about everything. And I am assuming that his contributions towards this obscure, neglected, yet most central incipient science of the future are as important as he took them to be.” I.A. Richards says this about Coleridge.⁵⁴ Coleridge says: “Few and unimportant would the errors of men be, if they did but know, first what they themselves mean: and secondly, what the *words* mean by which they attempt to convey their meaning.”⁵⁵ He was very careful in his use of words, desynonymised many of them and coined new ones in order to convey his ideas clearly. He thought of universal grammar and logic. He thinks of a whole and deduces all logic and grammar from that whole. He asks us to “conceive the indistinguishable all of our Perceptions, Conceptions and Notions as a vast Common.” In that vast common he thought of the essential unity of language and thought; of thought and thing. “To think,” he says, “is to thingify,” for “to think absolutely or indefinitely is impossible, for a finite mind at least.”⁵⁶

53. Letter 845, *C. L.*, III, 360.

54. Preface to *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. XI-XII.

55. Letter 1155, *C. L.*, IV, 889.

56. Letter 1152. Abhinavagupta had the same opinion. See *Īśvarapraty-abhijñā-vivṛti vimarśinī*, II, 173 :
 Parāmarśo hi vikalpah. Na ca śuddha-saṁvedana-rūpe Bhagavati
 samayabalāyattasya vedyatva vikalpyatva-nāntariyakasya śabdayoj-
 anasya avakāśah.

Bhartṛhari, the famous author of *Vākyapadīyam*, which is perhaps the greatest work in any language on what Coleridge called the Universal Grammar, declares that it is not possible to deny the use of language even at the highest state of self-consciousness; that to be self-conscious is to use language, though the language used at the human stage of self-consciousness is not the same as that used at the divine. The language of divine or pure self-consciousness is so united with itself that it may be truly called its self. Abhinavagupta totally agreed with him and quoted him with approval. He further clarified the unity of Word with Meaning. In the most primary state, Word is so united with its Meaning that it may be said that Word is Meaning and Meaning is Word; intuition is expression and vice versa.^{56a} In the primary state thus, Word is consciousness and Meaning is self or existence. Both are completely united. It is not possible to distinguish existence from consciousness then. In the second stage, Word is an intuitive expression felt distinct but not separate from intuition. Here Word is Divine Will or Percept. In the third stage, Word is Divine Knowledge or Concept. These three states of Word as Consciousness, Will and Knowledge are all divine and are known as *parā*, *paśyantī* and *madhyamā* respectively. In these states Word is a kind of divine intuitive light.⁵⁷

56a. Cp. *A. P.*, p. 143 quoted in Book 4, Ch. 4

57. See Book 2, ch. 3; see *IPVV*, II, 188-90; *IPV* I, 212.

Coleridge also thinks of a superior state of language. See the following lines of *Eolian Harp*.

O the one Life within us and abroad,
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light,
Rhythm in all thought and joyance everywhere
Methinks, it should have been impossible
Not to love all things in a world so filled,
Where the breeze warbles, and the mate still air
Is Music slumbering on her instrument.

Cp. also Benedetto Croce: "It (Expression) is generally restricted to what are called verbal expressions alone. But there exist also non-

Such a unity of word and meaning is the highest manifestation of truth and being, language and thought, subject and object, existence and consciousness. Such is the concept of *Śabda-Brahma* of Bhartrhari, of *Aham* or *Parama Śiva*⁵⁸ of Abhinavagupta. Coleridge's concept of the Eternal I AM can hardly be a different concept, but he did not, or rather could not, develop his semasiology in such details and with such a success as the Hindu philosophers did.

It is from this unity that all the letters of the alphabet and all the objects of the universe as well as our consciousness of them are derived. Thus the relation between subject and object is spoken of in the Trika philosophy as a relation between the word and its meaning.

Consciousness is the very nature of pure existence and consciousness is impossible without language. It would be better to say that at the absolute stage consciousness is language. Pure existence is represented by the first letter of the Sanskrit alphabet, *a*.⁵⁹ Consciousness which is the self-

verbal expressions, such as those of line, colour and sound, and to all of these must be extended our affirmation, which embraces therefore every sort of manifestation of the man, as orator, musician, painter, or anything else". *Aesthetic*, p. 8. Croce also believes in the essential unity of word and meaning. He points out the importance of knowing the primary state of language. "If language is the first spiritual manifestation, and if the aesthetic form is the language itself, taken in all its true scientific extension, it is hopeless to try to understand clearly the later and more complicated phases of the life of the spirit when their first and simplest moment is ill known, mutilated and disfigured." (Preface to *Aesthetic*, p. xxviii).

58. Abhinavagupta totally agrees with Bhartrhari regarding the unity of Word and Meaning and quotes him in support of his view.

Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte,
Anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena gamyate.
Vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī,
Na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī. *IPV*, I, 212.

59. It is a fact worth noting that the a sound begins all the Aryan alphabets.

projection, *visarga*, of this very first letter is represented by the last letter, *ha*, and both together with all the intermediate letters of the alphabet are unified in the *anusvāra* or *vindu*. Thus the word *Ahaṁ*, meaning *I*, is the mother of all letters of the alphabet and contains all of them in its womb.⁶⁰ The relation between subject and object being a relation between word and meaning, the concept of *Ahaṁ* is all-inclusive.⁶¹

Coleridge also made similar attempts but owing to the shortcomings of the Roman alphabet he could not succeed in deriving the whole alphabet from one letter. He, however, thought of "sticking up little *i* by itself, i against the whole alphabet", and knew well that "one word with meaning in it is worth the whole alphabet together".⁶²

This concept of *Ahaṁ* which includes in it not only all the letters of the alphabet but also all objects and all types of knowledge in it need not be confused with pantheism. Coleridge misread pantheism⁶³ in the Hindu philosophy as it is presented in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Pantheism unifies God with the world and does not conceive Him above or beyond it, as Coleridge himself explained.⁶⁴ The Hindu standpoint as

60. *Mālinīvijayavārtikam*, *kāṇḍa* I, verses 355-61.

61. *Ibid*, I, verse 400.

62. Letter 388 to Poole, March 23, 1801.

Cp. *Ekah śabdaḥ samyag jñātaḥ suṣṭhu prayuktaḥ loke vede ca kāmādhug bhavati. Mahābhāṣya* I. I. I.

I do not agree with I. A. Richards' statement that this was Coleridge's pursuit of philosophy and not his theory of poetry. See letter no. 956 to Joseph Cottle, dated 7 March 1815 :

"Now what the Globe is in Geography, *miniaturizing* in order to manifest the Truth, such is a Poem to that Image of God, which we were created into, and which still seeks that Unity, or Revelation of the *One* in and by the *Many* which reminds it that though in order to be an individual Being it must go forth from God, yet as the receding from *him* is to proceed towards Nothingness and Privation it must still at every step turn back toward him in order to be at all".

63. *P. L.*, p. 127.

64. In the essay "On the Prometheus of Aeschylus" Coleridge distinguishes his own theistic position from that of the pantheistic thus:

presented by the *Bhagavad-Gītā* or the Trika philosophy or the *Upanisad* thinks of God as both immanent and transcendent,⁶⁵ and hence is not pantheistic.

V

Word and meaning are being seriously studied in recent times. The modern position has been very well stated by Professor Urban.

"It was suggested by Hamann that Kant would have done better to have written a critique of Language than a critique of Reason. It has been suggested by others that this is precisely what he did. Much can be said for this interpretation. For one way of stating the Kantian problem is this. Our language made to deal with the material, the world of phenomena, has constantly been extended for discourse about the noumenal. Kant asked this question whether knowledge in this sphere is possible. He might just as well have asked whether discourse about such objects is meaningful or intelligible."⁶⁶

"The diversity between theism and pantheism may be most simply and generally expressed in the following formula in which the material universe is expressed by W and the deity by G.

$W-G=0$. Or the World without God is an impossible conception. This position is common to theist and pantheist. But the pantheist adds the converse— $G-W=0$, for which the theist substitutes $G-W=G$; or that— $G=G$, anterior and irrelative to the existence of the world, is equal to $G+W$. "*Coleridge's Miscellanies, Aesthetic and Literary*, pp. 59-60.

65. (a) Viṣṭabhyāhamidaṁ Kṛtsnamekāṁśena sthito jagat. *BG.* X, v. 42.

(b) Pūrṇasya pūrṇamādāya pūrṇamevāvaśiṣyate.

Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Iṣāvāsyopaniṣad.

(c) Viśvottīrṇaṁ viśvamayaṁ ca iti Trikādidaṛśanavidāḥ. *PH.* p. 18.

66. *Language and Reality*, p. 15, quoted by Miss Dorothy Emmet in her book, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*, p. 2.

Coleridge made similar complaints against the Post-Kantians. See *Inquiring Spirit*, item 70 :

That is how modern logical positivists raise their objection to metaphysics. They maintain that "although Kant also condemned transcendent metaphysics, he did so on different grounds. For he said that the human understanding was so constituted that it lost itself in contradictions when it ventured out beyond the limits of possible experience and attempted to deal with things in themselves. And thus he made the impossibility of a transcendent metaphysic not, as we do, a matter of logic, but a matter of fact".⁶⁷ They say: "Our charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a field where it cannot profitably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant".⁶⁸

They further define "a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical".⁶⁹

A sentence becomes nonsensical in two ways. Either the component words are meaningless or they are meaningless in a particular context. A metaphysical sentence is nonsensical in both ways. First, the metaphysician's "postulation of real non-existent entities results from the superstition...that to every word or phrase that can be the grammatical subject of a sentence, there must somewhere be a real entity corresponding. For as there is no place in the empirical world for

"Generally indeed I complain of the German Philosophers (as we are most apt to complain of our dearest Friends)—of the Post-Kantians at least—for the precipitance with which they pass to their own determinations of what the *thing* is, without having first enquired what the *word* means when it is used *appropriately*".

67. *Language, Truth and Logic*, by Alfred Jules Ayer, p. 34.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

many of these "entities" (like soul or God) a special non-empirical world is invoked to house them".⁷⁰

Logical analysis shows that what makes "appearances" the "appearances" of the same thing "is not their relationship to an entity other than themselves but their relationship to one another".⁷¹ The metaphysician fails to see this because he is misled by a superficial grammatical feature of the language. He is tempted to formulate a concept of Being which can never fall within the range of experience, because "in our language sentences which express existential propositions and sentences which express attributive propositions may be of the same grammatical form". Thus, for example, "Martyrs suffer" and "Martyrs exist", though of the same grammatical form, are not of the same logical type. While 'suffering' is an attribute of the martyrs, 'existence' cannot be an attribute. If it were, all positive existential propositions would be tautologous, and all negative existential propositions self-contradictory, but this is not the case. "So that those who raise questions about Being which are based on the assumption that existence is an attribute are guilty of following grammar beyond the boundaries of sense." As the metaphysician's statements thus "have no literal meaning they are not subject to any criteria of truth or falsehood".⁷²

For logical positivists "the distinction between the kind of metaphysics that is produced by a philosopher who has been duped by grammar and the kind that is produced by a mystic who is trying to express the inexpressible is of no great importance" for both make statements that are "literally senseless".⁷³

The foundation of logical positivism is the verificational theory of meaning and for verification they do not go beyond sense-experience. Thus logical positivism is "a form of empiricism. For it is characteristic of an empiricist to eschew

70. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-5.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

metaphysics on the ground that every factual proposition must refer to sense-experience."⁷⁴ Aware of the difficulty in which they may get involved, logical positivists try to be self-consistent.

"The fact is that one cannot in language point to an object without describing it. If a sentence is to express a proposition, it cannot merely name a situation; it must say something about it. And in describing a situation, one is not merely "registering" a sense-content; one is classifying it in some way or other and this means going beyond what is immediately given. But a proposition would be ostensive only if it recorded what was immediately experienced without referring in any way beyond. And as this is not possible, it follows that no genuine synthetic proposition can be ostensive and consequently that none can be absolutely certain."⁷⁵ Indeed, no empirical proposition can ever be anything more than probable. It is only *a priori* propositions that are logically certain and they are tautologies.⁷⁶

Logical positivism eliminates ethics as well as aesthetics because "there is nothing in aesthetics any more than there is in ethics, to justify the view that it embodies a unique type of knowledge".⁷⁷ "Such aesthetic words as 'beautiful' and 'hideous' are employed, as ethical words are employed, not to make statements of fact, but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response. It follows, as in ethics, that there is no sense in attributing objective validity to aesthetic judgments and no possibility of arguing about questions of value in aesthetics but only about questions of fact. A scientific treatment of aesthetics would show us what in general were the causes of aesthetic feeling, why various societies produced and admired the works of arts they did, why taste varies as it does within a given society, and so

74. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

forth. And these are ordinary psychological or sociological questions."⁷⁸

I have given this rather lengthy summary of logical positivism after one of its ablest exponents, Prof. Alfred Jules Ayer, to show that this empirical offshoot of Kantism is far away from the Coleridgean standpoint. Though the highest form of knowledge, God's own way of knowing, according to Coleridge, is in the form of an *a priori* tautologous statement, I AM I;⁷⁹ and in this respect he may be said to agree with logical positivists, yet from this tautologous statement, the fullest union of the whole of knowledge with the whole of existence, Coleridge derives each particular object and its knowledge. This logical positivists do not do. This tautology is not an empty assertion according to the Coleridgean philosophy, as it would be according to logical positivism. It gives certainty to all kinds of knowledge and reality to all kinds of objects.

Coleridge's theory of poetry is therefore quite different from that of I.A. Richards, whose psychological theory of poetry as propounded in the *Principles of Literary Criticism* is based on a theory of language and reality like that of logical positivists. In *Science and Poetry*, 1926, I. A. Richards distinguished poetry from science almost like a logical positivist. According to him, poetry is a "pseudo-statement" or "a form of words which is justified entirely by its effect in releasing or organising our impulses and attitudes", and is distinguished from science which is a statement "justified by its truth, i.e. its correspondence, in a highly technical sense, with the fact to which it points". The scepticism involved in such a view of poetic statement has been very well criticised by Stephen

78. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

79. "Let a young man separate I from Me as far as he possibly can, and remove Me till it is almost lost in the remote distance. "I am me" is as bad a fault in intellectuals and morals as it is in grammar, whilst none but one God can say, "I am I" or "That I am".

Table Talk, Nov. 1, 1833.

Spender in his essay, "Inside the Cage: Reflections on Conditioned and Unconditioned Imagination".⁸⁰ Coleridge derives the value of poetry from its capacity to lead us back to that unity of the eternal I AM from which all forms of existence and knowledge are derived.⁸¹

This was also the opinion of Abhinavagupta. His whole philosophy may be studied as a philosophy of Word and Meaning.⁸²

We shall see later on that the theory of *Rasa* when interpreted in terms of the philosophy of Word and Meaning becomes the theory of suggestion, for the word and the object conveyed by its literal meaning are connected together in the world of empirical experience only by an arbitrary convention, and it is only through this suggestive power that words can lead us to that meaning with which they are essentially unified. Hence it is that suggestive words are the most significant words in poetry. It is this centripetal tendency of the words that makes them poetic. Winged words we may call them. They can fly from the material world to the spiritual and be united with their spiritual essential meaning. Abhinava does not make an unnecessary fuss about the empirical verification as a criterion of the true use of language, for, according to Abhinava, such a verification is possible only on an ideal plane where word and meaning are united together, and which alone therefore can be real in the true sense of the

80. *The Making of a Poem*, 1955, reprinted in *English Critical Essays*, Twentieth Century, Second Series (World's Classics).

81. Cp. Letter 956 quoted above in fn. 62.

82. The absolute is given several names in his philosophy. We have already noted *Ahaṁ* or I AM I and *Parama Śiva* or "the Highest Good". The other names are *Mahāsattā* or "pure existence"; *Sphurattā* or "Pulsation"; *Parā Vāk* or Logos or "the Ultimate Word"; *Pratibhā* or "intuition"; *Vimarśa* or "consciousness". Word and Meaning remain united on the divine plane but become separate on the human plane. Their real literal union can be experienced only through the *mantras*, words of divine significance. That is *brahmāsvāda*. Poetry achieves this unity not literally but suggestively and is therefore called *brahmāsvādasahodara*.

term. Such a unity of word and meaning can be possible only in the world of Platonic ideas or that of the Sanskrit mantras.

Coleridge similarly said: "Through faith we understand that the Worlds were framed by the word of God; so that things which were seen were not made of things which do appear."⁸³

Coleridge's concept of symbol is very much akin to the Indian concept of the suggestive word. According to Coleridge, Imagination is "the reconciling and mediatory power which incorporates the reason in the images of the sense, and organising, as it were, the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason gives birth to a system of symbols."⁸⁴

VI

In Logic, Coleridge believes in Trichotomy. His belief in the essential unity of subject and object led him to conceive of that unity as both subject and object. Empirical logic believes in the laws of identity, non-contradiction and the excluded middle, according to which subject and object are two different things. But he pointed out the necessity of changing the dichotomic division based on these laws in order to explain the fact of knowledge. "Instead of starting with opposing concepts, in one or other of which, taken separately, we are to find the truth, we have to 'seek first for the Unity as the only source of Reality, and then for the two opposite yet correspondent forms by which it manifests itself....Instead therefore of affirmation and contradiction, the tools of dichotomic logic, we have the three terms: Identity, Thesis and Antithesis". It is on this principle that he conceived it possible to advance beyond the limitations of Logic or the science of the Understanding to a Noetic, or science of the Reason, which should also be a science of Reality".⁸⁵

83. *The Friend*, p. 330.

84. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 396.

85. Muirhead : *Coleridge as Philosopher*, p. 86.

Abhinavagupta's logic is similarly trichotomic. His philosophy is called *Trika*. He points out that consciousness and existence or subject and object have only three types of relation: unity, unity in difference and deference.⁸⁶ They are respectively the basis of the *Trika* classification of existence into three types: *Śiva*, *Śakti* and *Nara*. They will be explained later.

VII

It is on the basis of this trichotomic logic that Abhinava and Coleridge tried to explain the whole universe. Coleridge said: "I require in everything what for lack of another word, I may call propriety, that is a reason why the thing is at all, and why it is there or there rather than elsewhere or at another time".⁸⁷ Abhinava said the same thing in his concept of 'I am so'. *Īśvara* or God alone exists in different forms as He likes.⁸⁸

Coleridge was conscious of the superiority of his philosophy to other philosophies. He said: "My system, if I may venture to give it so fine a name, is the only attempt, I know, ever made to reduce all knowledges into harmony. It opposes no other system, but shows what was true in each, and how that which was true in the particular, in each of them became error, *because* it was only half the truth. I have endeavoured to unite the insulated fragments of truth and therewith to

86. *MVV*, Kāṇḍa I, verses 391-92 ; 396-7.

Distinction is not separation. Cp. Coleridge's explanation of a Platonic idea: "This is expressly asserted by [Plato] and it is the very essential of Platonism when he says that that which exists in the perfection of distinctness and yet without separation, either from another or from the supreme cause, is an Idea". *P. L.*, p. 166.

87. *Table Talk*, March 1, 1834 ; Cp. also *The Friend*, Sect. 2, Essay 5, para 1. There he says that the relations of objects are the prime materials of method.

88. *Iha yad yad kiñcit sphurati tat tat vakṣyamāṇeśvararūpa-svātma-prathāmātram. IPV.*, I, 9 ; *Ahamevam prakāśātmā prakāśe. Ib.*, p. 198.

frame a perfect mirror. I show to each system that I fully understand and rightfully appreciate what that system means; but then I lift up that system to a higher point of view, from which I enable it to see its former position, where it was, indeed, but under another light and with different relations;—so that the fragment of truth is not only acknowledged but explained".⁸⁹ In such an explanation consisted the newness of his system. He says, "A System may have no new Truths for it's component parts, yet having nothing but Truths may be for that very reason a new System".⁹⁰

The Trika philosopher claims superiority to others in exactly the same way.⁹¹ Explaining *Rasa* in his *Abhinava-Bhāratī*, Abhinavagupta says like Coleridge that he has nothing new to say. He only corrected the mistakes of previous scholars.⁹²

VIII

I shall neither try to write the *magnum opus* which Coleridge thought of writing but did not write, nor try to summarise everything that Abhinavagupta wrote. I shall simply deal with the basic philosophical ideas of both the writers and show how they explain poetics on their basis.

The most remarkable feature of the two systems, Coleridgean and Trika, is their agreement on the point that "The great business of real unostentatious virtue is not to eradicate any genuine instinct or appetite of human nature, but to establish a concord and unity between all parts of our nature, to give a feeling and a passion to our purer intellect, and to intellectualise our feelings and passions."⁹³

89. *Table Talk*, 12 Sept. 1831,

90. Letter 384 of Feb. 1801 to Josiah Wedgood ; *C. L.*, II, 700.

91. See *PH*, pp. 16-20.

92. *Tasmāt satāmatra na dūṣitāni, matāni tānyeva tu śodhitāni, Pūrva-pratiṣṭhāpitayojanāsu mūlapraṭiṣṭhāphalamāmananti.*

AB, I, 278.

This verse and the quotation from Letter 384 of Coleridge given above have almost the same meaning.

93. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 255.

The *Rasa* philosophy is an attempt to sublimate our innate tendencies,⁹⁴ to establish harmony in human nature, and, like Coleridge, Abhinava knew that "all harmony is founded on a relation to rest".⁹⁵

IX

A *prima facie* case against my thesis may, however, be that in comparing the two theories of Imagination and *Rasa*, I am confusing creation with appreciation, for *Rasa* is primarily a concept of enjoyment of poetry and Imagination that of poetic creation. But at the very outset I state that neither *Rasa* nor Imagination is exclusively a concept of poetic enjoyment or poetic creation as may be learned from the statements of the authors themselves. Coleridge's theory of Imagination is a result of his search for "the seminal principle" of poetry. The method of his search was to proceed from the effect to the cause,⁹⁶ from the pleasure the poem gave to the faculty that produced it.⁹⁷ Even if we equate the Coleridgean term *Taste* with the Sanskrit term *Rasa*, and *Imagination* with *Pratibhā*, as we should do in all propriety, we hardly find our thesis disproved. Coleridge defines Imagination and Taste in similar terms. Taste, like Imagination, is an intermediate faculty and has a similar nature: unifying, elevating, idealising and perceptual.⁹⁸

94. Ye sthāyino bhāvā loke cittaṭṭyātmano bahuprakāra-parīśrama prasava-nibandhana-kartavyatā prabandhābhidhāyinas tānapi nāma rasatvaṁ viśrāntyekaīyatanatvenopadeśadīśa neṣyāmaḥ. *AB*, I, 300.

95. *Table Talk*, April 10, 1832. Cp. *AB*, I, 339 ;

Sarvarasānām śāntaprāya eva āsvādo viṣayebhyo viparivṛtṭyā.

96. *B. L.*, I, 64.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

98. Cp. "Taste is the intermediate faculty which connects the active with the passive powers of our nature, the intellect with the senses; and its appointed function is to elevate the images of the latter, while it realises the ideas of the former". "On the Principles of Genial Criticism". *B. L.*, II, 227.

In the same way, we shall see that *Rasa* and *Pratibhā* are intuitive perception and have the same unifying and elevating character. Indeed, the terms are interchangeable.⁹⁹ Abhinavagupta saw that one and the same power worked at the root of poetic creation and appreciation.¹⁰⁰

Modern critics also point out that "The nature, the function and the evaluation of literature must necessarily exist in close correlation".¹⁰¹ Abhinavagupta is perhaps the first critic of the world to state unequivocally that it is the same power that creates and enjoys poetry.

I. A. Richards, who defines a poem as the poet's experience, speaks of a standard experience comprising all the different meanings of the poem that the poet and the readers get out of it.¹⁰²

"By taste, therefore, applied to the fine arts, we must be supposed to mean an intellectual perception..."

"Fragment of an Essay on Taste",

Ibid., p. 248.

"...This is no unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive. In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINATION. But, in common language, and especially on the subject of poetry, we appropriate the name to a superior degree of the faculty, joined to a superior voluntary control over it".

B. L., I, 86.

99. Abhinava's grand teacher Utpaladeva equates *Cit*, the eternal I AM, with both *Rasa* and *Pratibhā*. *Pratyabhijñā-kārikā*, *kārikās* 44 and 64 of ch. I. Commenting on him Abhinava did the same. (*IPV*, I, 203-6, 277-80).

100. Mark the singular number in *tattvam* in the following description of the creative and the appreciative faculties in the benedictory verse of *Locana* :

Sarasvatyās-tattvaṁ kavi-sahṛdayākhyam vijayate.

Cp. Coleridge's line, "Joy, the beautiful and the beauty-making power", *Dejection : An Ode*.

101. Rene Wellek and Austen Warren, *Theory of Literature*, p. 238.

See also *Critics and Criticism*, abridged, p. 199 and fn. 9.

102. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, ch. 30.

Coleridge says that when the reader experiences "with the entireness of mind and heart" "the whole feeling" of the poem, "each man does at the moment so far legislate for all men, as to believe of necessity that he is either right or wrong, and that if it be right for him, it is universally right...[for] each intellect is representative of all".¹⁰³ The concept of *Rasa* is a concept of a togetherness of knowing and admits of no difference at the time of its experience,¹⁰⁴ though differences are bound to crop up when the experience of what Coleridge calls "the whole feeling" is over and we wish to express what we felt. Abhinavagupta is definite on this point that there is only one power at work behind creation and enjoyment of poetry.

The matter is of vital importance for another reason also. Without this essential unity of the creative and the appreciative, without the essential oneness of the meaning of the poem, it is impossible to find any certain and scientific basis of poetics, and evaluation of poetry or art will be a matter of personal likes and dislikes, a position which can hardly be accepted by any sane critic.

Dr. Richards says that Coleridge's concept of Imagination "was devised as a means of describing the wider and deeper powers of some poetry. It is a descriptive psychological term in the sense that it points to facts which explain certain values". He adds that there are "instances of Imagination which are valuable and instances which are not and we must then go on to contrive a further theory, a theory of values which will explain...these differences of values", and he states that such a theory of values has been presented by him in his *Principles of Literary Criticism*. "Coleridge does not so separate his psychology from his theory of value. His theory of Imagination is a combination of the two..." Richards says a few points in favour of the Coleridgean theory: "It does more justice to the unity of mental process, and, if such an exposition

103. "Fragment of an Essay on Taste", *B. L.*, II, 249.

104. *Tantrāloka*, VI, 132 ; *IPV*, I, 194-5.

is understood, there is less risk of suggesting that the value aspects of our activities are independent of, or supernumerary to, their nature—less risk of our taking the same question twice as though it were two questions, not one". But he points out the shortcomings of the Coleridgean standpoint as well. "Arnold said that great poetry interests the permanent passions; but this, as so often happens, splits what is one into two. For the passions are in the poetry and the poetry is only the way this interest and these passions go in it. No description of Imagination is of any use to those who do not otherwise sometimes know this way—as poets; or know when they are in it, as readers; yet it is the way however often fashion, miscomprehension, obstructive prepossessions, or dullness may hide it from us".¹⁰⁵

Coleridge certainly knew the importance of passion in poetry, though he did not give as much attention to it as it deserved and Dr. Richards is justified in showing the weak point of the Coleridgean theory. Moreover, there is a criticism against Coleridge that he confused Imagination with Reason. We shall see that Abhinavagupta does not make any such mistakes. In him we find a combination of Richards and Coleridge. Or perhaps more correctly we may say that the Aristotelian concept of art as imitation or idealisation of *ēthē*, *pathē*, and *praxeis*, which was not further developed in the West, was explained by Abhinava with the help of a philosophy very much akin to the Platonic or Coleridgean. And it is my contention in this essay that it is the most comprehensive and perfect poetics so far known to us.

105. *Coleridge on Imagination*, pp. 96-8.

INTERCHAPTER I

THE Introduction underlines some of the important points of the present thesis. They are as follows:

Reality and its knowledge are the ultimate tests of all values. True education is nothing other than the knowledge of Reality. The value of education in any branch of learning has to be judged in this light. Coleridge and Abhinavagupta evaluated literary education with this measure of true education in their minds and came to similar findings regarding the place, value and method of literary education.

Coleridge did it in the nineteenth century; Abhinava had done it some eight hundred years before him. But Coleridge's masters were Germans and Greeks and Englishmen. He had too scanty a knowledge and too poor an opinion of the Indian thinkers to borrow anything from them. Sanskrit poetics was totally unknown to him. So were the different schools of Indian philosophy. Yet he fortuitously came to the same conclusions as the Indian critic, though he was not as free from mistakes. The similar conclusions arrived at by the two ablest critics of India and England underline the importance of their analyses of poetic creation and appreciation.

The solution of the problems of literary creation and appreciation naturally rests on the fundamental science of word, meaning and their relations. A true philosophy of literature has to be based on a true semantics. The *Principles of Literary Criticism* of I.A. Richards is based on the empirical semantics of logical positivists. And if empirical semantics is proved to be wrong, Richards' *Principles of Literary Criticism* cannot be correct. Coleridge tried to develop a correct semantics but could not give it a final system-

atic shape. The Indian literary critics had the good fortune of inheriting a tradition of correct semantics from the native grammarian philosophers like Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, who in their turn inherited it from the Vedas. This semantics is based on the self-evident self-consciousness and is totally opposed to the empirical semantics of logical positivists.

Logical positivists consider metaphysics nonsensical, while Coleridge says that metaphysics is "a genus generalissimum comprising *all* evidence transcending that of Sense—or rather the Sciences that have this for their object".¹ And his advice is: "never continue any discussion with a man, who rails against METAPHYSICS without being able to explain what he means by the term".² Logical positivists consider that a statement is meaningful only when it is verifiable and by verification they mean verification by observation or sense perception. Coleridge, on the other hand, makes the *a priori* genesis of knowledge as well as of objects of knowledge more important. Criticising the empiricists, he says, "With the Moderns...nothing grows; all is made".³ He criticises this "false philosophy, which retains but the name of *Logic*, and has succeeded in rendering Metaphysics a word of opprobrium".⁴

There is hardly any critic who does not say something good and valuable and true regarding literary creation and appreciation. But there are very few critics who have said the total truth. Half-truths are really dangerous, because they become accepted as they are truths even though partial; but like the witches in *Macbeth* they betray us in matters of deeper significance. They misrepresent the whole truth. Indeed anything less than the whole truth is false. Indian critics have succeeded in telling the whole truth about literature and among Western critics Coleridge comes most near them.

1. Letter 1088, *C. L.*, IV, 790.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 789.

3. Letter 1072, *C. L.*, IV, 761.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 762.

BOOK I

Idly talk they who speak of poets as mere Indulgers of Fancy, Imagination, Superstition, &c—They are the Bridlers by Delight, the Purifiers, they that combine them with *reason* & order, the true Protoplasts, Gods of Love who tame the Chaos.

N. 2355

No one can leap over his own shadow, but poets leap over death.

A.P., p. 22.

CHAPTER I

COLERIDGE'S STARTING POINT

In the course of these I shall have said, all I know, the whole result of many years' continued reflection on the subjects of Taste, Imagination, Fancy, Passion, the source of our pleasures in the fine Arts in the *antithetical* balance—loving nature of man, & the connection of such pleasures with moral excellence.

Letter 656, *C. L.*, III, 30.

EVEN while at school Coleridge learned from his teacher that poetry "had a logic of its own, as severe as that of science ; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes".¹ To write a philosophy of poetry became one of his life-long ambitions, though unfortunately it remained unfulfilled. In *Table Talk* of Jan. 1821 Coleridge says:

"I have already written materials and contents requiring only to be put together, from the loose papers and commonplace or memorandum books, and needing no other change, whether of omission, addition, or correction, than the mere act of arranging, and the opportunity of seeing the whole collectively bring with them of course—I *Characteristics of Shakespeare's Dramatic Works*, with a *Critical Review* of each

1. *B. L.* I, p. 4.

Play; together with a relative and comparative Critique on the kind and degree of the Merits and Demerits of the Dramatic works of Ben Johnson, Beaumont and Fletcher, and Massinger. The History of English Drama; the accidental advantages it afforded to Shakespeare without in the least detracting from the perfect originality or proper creation of Shakespearean Drama; and contradistinction of the latter from Greek Drama; and its still remaining *uniqueness*, with the causes of this, from the combined influences of Shakespeare himself, as man, poet, philosopher, and finally, by conjunction of all these, dramatic poet; and the age, events, manner and state of the English language. This work with every art of compression amounts to three volumes of about five hundred pages each. II Philosophical Analysis of the Genius and work of Dante, Spenser, Milton, Cervantes, and Calderon, with similar but more compressed Criticisms on Chaucer, Ariosto, Donne, Rabelais, and others, during the predominance of Romantic Poetry. In one large volume—these two works will, I flatter myself, form a complete code of the principles of judgment and feeling applied to works of Taste; and not of *Poetry* only, but of Poesy in all its forms, Painting, Statuary, Music, &c. &c. III The History of Philosophy considered as a Tendency of the Human Mind to exhibit the Powers of the Human Reason, to discover by its own strength the Origin and Laws of Man and the World from Pythagoras to Locke and Condillac. Two volumes. IV Letters on the Old and New Testament....

“To the completion of these four works I have literally nothing more to do than transcribe....

“In addition to these—of my Great Work to the preparation of which more than twenty years of my life have been devoted, and on which my hopes of extensive and permanent utility, of fame, in the noblest sense of the word, mainly rest—...to which all my other writings (unless I except my Poems, and these I can exclude in part only) are introductory and preparative; and the result of which...must finally be a revolution of all that has been called *Philosophy*

or Metaphysics in England and France since the era of the commencing predominance of the mechanical system at the restoration of our second Charles, and with this the present fashionable views, not only of religion, morals, and politics, but even of the modern physics and physiology."

Coleridge says that this work took the "labour of three-fourths of my intellectual life," and that "of this work, something more than a volume has been dictated by me, so as to exist fit for the press, to my friend and enlightened pupil, Mr. Green."²

Coleridge never found time to arrange his writings systematically, if we except the *Biographia Literaria*, *The Friend* and the *Poems*. The *Philosophical Lectures* have the defects lectures naturally have and are not a systematic history of philosophy. *Shakespearean Criticism* and *Miscellaneous Criticism* are lecture-notes, not systematically written essays. The basic tenets of his system, however, are sufficiently given in almost all his works, letters and talks to enable us to understand his philosophy. But because of the unfinished fragmentary nature of his works, it is not an easy task to present his views systematically.

Too much has been said against Coleridge's preoccupation with metaphysics. He himself was conscious of its evil effects. He knew that "delving in the unwholesome quicksilver mines of metaphysic depths" and "mismanaged sensibility in abstruse researches, which exercised the strength and subtlety of the understanding without awakening the feelings of the heart" deadened the poet in him.³ And as a safeguard he looked to the beautiful forms of Nature and the poetry of Bowles and Wordsworth.⁴ Both philosophy and poetry were dear to him. Any fame other than that as a poet and a metaphysician he considered a serious evil.⁵ He

2. Allsop's *Letters, Conversations and Recollections of S. T. Coleridge*, (1836) p. 436.

3. *B. L.*, I, 10.

4. *Ibid.*, I, 8-10, 56-60.

5. Letter 385, *C.L.*, II, 705.

says, "The substance, the stuff is philosophy, the form alone is poetry."⁶ And the stuff he valued more.⁷ "All genius is metaphysical, because the ultimate end of genius is ideal, however it may be actualised by incidental and accidental circumstances."⁸ That was his mature opinion. To condemn a poem for metaphysical dullness was perhaps his worst criticism of it.⁹ He understood the importance of "both heart and head" for poetry. He says: "My opinion is this — that deep Thinking is attainable only by a man of deep Feeling, and that all Truth is a species of Revelation".¹⁰ "Our genuine admiration of a great poet is a continuous under-current of feeling; it is everywhere present but seldom anywhere as a separate excitement." "No authority could avail in opposition to TRUTH, NATURE, LOGIC, and the LAWS of UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.... I laboured at a solid foundation, on which permanently to ground my opinions, in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance." And he enunciated what may be called his basic approach to poetics thus: "According to the faculty or source from which the pleasure given by any poem or passage was derived, I estimated the merit of such poem or passage".¹¹

6. Essay on "The Prometheus of Aeschylus", *Miscellanies, Aesthetic and Literary*, ed. T. Ashe, p. 65.
7. "And lecturing is the only means by which I can enable myself to go on at all with the great philosophical work to which the best and most genial hours of the last twenty years of my life have been devoted. Poetry is out of the question. The attempt would only hurry me into that sphere of acute feelings, from which abstruse research, the mother of self-oblivion, presents an asylum." Letter 1159 to William Collins, 6 December 1818 : *C. L.*, IV, 893.
8. *Table Talk*, August 11, 1832.
9. "When I tell you that the following passages were among those that were declared intolerable, and enough to damn a piece by their *metaphysical* dullness, I have said volumes to a man of Taste." Letter 1053, 15 April 1817, *C. L.*, IV, 721.
10. Letter 388 to Thomas Poole, 23 March 1801, *C. L.*, II, 709.
11. *B. L.*, I, 14.

Coleridge was aged twenty-five when he came to know Wordsworth personally and Wordsworth recited a manuscript poem, which had a tremendous effect on him. He was struck by its "union of deep feeling with profound thought, the fine balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed; and above all the original gift of spreading the tone, the *atmosphere*, and with it the depth and height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew drops".¹² He found in it the mark of genius, which, according to him, "produces the strongest impressions of novelty".¹³

No sooner had he felt all this than he sought to understand it. Thus he came to meditate on the famous distinction between Fancy and Imagination, which, he believed, he was "the first" among his countrymen to point out: not only the difference in their meanings but also the difference in the mental faculties to which they should be appropriated. The terms were already in vogue, but they were understood as "either two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, lower and higher degree of one and the same power". But Coleridge was convinced that they "were two distinct and widely differing faculties".

Coleridge refers to the distinctions made before him by Taylor, which were shown to be erroneous by Wordsworth. But Coleridge's approach was different from that of Wordsworth. While Wordsworth marked the difference between Fancy and Imagination in their effects as manifested in poetry, Coleridge's object was "to investigate the seminal principle, and then from the kind to deduce the degree. My friend" he said, "has drawn a masterly sketch of the branches with their *poetic* fruitage. I wish to add the trunk, and even the

12. *B. L.*, I, 59.

13. *Ibid.*, I, 60.

roots as far as they lift themselves above ground, and are visible to the naked eye of our common consciousness."¹⁴

Coleridge found that as a seminal principle of poetry or art in general, or poesy, as he preferred to say, the term "Imagination" was inexact, and in order to "prevent its being confounded with the usual import of the word," he coined an adjective from the Greek words which meant "to shape into one." With this new adjective, *esemplastic*,¹⁵ Imagination came to mean, for Coleridge, the essential poetic process, the true mark of genius, and the soul of poetry.¹⁶

14. *Ibid.*, I, 63, 60-61, 60, 63, 64.

15. *B. L.*, I, 107.

16. *Ibid.*, I, 86 ; II, 16, 13.

CHAPTER II

COLERIDGE'S CRITICISM OF THE ASSOCIATIONISTS

Motto for my Idoloclastes: "It is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish that lies in the way to Knowledge."

Locke's Epistle to the Reader prefixed to his *Ess. on Hum. Underst.*

N. 1729

Tho' I cannot give the Medicine, yet I shall not have been useless if I have discovered the Disease, and shown the way to the Physician.

Letter 736, *C.L.*, III, 159

I am much pleased with this Suggestion, as with everything that overthrows or illustrates the overthrow of that all-annihilating system of explaining everything wholly by association.

N. 2093

Materialists unwilling to admit the mysterious element of our nature make it all mysterious—nothing mysterious in nerves, eyes, &c., but that nerves think, etc. ! Stir up the sediment into the transparent water, and so make all opaque.

A.P., p. 14

COLERIDGE's investigations into the pleasures derived from poetry led him to a discussion of the theory of knowledge, to "the Relations of Thoughts to Things, in the language of Hume, of Ideas to Impressions".¹ He found that a mechanical materialistic theory of knowledge propounded by Hobbes,

1. Letter 1378, *C.L.*, II, 672.

Locke, Hume, Hartley and others held the field in his time and that they gave a wrong explanation of experience. His contact with the German philosophers, especially Immanuel Kant, Schelling and Fichte, gave him further strength in his conviction and the first task that he performed was to criticise the Lockean theory of knowledge. Even before Coleridge and Wordsworth, Joseph Addison had written eleven essays on the Pleasures of Imagination in the *Spectator*, (nos. 411—21) based on the Lockean theory of knowledge, but Coleridge did not criticise Addison, [probably out of respect for him. Instead, he criticised the philosophers themselves for propounding a wrong theory of knowledge.

Coleridge, who believed in the Biblical statement that man was created "in God's image" could not reconcile himself to the view of the materialists that the human mind was passive. It was his firm conviction that if the Divine Creator was man's prototype, man's mind could not be passive and any system based on the passivity of the mind was bound to be false.² He studied the etymology of the word 'mind' and found out that the oldest meaning of the word gave an active rather than a passive sense.³ Coleridge found that the mechanical theory of knowledge which was in vogue during his time under the grandiloquent name of the Law of Association was based on the passivity of the human mind, and his first task was to criticise it. He had already criticised Locke in a series of philosophical letters of 1801.⁴ He criticised him and his associates once again in the *Biographia Literaria* in chapters 5, 6 and 7.

It will be profitable to summarise Coleridge's refutation of his philosophical opponents before we study his own view. Sir James Mackintosh in his lectures affirmed "that the law of association as established in the contemporaneity of the origin-

2. Letter 388 to Thomas Poole, 23 March 1801.

3. Letter 383 of Feb. 1801, *C.L.*, II, 696-7.

4. Letters 381 to 384.

al impressions, formed the basis of all true psychology, and any ontological or metaphysical science, not contained in such (i.e. empirical) psychology, was but a web of abstractions and generalizations. Of this prolific truth, of this great fundamental law, he declared Hobbes to have been the original discoverer, while its full application to the whole intellectual system we owed to David Hartley; who stood in the same relation to Hobbes as Newton to Kepler; the law of association being that to the mind, which gravitation is to matter."⁵

Coleridge refuted each one of the statements made here. Before pointing out the limitations of the law itself, he showed the historical inaccuracy of Mackintosh's statement. Coleridge said that Hobbes himself made no claim to such a discovery as Mackintosh credited him with,⁶ that in this matter he was anticipated by Des Cartes, and the latter by Melanchthon, Ammerbach and Ludovicus Vives,⁷ and they by Aristotle, who gave "the fullest and most perfect enunciation of the associative principle".⁸

"The general law of association, or more accurately, the common condition under which all exciting causes act, and in which they may be generalised, according to Aristotle is this. Ideas by having been together acquire a power of recalling each other; or every partial representation awakes the total representation of which it had been a part. In the practical determination of this common principle to particular recollections, he admits five agents or occasioning causes: 1st, connection in time, whether simultaneous, preceding, or successive; 2nd, vicinity or connection in space: 3rd, interdependence or necessary connection, as cause and effect; 4th, likeness; and 5th, contrast. As an additional solution of the occasional seeming chasms in the continuity of reproduction, he proves, that movements or ideas possessing one or the other of these

5. *B. L.*, I, 67.

6. *Ibid.*, I, 68.

7. *Ibid.*, I, 70.

8. *B. L.*, I, 71.

five characters had passed through the mind as intermediate links, sufficiently clear to recall other parts of the same total impressions with which they had co-existed, though not vivid enough to excite that degree of attention which is requisite for distinct recollection, or as we may aptly express it, *after-consciousness*. In association; then consists the whole mechanism of the reproduction of impressions, in the Aristotelian Psychology. It is the universal law of the *passive* fancy and *mechanical* memory; that which supplies to all other faculties their objects, to all thought the elements of its materials."⁹

This is Coleridge's summary of the Aristotelian theory, and he points out that any deviation from it by any later writer was a mistake. Later writers mixed facts with fiction, which made the principle absurd. "The wise Stagyrice speaks of no successive particles propagating motion like billiard balls, (as Hobbes); nor of nervous or animal spirits, where inanimate and irrational solids are thawed down, and distilled, or filtrated by ascension, into living and intelligent fluids, that etch and re-etch engravings on the brain, (as the followers of Descartes, and the humoral pathologists in general); nor of an oscillating ether which was to effect the same service for the nerves of the brain considered as solid fibres, as the animal spirits perform for them under the notion of hollow tubes (as *Hartley* teaches)—nor finally, (with yet more recent dreamers) of chemical compositions by elective affinity, or of an electric light at once the immediate object and the ultimate organ of inward vision, which rises to the brain like an *Aurora Borealis*, and there disporting in various shapes (as the balance of plus and minus, or negative and positive, is destroyed or re-established) images out both past and present."¹⁰

Refuting *Hartley's* account of Association, Coleridge says: "From a hundred possible confutations let one suffice. According to this system the idea or vibration *a* from the external object *A* becomes associable with the idea or vibration

9. *Ibid.*, I, 72-73.

10. *B. L.*, I, 71-72.

m from the external object *M*, because the oscillation *a* propagated itself so as to reproduce the oscillation *m*. But the original impression from *M* was essentially different from the impression *A*: unless therefore different causes may produce the same effect, the vibration *a* could never produce the vibration *m*: and this therefore could never be the means, by which *a* and *m* are associated....

"But it may be said, that by the sensations from the objects *A* and *M*, the nerves have acquired a disposition to the vibrations *a* and *m*, and therefore *a* need only be repeated in order to re-produce *m*. Now we will grant, for a moment, the possibility of such a disposition in a material nerve, which yet seems scarcely less absurd than to say, that a weather-cock had acquired a *habit* of turning to the east, from the wind having been so long in that quarter: for if it be replied, that we must take in the circumstance of *life*, what then becomes of the mechanical philosophy?"¹¹

There is no improvement if it is supposed that every nerve has several dispositions. For "when the motion of any other nerve is propagated into it, there will be no ground or cause present, why exactly the oscillation *m* should arise, rather than any other to which it was equally pre-disposed".¹² If every idea have a nerve of its own and be capable of propagating its motion into many other nerves, then also there is no reason "why the vibration *m* should arise rather than any other *ad libitum*".

Attempts were made by Priestley "to improve upon Hartley by removing his "material hypothesis". But Coleridge says that Hartley was too consistent to endure omission of any part of his system. Hartley's main mistake was that he made "the principle of *Contemporaneity*, which Aristotle had made the common *condition* of all the laws of association", "the sole *law*". The action of material atoms was subject to the law of proximity of *place*, and their motions to that of *time*, according to him.

11. *B. L.*, I, 74-75.

12. *Ibid.*, I, 76.

If Hartley's mechanical theory be correct, "the will, the reason, the judgment, and the understanding, instead of being the determining causes of association, must needs be represented as its *creatures* and among its mechanical *effects*".¹³ While Coleridge believes in the freedom of will, Hartley's theory makes will and life passive. Conceived "in its highest abstraction and most philosophical form", the theory means that "every partial representation recalls the total representation of which it was a part", and this, Coleridge says, is "mere lawlessness". "If...we suppose the absence of all interference of the will, reason, and judgment, one or other of two consequences must result. Either the ideas, (or relics of such impression), will exactly imitate the order of the impression itself, which would be absolute *delirium*: or any one part of that impression might recall any other part, and (as from the law of continuity, there must exist in every total impression, some one or more parts, which are components of some other following total impression, and so on ad infinitum) any part of any impression might recall any part of any other, without a cause present to determine *what* it should be. For to bring in the will, or reason, as causes of their own cause, that is, as at once causes and effects, can [hardly be satisfactory]."¹⁴

Coleridge points out that "in Hartley's scheme, the soul is present only to be pinched or *stroked*, while the very squeals or purring are produced by an agency wholly independent and alien". Criticising this standpoint, Coleridge says: "It involves all the difficulties, all the incomprehensibility (if it be not indeed,...the absurdity), of intercommunion between substances that have no one property in common, without any of the convenient consequences that bribed the judgment to the admission of the *dualistic* hypothesis. Accordingly, this 'caput mortuum' of the Hartleian process has been rejected by his followers, and the consciousness considered as a *result*, as a

13. *B. L.*, I, 76.

14. *Ibid.*, I, 77.

tune, the common product of the breeze and the harp: though this again is the mere re-motion of one absurdity to make way for another, equally preposterous. For what is harmony but a mode of relation, the very *esse* of which is *percipi*? An ens rationale, which presupposes the power, that by perceiving creates it?"¹⁵

Even this suggestion of Hartley's followers cannot be accepted, for the main defect of the theory that it is mechanical still remains. So Coleridge vehemently criticises it in these words: "Yet according to this hypothesis the disquisition, to which I am at present soliciting the reader's attention, may be as truly said to be written by Saint Paul's church, as by *me*: for it is the mere motion of my muscles and nerves; and these again are set in motion from external causes equally passive, which external causes stand themselves in interdependent connection with everything that exists or has existed. Thus the whole universe co-operates to produce the minutest stroke of every letter, save only that I myself, and I alone, have nothing to do with it, but have merely the causeless and *effectless* beholding of it when it is done. Yet scarcely can it be called a beholding; for it is neither an act nor an effect; but an impossible creation of a *something-nothing* out of its very contrary! It is the mere quick-silver plating behind a looking-glass; and in this alone consists the poor worthless I! The sum total of my moral and intellectual intercourse, dissolved into its elements, is reduced to *extension*, *motion*, *degrees of velocity*, and those diminished *copies* of configurative motion, which form what we call notions, and notions of notions."¹⁶

It "turns truth to falsehood, falsehood into truth". "The inventor of the watch, if this doctrine be true, did not in reality invent it; he only looked on, while the blind causes, the only true artists, were unfolding themselves.... The same must hold good of all systems of philosophy; of all arts,

15. *B. L.*, I, 81.

16. *Ibid.*, I, 82.

governments, wars by sea and by land; in short, of all things that ever have been or that ever will be produced. For, according to this system, it is not the affections and passions that are at work, in as far as they are *sensations* or *thoughts*. We only *fancy*, that we act from rational resolves, or prudent motives, or from impulses of anger, love, or generosity. In all these cases the real agent is a *something-nothing-everything*, which does all of which we know, and knows nothing of all that it itself does."¹⁷

"The existence of an infinite spirit, of an intelligent and holy will, must, on this system, be mere articulated motions of the air. For as the function of the human understanding is no other than merely (to appear to itself) to combine and to apply the phaenomena of the association; and as these derive all their reality from the primary sensations; and the sensations again all *their* reality from the impressions ab extra; a God not visible, audible, or tangible, can exist only in the sounds and letters that form his name and attributes. If in *ourselves* there be no such faculties as those of the will, and the scientific reason, we must either have an *innate* idea of them, which would overthrow the whole system; or we can have no idea at all. The process, by which Hume degraded the notion of cause and effect into a blind product of delusion and habit, into the mere sensation of *proceeding* life (*nisus vitalis*) associated with the images of the memory, this same process must be repeated to the equal degradation of every *fundamental* idea in ethics or theology."¹⁸

Coleridge pins down the main defect in the following words: "These [paralogisms], it appears to me, may be all reduced to one sophism as their common genus; the mistaking the *conditions* of a thing for its *causes* and *essence*; and the process, by which we arrive at the knowledge of a faculty, for the faculty itself. The air I breathe is the *condition* of my life, not its cause. We could never have learnt that we had

17. *B. L.*, I, 82-83.

18. *B. L.*, I, 83,

eyes but by the process of seeing, yet having seen we know that the eyes must have pre-existed in order to render the process of sight possible." Coleridge points out that "contemporaneity...is the *limit and condition* of the laws of mind, itself being rather a law of matter, at least of phaenomena considered as material. At the utmost, it is to *thought* the same, as the law of gravitation is to locomotion."¹⁹

"Contemporaneity, then, being the common condition of all the laws of association, and a component element in all the *materia subjecta*, the parts of which are to be associated, must needs be co-present with all." For an incautious mind it is easy to accept "this constant companion of each, for the essential substance of all". But that is a blunder. Even time "as the *cause* of a *particular* act of association is distinct from contemporaneity, as the *condition* of *all* association". Coleridge explains this by examples: "Seeing a mackerel, it may happen, that I immediately think of gooseberries, because I at the same time ate mackerel with gooseberries as the sauce. The first syllable of the latter word, being that which had co-existed with the image of the bird so called, I may then think of a goose. In the next moment the image of a swan may arise before me, though I had never seen the two birds together. In the two former instances, I am conscious that their co-existence in *time* was the circumstance, that enabled me to recollect them; and equally conscious am I that the latter was recalled to me by the joint operation of likeness and contrast. So it is with *cause* and *effect*; so too with *order*. So I am able to distinguish whether it was proximity in time, or continuity in space, that occasioned me to recall B on the mention of A. They cannot be indeed *separated* from contemporaneity; for that would be to separate them from the mind itself. The act of consciousness is indeed identical with *time* considered in its essence. (I mean *time* per se, as contradistinguished from our *notion* of time; for this is always blended with the idea of space, which, as *contrary* of

19. *Ibid.* I, 85.

time, is therefore its *measure*.) Nevertheless the accident of seeing two objects at the same moment acts as a distinguishable cause from that of having seen them at the same place....” Coleridge now gives his own wording to the law of association: “and the true practical general law of association is this; that whatever makes certain parts of a total impression more vivid or distinct than the rest, will determine the mind to recall these in preference to others equally linked together by the common condition of contemporaneity, or (what I deem a more appropriate and philosophical term) of *continuity*”.²⁰

Explaining the true nature of this mechanical law governing memory, Coleridge remarks that here also man is free. He derides the attempts made to reduce memory to an artificial mechanism and makes an important statement in the following words: “But the will itself by confining and intensifying the attention may arbitrarily give vividness or distinctness to any object whatsoever”.

The law of association which appeared to solve all the problems of art and literature by explaining the fact of knowledge thus dwindles into insignificance. It is no solution of the problem of knowledge as the discovery of the fact of breathing is no solution of the mystery of life. Ideas, i.e., impressions, live in association in our mind, and we remember associated ideas. But that is a mere truism, Coleridge seems to say. The real point to be noted is that we possess free will, that we are free to remember any idea whatsoever out of all the ideas that are linked together by association. Those who do not accept this factor of free will in the work of memory produce “only a confusion and debasement of the fancy”.²¹

II

Coleridge’s discussion of the law of association was part of his introduction to the theory of Imagination. He criticised the Associationists’ high claims for their theory and pointed

20. *B.L.*, I, 86-87.

21. *B.L.*, I, 87.

out their shortcomings. He showed that the creative process of Imagination was not explained by the law of association.

All associations presuppose the existence of thoughts and images to be associated. Naturally, this led Coleridge to consider how thoughts and images are formed. Many types of explanation have been analysed and refuted by him.

"Des Cartes," he says, "was the first philosopher, who introduced the absolute and essential heterogeneity of the soul as intelligence, and the body as matter....The soul was a *thinking* substance; and body a *space-filling* substance."^{21a} But how did the one react on the other? This was the problem. Coleridge learned from the Greeks, especially from Pythagoras,²² that the law of causality holds good only between homogeneous things, *i.e.*, things having some common property; and cannot extend from one world into another, its opposite. "Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre-established harmony, which he certainly borrowed from Spinoza, who had himself taken the hint from Des Cartes's animal machines, was in its *common* interpretation too strange to survive the inventor—too repugnant to our *common sense*..."

Hylozoism only multiplied the difficulties by telling us that "we have a million souls, and that every atom of our bodies has a soul of its own". Indeed, it "is the death of all rational physiology, and indeed of all physical science",²³ of a true psychology, as we should now say.

Coleridge thus comes to the conclusion that dualism in any of its forms is wrong. His own solution is an idealistic monism. Coleridge was a follower and admirer of Pythagoras, whom he called "the proper founder of philosophy", because he pointed out "the connection of the visible thing, the phenomenon, with the invisible thing under a cause common to both and above both".²⁴ And again, Pythagoras and his immediate

21a. *B. L.*, I, 88.

22. *P. L.*, p. 114.

23. *B. L.*, I, 89.

24. *P. L.*, p. 145.

followers taught that "in essence both object and subject were united in one, that there was one principle which produced the object of perception and that the same principle at the other pole produced the contemplation of that object..."²⁵ "How the *esse* assumed as originally distinct from the *scire*, can ever unite itself with it; how *being* can transform itself into a *knowing*, becomes conceivable on one only condition; namely, if it can be shown that the *vis representativa*, or the Sentient, is itself a species of being..." And there are two ways of showing the sentient as a species of being. Coleridge points out the one "as a property or attribute", and the other "as an hypostasis or self-subsistence".²⁶

That thinking is a property of matter under particular conditions is the assumption of materialism. There are empirical materialists and there are rational materialists. The empiricists derive all knowledge from outside through contact of the senses and think that the mind prior to perception is 'tabula rasa.' Against them Coleridge says: "But how any affection from without can metamorphose itself into perception or will, the materialist has hitherto left, not only as incomprehensible as he found it, but has aggravated it into a comprehensible absurdity. For, grant that an object from without could act upon the conscious *self*, as on a consubstantial object; yet such an affection could only engender something homogeneous with itself. Motion could only propagate motion. Matter has no *Inward*. We remove one surface, but to meet with another. We can but divide a particle into particles; and each atom comprehends in itself the properties of the material universe."

Again, "by the impact on the percipient, or ens representans, not the object itself, but only its action or effect, will pass into the same. Not the iron tongue, but its vibrations, pass into the metal of the bell. Now, in our immediate perception, it is not the mere power or act of the object, but the

25. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

26. *B. L.*, I, 89-90.

object itself, which is immediately present." And against any attempt to explain this result "by a chain of *deductions* and *conclusions*" Coleridge pointedly retorts: "It is the object itself, not the product of a syllogism, which is present to our consciousness" in an act of perception.

Again, "would we explain this supervention of the object to the sensation, by productive faculty set in motion by an impulse; still the transition, into the percipient, of the object itself, from which the impulse proceeded, assumes a power that can permeate and wholly possess the soul,

'And like a God by spiritual art,

Be all in all, and all in every part".²⁷

And this amounts to the materialist's leaving the ground of materialism altogether.

The interaction between the two completely dissimilar substances, a *res extensa* and a *res cogitans*, an extended object and a thinking subject, was not explained even by rationalists like Des Cartes. Later philosophers tried to fill in this gap in his system. Thus occasionalists believed that a real interaction between two fundamentally different substances was impossible and the appearance of interaction was produced by the direct action of God. Thus the ideas which we think we receive from the external world through excitation of the organs of sense are really shaped by God in conformity with material things, and the movements of our body which seem to arise from a definite volition are regulated by Him in accordance with the mental intention. Mind and Body are, therefore, each of them, only the accidental or apparent cause of changes occurring in the other. They are but the opportunity, the occasion, of the working of the true cause, which is God.

Against such an explanation Coleridge says that "a revelation unconfirmed by miracles, and a faith not commanded by the conscience, a philosopher may venture to pass by, without suspecting himself of any irreligious tendency".²⁸

27. *B. L.*, I, 90-91.

28. *B. L.*, I, 91.

Summarising the associationists' theory of knowledge and his own criticism of it, Coleridge says that all association demands and presupposes the existence of thoughts and images to be associated; that according to the associationists we see only images or modifications of our own being; that the external world is supposed exactly to correspond to our image; and that this theory places us in a dream world of phantoms and spectres of our own creation. He very pointedly says: "The formation of a copy is not solved by the mere pre-existence of an original; the copyist of Raphael's *Transfiguration* must repeat more or less perfectly the process of Raphael. It would be easy to explain a thought from the image on the retina, and that from the geometry of light, if this very light did not present the very same difficulty. We might as rationally chant the Brahmin creed of the tortoise that supported the bear, that supported the elephant, that supported the world, to the tune of 'This is the house that Jack built'." ²⁹

Coleridge says against the associationists that "an answer to the whence? and why? is no answer to the how? which alone is the physiologist's concern", ³⁰ or, as we should now say, the psychologist's concern. Coleridge's main concern was psychological. How is a relation between the physical and the psychical, between the subject that knows and the object that is known, established at all? Coleridge's answer is that the relation can be explained only by considering the sentient as a self-subsistent being. "Truth is the correlative of Being." ³¹ "In order to explain *thinking*, as a material phaenomenon, it is necessary to refine matter into a mere modification of intelligence, with the two-fold function of *appearing* and *perceiving*." ³¹

29. *Ibid.*, I, 92.

30. *B. L.*, I, 94.

31. *Ibid.*, I, 91.

CHAPTER III

THE PERSPECTIVE CENTRAL POINT: THE ETERNAL I AM

The musician may tune his instrument in private, ere his audience have yet assembled: the architect conceals the foundation of his building beneath the superstructure. But an author's harp must be tuned in the hearing of those, who are to understand its after harmonies; the foundation stones of his edifice must lie open to common view, or his friends will hesitate to trust themselves beneath the roof.

The Friend, Introductory Essay 2, p. 5.

The first step to knowledge, or rather the previous condition of all insight into truth, is to dare commune with our very and permanent self.

The Friend, Introductory Essay 16, p. 68.

...unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how poor a thing is Man !

Daniel quoted in the Introductory Essay 14, *Ibid.*, p. 59.

This again is the mystery and the dignity of our human nature, that we cannot give up our reason, without giving up at the same time our individual personality. For that must appear to each man to be his reason which produces in him the highest sense of certainty ; and yet it is not reason, except as far as it is of universal validity and obligatory on all mankind. There is one heart for the whole mighty mass of humanity, and every pulse in each particular vessel strives to beat in concert with it.

Ibid., Intro. Essay 13, p. 57.

Eko bhāvaḥ sarva-bhāva-svabhāvaḥ

Sarve bhāvā eka-bhāva-svabhāvāḥ.

Mālinīvijayavārtikam, kāṇḍa I, verse 641.

THINGS utterly heterogeneous can have no intercommunion."¹ Coleridge learned from Pythagoras and repeatedly stated it in his lectures, letters and essays. He explained knowledge or experience as self-projection of the subject or the knower. An early study of Plato and Plotinus and other philosophers prepared his mind for the acceptance of the formula, "Cogito quia sum, et sum quia Cogito",² I think because I am, and I am because I think. "The term, Philosophy," according to Coleridge, "defines itself as an affectionate seeking after the truth, but Truth is the correlative of Being. This again is no way conceivable; but by assuming as a postulate, that both are *ab initio*, identical and co-inherent..."³ In another passage he refers to "the inmost centre, from which all the lines of knowledge diverge to their ever distant circumference".⁴ It is this inmost centre that he takes as the starting point of his philosophy. It was his great desire to derive from one supreme intelligential principle, which he calls Reason, all the lower mental powers.

Coleridge was conscious of the difficulty of his philosophy. "Albeit, I must confess to be half in doubt, whether I should bring it forth or no", he says in the words of Milton, "it being so contrary to the eye of the world, and the world so potent in most men's hearts that I shall endanger either not to be regarded or not to be understood".⁵ He, therefore, anticipated "a scanty audience for [his] abstrusest themes, and truths that can neither be communicated or received without effort of thought as well as patience of attention".⁶ But he had great faith and confidence in his philosophy, for it was, he says, "the most ancient and therefore presumptively the most natural".⁷ Naturally, he takes great precautions

1. *The Friend*, p. 338.

2. *B. L.*, I, 95.

3. *Ibid.*, I, 94.

4. *Ibid.*, I, 96.

5. *Ibid.*, I, 105.

6. *Ibid.*, I, 106-107.

7. *B. L.*, I, 95.

in introducing his subject and preparing the reader's mind for its hearty reception. At the very outset in his famous "Chapter of Requests", he requests his reader that "he will either pass over the following chapter [which deals with the exposition of his philosophy] altogether, or read the whole connectedly",⁸ for, otherwise, the chances of misunderstanding are very great. It is especially so because in most of the systems the truth "is often painted, yet oftener masked, and is sometimes mutilated and sometimes, alas ! in close alliance with mischievous errors".⁹ Coleridge thinks that his task as a philosopher is to collect "the fragments of truth" from the various systems of philosophy and explain them from "one perspective [central point, which shows regularity and a coincidence of all the parts in the very object, which from every other point of view must appear confused and distorted." "The spirit of sectarianism", he says almost in the Kantian fashion, "has been hitherto our fault, and the cause of our failures. We have imprisoned our own conceptions by the lines, which we have drawn, in order to exclude the conceptions of others."¹⁰ He gives every system of philosophy its due, and his main contribution is giving the "one perspective central point".

We can now very well understand his maxim that "until you understand a writer's ignorance, presume yourself ignorant of his understanding".¹¹ He means that different writers have given their own explanations of truth, but they have failed so far to convince us. The reason is that though there was some truth in the philosophy of each of them, it was either not fully stated or somewhat mixed with errors. With these omissions and errors they failed to convince us and often confused us. Naturally we fail to understand them. But once we get the necessary "perspective central point", we at once know clearly where a writer has failed. We under-

8. *Ibid.*, I, 162.

9. *Ibid.*, I, 169.

10. *Ibid.*, I, 170.

11. *Ibid.*, I, 160.

stand his ignorance. At the same time we become conscious of the achievement of the writer. We measure the distance he has travelled on the road to Truth. One who knows the destination alone can say what distance has been covered and what remains, whether the journey has been made on the right track or it has been all a roaming. One having no knowledge of the destination cannot pass a correct judgment on the journey of his fellow-travellers. Coleridge was convinced that he had caught the right perspective central point, which others had missed. And he took very great care to explain it.

Coleridge has given various criteria which the reader must conform to in order to understand his perspective central point. He says that though he cannot request the reader to strip his mind of all prejudices, nor to keep all prior systems out of view during his examination of the present, for that is impossible, as there is no art of destroying the memory *a parte post* without injury to its future operations and without detriment to the judgment,¹² yet he must ask him to be prepared to revise his opinion about almost everything in the universe. To give his criterion in his own words, "if a man receives as fundamental facts and therefore of course indemonstrable and incapable of further analysis, the general notions of matter, spirit, soul, body, action, passiveness, time, space, cause and effect, consciousness, perception, memory and habit ; if he feels his mind completely at rest concerning all these, and is satisfied, if only he can analyse all other notions into some one or more of these supposed elements with plausible subordination and apt arrangement: to such a mind I would as courteously as possible convey the hint, that for him the chapter was not written". The reason is apparent. "For these terms do in truth *include* all the difficulties, which the human mind can propose for solution." To accept them unexamined would have defeated the very purpose of Coleridge, who was to give a new explanation of the relation between thoughts and things. Coleridge realized

12. B. L., I, 162.

the utility of these terms for "rendering our knowledge more distinct", but he also knew that an analysis in these terms without explaining them did not really add to knowledge.

He speaks very vehemently against the empirical materialistic philosophy, "which talking of mind but thinking of brick and mortar, or other images equally abstracted from body, contrives a theory of spirit by nicknaming matter, and in a few hours can qualify its dullest disciples to explain the omne scibile by reducing all things to impressions, ideas, and sensations". "The proselytes of that compendious philosophy" cannot understand Coleridge.¹³

He is not disturbed if he gets a scanty audience, for, he says, "it is neither possible or necessary for all men, or for many, to be PHILOSOPHERS."¹⁴ With such a preamble he makes a statement of great significance and it deserves to be quoted in full.

"There is a *philosophic* (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness*, which lies beneath or (as it were) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of PURE philosophy, which is therefore properly entitled *transcendental*, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and *re*-presentation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned, as *transcendent*. The first range of hills, that encircles the scanty vale of human life, is the horizon for the majority of its inhabitants. On *its* ridges the common sun

13. *B. L.*, I, 162-3.

14. *Ibid.*, I, 164.

is born and departs. From *them* the stars rise, and touching *them* they vanish. By the many, even this range, the natural limit and bulwark of the vale, is but imperfectly known. Its higher ascents are too often hidden by mists and clouds from uncultivated swamps, which few have courage or curiosity to penetrate. To the multitude below these vapours appear, now as the dark haunts of terrific agents, on which none may intrude with impunity; and now *a-glow*, with colours not their own, they are gazed at as the splendid palaces of happiness and power. But in all ages there have been a few, who measuring and sounding the rivers of the vale at the feet of their furthest inaccessible falls have learned, that the sources must be far higher and far inward; a few, who even in the level streams have detected elements, which neither the vale itself or the surrounding mountains contained or could supply. How and whence to these thoughts, these strong probabilities, the ascertaining vision, the intuitive knowledge may finally supervene, can be learnt only by the facts. I might oppose to the question the words with which Plotinus supposes NATURE to answer a similar difficulty. "Should anyone interrogate her, how she works, if graciously she vouchsafe to listen and speak, she will reply, it behoves thee not to disquiet me with interrogatories, but to understand in silence even as I am silent, and work without words".¹⁵

Whenever Coleridge speaks of noumenal consciousness, he becomes ecstatic and his language becomes intensely imaginative and metaphorical. In the following passage of *The Friend* (p. 336) he deals with this very subject in another way.

"In the pursuits of commerce the man is called into action from without, in order to appropriate the outward world, as far as he can bring it within his reach, to the purposes of his senses and sensual nature. His ultimate end is—appearance and enjoyment. Where, on the other hand, the nurture and evolution of humanity is the final aim, there will soon be seen

15. *B. L.*, I, 164-6.

a general tendency toward, an earnest seeking after, some ground common to the world and to man, therein to find the one principle of permanence and identity, the rock of strength and refuge, to which the soul may cling amid the fleeting surge-like objects of the senses. Disturbed as by the obscure quickening of an inward birth; made restless by swarming thoughts, that, like bees when they first miss the queen and mother of the hive, with vain discursion seek each in the other what is the common need of all; man sallies forth into nature - in nature as in the shadows and reflections of a clear river, to discover the originals of the forms presented to him in his own intellect. Over these shadows, as if they were the substantial powers and presiding spirits of the stream, Narcissus-like, he hangs delighted; till finding nowhere a representative of that free agency which yet is a fact of immediate consciousness sanctioned and made fearfully significant by his prophetic conscience, he learns at last that what he seeks he has left behind, and but lengthens the distance as he prolongs the search. Under the tutorage of scientific analysis, haply first given to him by express revelation...he separates the relations that are wholly the creatures of his own abstracting and comparing intellect, and at once discovers and recoils from the discovery, that the reality, the objective truth, of the objects he has been adoring, derives its whole and sole evidence from an obscure sensation, which he is alike unable to resist or to comprehend, which compels him to contemplate as without and independent of himself what yet he could not contemplate at all, were it not a modification of his own being."

In these passages Coleridge speaks of two different regions of consciousness. The region of 'spontaneous' consciousness is common to all people. It is the domain of 'sense', of 'sensuous' knowledge, of conceptions, of what Coleridge calls 'understanding', or what in the happy phrase of Wordsworth is 'the light of common day'. Very few people can go beyond this region of consciousness. It is their horizon. But there are

a few who get a glimpse of a region beyond or beneath it. This other region of consciousness is exclusively the domain of pure philosophy ; and philosophy, says Coleridge, "cannot be intelligible to all, even of the most learned and cultivated classes".¹⁶ He further says that just as there are "organs of sense...framed for a corresponding world of sense", so there are "organs of spirit...framed for a correspondent world of spirit". But "the latter organs are not developed in all alike", though "they exist in all".¹⁷

Of these organs of spirit Coleridge does not speak here separately. He only says that "Philosophy is employed on objects of the inner sense".¹⁸ which thus is the organ of the spirit. While the outward sense-organs are almost equally developed in all healthy people, this inner sense is developed more or less. "One man's consciousness extends only to the pleasant or unpleasant sensations caused in him by external impressions; another enlarges his inner sense to a consciousness of forms and quantity; a third in addition to the image is conscious of the conception or notion of the things; a fourth attains to a notion of his notions—he reflects on his own reflections; and thus we may say without impropriety, that the one possesses more or less inner sense, than the other." Thus we see that "the inner sense has its direction determined for the greater part only by an act of freedom".¹⁹

"The medium, by which spirits understand each other is not the surrounding air; but the *freedom* which they possess in common, as the common ethereal element of their being, the tremulous reciprocations of which propagate themselves even to the inmost of the soul. Where the spirit of a man is not *filled* with the consciousness of freedom (were it only from its restlessness, as of one still struggling in bondage) all spiri-

16. *B. L.*, I, 168.

17. *Ibid.*, I, 167.

18. *Ibid.*, I, 171-72.

19. *Ibid.*, I, 172.

tual intercourse is interrupted, not only with others, but even with himself." The result is that even his common or spontaneous consciousness presents difficulties to him. His understanding remains "unenlivened and stagnant". His common consciousness appears as a "fearful desert"; "he wearies himself out with empty words to which no friendly echo answers, either from his own heart or the heart of a fellow being".²⁰ Coleridge thus shows that the philosophic consciousness is necessary for clarity even in the domain of the common consciousness, for, according to him, it is connected with the "master-currents" of the philosophic consciousness.²¹ Speaking of the true education, which, he says, can be no other than a methodical and progressive education, he stresses this point in *The Friend* (p. 330). He shows the importance of the "period of dawning and twilight, a period of anticipation" after "a period of orderliness, of circumspection, of discipline". If this period of twilight does not come in a person's career, he cannot be said to have been properly educated, however talented he may be. Coleridge emphasises the need of "progressive transition" in a true methodical education, for which the light must come from within. "But as, without continuous transition there can be no method, so without a pre-conception there can be no transition with continuity. The term, method, cannot therefore, otherwise than by abuse, be applied to a mere dead arrangement, containing in itself no principle of progression."²² "...Philosophy in its first principles must have a practical or moral, as well as a theoretical or speculative side."²³ It "is neither a science of the reason or understanding only, nor merely a science of morals, but the science of BEING altogether".²⁴

Here we may note the difference between Coleridge and his master, Immanuel Kant. Kant also believed in two re-

20. *B. L.*, I. 168-9.

21. *Ibid.*, I. 167.

22. *The Friend*, p. 304.

23. *B. L.*, I. 172-3.

24. *Ibid.*, I. 174.

gions of consciousness, phenomenal and noumenal. Kant's noumenal consciousness or transcendental apperception, by which he means the "pure, original, unchangeable consciousness",²⁵ can render knowledge possible by giving unity to the flux of sensations. But it cannot make us know the nature of the thing-in-itself; it cannot reveal the real noumenal region. It only gives us the "form" of knowledge. The "matter"—the affections produced by things-in-themselves—has, according to Kant, a character independent of the form. Kant insists on a distinction between the "form" and the "matter" of experience. He assigns to its "form" an origin in the understanding but ascribes the "matter" to an unknown and unknowable alien source. This dualism of Kant made Coleridge reject the master's guidance. Coleridge accepted Kant so far as he pointed out the limitations of the empiricists and the rationalists in solving the problem of experience. But when he denied the power of the speculative reason to transcend the limits of the logical understanding, Coleridge refused to follow.

T. H. Green very clearly shows that Kant's ascribing the 'matter' of experience to an unknown alien source "seems to cancel the significance of his own declarations in regard to the intellectual principle necessary to constitute its form". He says: "And if phaenomena, as *materialiter spectata* have such another nature, it will follow—not indeed that all our knowledge is an illusion in the ordinary sense of the term, for that implies a possibility of correction by true knowledge—but that there is no ground for that conviction of there being some unity and totality in things, from which the quest for knowledge proceeds....If this be so, the conception of a universe is a delusive one. Man weaves a web of his own and calls it a universe; but if the principle of this universe is neither one with, nor dependent on, that of things-in-themselves, there is in truth no universe at all, nor does there seem

25. Watson's *Selections*, p. 65, quoted by A. C. Mukherjee, *Nature of Self*, p. 164.

to be any reason why there should not be any number of such independent creations. We have asserted the unity of the world of our experience only to transfer that world to a larger chaos."²⁶

Coleridge would have agreed in toto with this criticism of Kant. In the *Biographia* Coleridge is very respectful to Kant even though he notes his disagreement with the master. Referring to him Coleridge says: "The few passages that remained obscure to me, after due efforts of thought (as the chapter on *original apperception*), and the apparent contradictions which occur, I soon found were hints and insinuations referring to ideas, which KANT either did not think it prudent to avow, or which he considered as consistently *left behind* in a pure analysis, not of human nature in toto, but of the speculative intellect alone".²⁷ But later on Coleridge spoke of Kant's errors boldly.²⁸ Miss Coburn quotes Coleridge's statement that "in Psychology Kant is but suspicious Authority".²⁹

Coleridge has the strongest conviction that Reality can be known. He says in *The Friend*, (p. 328), "In a self-conscious and thence reflecting being, no instinct can exist, without engendering the belief of an object corresponding to it, either present or future, real or capable of being realized: much less the instinct in which humanity itself is grounded: that by which, in every act of conscious perception, we at once identify our being with that of the world without us, and yet place ourselves in contra-distinction to that world". Our very desire to know is a proof that Reality can be known. This goes against Kant's sceptical theory of knowledge. All the essays in *The Friend* on a progressive methodical education are based on the faith that Reality can be revealed even though to a select few only. Coleridge states his view on this

26. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 40, 42.

27. *B. L.*, I, 99.

28. See Letter 1096, *C. L.*, IV, 808.

29. Foreword to *Coleridge on Imagination* by I. A. Richards, p. xxi.

point very simply and clearly in the *Biographia*. "Truth is correlative to being. Knowledge without a correspondent reality is no knowledge; if we know, there must be somewhat known by us."³⁰

In the *Biographia* Coleridge speaks of the hypothetical priority of the two poles of knowledge. "During the act of knowledge itself, the objective and subjective are so instantly united, that we cannot determine to which of the two the priority belongs. There is here no first, and no second; both are coinstantaneous and one. While I am attempting to explain this intimate coalition, I must suppose it dissolved."³¹

Later on he corrected this view, which, he said, he had borrowed from Schelling. He said: "...from the tendency of my mind to confidence in others I was myself *taken in* by it, retrograding from my own prior and better Lights, and adopted it in the metaphysical chapters of my *Literary Life*". He noted the fallacy in Schelling's argument and rejected it. "If God as God be the one necessary Existence, if he be *Ens semper perfectum*, and all-sufficient, the material World cannot be *necessary*-and if it be, then God as God is not self-sufficing *i.e.*, he is not GOD, but a part of the universe, nay a product of the same." He further points out that "the artifice of making all knowledge bi-polar, Transcendental Idealism as one Pole and Nature as the other,...was putting the Candle horizontally and burning it at both ends".³²

In order to find the truth, we should not start with opposing concepts. Instead, we have to "seek first for the Unity as the only source of Reality and then for the two opposite yet correspondent forms by which it manifests itself". So he says in a marginal note on a work of Kant.³³

The proper beginning in philosophical thinking is made with "I am" and not with "it is". In the letter quoted above

30. *B. L.*, I, 180.

31. *Ibid.*, I, 174.

32. Letter 1145 to J. H. Green, dated 30 Sept. 1818, *C. L.* IV, 873-4.

33. *Coleridge as Philosopher*, p. 86.

Coleridge rejects the antecedence of object and makes the divine unity of subject and object as the first postulate of his philosophy. In his mature essays of *The Friend* he writes, "Long indeed will man strive to satisfy the inward querist with the phrase, laws of nature. But though the individual may rest content with the seemingly metaphor, the race cannot....In order, therefore, to the recognition of himself in nature man must first learn to comprehend nature in himself, and its laws in the ground of his own existence. Then only can he reduce phaenomena to principles—then only will he have achieved the method, the self-unravelling clue, which alone can securely guide him to the conquest of the former—when he has discovered in the basis of their union the necessity of their differences; in the principle of their continuance the solution of their changes. It is the idea of the common centre, of the universal law, by which all power manifests itself in opposite yet interdependent forces,... that enlightening enquiry, multiplying experiment, and at once inspiring humility and perseverance, will lead him to comprehend gradually and progressively the relation of each to the other, of each to all, and of all to each".³⁴

In the *Biographia* Coleridge speaks of two kinds of truth, immediate or original and mediate or derived. He points out that "a cycle of equal truths without a common and central principle, which prescribes to each its proper sphere in the system of science" is inconceivable.³⁵ He reiterated in *The Friend*, (p. 307), that "to find a ground that is unconditional and absolute, and thereby to reduce the aggregate of human knowledge to a system" was "the final object and distinctive character of philosophy".

In search of this central principle he proceeds step by step with the help of some self-evident truths he calls theses. The central principle of truth thus cannot be a mediate one. It must be "a truth self-grounded, unconditional and known by

34. *The Friend*, pp. 337-8.

35. *B. L.*, I, 181.

its own light". Such a truth "must be one which is its own predicate, so far at least that all other nominal predicates must be modes and repetitions of itself".³⁶ "Such a principle cannot be any THING or OBJECT. Each thing is what it is in consequence of some other thing. An infinite, independent *thing*, is no less a contradiction, than an infinite circle or a sideless triangle." "But neither can the principle be found in a subject as a subject, contra-distinguished from an object.... It is to be found therefore neither in object nor subject taken separately, and consequently, as no other third is conceivable, it must be found in that which is neither subject nor object exclusively, but which is the identity of both."³⁷ "This principle, and so characterized, manifests itself in the SUM or I AM", which Coleridge variously names as "spirit, self, and self-consciousness".³⁸

So far Coleridge does not clarify the difference between the individual self and the Absolute Self. He does it in the Scholium to Thesis VI. He says: "If a man be asked how he *knows* that he is? he can only answer, *sum quia sum*". 'I am because I am' is a satisfactory answer. But that reply cannot be correct when he is asked about the ground of his existence, for man is a mortal being and he can be easily blown out of existence to disprove such a statement. It is only God who can say in reply to the question about the ground of his existence also that "I am because I am". God thus is no other than the absolute eternal I AM and in Him alone "the principle of being and of knowledge, of idea and of reality; the ground of existence and the ground of the knowledge of existence are absolutely identical". He alone can say, "I am, because I affirm myself to be; I affirm myself to be, because I am".³⁹

The individual self inheres in the absolute self. In a *Table Talk* of Nov. 1, 1833, Coleridge speaks of the process how

36. *Ibid.*, I, 181.

37. *Ibid.*, I, 182.

38. *Ibid.*, I, 183.

39. *Ibid.*, I, 183.

the individual self will find it out for himself. "Let a young man separate I from Me as far as he possibly can, and remove Me till it is almost lost in the remote distance." This Me is finite I, the empirical impure self; the pure, absolute, eternal self is I. Coleridge says that "none but one—God—can say, 'I am I', or 'That I am'". Coleridge, however, says that man or individual self also can be in a position to say so when by a process of abstraction or annihilation 'Me is lost'. "We begin", he says at the end of Thesis IX, "with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in God".⁴⁰ That state of the self will be the state of godhead. He who achieves it is one with God.

That will be a state of pure self-consciousness. We cannot think of any other predicate of self at that stage. For if "I know myself only through myself, it is contradictory to require any other predicate of self, but that of self-consciousness. Only in the self-consciousness of a spirit is there the required identity of object and of representation; for herein consists the essence of a spirit that it is self-representative".⁴¹

This means that the spirit or the subject "objectizes" itself in this most original and fundamental form of knowledge. As this "primary self-knowing"⁴² is "the one only immediate truth in the certainty of which the reality of our collective knowledge is grounded, it must follow that the spirit in all the objects which it views, views only itself".⁴³ Considering the problem from the naturalistic standpoint Coleridge says in Thesis X that "...sensation itself is but vision nascent, not the cause of intelligence, but intelligence itself revealed as an

40. *B. L.*, I, 186.

41. *Ibid.*, I, 184.

42. *Ibid.*, I, 186.

43. *Ibid.*, I, 184.

earlier power in the process of self-construction".⁴⁴ In his *Dejection: An Ode* Coleridge says the same thing:

"O Lady, we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live."

Similarly in a Note Coleridge says that "percipiency in *genere* is an attribute of the soul, and that sensation is nothing more than a species of perception modified by the object".⁴⁵

That "intelligence is a self-development, not a quality supervening to a substance,"⁴⁶ is the most fundamental tenet of the Coleridgean philosophy. For if intelligence be taken as a quality different from the substance to which it supervenes, the union of heterogeneous things will remain unexplained. Hence intelligence or self-consciousness is a self-development. It may be conceived as freedom or as indestructible power of self. This power has two opposite and counteracting forces or tendencies, which, by a metaphor borrowed from astronomy, Coleridge calls "the centrifugal and centripetal forces. The intelligence in the one tends to *objectize* itself and in the other to *know* itself in the object."⁴⁷

The unity of subject and object, which is Coleridge's dynamic absolute, has to be dissolved in order that knowledge may be possible, in order that the subject may be conscious of itself. Just as this unity is essential for the certainty of knowledge, similarly its dissolution is essential for the possibility of knowledge. This dissolution "implies an act and it follows therefore that intelligence or self-consciousness is impossible except by and in a will. The self-conscious spirit therefore is a will; and freedom must be assumed as a ground of philosophy, and can never be deduced from it."⁴⁸ As Will, the absolute spirit is free to act, free to dissolve its identity with the object, which is the original act that it performs. The spirit must will in order to be self-conscious. In

44. *Ibid.*, I, 187-8.

45. *P. L.*, Introduction, p. 61.

46. *B. L.*, I, 188.

47. *Ibid.*, I, 188.

48. *Ibid.*, I, 185.

order to be self-conscious, in order to know itself it must act, and the first act that it performs is to duplicate itself, to objectize itself. The dissolution, however, does not make the absolute deficient in any way. Coleridge pointed out that God-World=God.

Coleridge says that a state of the absolute prior to this primary act of self-consciousness can hardly be known. "The transcendental philosopher does not enquire what ultimate ground of our knowledge there may lie out of our knowing, but what is the last in our knowing itself, beyond which we cannot pass."⁴⁹ In *The Friend* he speaks of "absolute existence" but speaks of it in terms of self-consciousness. He says that it "admits of no question out of itself, acknowledges no predicate but the I AM IN THAT I AM".⁵⁰

Therefore the most original form of the absolute spirit for us is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, spirit, self, absolute existence, God, divine idea, I AM, reason, freedom, will, power and life are almost synonymous terms in the Coleridgean philosophy. He uses these terms to explain his concept of the most original ground of all that exists and knows. This is the first postulate of his transcendental philosophy, which he names the "ultimate science", on which every other science depends.

In his essay, 'The Prometheus of Aeschylus', Coleridge himself sees the similarity of his views with those of Greek and Eastern thinkers. "The Greeks agreed with the cosmogonies of the East in deriving all sensible forms from the indistinguishable. The latter we find designated as the $\tauὸ ἀμορφόν$, the $\psiδωρ$ $\piροκοδμικόν$, the $\chiᾶος$, as the essentially unintelligible, yet necessarily presumed, basis or sub-position of all positions. That it is, scientifically considered, an indispensable idea for the human mind just as the mathematical point, &c. for the geometrician;...As an

49. *Ibid.*, I, 186.

50. *The Friend*, p. 343.

idea it must be interpreted as a striving of the mind to distinguish being from existence, — or potential being the ground of being, containing the possibility of existence, from being actualized. In the language of the mysteries, it was the *ensurence*, the *desideratum*, the unfuelled fire, the Ceres, the ever-seeking maternal goddess, the origin and interpretation of whose name is found in the Hebrew root signifying hunger, and thence capacity. It was, in short, an effort to represent the universal ground of all differences distinct or opposite, but in relation to which all *antithesis* as well as all *antitheta*, existed only potentially. This was the container and withholder, (such is the primitive sense of the Hebrew word rendered darkness (Gen. 1. 2.)) out of which *light*, that is, the *lux lucifica* as distinguished from *lumen sensus lux phaenomenalis*, was produced ; say, rather, that which producing itself into light as the one pole or antagonist power, remained in the other pole as darkness, that is gravity, or the principle of mass, or wholeness without distinction of parts."

We shall see later on that the *Śiva-Śakti* unity of the Trika philosophy believes in a similar immanent and transcendental concept of the absolute and that, like Coleridge, Abhinavagupta also considered the divine unity of existence and knowledge as the most important form of the absolute. Darkness manifests light from its own womb, so to say, by its freedom. Without this freedom and power of manifestation, light cannot be explained and darkness will be worthless as sod, not capable of being unified with absolute existence.

In the divine unity the primary act of willing or self-duplication, objectizing and knowing are almost synonymous ; the one includes the other. But in the lower manifestations they become the two poles of natural and transcendental philosophy—the dead object and the knowing self, and objectizing becomes a centrifugal tendency and knowing a centripetal one.

There are two poles in every experience, the objective and the subjective. Their unity and identity account for the possibility and reality of the experience as has already

been explained. "The highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiritualisation of all the laws of nature into laws of intuition and intellect. The phaenomena (*the material*) must wholly disappear, and the laws (*the formal*) must remain. Thence it comes, that in nature itself the more the principle of law breaks forth, the more does the *husk* drop off, the phaenomena themselves become more spiritual and at length cease altogether in our consciousness....The theory of natural philosophy would then be completed, when all nature was demonstrated to be identical in essence with that, which in its highest known power exists in man as intelligence and self-consciousness."⁵¹ That will be "substantial knowledge" when we see nature and intelligence as essentially one. But "we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as object to subject, thing to thought, death to life". This "abstract knowledge, or the science of mere understanding", "which belongs to us as finite beings, and which leads to a science of delusion",⁵² has to be replaced by the substantial knowledge of the essential unity between the two separated factors.

Coleridge points out that scientists who commence with the material phenomena as real do tend almost instinctively to end in nature as intelligence. To him idea and law are correlative terms.⁵³ He praises chemistry, for it shows nature "as at once the poet and the poem". "If in Shakespeare we find nature idealised into poetry, through the creative power of a profound yet observant meditation, so through the meditative observation of a Davy, a Woollaston, or a Hatchett,...we find poetry, as it were, substantiated and realized in nature."⁵⁴

To Coleridge realism and idealism are not contradictory terms. He calls his standpoint both realistic and idealistic. He says that it is wrong to understand by realism that there

51. *B. L.*, I, 175-6.

52. *The Friend*, p. 344.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 312.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 313.

exists something without us, which occasions the objects of our perception. Realism in this sense "is neither connatural nor universal. It is what a few have taught and learned in the schools and 'which the many repeat without asking themselves concerning their own meaning'. The true and original realism, which is natural as well as universal, means that the object which the self presents to itself is the real object. "It is the table itself, which the man of common sense believes himself to see, not the phantom of a table, from which he may argumentatively deduce the reality of a table, which he does not see."

Coleridge speaks vehemently against that type of idealism which aims only at the destruction of the reality of all that we actually behold. If that be idealism, he asks, "what can be more egregiously so, than the system of modern metaphysics, which banishes us to a land of shadows, surrounds us with apparitions, and distinguishes truth from illusion only by the majority of those who dream the same dream?"⁵⁵

Coleridge was as much against Locke's empiricism as against Berkeley's idealism. In a Note Coleridge writes :

"A position which occurred to me 20 years ago as an objection to idealism (as Berkeley's &c.) recurs with additional weight to me as often as I think on the subject. Idealism and materialism are both grounded in the impossibility of intermutual action between things altogether heterogeneous—and here again it is assumed by both parties that *perception* is but a sort of, or at least an immediate derivation from *sensation*—so that the changes or modifications of the percipient's own being are exclusively the objects of his perception. But is not this gratuitous ? Is not sensibility just as mysterious, equally *datum haud intellectum*, as percipency ? If I assume, as I have a far better right to do because all men do so naturally, that percipency *in genere* is an attribute of the soul, and that sensation is nothing more than a species

of perception modified by the object (just as colours, and sounds difference it, while they realize it) which in this instance is the percipient's own existence, all is clear."⁵⁶

Again Coleridge says: "From the beginning I avoid the false opposition of Real and Ideal which embarrasses Schelling. Idea with me is contradistinguished only from Conception, Notion, Construction, Impression, and Sensation".⁵⁷ In the *Lay Sermons* (pp. 35-6) Coleridge's idealistic realism gets a still clearer expression. He says:

"Suffer me to inform or remind you, that there is a three-fold necessity. There is a logical, and there is a mathematical necessity; but the latter is always hypothetical, and both subsist formally only, not in any real object. Only by intuition and immediate spiritual consciousness of the idea of God, as the One and Absolute, at once the ground and cause, who alone containeth in himself the ground of his own nature, and therein of all natures, do we arrive at the third, which alone is a real objective necessity. Here the immediate consciousness decides: the idea is its own evidence and is insusceptible of all other. It is necessarily groundless and indemonstrable; because it is itself the ground of all possible demonstration. The reason hath faith in itself, in its own revelations....All the necessity of causal relations (which the mere understanding reduces, and must reduce to co-existence and regular succession in the objects of which they are predicated and to habit and association in the mind predicating) depends on, or rather inheres in, the idea of the omnipresent and absolute: for this it is, in which the possible is one and the same with the real and the necessary."

"All other sciences are confined to abstractions unless when the term science is used in an improper and flattering sense—Thus we may speak without boast of natural history; but we have not yet attained to a science of nature. The Bible alone contains a science of realities: and therefore

56. *P. L.*, Introduction, pp. 60-1.

57. *Inquiring Spirit*, item 98.

each of its elements is at the same time a living germ, in which the present involves the future, and in the finite the infinite exists potentially. That hidden mystery in even the minutest form of existence, which contemplated under the relations of time presents itself to the understanding retrospectively, as an infinite ascent of causes, and prospectively as an interminable progression of effects;—that which contemplated in space is beholden intuitively as a law of action and reaction, continuous and extending beyond all bound;—this same mystery freed from the phaenomena of time and space, and seen in the depth of real being, reveals itself to the pure reason as the actual immanence or in-being of all in each."

Thus the standpoint of Coleridge is realistic inasmuch as the object is not a figment of the mind, and it is idealistic so far as the essence of everything is no other than our self-consciousness. "In this sense, however much we may strive against it, we are all collectively born idealists, and therefore and only therefore are we at the same time realists."⁵⁸

Using the words of T. H. Green we may say that it is an "idealism which interprets facts as relations, and can only understand relations as constituted by a single spiritual principle".⁵⁹

Coleridge's life-long task was to give the spiritual principle and the right method of education to the people of his age. Method, he says, "becomes natural to the mind which has been accustomed to contemplate not things only, or for their own sake alone, but likewise and chiefly the relations of things, either their relations to each other, or to the observer, or to the state and apprehension of the hearers. To enumerate and analyse these relations, with the conditions under which alone they are discoverable, is to teach the science of method."⁶⁰

58. *B. L.*, I, 179. See also Letter 1126 : "The Reason, the realizing of the Ideal, the Idealizing of the Real..." *C. L.*, IV, 851.

59. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 39.

60. *The Friend*, p. 300.

Pointing out the difference between the uneducated and the educated, Coleridge says that while the former sees and expresses "insulated facts", the latter "chiefly seeks to discover and express those *connections* of things or those relative *bearings* of fact to fact, from which some more or less general law is deducible. For *facts* are valuable to a wise man, chiefly as they lead to the discovery of the indwelling *law*, which is the true *being* of things, the sole solution of their modes of existence, and in the knowledge of which consists our dignity and our power."⁶¹

To sum up, we see that the most original ground of knowledge and existence is self-consciousness, which is self-grounded and requires no further ground. It is free and hence may be conceived as Will. It is full and self-sufficient and hence may be felt as Joy. It is the sheet-anchor of the certainty of all knowledge and the reality of all existence. It is the only creative force. It creates the whole universe out of itself by its own self-limiting power but is never imprisoned in any of its forms. We shall see next how creation and knowledge are manifestations of this "ever-ebullient stream" of life.

61. *B. L.*, II, 39. Cp. Letter 1002: "It is now as much my nature to evolve the *fact* from the *Law* as that of a practical man to deduce the Law from the Fact." *C. L.*, IV, 629.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ORGANS OF SPIRIT AND THE ORGANS OF SENSE

In order to understand by the Rule you must first understand the Rule and in order to ascertain this, it would be well to know what you mean by Understanding in general. And this is one main object of the present work.

...I know much that I do not understand ; but to understand what I know (*scire me scire*) is the end of all...science...and the aim of all liberal Education as far as the Intellect is concerned. The very word implies it—for the mind is educed, drawn forth, or developed, in exact proportion as the consciousness is extended.

I. S., item 66.

Until you have mastered the fundamental difference in kind between the reason and the understanding as faculties of the human mind, you cannot escape a thousand difficulties in philosophy. It is pre-eminently the *Gradus ad Philosophiam*.

Table Talk, May 14, 1830.

Charles Lamb wrote an essay on a man who lived in past time. I thought of adding another to it on one who lived not *in time* at all, past, present or future, but beside it, or collaterally.

Table Talk, Aug. 10, 1833.

Bhūta-bhāvi-layāt tasmād vartamānalayādapi
Cinnātha eva devo' sa । kāmābhāsayaṭyalam.

Mālinīvijayavārtikam, kāṇḍa 1, verse 815.

Jñāna-śakter iyaṁ jṛmbhā taj-jñānasthiti-bhāvinah
Bhāvāḥ prayānti pūrṇatvaṁ vikāsi-nija-tejasah.

Ibid. 1, 267.

Men who direct what they call their understanding or common-sense by rules abstracted from sensuous experience in moral and super-sensuous truths remind one of the zemmi (mus τυφλός or typhlus), "a kind of rat in which the skin (conjunctiva) is not even transparent over the eye, but is there covered with hairs as in the rest of the body. The eye (=the understanding), which is scarcely the size of the poppy-seed, is perfectly useless". An eal (muraena caecilia) and the myxine (gastrobranchus caecus) are blind in the same manner, through the opacity of the conjunctiva.

A. P., p. 270.

As a transcendental philosopher Coleridge says: "...grant me a nature having two contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or *find* itself in this infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences with the whole system of their representations to rise up before you."¹ That nature is no other than absolute intelligence, self-consciousness, the eternal infinite I AM, a "life-ebullient stream which breaks through every momentary embankment, again, indeed, and evermore to embank itself, but within no banks to stagnate or be imprisoned".² The contrary forces are the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies of the absolute self-consciousness or intelligence, the principles of objectizing and knowing itself. "Every other science presupposes intelligence as already existing and complete: the philosopher contemplates it in its growth, and as it were represents its history to the mind from its birth to its maturity."³ This statement should not be misunderstood, for the absolute intelligence, the eternal I AM, being self-sufficient, can, in its plenitude, have

1. B.L., I, 196.

2. *The Friend*, p. 343.

3. B.L. I, 196. I.A. Richards would like to change the word 'philosopher' and put 'psychologist' in its place. But that would not be a true interpretation of Coleridge who regretted the separation of psychology from metaphysics as a great catastrophe in the history of philosophy. See *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 11 and P. L., p. 59.

no history.⁴ But it is free and so limits itself in order that the world of particulars may appear. Its history which becomes possible only by its freedom and power of self-duplication and self-limitation is thus its game of hide-and-seek, which is the story of the universe.

Coleridge did not fulfil his promise of giving us a complete story of creation from the eternal, infinite I AM. Yet to understand what he has said about creation is necessary. He was very much influenced by Plato's concept of eternal ideas, the divine archetypes of the things of our human world. He believed in the existence of this spiritual sphere. He says: "Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise constitutive, and one with the power and law of nature, according to Plato and Plotinus...is the highest problem of philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature."⁵ He speaks of "the remarkable fact...that the material world is found to obey the same laws as had been deduced independently from the reason; and that the masses act by a force, which cannot be conceived to result from the component parts, known or imaginable".⁶ He believed in Plato's doctrine that a true knowledge of phenomena was possible only by first knowing noumena,⁷ that "by celestial observations alone can even terrestrial charts be constructed scientifically".⁸ Hence Coleridge made efforts to understand noumena first. Here Plato's concept of 'idea' gave him guidance.

Coleridge defines Idea as "that which is neither a sensation nor a perception, that which is neither individual (that

4. "Antecedent to all history, and long glimmering through it as a holy tradition, there presents itself to our imagination an indefinite period, dateless as Eternity, a state rather than a time. For even the sense of succession is lost in the uniformity of the stream." *The Friend*, p. 1.

5. *Lay Sermons*, pp. 124-5; *P.L.*, p. 54.

6. *The Friend*, p. 307.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 306 fn.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

is, a sensible intuition) nor general (that is, a conception), which neither refers to outward facts, nor yet is abstracted from the forms of perception contained in the understanding but which is an educt of the imagination actuated by the pure reason, to which there neither is nor can be an adequate correspondent in the world of the senses ; this and this alone is = an Idea".⁹ Ideas are "mysterious powers, living, seminal, formative, and exempt from time".¹⁰ As J. H. Green, Coleridge's disciple, explained, Ideas are those "Verities that are at once subjective Truths and objective Realities".¹¹ Explaining this he says :

"Man recognises in himself, as the privilege and need of a rational mind, the capability of enlarging his thoughts to the universe, infinite as the omnipresence of God, 'upholding all things by the word of his power', the capability of raising his mind to the Supreme, as the Absolute Will causative of all Reality in the eternal plenitude of being. And it is in meditating on the conditions and cause of this capability, that man becomes conscious of an operance in and on his own mind, of the downshine of a light from above, which is the power of Living Truth, and which, in irradiating and actuating the human mind, becomes for it (reveals itself as) Reason ;—yea which is the revelation of those divine acts, at once causative and intelligential, which man recognises as first principles or ultimate truths, *Ideas* for the human mind, and constitutive Laws in nature."¹²

Coleridge admired Bacon for doing for laws of nature what Plato did for ideas. "Plato...often denominates Ideas living Laws in and by which the mind has 'its whole being and permanence' ; ...Bacon, *vice versa* names the Laws of Nature, Ideas."¹³ Coleridge observed that "the relations of

9. *Lay Sermons*, p. 124.

10. *B.L.*, I, 69, fn.

11. *Spiritual Philosophy*, p. 3.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-2.

13. *P. L.*, p. 59.

objects are prime materials of method, and that the contemplation of relations is the indispensable condition of thinking methodically". And the first and the most important relation of Law is to comprehend the substance of anything as "an attribute of the Supreme Being".¹⁴ Green points out that "a class founded on a generic conception is an empirical abstract, whereas a class founded on a Type or Idea is a causative principle". The Type or Idea is "the antecedent and genetic unity, which confers the essential and abiding character on any and every group, and which whilst preserving the unity, manifests itself in the diversity of forms or products, of which the group consists, at once entire in each and in all".¹⁵ Ideas, Coleridge says, are "the living Truths, that may be re-excited but cannot be expressed by Words, the Transcendents that give the Objectivity to all Objects, the Form to all Images, yet are themselves untranslatable into any Image, unrepresentable by any particular Object...".¹⁶ And the lower types are connected with higher types till we reach the highest absolute archetype of God. Coleridge thought of God as the highest universal. He says: "It may be shown that the *plus* or universal, which man as the *minus* or individual finds his correlative pole, can only be God....The principle of personal individuality being the transcendent...the personal principle, I say, being the transcendent of all particulars requires for its correspondent opposite the transcendent of all universals; and this is God."¹⁷ Self-consciousness or Will which is universally present in all human beings is the divine universal humanity. On its basis alone any human intercourse is possible. It is present in nature also but only latently. It does not become manifest

14. *The Friend*, pp. 305-6.

15. *Spiritual Philosophy*, p. 86. Cp. Coleridge, *Lay Sermons*. (pp. 25-6): "But every principle is actualised by an idea; and every idea is living, productive, partaketh of infinity, and (as Bacon has sublimely observed) containeth an endless power of semination."

16. *I. S.*, item 178.

17. *Lay Sermons*, p 78 fn.

below the human level and therefore man is the subject for whom everything else in the world is an object.

Coleridge showed the development of this intelligential principle even below the human level. In his essay, "The Prometheus of Aeschylus", there is a very interesting information on the evolution of intelligence. The passage is a big one but deserves to be quoted in full. He quotes from his own *Aids to Reflection* :

"In the world we see everywhere evidences of a unity, which the component parts are so far from explaining, that they necessarily pre-suppose it as the cause and condition of their existing as those parts, or even of their existing at all. This antecedent unity or cause and principle of each union, it has since the time of Bacon and Kepler been customary to call a law. This crocus, for instance, or any flower the reader may have in sight or choose to bring before his fancy ; that the root, stem, leaves, petals, etc., cohere as one plant, is owing to an antecedent power or principle in the seed, which existed before a single particle of the matters that constitute the size and visibility of the crocus had been attracted from the surrounding soil, air, and moisture. Shall we turn to the seed ? Here too the same necessity meets us, an antecedent unity, (I speak not of the parent plant but of an agency antecedent in order of operance, yet remaining present as the conservative and reproductive power), must here too be supposed. Analyse the seed with the finest tools, and let the solar microscope come in aid of your senses, — what do you find ? — means and instruments, a wondrous fairy tale of nature, magazines of food, stores of various sorts, pipes, spiracles, defences, — a house of many chambers, and the owner and inhabitant invisible."¹⁸

"Now," he proceeds to say, "compare a plant, thus contemplated, with an animal. In the former, the productive energy exhausts itself and as it were, sleeps in the product

18. *Aids to Reflection*, Moral and Religious Aphorisms, Aphorism VI.

or *organismus*—in its root, stem, foliage, blossoms, seed. Its balsams, gums, resins, *aromata*, and all other bases of its sensible qualities, are, it is well known, mere excretions from the vegetable, eliminated, as life-less, from the actual plant. The qualities are not its properties, but the properties, or far rather, the dispersion and volatilization of these extruded and rejected bases. But in the animal it is otherwise. Here the antecedent unity—the productive and self-realising idea—strives, with partial success, to re-emancipate itself from its product and seeks once again to become idea : vainly, indeed : for in order to this it must be retrogressive, and it hath subjected itself to the fates, the evolvers of the endless thread—to the stern necessity of progression. *Idea* itself it cannot become, but it may in long and graduated process become an image, an ANALOGON, an anti-type of IDEA.... Thus, in the lower animals, we see this process of emancipation commence with the intermediate link, or that which forms the transition from properties to faculties, namely, with sensation. Then the faculties of sense, locomotion, construction, as, for instance, webs, hives, nests, &c. Then the functions ; as of instinct, memory, fancy, instinctive intelligence, or understanding, as it exists in the most intelligent animals. Thus the *idea* (hence forward no mere *idea*, but irrecoverable by its own fatal act,) commences the process of its own transmutation, as *substans in substantiato*, as the *enteleche*, or the *vis formatrix*, and it finishes the process as *substans e substantiato*, that is, as the understanding.

“...To imitate the symbolic language of the algebraists and thus to regard the successive steps of the process as so many powers and dignities of the *nomos* or law, the scheme would be represented thus :—

Nomos¹ = Product : N² = Property : N³ = Faculty : N⁴ = Function : N⁵ = Understanding.”

Thus Coleridge describes evolution in nature. It is how nature grows into intelligence. The highest product in this biological process of evolution due to the self-limiting

power of the creative principle of self-consciousness is Understanding. It is the highest product in the sense that "it is the index of the *nomos*, as well as its highest function; but like the hand of a watch, it is likewise a *nomizomenon*. It is a verb, but still a verb passive."¹⁹

But when the eternal spirit retains its own nature, it manifests itself as self-consciousness, for as product it cannot retain its nature. While the *nous*, as self-conscious spirit, distinguished from *nomos*, the law, becomes manifest only in man, it becomes "the contradistinctive faculty of man as timeless, ... and in this negative sense eternal". Man is superior to and diverse from "all things that subsist in space, and time, nay, even those which spaceless yet partake of time, namely souls or understandings. For the soul or understanding if it be defined physiologically as the principle of sensibility, irritability, and growth, together with the functions of the organs, which are at once the representatives and the instruments of these, must be considered *in genere*, though not in degree or dignity, common to man and the inferior animals. It was the spirit, the *nous* which man alone possessed."²⁰

The human beings have various faculties. From an article "on the soul and its organs of sense", which Coleridge contributed to Southey's *Cmniana*, he quotes the following sentence in the *Biographia*: "These (the human faculties) I would arrange under the different senses and powers: as the eye, the ear, the touch, &c.; the imitative power, voluntary and automatic; the imagination, or shaping and modifying power; the fancy, or the aggregative and associative power; the understanding, or the regulative, substantiating and realising power; the speculative reason, vis theoretica et scientifica, or the power by which we produce or aim to produce unity, necessity, and universality in all our knowledge by means of principles *a priori*; the will, or

19. The Prometheus of Aeschylus", *Miscellanies Aesthetic and Literary* pp. 70-2.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

practical reason ; the faculty of choice (*Germanice*, Willkür) and (distinct both from the moral will and the choice) the sensation of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of single and double touch.”²¹

Of all these faculties the two, the Understanding and the Reason are fundamentally different. Coleridge says : “Until you have mastered the fundamental difference in kind between the reason and the understanding as faculties of the human mind, you cannot escape a thousand difficulties in philosophy. It is pre-eminently the *Gradus ad Philosophiam*.”²²

The Understanding is “a faculty judging according to sense”,²³ while the Sense he defined as “whatever is passive in our being, ...all that man is in common with animals, in kind at least—his sensations and impressions, whether of his outward senses or the inner sense of imagination”. “This in the language of the schools was called the ‘vis receptiva’ or recipient property of the soul, from the original constitution of which we perceive and imagine all things under the form of space and time.”²⁴

In simple words, Understanding is “the mind of the flesh”, as Reason is “the eye of the spirit”. The former is the limited power of knowing of the empirical self that Coleridge calls the soul; and the latter is the unobstructed light of the infinite self which he calls the spirit. “*As sure as God liveth* is the pledge and assurance of every positive truth, that is asserted by the reason. The human understanding musing on many things snatches at truth, but is frustrated and disheartened by the fluctuating nature of its objects ; its conclusions therefore are timid and uncertain, and it hath no way of giving permanence to things but by reducing them to abstrac-

21. *B. L.*, I, 193 4.

22. *Table Talk*, May 14, 1830 ;

23. *Aids to Reflection*, Works I, 251, quoted by C.R. Sanders : “Coleridge’s Distinction between Reason and Understanding.” *PMLA*, vol. I, 1936, pp. 459-75.

24. *The Friend*, Works II, 164 fn. quoted by Sanders.

tions."²⁵ The superiority of the human understanding to the instinctive intelligence of the animals is due to the fact that the human understanding co-exists with the superior power of Reason which is infinite and timeless.²⁶

Differentiating the two, Coleridge says: "The eye is not more inappropriate to sound, than the mere understanding to the modes and laws of spiritual existence. In this sense I have used the term; and in this sense I assert that the understanding or experiential faculty, unirradiated by the reason and the spirit, has no appropriate object but the material world in relation to our worldly interests."²⁷

Reason meant for Coleridge the infinite self and its light, its power of self-consciousness. In his article on "The Prometheus of Aeschylus", which Coleridge considered to be an allegory of the generation of Reason in man, he speaks of some distinctive features of this faculty or power. The first thing to be noted about Reason is "that it could not have grown out of the other faculties of man, his life, sense, understanding, as the flower grows out of the stem, having pre-existed, potentially in the seed". Secondly, we note its "diversity, its difference in kind, from the faculties which are common to man with nobler animals". Thirdly, we find "its superiority in kind" to those faculties which man possesses in common with other animals. Fourthly, "it is not subject to any modifying reaction from that on which it immediately acts, that it suffers no change, and receives no accession, from the inferior, but multiplies itself by conversion, without being alloyed, or amalgamated with that which it potentiates,

25. *Lay Sermons*, p. 21.

26. "...Understanding differs indeed from the noblest form of instinct, but not in itself, or in its own essential properties, but in consequence of its co-existence with far higher powers of a diverse kind, in one and the same subject. Instinct in a rational responsible and self-conscious animal, is understanding". *Aids to Reflection*, Works I, 261, quoted by Sanders.

27. *Lay Sermons*, p. 71.

ennobles and transmutes." Lastly, it is not limited by time and space.²⁸

It is this very power which, Coleridge believes, man knows most immediately and on which the certainty of all knowledge depends. "On the IMMEDIATE, which dwells in every man, and on the original intuition, or absolute affirmation of it, (which is likewise in every man, but does not in every man rise into consciousness) all the *certainty* of our knowledge depends...."²⁹

Coleridge says that Reason "cannot in strict language be called a faculty, much less a personal property of any human mind. He with whom it is present can as little appropriate it, whether totally or by partition, as he can claim ownership in the breathing air or make an enclosure in cope of heaven."³⁰ He says that "but for the confidence which we place in the assertions of our reason and conscience, we could have no certainty of the reality and actual oneness of the material world. It might be affirmed that in what we call 'sleep', everyone has a dream of his own ; and that in what we call 'awake' whole communities dream nearly alike. It is ! is a sense of reason : the senses can only say — It seems !"³¹

In the allegorical language of the Prometheus legend there is "homogeneity between the donor and the gift". Reason is the "indwelling power", the "essence" of man. Essence "means the principle of *individuation*, the inmost principle of the possibility of anything, as that particular thing. It is equivalent to the *idea* of a thing, whenever we use the word, idea, with philosophic precision."³² In the 5th Essay of the First Landing Place of *The Friend* (p. 95), Coleridge quotes Harrington's definition of man : "Man may rather be defined a religious than a rational character, in

28. *Miscellanies, Aesthetic and Literary*, pp. 65-6.

29. *B. L.*, I, 168.

30. *Statesman's Manual*, *Works*, I, 461, quoted by Sanders.

31. *Lay Sermons*, p. 19, fn.

32. *B. L.*, II, 47.

regard that in other creatures there may be something of reason, but there is nothing of religion." Coleridge qualifies this statement in order to get his own definition of man thus : "If the reader will substitute the word 'understanding' for reason and the word 'reason' for 'religion', Harrington has here completely expressed the truth for which The Friend is contending."

The relation between the sunlight and the sun may be taken as the closest analogy that can explain Coleridge's meaning when he calls Reason as the "power" which is one with the "indwelling spirit", the infinite I in man. This relation is one of distinction without difference, or identity in difference, *bhedābheca*, if we borrow a term from the Trika or the Vaiṣṇava philosophers of India. The point is of considerable importance in Coleridgean thought. Coleridge said : "Every man is born an Aristotelian, or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that any one born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist ; and I am sure no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian. They are the two classes of men, beside which it is next to impossible to conceive a third. The one considers reason a quality or attribute ; the other considers it a power."³³ One who considers Reason as a quality is a materialist and only a true idealist understands Reason as power.

"Whatever we do or know that in kind is different from the brute creation, has its origin in a determination of the reason to have faith and trust in itself. This, its first act of faith, is scarcely less than identical with its own being....It is itself, therefore, the realising principle, the spiritual *substratum* of the whole complex body of truths. This primal act of faith is enunciated in the word, God : a faith not derived from, but itself the ground and source of, experience, and without which the fleeting chaos of facts would no more form experi-

33. *Table Talk*, 2 July 1830. Imitating Coleridge we Indians may classify mankind into two groups, namely, Vaiṣeṣikas and Śāktas. In a note on Tenneman Coleridge calls Aristotelians, "the born conceptionists", and Platonists, "the born Ideists".

ence, than the dust of the grave can of itself make a living man."³⁴

"In respect of their reason, all men are equal. The measure of the understanding and of all other faculties of man is different in different persons: but reason is not susceptible of degree."³⁵

Reason is "the realising principle". With the power of Reason we can comprehend; with the faculty of understanding we can apprehend only. Coleridge says: "It is one thing to apprehend and another to comprehend."³⁶

While Coleridge thus differentiates Reason from Understanding, it has to be remembered that it is "a distinction, not a division". Coleridge does not consider these faculties as "detached" activities as has been well remarked by Shawcross.³⁷ They would have been so only in a materialistic conception of a substance having attributes. Coleridge, on the other hand, believes in the perfect or imperfect manifestations of the "immediate", "eternal and timeless" self-consciousness, which he calls Reason. "When I make a three-fold distinction in human nature, I am fully aware that it is a distinction, not a division, and that in every act of mind the man unites the properties of sense, understanding and reason."³⁸

Thus "reason is the knowledge of the laws of the whole considered as one: and as such it is contradistinguished from the understanding, which concerns itself exclusively with the

34. *Lay Sermons*, pp. 19-20.

35. *The Friend*, Works II, 176, quoted by Sanders. Cp. *Lay Sermons*, p. 20: "Man alone was created in the image of God: a position groundless and inexplicable, if the reason in man do not differ from the understanding. For this the inferior animals (many at least) possess in degree: and assuredly the divine image of idea is not a thing of degrees."

36. Sanders, *op. cit.*

37. Introduction to *B. L.*, I, Lxxxvi.

38. *The Friend*, Works II, 164 fn., quoted by Sanders.

quantities, qualities, and relations of particulars in time and space."³⁹

Reason is "the power of intuitive that is immediate knowledge".⁴⁰ Understanding is "the faculty which generalising particular experiences, judges of the future by analogy of the past".⁴¹ Both are synthetic processes, but while the synthesis made by Reason is complete and certain, that by Understanding is incomplete and uncertain. Understanding is the faculty of knowing one relation with reference to another; Reason is the power that enlightens the very ground where these relations subsist. Reason "is the science of the universal having the ideas of oneness and allness as its two elements or primary factors. In the language of the old schools, Unity + Omneity = Totality". Understanding is "the science of phaenomena", that is, of particulars.⁴²

It seems that in knowing the finite objects, that is, objects in space and time, the knowing subject, which is really infinite and timeless, has to limit itself, has to focus its light through a finite lens. Knowing is possible only in limitation, only within the bounds of space and time. This limitation can, however, be removed according to Coleridge, and when it is removed, knowing takes the form of being.⁴³ We may explain it with the help of an example. In the sentences, "I am a man," "I am a teacher", and the like, the very possibility of substituting a number of complements indicates the fact that no one complement completely expresses all that I am, and hence every one of the complements is a limitation, a

39. *Lay Sermons*, Appendix B, p. 63.

40. *Aids to Reflecion, Works*, p. 278 fn., quoted by Sanders.

41. *Literary Remains, Works*, V, 82, quoted by Sanders.

42. *Lay Sermons*, pp. 63-4.

43. And this means that knowing at this stage is of the form of feeling. This union of Reason and feeling is of great importance in Coleridgean thought. See also the remarks of Kathleen Coburn in her Introduction to Coleridge's *Philosophical Lectures*.

devaluation of the subject 'I'.⁴⁴ The subject 'I' can get itself fully expressed only when it is its own predicate in the sentence, 'I am I', which God alone can say. "Thus God, the soul, eternal truth, etc., are the objects of reason; but they are themselves reason."⁴⁵ And "the contradistinction of God, from all finite Beings consists in God's having the *ground* of his existence in himself whereas all other Beings have their *ground* in [another]."⁴⁶ Reason is different from conceptual knowledge and the form of the proposition comprehended by Reason is tautologous.

Hence Coleridge says that "reason never acts by itself but must clothe itself in the substance of individual understanding and specific inclination, in order to become a reality and an object of consciousness and experience".⁴⁷ But it is Reason which gives the light. Understanding remains blind without it. The latter works only in consequence of its co-existence with the former, which "is not a faculty, but a light".⁴⁸ Reason is the light of the spirit or self-consciousness.

Coleridge's statement that Reason is not susceptible to degree means it is beyond the limits of space and time. Hence comes the truth of the statement that "the understanding may be deranged, weakened or perverted, but the reason is either lost or not lost, that is, wholly present or wholly absent."⁴⁹ The contradiction involved in the omnipresence of Reason and its total absence can be thus explained that everyone is not capable of so purifying his Understanding as to submerge it in the infinite ground of Reason "which dwells in every man". Everyone, therefore, cannot have the philosophic consciousness. As the submersion can never be partial, Reason can

44. Cp. "Does not Intellect as necessarily imply Limit...as on a geometrical figure?" Letter 1126, *C.L.*, IV, 849. See also *I. S.*, item 29.

45. *Literary Remains*, Works, V, 40, quoted by Sanders.

46. Letter 1126, *C.L.*, IV, 850.

47. *The Friend*, Works, II, 186, quoted by Sanders.

48. *Literary Remains*, Works, V, p. 181, quoted by Sanders.

49. *The Friend*, Works, II, 142, quoted by Sanders.

be either wholly present or wholly absent. Thus when Coleridge speaks of the possibility of a man's possessing "more or less inner sense", he should only be understood to refer to the gradually higher forms of synthesis of Understanding or Imagination. In the highest synthesis of "I am I" there can hardly be any gradation.

Just as Reason cannot know mediately without becoming limited, that is, without becoming Understanding, similarly Understanding cannot comprehend immediately without submerging itself into Reason. Reason is the spiritual organ for the spiritual world of universals, and does not substantially differ from the spirit.⁵⁰ Understanding is the sensuous organ for knowing the material world of particulars. Reason by itself is unable to understand the finite objects of the mortal world, and Understanding fails as a guide to the world of the spirit, being incapable of spiritual intercourse. Reason may be defined as "the organ of the supersensuous", and Understanding as "the conception of the sensuous, or the faculty by which we generalise and arrange the phaenomena of perception; that faculty, the functions of which contain the rules and constitute the possibility of outward experience".⁵¹

As sense-organs are to Understanding, so is Understanding to Reason.⁵² Objects are presented to Understanding through sense-organs, but it has no light of its own. It is capable of grasping objects only with the light it receives from Reason. Understanding can have concepts only, i. e., know things as objects only under the limitations of time and space. It can at best arrive at a conclusion by generalisation from the observation of particular facts in the form of a maxim. It can never know an eternal principle, which Reason alone is capable of knowing by changing the mode of

50. *Lay Sermons*, fn. on pp. 71-2.

51. *The Friend*, p. 96.

52. Cp. "Now as the ears to the understanding, so is understanding to the spirit." *Lit. Rem., Works V*, 286, quoted by Sanders.

knowledge from conception to identification, from knowing to being.⁵³

Coleridge tries to explain the distinction between Reason and Understanding from so many standpoints that an ordinary reader gets bewildered. This method Coleridge learnt from Plato. The essence of this method was raising a question to oneself and answering it, "to open anew a well of springing water". "For of Plato's works, the larger and more valuable portions have all one common end....The purpose of the writer is not so much to establish any particular truth as to remove the obstacles the continuance of which is preclusive of all truth....We see, that to open anew a well of springing water, not to cleanse the stagnant tank, or fill, bucket by bucket, the leaden cistern; that the education of the intellect, by awakening the principle and method of self-development, was his proposed object, not any specific information that can be conveyed into it from without: not to assist in storing the passive mind with the various sorts of knowledge most in request,...but to place it in such relations of circumstances as should gradually excite the germinal power that craves no knowledge but what it can take up into itself, what it can appropriate, and reproduce in fruits of its own."⁵⁴

Coleridge says that "the understanding and experience may exist without reason. But reason cannot exist without understanding nor does it or can it manifest itself but in and through the understanding...."⁵⁵ The question naturally

53. See *Table Talk*, August 24, 1831: "The English public is not yet ripe to comprehend the essential difference between the reason and the understanding—between a principle and a maxim—an eternal truth and a mere conclusion generalised from a great number of facts."

54. *The Friend*, pp. 313-4.

55. *The Friend*, p. 96. The Trika philosopher says exactly the same thing in the following line:

Pāśaṁ vinā na Śambhur vyañjayati yato na sarva-viśayaṁ tat.

Tantrāloka, commentary, VI, 141.

Vedānta also holds the same view. See *Vedānta-sāra*. p. 41:

Phalavyāpyatvamevāsya Śāstrakṛdbhir nivāritam

Brahmaṇyajñānanāśāya vṛttivyāptir apekṣitā.

arises, how can Coleridge who equated Reason with the power of omniscience of God now restrict it thus? The explanation is this: In the process of the biological evolution, Reason, which is the light of the pure self-consciousness, does not appear till the animal stage. Even the most intelligent animal does not show any sign of it. Even man in whom we get the first manifestation of Reason as his pure self-consciousness does not manifest it always. He sees, hears, touches, even without being self-conscious. He does not always question what he perceives in order to be certain about his perception. The only difference between a man and an animal is that if a man desires to know the universal self, the ground that holds all particulars, he can do so, while an animal cannot. Coleridge says: "The understanding of the higher brutes has only organs of outward sense, and consequently material objects only; but man's understanding has likewise an organ of inward sense, and therefore the power of acquainting itself with invisible realities or spiritual objects. This organ is his reason."⁵⁶

Coleridge makes himself more clear in the following passage of *Lay Sermons*:

"Perhaps the safer use of the term, understanding for general purposes, is to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as percipient being and reason as a power supervening. The want of a clear notion respecting the nature of reason may be traced to the difficulty of combining the notion of an organ of sense, or a new sense, with the notion of the appropriate and peculiar objects of that sense, so that the idea evolved from this *synthesis* shall be the identity of both. By reason we know that God is, but God is himself the Supreme Reason. And this is the proper difference between all spiritual faculties and the bodily senses;—the organs of spiritual apprehension having objects consubstantial with themselves.,,

56. *The Friend*, p. 96.

or being themselves their own objects, that is, self-contemplative."⁵⁷ "In short, the human understanding possesses two distinct organs, the outward sense, and 'the mind's eye' which is reason...."⁵⁸

In order to understand Coleridge's meaning of the term Reason, it is necessary that we should know something of Coleridge's notion of creation. In two of his letters⁵⁹ he gives some ideas of "the Science of the construction of Nature". He proceeds with God as "the Identity of Prothesis of Unity and Omneity", of "the self-affirmant and the self-affirmed", or as "pregnant Indistinction" and thinks of a state of Indistinction where all distinctions are in the possibilities alone, and considers this absolute Indistinction as abysmal Darkness or Depth which as the first act of creation is lighted with the word of God and thus becomes the light and life of everything that is created.⁶⁰

In its highest sense Reason is the Supreme Being contemplated objectively, the Word or Logos or Light, for the divine Word is the same as the divine Light.⁶¹ As constituents of Reason are unity and distinctities, these distinctities considered distinct but not different from the unity are Ideas, and Reason as the ground and source of Ideas is their unity.⁶²

When we speak of ourselves as possessing Reason we use the word Reason in another sense. It is man's capability of

57. *Lay Sermons*, fn. pp. 71-2.

58. *The Friend*, p. 96.

59. Letters 1077 and 1096.

60. Cp. the concepts of *Parma Śiva* or *Parā Vāk* and *Sadāśiva* or the *Paśyanti Vāk* in the Trika philosophy discussed in Book II. In the primary *Parā* stage there is complete identity of unity and omneity, and it is the stage of I am I. The next stage is that of *Paśyanti* when the predicate I becomes an abysmal Darkness or Depth (*Mahāśūnya*), mere this', which is lighted with the light of the word of God, that is, the *Parā Vāk*. *Paśyanti* is the first epiphany of the Divine.

61. Letter 1096, *C.L.*, IV, 806.

62. *Lay Sermons*, fn., pp. 72-3.

being conscious of the divine light, his "organ of the super-sensuous".⁶³ "But this very capability is itself that light, not as the divine light, but as the life or indwelling of the living Word which is our light; that is a life whereby we are capable of the light and by which the light is present to us, as a being which we may call ours, but which I cannot call mine, for it is the life that we individualise, while the light, as its correlative opposite, remains universal."⁶⁴

Thus Reason is both the divine light and the capability of receiving it.⁶⁵ Coleridge uses Reason in a third sense, though in a sense of lower dignity. Reason in this third sense is the consciousness of the universal behind a particular object, the consciousness of the object's being a symbol of the life of nature.⁶⁶

Thus while the faculty of Understanding "contemplates the unity of things in their limits only, and is consequently a knowledge of superficies without substance",⁶⁷ the power of Reason is "the substance and the life of all our knowledge. Without the latent presence of the 'I am', all modes of existence in the external world would flit before us as coloured shadows, with no greater depth, root or fixture, than the image of a rock hath in a gliding stream or the rainbow on a fast-sailing rain-storm."⁶⁸

63. *The Friend*, p. 96.

64. *Lay Sermons*, fn., pp. 72-3.

65. Abhinavagupta says the same thing about *Vidyā Śakti* :

Eṣa pramātā māyāndhaḥ sansārī karmabandhanaḥ.

Vidyābhijñāpitaiśvaryaḥ cidghano mukta ucyate.

IPV, II, 218.

Tasyaiśvarya-svabhāvasya paśubhāve prakāśikā

Vidyāśaktiḥ...

Ibid., p. 202.

This *Vidyā* is the same as *sadvidyā*, one of the five aspects of the absolute self-consciousness. Reason may be equated with *PAŚYANTI* in all its three aspects : *parama-mahā-paśyanti*, *mahā-pasyanti* and *paśyanti*. The matter will be clear in Books II and IV.

66. *Lay Sermons*, p. 76.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

While the Understanding alone will produce a "philosophy of death" by studying merely "the relations of unproductive particles to each other",⁶⁹ for the purpose of "comparing and arranging phaenomena",⁷⁰ Reason reconstructs a "living and spiritual philosophy" where "the two component counterpowers actually interpenetrate each other and generate a higher third, including both the former..."⁷¹

Coleridge's idea of creation was in the form of concentric circles.⁷² He believed that "there exist folios on the human understanding and the nature of man".⁷³ The plenitude of the eternal I AM, which is the absolute, from where he starts gradually, dwindles as creation assumes lower grades. But the higher units contain the lower ones in them. Thus the "reason without being either the sense, the understanding, or the imagination, contains all three within itself even as the mind contains its thoughts and is present in and through them all; or as the expression pervades the different features of an intelligent countenance". Reason thus "dwells in us only as far as we dwell in it";⁷⁴ it is not something that we possess or can possess. The universal light of Reason being rejected, Understanding is left "to a world of dreams and darkness".⁷⁵

We shall see later that the *Trika* philosopher says the same things still more accurately and convincingly. The concepts of *Sadvidyā* and *Māyā* in the *Trika* philosophy are similarly concepts of the supersensuous and sensuous organs for knowing the noumenal world of universals and the phenomenal world of particulars respectively.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

72. Letter 1077, fn., *C. L.*, IV, p. 769.

73. *P. L.*, p. 329; The *Trika* philosopher also believes similarly in the folds of the mind. See Book II.

74. *Lay Sermons*, p. 74.

75. *Ibid.*, Appendix, p. 105.

CHAPTER V

THE SCIENCE OF METHOD : A SCHEME OF TOTAL EDUCATION

For method implies a progressive transition, and it is the meaning of the word in the original language. The Greek *Μεθοδος* is literally a way, or path of transit.

The Friend, Sec. II, Essay 4, p. 304.

...the full exposition of a principle which is the condition of all intellectual progress, and which may be said even to constitute the science of education, alike in the narrowest and in the most extensive sense of the word.

The Friend, Sec. II, Essay 3, p. 296.

Method, therefore, becomes natural to the mind which has been accustomed to contemplate not things only, or for their own sake alone, but likewise and chiefly the relations of things....

Ibid., Sec. II, Essay 4, p. 300.

Adhvā krameṇa yātavye
Pade samprāpti-kāraṇam
Dvaitinām bhogyabhāvāt tu
Prabuddhānām yato' dyate.

Tantrāloka, vol. IV, pp. 30-1.

Vastuto hi tridhaiveyaṁ jñāna-sattā vijrmbhate
Bhedena bhedaḥbhedena tathā cābhedasandhinā.

Mālinīvijayavārtikam, Kāṇḍa I, verses 391-2.

The essays of Section 2 of *The Friend* are Coleridge's maturest statement of his philosophic standpoint.¹ They are the "Essays on the Principles of Method common to all investigations" and are a necessary introduction to

1. See Letters 1152 and 1182, *C. L.*, pp. 885-925.

Coleridge's philosophy.² In these essays he emphasises the need of methodical thinking, without which, he says, true education is not possible. Methodical thinking is the contemplation of relations as opposed to the observation of "insulated facts".³ These relations are indicative of a "progressive transition".⁴ Education is complete when we attain wisdom. Wisdom cannot be achieved unless we discover "the indwelling law",⁵ unless we realise "the unconditional and absolute" ground of a conditioned existence.⁶

Coleridge speaks of three relations. They are Law, Mental Initiative and Theory,⁷ corresponding to the faculties of Reason, Imagination and Understanding, that are active in each respectively. The lowest type of relation in this hierarchy of knowledge is that of Theory, "in which the existing forms and qualities of objects, discovered by observation and experiment, suggest a given arrangement of many under one point of view ; and this not merely or principally in order to facilitate the remembrance, recollection, or communication of the same ; but for the purposes of understanding, and, in most instances, of controlling them". In other words, it is the relation of cause and effect, with the help of which we abstract and generalise. This method is common to physical sciences. Coleridge enumerates the scientific arts of medicine, chemistry and physiology in general as examples of this relation.⁸

The highest position is given to the relation of Law, "which, in its absolute perfection, is conceivable only of the Supreme Being, whose creative idea not only appoints to each thing its position, but in that position, and in consequence of that position, gives it its qualities, yea, gives it its

2. *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay 3, p. 296.

3. *B. L.*, II, 39.

4. *The Friend* p. 304.

5. *B. L.*, II, 39.

6. *The Friend*, p. 307.

7. *Ibid.*, Sec. II, Essays 5, 6 and 9.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

very existence, as that particular thing". Secondly, "in whatever science the relation of the parts to each other and to the whole is predetermined by a truth originating in the mind, and not abstracted or generalised from observation of the parts, there we affirm the presence of a law, if we are speaking of the physical sciences as of astronomy for instance; or the presence of fundamental ideas, if our discourse be upon those sciences, the truths of which, as truths absolute, not merely have an independent origin in the mind, but continue to exist in and for the mind alone. Such for instance, is geometry, and such are the ideas of a perfect circle, of asymptotes, &c."⁹

This method may be called Law or Idea, for the Law in nature is the same as the Idea in mind.¹⁰ This fundamental or absolute relation "comprehending in itself the substance of every possible degree precludes from its conception all degree, not by generalisation but by its own plenitude".¹¹ In its perfect form this relation contemplates things and thoughts as they are related to a central power, God, the infinite eternal I AM.

Coleridge quotes Plato as his authority: "...What is the ground of the coincidence between reason and experience? Or between the laws of matter and the ideas of the pure intellect? The only answer which Plato deemed the question capable of receiving, compels the reason to pass out of itself and seek the ground of this agreement in a supersensual essence, which, being at once the ideal of the reason and the cause of the material world, is the pre-establisher of the harmony in and between both. Religion therefore is the ultimate aim of philosophy, in consequence of which philosophy itself becomes the supplement of the sciences, both as the convergence of all to the common end, namely, wisdom; and as supplying the copula, which modified in each,

9. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

in the comprehension of its parts to one whole, is in its principles common to all, as integral parts of one system. And this is method, itself, a distinct science, the immediate offspring of philosophy, and the link or *mordant* by which philosophy becomes scientific and the sciences philosophical."¹²

There is "but one principle, which alone reconciles the man with himself, with others and with the world; which regulates all relations," and that is "the principle of religion, the living and substantial faith 'which passeth all understanding'".

"This elevation of the spirit above the semblances of custom and the senses to a world of spirit, this life in the idea, even in the supreme and God-like, which alone merits the name of life, and without which our organic life is but a state of somnambulism; this it is which affords the sole sure anchorage in the storm, and at the same time the substantiating principle of all true wisdom, the satisfactory solution of all the contradictions of human nature, of the whole riddle of the world. This alone belongs to and speaks intelligibly to all alike, the learned and the ignorant, if but the heart listens."¹³

This elevation is possible when the Heart and the Head, Will and Reason, work in perfect union;¹⁴ when we get the "singleness of eye";¹⁵ when the subject becomes its own predicate;¹⁶ when knowing turns into being;¹⁷ when I am I and nothing else. This becomes possible when we gain "control over time";¹⁸ when instead of our living in time, time itself lives in us.¹⁹ This is the ultimate end of all knowing, the final goal of all education.

Every other kind of knowledge is knowledge only so far as it is symbolical of this eternal infinite I AM. The certainty

12. *The Friend*, p. 308.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 338.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 341, 343.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 344.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 299.

of knowledge comes from this invisible basis, which is "the supporter of the apparent" and in which the "sensible concretes"²⁰ "are contained, not as parts, but as manifestations".²¹ The infinite I AM remains in the background, "though like heat in the thawing of ice it may appear only in its effects".²²

The noumenal world of universals is beyond realisation by human beings living in the phenomenal world of particulars, but none the less this divine world of universal ideas is "a polar star, guiding a man's mind by approximation".²³ To explain particulars with the help of particulars brings nothing but confusion.²⁴ Universals as such are unrealisable. It is here that Imagination as an intermediary method becomes so important according to Coleridge. Just as the faculty of Understanding is appropriate to the method of Theory and the empirical sciences, and the power of Reason is to that of Law and Religion, so is Imagination appropriate to the artistic method. It is an intermediary method because it partakes of both Law and Theory and is valuable only because it is an approximation to the first and fundamental method of Law, a tentative exercise in the hope of discovering it.²⁵ Thus, for example, the value of a poem lies in this that it manifests the truth; that it "still seeks that Unity, or Revelation of the *One* in and by the *Many*, which reminds it that, tho' in order to be an individual Being it must go forth *from* God, yet as *receding* from *him* is to *proceed* towards Nothingness and Privation, it must still at every step turn back toward him in order to *be* at all...".²⁶ In the artistic method "the effect and position of the parts is always more or less influenced by the knowledge and experience of their previous qualities".²⁷ This is in common with Theory. On the other hand, we find in arts, as in Law, a union of

20. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 344.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 328.

23. *P. L.*, p. 164.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

25. *The Friend*, p. 309.

26. Letter 956, *C. L.*, IV, 545.

27. *The Friend*, p. 309.

opposites,²⁸ a perception of the universal behind particulars,²⁹ the predominance of idea over matter.³⁰

This intermediary method is not peculiar to fine arts only. It is found in sciences as well. As a matter of fact all these three methods show a progressive transition in the process of thinking and the higher method includes the lower ones. Coleridge emphasises "the necessity of a mental initiative to all method",³¹ the need to have "a staple, or starting-post, in the narrator himself",³² and "to find out the east for one's self" as the French so happily express.³³ This predominance of the mind may often degenerate the discourse into the grotesque or the fantastical when its display becomes too exuberant. But "sterility of mind,...wanting the spring and impulse to mental action, is wholly destructive of method itself".³⁴

Coleridge says that "it is with our cognitions as with our children. There is a period in which the method of nature is working for them, a period of aimless activity and unregulated accumulation, during which it is enough if we can preserve them in health and out of harm's way. Again there is a period of orderliness, of circumspection, of discipline, in which we purify, separate, define, select, arrange, and settle the nomenclature of communication. There is also a period of dawning and twilight, a period of anticipation, affording trials of strength. And all these, both in the growth of the sciences and in the mind of a rightly educated individual, will precede the attainment of a scientific method. But, notwith-

28. *B. L.*, II, 12.

29. *Ibid.*, II, 33 fn.

30. The essential mark of poetry is "a necessary predominance of the ideas (i. e. of that which originates in the artist himself), and a comparative indifference of the materials". *The Friend*, p. 309. See also "On Poesy or Art", *B. L.*, II, 254.

31. *The Friend*, p. 309.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 329.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

standing this, unless the importance of the latter be felt and acknowledged, unless its attainment be looked forward to and from the very beginning prepared for, there is little hope and small chance that any education will be conducted aright, or will ever prove in reality worth the name."³⁵

There is a period of passivity when the apparent world presented through the forms of time and space is most predominant in the mind with very little reaction of the mind. Then this aggregate of information is arranged under some qualitative, quantitative, or causal relation; and though the arrangement shows the activity of the mind, yet things are not less predominant than the mind. The mind still has no capacity to anticipate or predict or in any way improve upon what it learns. There is a third period, the period of dawning twilight and anticipation, when the mind predominates. Last comes the period of sunrise of wisdom, which is the end of all education and which alone gives the mind the capacity to understand that in God's creation "every thing is in its place".³⁶

The phenomenal world of particulars can never be understood so long as the mind of man is taken as part of it. To understand phenomena the mind must rise above phenomena. A vigorous energy of thought is required in order to rise above this little world of particulars. "No real information can be conveyed, no important errors radically extracted, without demanding an effort of thought on the part of reader; but the obstinate, and now contemptuous, aversion to all energy of thinking is the mother evil, the cause of all the evils in politics, morals, and literature,

35. *Ibid.*, p. 330.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 298. Cp. "...with the knowledge of LAW alone dwell Power and Prophecy, decisive Experiment, and lastly, a scientific method, that dissipating with its earliest rays the gnomes of hypothesis and the mists of theory may, within a single generation, open out on the philosophic seer discoveries that had baffled the gigantic, but blind and guideless, industry of ages."

which," Coleridge says, "it is my object to wage war against...."³⁷

When mental energies are fully methodised, then alone can the mind have a look into the soul of things. Without rising above the fleeting forms of time and space one can hardly get the power to understand phenomena. It is said of a wise man that he is one whose mind is completely methodical ; that instead of his living in time, time lives in him.³⁸

All the four stages of development referred to above respectively show the faculties of Sense, Understanding, Imagination and Reason at work. The real source of knowledge is one only, namely, Reason, the eternal infinite I AM. Knowledge received through the faculties of Imagination and Understanding becomes knowledge only because the light of Reason is felt even then, though not so clearly. Imagination is called a living power because it is close to Reason. Understanding does not get the light of Reason directly, because Imagination intervenes between them. The light of Imagination is the light of the twilight, when the sun is still invisible, but the darkness is over ; when limited things of the world are known in the background of their unlimited essence ; when one becomes conscious of "the involution of the universal in the particular".³⁹ In the sphere of Understanding, the light is not felt unlimitedly and hence all arrangements are 'unenlivened', 'stagnant',⁴⁰ because they are limited by the forms of time and space. Limits can be clear only to such a mind as has crossed the limits. Coleridge does not give the faculty of Sense a place in the Science of Method, for the mental activity at this stage is too little to be recognised. It is the stage of gathering pieces of information and of accepting

37. Letter 790, C. L., III, 253-4.

38. *The Friend*, p. 299.

39. B. L., II, 33 fn.

40. *Ibid.*, I, 169.

them passively. It shows no signs of selection or arrangement of what is received.

Coleridge says that "method implies a progressive transition, and it is the meaning of the word in the original language. The Greek *Μεθοδος*, is literally a way, or path of transit."⁴¹ A similar concept of methodical progress may be found in the analysis of *Adhvā* or the Way in the Trika philosophy. *Samvit* or pure self-consciousness hides itself by its own freedom and there is a process by which it may be sought and found out. The process, however, is described in a different manner.⁴²

41. *The Friend*, p. 304.

42. See Book II.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRIMARY IMAGINATION

We know nothing even of others, till we know *ourselves* to be as nothing ! (a solemn truth, spite of the Point and antithesis, in which the Thought has chanced to *word* itself.)

Letter 951, C. L., III, 530.

...and of genuine Imagination, with it's streaming Face unifying all at one moment....

Letter 954, C.L., III, 542.

...Existence itself is swallowed up in *Being*....

Letter 412, C.L., II, 758.

...that shadowy half-being, that state of nascent Existence in the Twilight of Imagination, and just on the vestibule of Consciousness,... and the Conceptions, as they *recede* from distinctness of *Idea*, approximate to the nature of *Feeling*, & gain thereby a closer & more immediate affinity with the appetites.

Letter 445, C.L., II, 814.

...by a sort of transfusion and transmission of my consciousness to identify myself with the Object—

Letter 1215, C. L., IV, 975.

Each man will universalize his notions, & yet each is variously finite. To *reconcile* therefore is truly the work of the Inspired.

N. 2208.

Jñānam hi viśayākāra-prakāśa-pariniṣṭhitam.

Mālinīvijayavārtikam, kāṇḍa I, verse 584.

Ucyate sarva evāyam bodhaḥ sarvāt -prabhāmayah.

Ibid., I. 25.

Coleridge says that the prior half of every act of knowledge is an unconscious repetition of the *a priori* activity of the fundamental idea, the eternal I AM ; and of the two halves, the prior half, the mental anticipation is more

important.¹ This discovery of Coleridge shows the difference between his concept of perception, the primary act of knowing, and that of the common man. Ordinary people are Lockeans in their explanation of perception. They believe that the mind comes in contact with an object through its appropriate sense-organ. The object so contacted leaves its impression on the clean slate of the mind, which passively receives it. Later on, with the help of the laws of association working in memory, the mind knows that object as it is. This is Locke's explanation of perception.² Coleridge criticises Locke's claim to originality even in such an explanation of perception and traces the origin of this misconception to the gradual erosion of the meaning of the word 'Ideas', what Locke called "the original Faculties & Tendencies of the mind, the internal Organs, as it were, and *Laws* of human thinking". Coleridge says that "the word should be translated '*Moulds*' and not '*Forms*'." The original author of the empirical concept of mind is Aristotle. Hobbes' "tabula rasa" and Locke's "unwritten sheet of paper" are merely translations of the Aristotelian concept of mind. In Aristotle's opinion, "in respect of *Faculty* the Thought (Mind) *is* the Thoughts, but *actually* it is nothing previous to Thinking. By the usual Process of language Ideas came to signify not only these original *moulds* of the mind, but likewise all that was cast in these moulds, as in our language the Seal & the Impression it leaves are both called Seals." Coleridge shows that later on the original meaning of the word 'idea' as a mould of the mind was lost and 'idea' became synonymous with 'image' (whether impression or idea) and sometimes with image in the memory.³ In short the *a priori* character of knowledge was denied and its *a posteriori* character was emphasised. Coleridge's own contribution lies in changing this wrong emphasis. In his opinion this wrong emphasis is responsible.

1. *The Friend*; Section II, Essay 9, p. 323.

2. Letters 381-8, C. L., II.

3. Letter 381, C. L., II, 682.

for our losing a true insight into the nature of thinking or perceiving. He thinks that in such an endeavour he has the support of such eminent thinkers as Plato and Bacon.⁴

It has already been explained that the absolute ground of all knowledge as well as all existence is the infinite eternal self-consciousness, the most *a priori* and the immediate act, which can never be obliterated. The eternal subject, the infinite I, projects itself in order to know itself. It becomes its own object. The object is no foreign second, but is a duplicate of of the subject's own self. That is so in the infinite level, when we lose consciousness of the limitations of time and place, which made the phenomena or the world of particulars possible. The finites only appear; they do not really exist.⁵

But the problem is : how to explain perception and conception in the phenomenal world of particulars. That there can be no interaction between any two things completely dissimilar was the foundation-stone of Coleridge's philosophical thinking. Firmly grounded on this Pythagorean principle, Coleridge criticised both idealistic and materialistic explanations that held the field in his day. "Idealism & materialism are both grounded," he says, "in the impossibility of intermutual action between things altogether heterogeneous and here again it is assumed by both parties that *perception* is but a sort of, or at least an immediate derivation from, *sensation*—so that the changes or modifications of the percipient's own being are exclusively the objects of his perception."⁶ Coleridge saw that idealists like Berkeley

4. *The Friend*, Sec. 2, Essay 9.

5. "...for even as thou art capable of beholding the transparent air as little during the absence as during the presence of light, so canst thou behold the finite things as actually existing neither with nor without the substance. Not without, for then the forms cease to be, and are lost in night. Not with it, for it is the light, the substance shining through it, which thou canst alone really see." *The Friend*, p. 344.

6. *P. L.*, p. 60.

who denied the existence of an objective world, and materialists like Locke who accepted the material objects as the real source of impressions, in the absence of which mind was non-existent, were groping in blind alleys. The idealists denied the real existence of the predicate, the materialists that of the subject of knowledge.

Coleridge takes the help of common sense and says that "percipieny *in genere* is an attribute of the soul." The primary form of perception, which is generally known as sensation, "is nothing more than a species of perception modified by the object (just as colours and sounds difference it, while they realize it) which in this instance is the percipient's own existence".⁷ The existent object is nothing other than a duplicate of the knowing subject. Knowing is being in its purest form, when it is free from the limitations of time and place. Even in the impure empirical form of knowing, that is, when we know material objects as totally different from and not as projections of our self, Coleridge found that the principle of knowledge was the same *a priori* activity of the eternal spirit, the same self-duplication or self-projection and self-identification. Things exist in this world because of the omniformity of God, the eternal, infinite I AM. Things are known also with the help of the same God. Everywhere the principle is the same, whether it be the pure form of knowing, when the subject is equated with its complete self, that is, with nothing other than itself, or it be the impure form of knowing, when the object is the limited object and the subject is the limited subject, the finite mind. In the limited sphere knowing cannot be the subject's total being. Naturally, therefore, knowing becomes resembling here.

In his explanation of knowledge Coleridge had the support of such a great authority as Plato. Seals are outward impressions. Yes, they do appear as such, but the mystery

7. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

of their nature, the fact why they are so, can hardly be clear unless we know the seal itself, of which they are only impressions, external duplicates. The sealing act is done by the seal rather than by any of its outward impressions, which are fixed, imprisoned on paper and hence passive, incapable of any activity. Thus in all cases of perception Coleridge found a repetition of the activity of the eternal I AM, the sealing act of the infinite spirit. "The living power and the prime agent of all human perception" is a "repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM."⁸ He refers to the very ground of existence and knowledge in order to show the possibility as well as the certainty of knowledge, for he found that if we began with the separate and finite, the result was confusion.⁹

But in the empirically valid finite everyday world subject and object are separate and knowing is not being. I do not become a rose when I see it. Coleridge would say that "identity" here would mean becoming "one with" and not "the same as".¹⁰ It would only mean that the inner universal principle of self-consciousness is the same behind its bipolar manifestations, the finite mind and the finite object.

8. *B. L.*, I, 202.

9. "Our present mode is from light to bring out smoke, to begin with the separate and finite, the distinct, and out of that come to what? Confusion." *P. L.*, pp. 166-7.

10. See *I. S.*, item 85 :

Without any excessive or groundless Refinement I may complain of the too inclusive meaning of $=$ or the mark of equation. For it may be used in three different senses :

1. *One with.* The regenerate Will $=$ the Will Divine.
2. *Equivalent to.* 20 Shillings $=$ 1 Sovereign.
3. *The same as.* $2+2=4$.

The difference in the first might be marked by raising the object above the $=$: thus,

Man $\overset{\text{God}}{=}$

in the second by depressing it : thus, $^{S}20 = 1 \text{ sov}^n$.

and in the third by retaining both on the same line : $2+2=4$.

Coleridge says that "to know is to resemble."¹¹ He learned from children's behaviour this fundamental character of human nature : "It is a character, an instinct of our human Nature, to pass out of our *self* ...and to exist in the form of others."¹² What he learned from his keen observation tallied with his philosophical reasoning also. The subject cannot know without self-projection and identification of itself with the object. The mind, as it were, opens its cavity to receive the object from without ; or the mind has a tendency to assume 'such a mould as the object is.

The mind's passing out and assuming the form of the object of perception is called *Vrtti* in the Indian philosophy.¹³ It speaks highly of Coleridge's intelligence that he learnt it from personal observation. Similarly it is no ordinary thing that the Indian concept of *Vrtti* gets the confirmation of an eminent thinker of the West.

The following statement of Coleridge is very significant.

"But in the great majority of our gentry, and of our classically educated clergy, there is a fearful combination of the *sensuous* and the *unreal*. Whatever is *subjective*, the true and only proper *noumenon*, or *intelligible*, is unintelligible to them. But all substance *ipso nomine* is necessarily *subjective* ; of course an appearance only, which becomes connected with the sense of *reality* by its being common to any number of beholders present at the same moment ; but an *apparitio communis* is still but an *apparition*, and can be substantiated for each individual only by his attributing a subject thereto, as its support and *causa sufficiens*, even as the *community* of the appearance is the sign and presumptive proof of its objectivity."¹⁴

At the end of the sixth chapter of the *Biographia*, Coleridge

11. 'On Poesy or Art', *B. L.*, II, 259. See also *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa* for a similar analysis of perception.

12. *I. S.*, item 53.

13. See *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, para 18, p. 13.

14. *I. S.*, item 172.

quotes Plotinus in support of his own view : “For in order to direct the view aright, it behoves that the beholder should have made himself congenerous and similar to the object beheld. Never could the eye have beheld the sun, had not its own essence been soliform,” (i. e. *pre-configured to light by a similarity of essence with that of light*) “neither can a soul not beautiful attain to an intuition of beauty.”¹⁵

A doubt may be raised here. How can invalid knowledge be differentiated from valid knowledge, if knowing is resembling ? Coleridge’s answer would be easy. Things exist in the world not on account of the will of the finite selves but on account of the will of God, the absolute infinite eternal spiritual subject. He alone possesses omniformity. Things in nature are projections of his self. Their reality or true objectivity is not decided by any individual finite self but by a common agreement of several subjects who have perceived them. These subjects are only limited forms of one universal subject, God, the eternal I AM. Thus in cases of illusion, taking a rope to be a snake, for example, the falsity of the perception lies in the fact that the perception is not corroborated by others. This leads people to believe that the principle of corroboration lies somewhere outside us. But such a belief is false. The falsity of the perception in such cases does not lie in the false nature of self-projection. Indeed, that is never false for it is an *a priori* eternal activity of the self. Even to have false knowledge one must know first. Self-projection is the activity which makes knowledge possible. Falsity can be attributed only later on. There is no falsity at the stage of perception. Falsity of a percept consists in the wrong associations, the false connections, the false accords of the impression of the rope with the impression of the snake lying in the storehouse of memory.

15. B. L., I, 80 fn. Cp.also *Tantrāloka*, vol. IV, p. 5, commentary on verse 7 : ...Sarvamidam jagat samvillagnameva avabhāsatē anyathā hyasya bhānameva na bhavet.

What we actually receive as impression is only the zigzag form of the object, neither the snake nor the rope. Associating on the principle of similarity, we take the impression received at the sight of a rope to be the same as that received at the sight of a snake. Thus falsity lies in false association of two similar impressions. The activity of the eternal I AM, the *a priori* form of knowing, has little to do with it.

Thus in all cases of perception the mind goes out through a particular sense-organ when a particular object falls within its ken. The mind takes the form of the object and it is this identity or this resembling that is sensation or the primary perception or knowing. Repetition of such a sensation makes us recollect the former similar sensations. When we hear a thing named, we similarly recollect that thing and by the laws of association working in the memory we associate these sensations and thus perceive an object. Thus recollection plays the most important part in our perception. "Pythagoras, it is said, and Plato, it is known, held the pre-existence of human Souls, and that the most valuable part of our knowledge was Recollection. The earliest of these Recollections Plato calls *Zw'pyra*, living Sparks, & *Evav'dματα* kindlefuel."¹⁶

It will be seen later that the *Trika* philosophy is called the philosophy of Recognition (*Pratyabhiññā darśana*), the most original idea of which is *Prakāśa-Vimarśa*.

Even in lower levels of knowledge it is recollection that gives knowledge its content.

It may thus be clear that though the sense-organs are helpful in the passing out of the object outside, they are actually nothing more than the gateway. It is the unification of the mind with the object that really makes knowing possible. In the case of reflexion, where objects exist inside the mind, this going out of the mind is not necessary and the sense-organs are of no use there. But the identity of the mind with the object of reflection is necessary there also, for that

16. Letter 381, *C.L.*, II, 680.

is really the method of knowing. It may therefore be said that the mind's focussing at a particular idea or thought or object is knowing. Coleridge says that this focus is nothing other than the most primary form of word, with the help of which we think. Reflection is not possible without the help of such a focussing of the mind. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, this focal point or the word is an intuitive activity of the eternal I AM. Coleridge's note on this point is worth quoting :

"I do not know whether you are opticians enough to understand me when I speak of a Focus formed by converging rays of Light or Warmth in the *Air*. Enough that it is so—that the Focus exercises a power altogether different from that of the rays not converged—and to our sight and feeling acts precisely as if a solid flesh and blood reality were there. Now exactly such focal entities we are all more or less in the habit of creating for ourselves in the world of Thought. For the given point in the Air take any given *word*, fancy-image, or remembered emotion. Thought after Thought, Feeling after Feeling, and at length the sensations of Touch, and the blind Integer of the numberless number of the Infinitesimals that make up our sense of existing, converge in it—and there ensues a working on our mind so utterly unlike what any one of the confluent, separately considered, would produce, and no less disparate from what any mere Generalization of them all, would present to us, that I do not wonder at the unsatisfactoriness of every attempt to undeceive the person by an analysis, however clear. The focal word has acquired a *feeling* of *reality*—it heats and burns, makes itself be felt. If we do not grasp it, it seems to grasp us, as with a hand of flesh and blood, and completely counterfeits an immediate presence, an intuitive knowledge. And who can reason against an intuition?"¹⁷

Had Coleridge read the Indian philosophy of grammar

and understood the nature of the word as *spkōta*¹⁸ he would have realised his mistake in having such a poor opinion of Brahman thinkers as he had. Indeed if any Coleridgean scholar tries to reconstruct Coleridge's proposed logosophy out of his manuscript notes, he will be immensely helped in his reconstruction by the Hindu philosophy of Word and Meaning. Semasiology, as I.A. Richards points out, is still an incipient science in the West.¹⁹ It can hardly be developed in the empirical way. Modern empirical attempts like those of logical positivists have miserably failed. Logical positivists' empirical thinking brought them to the conclusion that tautology was the only form of correct proposition. Thus they could not make any advance in their analysis. Their basic fault was their empiricism. They could not understand the omniformity of the most original unity of word and meaning, which is nothing other than the eternal I AM. Coleridge very well shows the way out of the blind alley of empirical logical positivism in a letter to Dorothy Wordsworth where he translates Fichte's ideas on the subject. The whole letter requires a close reading, but the following extract will serve our purpose here :

"Namely : the Proposition, $A=A$, holds good originally only of the I : it is abstracted from the Proposition in the Science of absolute knowledge, I am I - the substance therefore or sum total of every Thing, to which it may be legitimately applied, must lie in the I, and be comprehended under it. No A therefore can be aught else than something established in the I, and now therefore the Proposition may stand thus : What is established in the I, is established - if therefore A is established in the I, then it is established (that is to say in so far as it is established, whether as only possible, or as real, or necessary) and then the Proposition is true without possibility of contradiction, if the I is to be I. Farther, if the I be established, because it is established, then

18. See Book II.

19. *Coleridge on Imagination*, Preface, pp. xi-xii.

all that is established in the I, is established because it is established ; and provided only that A is indeed a something established in the I, then it is established, if it is established ;..."²⁰

The philosophy of Word and Meaning is one of the most developed branches of Indian lore. We may even say that it has reached its acme. In India literary critics have the greatest regard for these grammarian philosophers. One of the ways of explaining the manifold nature of the universe in the *Trika* philosophy is to explain it in terms of words and meanings. The Absolute is called *Śabdarāśikalāmaya*.²¹ The whole concept of *Dhvani* or Suggestion which is called the soul of poetry, and of which *Rasa* is the highest form, is based on the concept of the word as *Sphoṭa*, which may be understood as Coleridge's focus of the eternal self-consciousness.²²

The exposition of the synthetic nature of the word as a focus of consciousness makes word, in ultimate analysis, an idea in the Platonic sense, not different from the eternal consciousness. Self-consciousness is said to be the ground of all knowledge and all existence. We may better say that it is the ultimate ground of all meanings and all words. The eternal I AM is the eternal unity of word and meaning. It acts as both mirror and focus.²³ As mirror it is meaning, existence, self, object; as focus it is word, knowledge, consciousness, subject. Consciousness is the essence of self and is totally united with it.

Coleridge equates sound with light.²⁴ God who creates

20. Letter 379, *C. L.*, II, 674.

21. *Vijñāna-Bhairava*, verse 2.

22. See Books II and III.

23. 'On Poesy or Art', *B. L.*, II, 259.

24. "Before my visit to Germany in September 1798, I had adopted (probably from Behmen's *Aurora*, which I had *conjured over* at School) the idea, that Sound was=Light under the praepotence of Gravitation, and Color=Gravitation under the praepotence of Light : and I have never seen reason to change my faith in this respect." Letter 1067, *C. L.*, IV, 750-1.

with his word, whose conceiving is begetting,²⁵ is the source of all words and meanings. His will, his self-duplication, is the primary focal point.²⁶ It is Light. Thus word and meaning, knowledge and existence, have one common origin ; or, rather, they are the two aspects of the same truth. That which goes out is objective reality. That which remains unmanifested is the essence that gives meaning to all the outside manifestations, that are actually forms of the one central essence.

In order to have an individual existence, a word must go forth from God, yet as the receding from him is to proceed towards nothingness and privation, it must still at every step turn back towards him in order to be at all. Thus every word, which owes its existence to the act of focussing of self-consciousness, becomes significant. Coleridge explained the significance of the poem on this very basis.²⁷ God's breathing out is his word²⁸ which is the universal ground of all

25. "Admit for a moment, that "to conceive" is=with creation in the divine nature, synonymous with "to beget", (a feeling of which has given to Marriage a mysterious sanctity & sacramental significance in the mind of many great & good men). Admit this, and all difficulty ceases—all Tumult is hushed—all is clear & beautiful—" N. 1619.

26. "All that exists has a beginning—and God, whose essence is the *ground* of all things, is by his Will, thro' the *utterance* of his Will (=the Word, Aóyos) the *Beginner* of their *existence* ; i. e. God *createth* all things. He not only *formeth* them, i. e. establisheth their relativity and correspondent relations, but he likewise *groundeth* them— in him they have their *Being*, from him they receive their *existence*." Letter 1077, C. L., IV, 770. Cp. PH. Sutra 2 : Svecchayā svabhittou viśvam unmiḷayati.

27. Letter 956.

28. Cp. N. 2784.

"...the Central point is primary Consciousness=living Action ; the circumference=secondary Consciousness (or Consc : in the common sense of the word) and the passing to and fro from the one to the other Thought, Things, necessary Possibilities, contingent Realities/=Father, Son, Holy Ghost ...The . is I which is the articulated Breath drawn inward, the O is the same sent outward, the ⊕ or Theta expresses the synthesis and coinstantaneous reciprocation of the two Acts, the Dualism of *Thought* by *Distinctions*, the Unity of *Thing* by Indivisibility /

universal ideas or the souls of things. To see these souls is possible only through an identification of the percipient and the perceived.²⁹

Just as Coleridge says that the object, the sense-content that is received from outside only modifies the mental mould grasping it and gets significance only through the mould, similarly we may say³⁰ that the sounds of letters only modify, that is, help in focussing consciousness, which focus really is the significant word, that is, word with meaning. Letters not capable of focussing consciousness, that is not put together in the form of a significant word, become meaningless. Similar is the case of words put together in a sentence. The words of a sentence help in focussing our consciousness, which is the significant sentence, that is, the sentence with meaning. The sense-contents in the perception of outward objects and letters and words in the case of reflection are subordinate to the primary act of Imagination, which gives unity in each case and thus makes perception or reflection significant.

The *sine qua non* of all perception is the identity of the percipient and the perceived. Coleridge names this the faculty of Imagination when he thinks of this identification in the finite human mind. Imagination is "the prime agent of all human perception". Divine perception or divine knowledge is Reason, eternal I AM. Imagination is its

29. N. 921 :

and the deep power of Joy
We see into the *Life* of Things—

i.e.—By deep feeling we make our *Ideas dim*—& this is what we mean by our *Life*—ourselves. I think of the Wall— it is before me, a distinct Image—here. I necessarily think of the *Idea* & the Thinking I as two distinct & opposite Things. Now (let me) think of *myself*—of the thinking Being—the *Idea* becomes dim whatever it be—so dim that I know not what it is—but the Feeling is deep and steady—and this I call *I*—identifying the percipient & the Perceived.

30. Here I am developing Coleridge's concept of the word as a focal point of consciousness with the help of the Indian theory of *sphoja*. This shows the identity of the two views.

approximation. To the divine imagination we owe the existence of the whole universe. To the same faculty on the lower plane we owe our knowledge of the universe.

Thus we see that in a comprehensive scheme of education of man the faculty of Imagination holds a place higher than the faculties of Sense and Understanding. The faculty of Sense is totally passive. Understanding explains a thing with reference to another. It explains things by causal relation. But a particular thing cannot completely explain another particular thing. Causal relations cannot give us the final explanation of anything. Chance occurrences always remain a baffling factor in explanations by causal relations. Imagination relates a thing to an observer or a listener.³¹ As explained above, we may perceive by observing objects, or by reflecting on them, which is possible by listening to words. The essence of perception is unification of the percipient and the perceived. Imagination thus is a unifying faculty and a manifestation, on the finite level, of the eternal activity of Reason or the infinite I AM.

Coleridge thus establishes the importance of the Primary Imagination in perception or knowledge. Unless we understand the significance of the change made by Coleridge in the explanation of the act of knowing, his important deviation from Locke's account of it, as well as from that of his master, Immanuel Kant, we can never understand Coleridge's account of the Secondary Imagination, for the latter is only an echo of the former, and there is no difference in *kind* between the two varieties of Imagination. It is here that most Coleridgean scholars have failed to interpret Coleridge correctly.

I. A. Richards, for example, whose explanation of Coleridge's Primary Imagination is accepted by most Coleridgean critics, explains it as "normal perception that produces the usual world of the senses,

That inanimate cold world allowed
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd,

31. *The Friend*, p. 300.

the world of motor-buses, beef-steaks, and acquaintances, the frame-work of things and events within which we maintain our everyday existence, the world of the routine satisfaction of our minimum exigences".^{31a} Dr. Richards not only misses the significance of Coleridge's discovery and consequently neglects to explain his idea of the Primary Imagination but also puts the reader on a wrong track. The most incisive criticism of this view may be found in George Whalley's *Poetic Process* (p. 95) :

"It is astonishing how little attention has been paid in aesthetics to what Coleridge called 'the original unific consciousness, the primary Perception'. The reason is perhaps — again, in Coleridge's words — its extreme difficulty'. Through failure to enquire closely into perception, aesthetics has failed to describe the single unbroken arch of poetic process. Either perception has been taken to be a spontaneous but mechanical neural response to external stimuli ; in which case there is no means of accounting for the variety and value of art. Or else, in the attempt to show that art is 'spiritual' activity — neither a neural mechanism nor an activity dominated by 'intellect' — the physical and perceptual character of art has been ignored or vaporised out of existence. All scientific theories of perception — and some philosophical ones — suffer from a misguided zeal for simplicity. Searching for a simple instance of a complex phenomenon, they carry analysis below the level of relevance and start with 'ordinary' perception. In this way an inert and confused middle term is mistaken for the prototype of perceptual existence."

The most significant point in the Coleridgean theory is that Imagination is an intermediate faculty. It is not wholly active, for its primary function is to know the phenomenal object, not spirit or God. The only pure activity is the pure I AM I, the complete identity of the self with its projection. But that is possible only when the eternal self tries to know itself. We know God by being God, by being the eternal I

31a. Coleridge on Imagination, p. 58.

AM.³² But Coleridge says that even in lower levels of knowing the process is the same. We mark the repetition of the same activity. Everywhere the form of knowing is I AM. But in the phenomenal world, where the knowable are particular objects, the activity of the eternal spirit, the eternal infinite I, becomes modified, limited, by the object of perception or contemplation. That is the only difference. The activity of I AM when the object is nothing other than I is called Reason by Coleridge and the form of knowing then is I AM I. This is pure activity, where there is no touch with anything finite, fixed, passive or dead. The knowledge gained by Reason is of the type of feeling rather than knowing.³³ The same activity, when modified by something, the nature of which is finite, becomes of a lower grade because of the impurity of the object of knowledge. And this faculty of the lower grade is called Imagination. Imagination is thus a link between the the pure eternal life of the eternal I AM and the mortal life of human beings, between omniscience and limited knowledge. Those who seek the source of knowledge anywhere in the world of finite objects grope in the dark in vain. The source of existence as well as knowledge lies in the infinite, eternal I AM. Even the finites can be known with the help of the infinite only. Coleridge firmly stuck to this Platonic doctrine.

Thus Imagination is an intermediate or active-passive faculty leading us from ignorance to knowledge, from the world of finites to that of infinity.

Abhinava would make the eternal I AM the prime agent of perception everywhere. We shall see later that this is an improvement on Coleridge.

32. Cp. the Vedantic Theory : Brahmanit Brahmaniva bhavati.

33. N. 1710 : "Reverence for the LAW of Reason, now this truly is a feeling,..."

CHAPTER VII

THE SECONDARY IMAGINATION

But what are my metaphysics ? Merely the referring of the mind to its own consciousness for truths indispensable to its own happiness ! To what purposes do I or am I about to employ them ? To perplex our clearest notions and living moral instincts ? To deaden the feelings of will and free power, to extinguish the light of love and of conscience, to make myself and others worthless, soulless, God-less ? No ! to expose the folly and the legerdmain of those who have thus abused the blessed machine of language ; to support all old and venerable truths ; and by them to support, to kindle, to project the spirit ; to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings, with their vital warmth, actualize our reason :—these are my objects, these are my subjects, and are these the metaphysics which the bad spirits in hell delight in ?

The Friend, Introductory Essay 15, pp. 64-5.

On entering a cathedral I am filled with devotion and with awe ; I am lost to the actualities that surround me, and my whole being expands into the infinite ; earth and air, nature and art, all swell up into eternity, and the only sensible impression left is, 'that I am nothing'.

Misc. Crit., p. 12.

The writer who makes me sympathise with his presentations with the *Whole* of my being, is more estimable than the writer who calls forth and appeals to but a part of my being—my sense of the ludicrous for instance; and again, he who makes me forget my *specific* class, character, and circumstances, raises me into the universal man.

Misc. Crit., p. 293.

In the imagination of man exists the seeds of all moral and scientific improvement....The imagination is the distinguishing characteristic of man as a progressive being ; and I repeat that it ought to be carefully guided and strengthened as the indispensable means and instrument of continued amelioration and refinement. Men of genius and goodness are generally restless in their minds in the present, and this, because they are by a law of their nature unremittingly regarding themselves in the future, and contemplating the possible of moral and intellectual advance towards perfection.

Ibid., p. 195.

It has been explained in the previous chapter that Coleridge meant by the Primary Imagination the repetition of the activity of the eternal infinite I AM in the finite mind. It appears as if the omnipresent, omniscient, eternal, infinite I AM hides itself in the world of finites, a product of its own self-limitation, becomes immanent, and goes on repeating its activity from below the human consciousness. All activity is merely its seeking itself;¹ attempts of Reason to find out Will, to remove their primary splitting and get a re-unification. In every such attempt of re-unification the finite object comes as an obstacle, which frustrates total unification. The modified unification is knowledge in our world of finites. The secret of knowledge lies not in this modification but in the unification. The object only modifies; knowing is the act of unification.

The Secondary Imagination is a continuation of the exercise of the Primary Imagination in a superior way. The kind or the nature of the subjective activity is the same but the scope is enlarged and the degree enhanced. Man's mental progress lies in the increase of the scope of his knowledge. As in a jump we first resist the gravitating power and then yield to it, so does the thinker in every act of thinking first eloin himself from nature in order to know her well.² Coleridge's emphasis is on this resisting activity, this involu-

1. So shalt thou see and hear
 The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible
 Of that eternal language, which thy God
 Utters, who from eternity doth teach
 Himself in all, and all things in himself.
 Great universal Teacher ! he shall mould
 Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask.

Frost at Midnight, lines 58-64.

See also *The Destiny of Nations*, lines 461-62.

2. Cp. *B. L.*, I, 85 :

"Let us consider what we do when we leap. We first resist the gravitating power by an act purely voluntary, and then by another act, voluntary in part, we yield to it in order to light on the spot, which

tion, this receding mental process necessary to synthesise more and more matter of knowledge :

Self, far diffused as Fancy's wing can travel !
 Self, spreading still ! oblivious of its own,
 Yet all of all possessing !³

We are not concerned here with the religious mystic and the scientist, who also carry on this exercise and make rapid advances in their spheres so far as they succeed in doing so. Our concern is the poet and his exercise of this faculty. The Secondary Imagination is the faculty which breathes life into poetry. A poem is a "miniaturizing in order to manifest the truth," "a Revelation of the one in and by the Many".⁵ "To support, to kindle, to project, to make the Reason spread Light over our Feelings, to make our Feelings diffuse vital Warmth thro' our Reason—these," says Coleridge, "are my objects & these my Subjects."⁶

Feeling came out of Reason as every other thing came out of it and had manifestation in the heart. He thought of it as an "animant self-conscious pendulum, continuing for ever its arc of motion by the for ever anticipation of it," almost like "a life within Life," "a consciousness

we had previously proposed to ourselves. Now let a man watch his mind while he is composing ; or, to take a still more common case, while he is trying to recollect a name ; and he will find the process completely analogous."

See also "On Poesy or Art," *B. L.*, II, 258 : "And this is the true exposition of the rule that the artist must first eloin himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect."

3. *Religious Musings*, lines 155-57, *Poems*, p. 115.

4. See *Misc. Crit.*, p. 195 quoted above. See also *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essays 5 and 6.

5. Letter 956, quoted before.

6. *N.* 1623 ; see also *The Friend*, pp. 64-5, quoted above.

As will be shown later on, Bharata, the author of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, made a statement of similar import in these words :

Sthāyibhāvan rasatvam upaneṣyāmaḥ.

Nāṭyaśāstra, I, 299.

within a Consciousness...distinct tho' indivisible".⁷ How to unite feeling with Reason again is the great task performed by poetry.

"All the fine arts are different species of poetry. The same spirit speaks to the mind through different senses by manifestations of itself, appropriate to each. They admit therefore of a natural division into poetry of language (poetry in the emphatic sense, because less subject to the accidents and limitations of time and space); poetry of the ear, or music; and poetry of the eye, which is again subdivided into plastic poetry, or statuary, and graphic poetry, or painting. The common essence of all consists in the excitement of emotion for the immediate purpose of pleasure through the medium of beauty; herein contra-distinguishing poetry from science, the immediate object and primary purpose of which is truth and possible utility."⁸

Coleridge's concern is this universal essence of the fine arts, or poesy as he sometimes calls it, though he mainly discusses the poetry of language. "The excitement of emotion for the purpose of *immediate* pleasure, through the medium of beauty"⁹—this is how Coleridge defines poetry as the regulative idea of all the fine arts.

Coleridge made no difference between emotion and feeling though he had a keen sense of accuracy and loved to desynonymise words. He complained of the popular use of the word 'mind', which meant "sometimes *memory*, sometimes *reason*, sometimes *understanding*, sometimes *sense*,...sometimes *inclination*, and sometimes all together, confusedly".¹⁰ He desynonymised these words and showed that without understanding their exact connotation no one could ever understand 'mind' or 'matter' or his explanation of these words. Similar is the case with the word 'heart', which is promis-

7. N. 2999.

8. 'On the Principles of Genial Criticism', *B. L.*, II, 220-1.

9. *Ibid.*, *B. L.*, II, 224.

10. *I. S.*, item 172.

cuously used for the physiological organ that is the reservoir of blood, or the feelings or emotions, or passions, or their seat. In the absence of any clear note of Coleridge on the difference between 'feeling' and 'emotion' it has to be presumed that he used the two words promiscuously. George Whalley, a great Coleridgean scholar, in his *Poetic Process* (p. 66), rightly points out that this confusion appears "in every writer on poetic experience and the nature of poetry" and that "one of the most important tasks for a philosophical critic at the present time is to distinguish clearly between them".

Coleridge, however, distinguished the word 'passion' from the words 'feeling' and 'emotion'. At one place he calls passion the soul of poetry :

"If we say, strong Figures, bold Metaphors, and rapid associations of distinct Images by slight resemblances are appropriate to Poetry, yet these being the natural Language of the Mind in a state of high excitement, Passion must be (the) Soul of Poetry or if Passion be the Soul of Poetry, then &c."¹¹

The note ends abruptly. Probably Coleridge was clarifying some point to himself and thought he had succeeded and did not therefore write of other things. This note explains why Coleridge observed that "images, however beautiful, though faithfully copied from nature, and as accurately represented in words, do not of themselves characterise the poet. They become proofs of original genius only so far as they are modified by a predominant passion."¹² But it leaves us inquisitive as to how Passion and Imagination are related together, for each of these two by turns has been called by Coleridge "the soul of poetry".¹³

Coleridge's major thoughts are that Reason, the highest faculty or power of the absolute self-consciousness, spreads

11, *I. S.*, item 174.

12. *B. L.*, II, 16.

13. *B. L.*, II, 13 and *I. S.*, item 174, quoted above.

light over our feelings ; that feelings can diffuse vital warmth only through this light of Reason ; that Imagination is the soul of poetry, and so is Passion ; that poetry has an important place in the scheme of education ; and that poetry is related with divinity. All these points become clearer by Coleridge's definition of the word Passion.

"By the Passions generally, and described therefore by their generic or common character, we mean a state of emotion, which tho' it may have its pre-disposing cause in the Body, and its occasion in external Incidents or Appearances, is yet not *immediately* produced by the incidents themselves, but by the person's Thoughts and Reflections concerning them. Or more briefly : A Passion is a state of emotion, having its immediate cause not in Things, but in our Thoughts of the Things—or—A Passion is a state of emotion which, whatever its object or occasion may be, in ourselves or out of ourselves, has its proper and immediate cause not in this, but in our Thoughts respecting it."¹⁴

It will be profitable to see how Coleridge arrived at this definition of Passion. The primary sense of the word, he points out, is "a state of undergoing" "from *pati*—*agere*, to *undergo*—to act upon". "If the word were to be understood in the full extent of its Etymon, the Passions would include every impression made on the Brain and Nerves by external agents or by the Body itself." That is, however, "not our present use of the word".¹⁵

Coleridge also rejects the Cartesian view that "Action and Passion...are the same thing contemplated as existing in two...opposite yet corresponding Subjects : and derive their difference from the different relations of the Subjects. An Action in the Mind is a Passion in the Body : and Actions of the Body are reflected as Passions in the Mind." Coleridge's criticism is that this is "a mere logical antithesis of our *Thoughts*—or lower still—a grammatical Antithesis of the

14. *I. S.*, item 52.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

Terms, Action and 'Passion,' substituted for a real definition of the Things themselves". He pointed out that the source of this mistake lies in the Cartesian dualism, "the contrariety of Soul and Body'"¹⁶ which brought several "mischievous" consequences in the field of learning. One such was "the separation of Psychology from Physiology, depriving the former of all root and objective truth, and reducing the latter to a mere enumeration of facts and phaenomena without a copula or living form".¹⁷ As we already know, Coleridge believed in one reality and his whole philosophy, in short, is an explanation of the One becoming many and the many being One.

How does feeling become Passion, that is the question. Coleridge marked "the very rare occurrence of strong and deep Feeling in conjunction with free power and vivacity in the expression of it. The most eminent Tragedians, Garrick for instance, are known to have had their emotions as much at command, and almost as much on the surface, as the muscles of their countenances ; and the French, who are all Actors, are proverbially heartless."¹⁸ Thus Coleridge marked a state of feeling which was completely disciplined by the control of the mind. Coleridge's concept of feeling was that of a consciousness within Consciousness,¹⁹ a limitation of Reason. He opposed head to heart and required the reconciliation of these opposites in poetry.²⁰ He observed that "The vital warmth seldom rises to the surface in the form of sensible Heat, without becoming hectic and inimical to the Life within, the only source of real sensibility." But when we wish to communicate it, a change occurs in cases of

16. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

18. *I. S.*, item 6, p. 33. Cp. *N.* 1692 ; "True & easy Test of Poetry. If it relate to sight, might a well-educated man born blind have written it....And if to ear or sound, the deaf—if to feelings, a man utterly heartless ?"

19. *N.* 2999, quoted above.

20. *B. L.*, II, 19.

very successful communication and that change Coleridge had experienced and he attributed it to the following causes. "A naturally, at once searching and communicative disposition, the necessity of reconciling the restlessness of an ever-working Fancy with an intense craving after a resting-place for my Thoughts in some *principle* that was (not)²¹ derived from experience, but of which all other knowledge should be but so many repetitions under various limitations, even as circles, squares, triangles, etc., etc., are but so many positions of space. And, lastly, that my eloquence was most commonly excited by the desire of running away and hiding myself from my personal and inward feelings, *and not for the expression of them*, while doubtless this very effort of feeling gave a passion and glow to my thoughts...and language on subjects of a general nature, that they otherwise would not have had." Coleridge saw that this change was brought about by his realisation of "the *transcendency of the moral to the intellectual*," by his experience of truth as Being by an effort of his own will which united his heart and his mind in so close a manner that he could not love without esteem, neither could he esteem without loving.²²

I think Coleridge has given a more convincing impersonal theory of poetry than that given by T.S. Eliot in *Tradition and the Individual Talent*. In the second section of that essay Eliot attacks "the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul" and concludes that "the poet has, not a 'personality' to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways." Eliot's arguments are based on the analogy of the presence of a filament of platinum, which by its mere presence makes oxygen and sulphur dioxide combine together and produce

21. This 'not' does not occur in the printed text, but I think it is a misprint.

22. *I.S.*, item 6, pp. 33-4. Cp. *N*, 957: "The more I think, the more I am convinced that Admiration is an *essential* element of poetical Delight."

sulphurous acid, while neither the new compound has any trace of platinum nor the platinum is the least affected. He has no better proof of the fact of impersonality of poetic emotion than analogy. On the other hand, Coleridge's theory is based on the self-evident intuition and thus has a stronger proof. Eliot's conclusion on the falsity of the unity of soul is unwarranted. Similar is the case of I.A. Richards who agrees with Coleridge about the nature of successful communication but thinks like Eliot. Richards says that the so-called "aesthetic" experience contains no unique constituent. It has "the usual stuff but with a special form". "Now the special form as it is usually described—in terms of disinterestedness, detachment, distance, impersonality, subjective universality, and so forth—this form, I shall try to show later, is sometimes no more than a consequence of the incidence of the experience, a condition or an effect of communication."²³

For successful communication the restlessness of a feeling has to pass through the crucible of a resting place, which can be no other than the eternal, infinite I AM.²⁴ "Is it that it is a false and feverous state for the Centre to live in the Circumference?" Coleridge asks, and answers in the affirmative.²⁵ His belief was that the vital warmth, the real sensibility, belonged to Reason, but as soon as it came to the surface, that is, was expressed, it became hectic and inimical to the life within. Feeling is a false and feverous state of Reason, the infinite, eternal I AM. How to restore feeling to its original vital warmth was the main problem for Coleridge. He saw that successful poetry performed the magnificent work of making the feeling pass through the melting point which changed its nature from a feverous state to a state of vital warmth.

23. *Principles of Criticism*, p. 15.

24. in that repose divine
When the soul centred in the heart's recess
Hath quaff'd its fill of Nature's loveliness.

A Stranger Minstrel, lines 2-4.

25. *I. S.*, item 6, p. 33.

In his essay, "On the Principles of Genial Criticism," speaking of "the perfect reconciliation, effected between these two conflicting principles of the FREE LIFE, and of the confining FORM" Coleridge uses another metaphor. He says, "How entirely is the stiffness that would have resulted from the obvious regularity of the latter, *fused* and (if I may hazard so bold a metaphor) almost *volatilized* by the interpenetration and electrical flashes of the former."²⁶

Poetry, which is the most successful form of communication, "the *best* words in the best order,"²⁷ receives its power and vitality only because of this change brought about by an inscape of emotion into Reason, its original source. Feeling as well as knowing emerges out of this crucible fresh and glowing as impure gold comes out of fire cleansed and purified. It is the eternal I AM that purifies, that brings about catharsis, for that alone is the pure substance, and the pure alone can purify. Speaking from the other side we may say that feeling becomes purified when its limitations of time and space, its tags of particularity or individuality are removed. When the eternal I AM embraces the original mould of feeling, which is the same in all human beings, feeling changes its nature and becomes 'passion,' which is the soul of poetry. Thus it is that the feeling experienced in the ordinary daily life takes a freshness in the stage of 'passion' which seems almost divine.

Coleridge gives a fine description of his first imaginative experience in the following passage of *The Friend* (pp. 18-19). We quote it in full.

"I have said, that my very system compels me to make every fair appeal to the feelings, the imagination, and even the fancy. If these are to be withheld from the service of truth, virtue, and happiness, to what purpose were they given? In whose service are they retained? I have indeed considered the disproportion of human passions to their ordinary objects

26. *B. L.*, II, 235.

27. *Table Talk*, July 12, 1827,

among the strongest internal evidences of our future destination, and the attempt to restore them to their rightful claimants the most imperious duty and the noblest task of genius. The verbal enunciation of this master truth could scarcely be new to me at any period of my life since earliest youth ; but I well remember the particular time, when the words first became more than words to me, when they incorporated with a living conviction, and took their place among the realities of my being. On some wide common or open heath, peopled with ant-hills, during some one of the grey cloudy days of late autumn, many of my readers may have noticed the effect of a sudden and momentary flash of sunshine on all the countless little animals within his view, aware too that the selfsame influence was darted co-instantaneously over all their swarming cities as far as eye could reach ; may have observed, with what a kindly force the gleam stirs and quickens them all ! and will have experienced no unpleasurable shock of feeling in seeing myriads of living and sentient beings united at the same moment in one gay sensation, one joyous activity. But awful indeed is the same appearance in a multitude of rational beings, our fellow-men, in whom too the effect is produced not so much by the external occasion as from the active quality of their own thoughts. I had walked from Gottingen in the year 1799, to witness the arrival of the Queen of Prussia, on her visit to the Baron Von Hartzberg's seat, five miles from the university. The spacious outer court of the palace was crowded with men and women, a sea of heads, with a number of children rising out of it from their fathers' shoulders. After a buzz of two hours' expectation, the avant-courier rode at full speed into the court. At the loud cracks of his long whip and the trampling of his horse's hoofs, the universal shock and thrill of emotion—I have not language to convey it—expressed as it was in such manifold looks, gestures, and attitudes, yet with one and the same feeling in the eyes of all ! Recovering from the first inevitable contagion of sympathy, I involuntarily exclaimed, though in a language to myself alone intelligible, 'O man ! ever nobler

than thy circumstances ! Spread but the mist of obscure feeling over any form, and even a woman incapable of blessing or of injury to thee shall be welcomed with an intensity of emotion adequate to the reception of the Redeemer of the world !”

Abhinavagupta also says that in an artistic performance there is one and the same feeling in the hearts of all the audience.

Feeling becomes passion when it is activated by the whole soul of man, that is, his Spirit, his Reason, his eternal infinite self.²⁸ This is possible only when the feeling is strong and deep, universal and not particular. That Coleridge realized but unfortunately did not clarify. He did not note the difference between one stage of feeling and another, though by accepting the Platonic concept of idea he had the clue to it. What Coleridge did for knowing he was to do for feeling also. What he did for epistemology he was to do for aesthetics also. Indeed he revolutionalised epistemology in order to revolutionise aesthetics. The former was the means of the latter. But unfortunately his discovery did not get the final shape and exists in notes only. Feeling is different from knowing only in this that the former is a state of being which the latter is not. To know or understand what love is and to love are two different things. Coleridge who showed that concept could only be explained on the basis of percept, that true knowing was being, knew also that ordinary feeling was false being. In both cases he was concerned with truth, the true being. Just as Understanding meant a hazy knowledge of particulars, feeling was a feverous state of being, a hankering after particulars. Imagination was both the clear ground of understanding or knowing and the healthy ground of feel-

28. *Cp.* O meek attendant of Sol's setting blaze,
I hail, sweet star, thy chaste effulgent glow ;
On thee full oft with fixed eye I gaze
Till I, methinks, all spirit seem to grow.

To the Evening Star, lines 1-4, *Poems*, p. 16.

ing. Reason shed its light on both knowing and feeling. The shedding of light by the great universal power of Reason over the faculty of knowing and feeling particulars was called Imagination. In the case of knowing Coleridge called it primary; in the case of feeling he called it secondary.

We may once more refresh our memory regarding Coleridge's understanding of Plato's concept of Ideas as original tendencies or moulds of the mind.²⁹ In order to explain these original moulds Coleridge takes the help of the English word 'seal'. The seal creates impression on wax. Similarly these original moulds shape us into what we are. Indeed there is an original state of feeling which assumes the forms of our particular states of feeling. Concrete forms of feeling can be understood as entelechy, that is, self-development of an original mould of feeling. Coleridge followed Aristotle in defining poesy or art as "the imitatress of nature." His explanation of imitation amply justifies our analysis. "The impression on the wax is not an imitation, but a copy, of the seal; the seal itself is an imitation." Unless the concrete forms of feeling have an inscape in their respective original mould, no imitation is possible.

Coleridge says that "in order to form a philosophic conception, we must seek for the kind, as the heat in ice, invisible light, &c., whilst, for practical purposes, we must have reference to the degree." And thus he comes to the conclusion that "in all imitation two elements must co-exist, and not only co-exist, but must be perceived as co-existing. These two constituent elements are likeness and unlikeness, or sameness and difference, and in all genuine creations of art there must be a union of these disparates."³⁰ The concrete feelings or emotions are necessary, for universal feeling cannot be displayed. But at the same time emotions must be felt along with their original mould, for without such an inscape into the original universal mould they cannot be impregnated with

29. Letter 381, *C.L.*, II, 682.

30. "On Poesy or Art," *B. L.*, II, 255-6.

Reason and thus will lack all vitality ; remain ugly, stale, feverous, personal and so unworthy to be communicated to others. Why should a man even try to know what another feels in a particular situation unless it be of some interest to him ? This interest cannot be generated in him unless he realises it as his own in some way or the other. The poet can create interest in the heart of his reader only by evoking that original universal mould of feeling of which all the concrete feelings or emotions including those of himself and his readers are but different forms. The original universal mould of feeling is the common property of all and universal interest in poetry can be created only by entering into that universal region.³¹ Genuine poetry makes universal appeal because it helps the sensitive readers to enter into that universal state. Hence Coleridge said that "all genius exists in a participation of a common spirit....To have a genius is to live in the universal, to know no self but that which is reflected not only from the faces of all around us, our fellow creatures, but reflected

31. Coleridge was thinking in a similar vein in the concluding chapter of the *Biographia Literaria* :

"I remember the ludicrous effect of the first sentence of an autobiography which, happily for the writer, was as meagre in incidents as it is well possible for the Life of an Individual to be—'The *eventful* Life which I am about to record, from the hour in which I rose into existence on this Planet, &c'. Yet when, notwithstanding this warning example of Self-importance before me, I review my own life, I cannot refrain from applying the same epithet to it, and with more than ordinary emphasis—and no private feeling, that affected myself only, should prevent me from *publishing* the same (for *write* it I assuredly shall, should life and leisure be granted me), if continued reflection should strengthen my present belief, that my history would add its contingent to the enforcement of one important truth, viz. that we must not only love our neighbours as ourselves, but ourselves likewise as our neighbours ; and that we can do neither unless we love God above both.

B.L., II, 210.

Coleridge who conceived of God as eternal I AM knew that the whole universe was its choral echo, (*Ibid.*, p. 218), and that Eternity revealed itself in the phenomena of Time. (*Ibid.*, p. 207).

from the flowers, the trees, the beasts, yea from the very surface of the (*waters and the*) sands of the desert. A man of genius finds a reflex to himself, were it only in the mystery of being."³²

The *a priori* universal mould of feeling lying in the unconscious behind its conscious forms has to be experienced before genuine poetry can be created. That we "inly feel" is a very important poetic faith. "In every work of art there is a reconciliation of the external with the internal; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it; ...He who combines the two is the man of genius; and for that reason he must partake of both. Hence there is in genius itself an unconscious activity; *nay*, that is the genius in the man of genius."³³ And this is the true exposition of the rule that the artist must first eloin himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect. Why this? Because if he were to begin by mere painful copying, he would produce masks only, not forms breathing life. He must out of his own mind create forms according to severe laws of intellect, in order to generate in himself that co-ordination of freedom and law, that involution of obedience in the prescript, and of the prescript in the impulse to obey, which assimilates him to nature, and enables him to understand her. He merely absents himself for a season from her, that his own spirit, which has the same ground with nature, may learn her unspoken language in its main radicals, before he approaches to her endless compositions of them. Yes, not to acquire cold notions - lifeless technical rules - but living and life-producing ideas, which shall contain their own evidence, the certainty that they are essentially one with the germinal causes in nature, - his consciousness being the focus and mirror of both, - for this does the artist for a time abandon the

32. *P. L.*, p. 179.

33. Cp. "But Composition is no voluntary business: the very necessity of doing it robs me of the power of doing it." Letter 958, *C.L.*, IV, 552.

external real in order to return to it with a complete sympathy with its internal and actual....The artist must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourses to us by symbols—the *Naturgeist*, or spirit of nature,...for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect. The idea which puts the form together cannot itself be the form. It is above form, and is its essence, the universal in the individual, or the individuality itself—the glance and the exponent of the indwelling power.”³⁴

Elsewhere Coleridge says: “It is for the Biographer, not the Poet, to give the *accidents* of *individual* Life. Whatever is not representative, generic, may be indeed most poetically expressed, but is not Poetry.”³⁵

In all these various expositions Coleridge's idea is the same that the concrete feelings must be brought back to their original mould of which they are but developments and limitations. Creation can proceed only from the original universal mould and not from the limited forms of the same. The impress of the seal is a fixed thing, dead, inactive, incapable of giving another impress. The seal itself has the active power of producing innumerable impresses. “Remember that there is a difference between form as proceeding, and shape as superinduced; — the latter is either the death or the imprisonment of the thing; — the former is its self-witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency.”³⁶ “If the artist copies the mere nature, the *natura naturata*, what idle rivalry! If he proceeds only from a given form, which is supposed to answer to the notion of beauty, what an emptiness, what an unreality there always is in his productions, as in Cipriani's pictures! Believe me, you must master the essence, the *natura naturans*, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of man.”³⁷

34. “On Poesy or Art,” *B. L.*, II, 258-9.

35. Letter 969, *C. L.*, IV, 572.

36. “On Poesy or Art,” *B. L.*, II, 262.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

"Art would or should be the abridgement of nature. Now the fulness of nature is without character, as water is purest when without taste, smell, or color ; but this is the highest, the apex only, – it is not the whole. The object of art is to give the whole *ad hominem* ; hence each step of nature hath its ideal, and hence the possibility of a climax up to the perfect form of a harmonised chaos."³⁸

Coleridge very excellently explains that both the original mould of feeling and its self-development into concrete forms are essential for imitation by the artist. But the artist has to proceed from the prior stage, for creation is possible only in that way. Everything in this world of particulars is a finite form of the eternal I AM. But to imitate the finite form will be a mere copying, an 'idle rivalry' with nature, an unnecessary meaningless repetition. That cannot be the artist's forte. True poets are imitators in a higher sense. They imitate God, the eternal I AM. The eternal subject has the power and freedom of omniformity and creates matter as a self-projection without any extraneous aid. The poet, in whom also the same eternal self-consciousness is the creative force, repeats the same activity in the finite mind.³⁹ He starts with the *natura naturans*, the universal essence, the original feeling, for the concrete pieces of feeling are incapable of further development. Once a shape is imposed, growth is arrested.⁴⁰

The poet is, however, less than God, the eternal spirit, the infinite Reason, because he does not possess absolute freedom or plenitude. The poet's self-projections remain confined to his words. God's self-projections become facts of nature. Because the nature of the poetic faculty is an aping of this

38. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

39. Cp. "...the poet only bringeth his own stuff, and doth not learn a conceit out of a matter, but maketh matter for a conceit..." Sidney : "An Apology for Poetry," *English Critical Essays*, (Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries), ed. by Edmund D. Jones, p. 35.

40. Cp. N. 1312 : "Outline imprisons the mind of the Artist within the first conception/"

fundamental everlasting creative principle, because the poet possesses God's freedom of omniformity though only in the world of imagination and not in that of sense, the poetic faculty deserves a high place in the hierarchy of mental powers. It is below Reason but above Understanding. As has already been explained, everywhere the principle of life and light, of existence and knowledge, is the same eternal, infinite, universal I AM. But different names have to be given to such degrees of its manifestation as change the kind, the quality of its sphere. And "whatever is the definition of the *kind*, independent of degree, becomes likewise the definition of the highest degree of that kind."⁴¹ Hence Coleridge calls the poetic faculty by the same name of Imagination which is the prime agent of all human perception and not merely poetic perception. As he points out, Imagination differs from Reason in this that while the latter is completely active, the former is both active and passive. The passivity in all types of knowledge is due to the particularity of its content. In poetry also it comes from the necessary substance of poetry, the human feelings. As has been already explained, the finite, concrete pieces of feeling cannot be the starting point of the poet. A start has to be made with the original, universal mould of a feeling. The first and the most important task of the poet is to take his firm stand there. He creates concrete forms, for without these he cannot be intelligible to his readers. But these concrete forms are the entelechy of his starting point, the original mould of feeling. They are new and fresh, shaped by his own freedom of imagination. He follows the laws of his own making of them. He observes self-consistency so that others may follow him, may reach the original source of his creation with the help of his words and may feel the joy which he himself felt at the time he began his creation, at the moment of his first conception when his eternal self-consciousness impregnated his feeling in the joy of its infinite embrace.

41. "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B. L.*, II, 232.

Coleridge observes: "With regard to works in all the branches of the fine arts, I may remark that pleasure arising from novelty must of course be allowed its due place and weight. This pleasure consists in the identity of two opposite elements, that is to say—sameness and variety. If in the midst of the variety there be not some fixed object for the attention, the unceasing succession of the variety will prevent the mind from observing the difference of the individual objects; and the only thing remaining will be the succession, which will then produce precisely the same effect as sameness. This we experience when we let the trees or hedges pass before the fixed eye during a rapid movement in a carriage, or, on the other hand, when we suffer a file of soldiers or ranks of men in procession to go on before us without resting the eye on any one in particular. In order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the principle of unity must always be present, so that in the midst of multitude the centripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by the predominance of the centrifugal force. This unity in multitude I have elsewhere stated as the principle of beauty. It is equally the source of pleasure in variety, and in fact a higher term including both."⁴²

In his definition of art or poesy, Coleridge uses the term beauty, which appears at the outset as an introduction of an extraneous concept. But in the ultimate analysis we find that Coleridge's concept of beauty is only a further clarification of his concept of Imagination.

"We must imitate nature! Yes, but what in nature,—all and everything? No, the beautiful in nature. And what then is the beautiful? What is beauty? It is, in the abstract, the unity of the manifold, the coalescence of the diverse; in the concrete, it is the union of the shapely (*formosum*) with the vital. In the dead organic it depends on regularity of form, the first and lowest species of which is the triangle with all its

42. "On Poesy or Art", *B. L.*, II, 261-2.

modifications, as in crystals, architecture, &c. ; in the living organic it is not mere regularity of form, which would produce a sense of formality ; neither is it subservient to anything beside itself. It may be present in a disagreeable object, in which the proportion of the parts constitutes a whole ; it does not arise from association, as the agreeable does, but sometimes lies in the rupture of association ; it is not different to different individuals and nations, as has been said, nor is it connected with the ideas of the good, or the fit, or the useful. The sense of beauty is intuitive, and beauty itself is all that inspires pleasure without, and aloof from and even contrarily to, interest."⁴³

The sense of beauty is intuitive. An intuition is "a direct and immediate beholding or presentation of an object to the mind through the senses or the imagination".⁴⁴ How direct and immediate beholding of an object is done by the Primary Imagination has already been explained. It has also been shown that it makes no difference whether the object is presented through the senses or through reflexion. Pleasure or joy has the same source—immediate beholding of unity in multitude. Coleridge's great principle of unity is the infinite I AM and he equated it with Joy. Things in the universe exist only in complexity, but in order to exist at all they must have a basis in the infinite I AM. Whatever appears concrete or finite is chaotic and chaos is confusing. In other words, whatever is ugly is unpleasant. Chaos and ugliness are synonymous, and so are cosmos and beauty. To see unity in multitude is to see the parts as subsisting in a whole, and everything becomes beautiful when we see it as subsisting in a whole, irrespective of our interest in that thing. Thus even

43. "On Poesy or Art", *B. L.*, II, 256-7.

44. "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B. L.*, II, 230.

disagreeable⁴⁵ things become beautiful.⁴⁶ Poetry presents harmonized chaos.

Again, beauty and joy are correlatives. What is objectively seen as beauty is subjectively felt as joy. They are subjective and objective poles of one and the same principle. Common people say that beauty produces joy. Coleridge changes the emphasis from the objective to the subjective side, says that joy is the "beauty-making power",⁴⁷ and thus explains the secret of poetic creation and appreciation.⁴⁸ To start from the objective side brings confusion,⁴⁹ for it leads us nowhere.

While the Secondary Imagination is identical with the Primary in kind, it differs in the mode of its operation. Perception of an object means receiving it in the mould of our mind. Because our mind is active, it means the superimposition of the subjective activity on the object of sense. This is possible only on the basis of the activity of the infinite, eternal I AM, for nothing else is living or conscious. This imposition of the subject over the object is the same in the fields of both the Primary and the Secondary Imagination. Again, just as in the case of the perception of objects lying outside

45. For Coleridge's subtle differentiation between 'agreeable' and 'beautiful' see "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", Essay Third, *B. L.*, II, pp. 228-43.

46. See "To the Muse", *Poems*, p. 9 :

For, lovely Muse ! thy sweet employ
Exalts my soul, refines my breast,
Gives each pure pleasure keener zest,
And softens sorrow into pensive Joy;

"An Effusion at Evening", *Poems*, pp. 49, 50 :

When link'd with Peace I bounded o'er the Plain
And Hope itself was all I knew of Pain !

and "Apologia Pro Vita Sua", *Poems*, p. 345 :

Where soften'd Sorrow smiles within her tears.

47. "Dejection : An Ode", line 63, *Poems*, p. 365.

48. Coleridge defined both Taste and Imagination as unity in multitude.

See "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B. L.*, II, p. 227 and p. 12.

49. *P. L.*, pp. 166-7, quoted before.

so also in the case of the imaginary objects of reflexion there may be one object or many objects. Our mind gives this multitude a unity. Thus in kind both the varieties of Imagination are similar.

But in the mode of operation the Secondary Imagination differs from the Primary. The objects of the Primary Imagination are objects of God's creation, of nature. The poet does not make them exist. They exist on account of God's omniformity, the dynamic activity of the ever-ebullient stream of Life, which by its power of freedom limits itself in manifold shapes and thus brings the whole universe into existence. The objects of the poetic or the Secondary Imagination are not these objects of nature. They are re-constructed by the poet's mind through meditation and so are artificial. Re-construction requires dissolution. The Secondary Imagination "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate."⁵⁰ The concrete shapes of the natural objects, the *natura naturata*, have to be disintegrated. They have to disappear in order that fresh forms may appear. The natural objects become the subject matter of poetry only after they affect the human mind. Rather we should say that it is not the natural objects but the mental affections caused by them that are the objects of poetry. All the materials of poetry "are from the mind" just as "all its products are for the mind."⁵¹

The question arises: what is the differentia between the common man's feelings and those of the poet? The common man's feelings are always tagged to the individual object and his individual person, his little narrow limited self, which is itself *natura naturata* as any object of nature is. But the Secondary Imagination of the poet at once dissolves or dissipates this limitation and brings the natural object to nothingness, and as that is not possible in many cases, dissipates the tags of time and place of his own feelings regarding them, and re-creates new forms, which are beautiful only because the

50. *B. L.*, I, 202.

51. "On Poesy or Art", *B. L.*, II, 254.

unifying universal basis of the new concrete forms is never lost sight of ; because the vital stream of joy, that "beauty-making power" behind the shapely form, is felt simultaneously with the form ; because the centripetal force is present in the poet's mind, holding the multitude, the work of the centrifugal force.

Commenting on Shakespeare Coleridge says : "Shakespeare...too worked in the spirit of nature, by evolving the germ within by the imaginative power according to an idea—for as the power of seeing is to light, so is an idea in mind to a law in nature. They are correlatives that suppose each other."

"Shakespeare shaped his characters out of the nature within ; but we cannot so safely say, out of *his own* nature, as an individual person. No ! this latter is itself but a *natura naturata*, an effect, a product, not a *power*. It was Shakespeare's prerogative to have the *universal* which is potentially in each *particular*, opened out to him in the *homo generalis*, not as an abstraction of observation from a variety of men, but as the substance capable of endless modifications, of which his own personal existence was but one, and to use *this one* as the eye that beheld the other, and as the tongue that could convey the discovery. (There is) no greater or more common vice in dramatic writers than to draw out of themselves....Shakespeare in composing had no I but the I representative."⁵²

A Note-book entry repeats the same idea :

"Poetry is rationalised dreaming dealing to manifold forms our own feelings, that never perhaps were attached by us consciously to our personal selves. What is the *Lear*, the *Othello*, but a divine dream, all Shakespeare,—and nothing Shakespeare ?"⁵³

The personal emotions, the empirical realities, have to be

52. *Misc. Crit.*, Lecture 7, pp. 43-4.

53. N. 2086. Raysor quotes it in *Shak. Crit.*, II, 85-6. See also *A. P.*, pp. 52-3, where Coleridge illustrates the proverb, "Extremes meet", in one such way as "Nothing and intensest absolute being."

dissolved in the universal in order that creation may be started afresh. Shelley, for example, addresses the skylark thus :

Hail to thee, blithe spirit !
Bird thou never wert.

He dissipated the empirical reality of the bird and thought of it as a happy spirit. Now, something new has been done. It is strange to hear that the skylark was never a bird. It is shaking up the mind accustomed to see things in the hackneyed way. "To combine the child's sense of wonder and novelty with the appearances, which every day for perhaps forty years had rendered familiar...this is the character and privilege of genius, and one of the marks which distinguish genius from talents."⁵⁴ A man of genius is a man of Imagination. How old familiar things, truths grown stale by the very circumstance of their universal admission are rescued by genius, which is akin to Imagination, and give the strongest impression of novelty is illustrated by Coleridge by a couplet of Burns. "Who has not a thousand times seen snow fall on water? Who has not watched it with a new feeling, from the time that he has read Burns' comparison of sensual pleasure

"To snow that falls upon a river
A moment white—then gone for ever!"^{54a}

Now, where does the new creation start? It would not be misrepresenting Coleridge if we point out that the Secondary Imagination set in action by the will to create destroys the familiar, fixed, stale, lifeless form of the thing, the narrow attitude regarding it, and at once makes us have an inscape into the region of the universal that exists in the unconscious, the unformed state of feeling that lies dormant in the human heart as a mould. The poet's mind is immersed in the vast realm of the universal feeling, maybe for a moment only.

This universal feeling is no other than Reason.⁵⁵ There is homogeneity between feeling and Imagination.⁵⁶ It is the unity of the head and the heart.⁵⁷ They respectively represent male and female aspects of the human personality.⁵⁸ This union of male and female parts of the ideal personality produces ineffable joy—or gladness of joy if the eternal I AM be conceived as Joy. Coleridge conceived of the androgynous nature of a man of genius⁵⁹ and said that the head and the heart wrestled together for supremacy in Shakespeare, the ideal poet. The depth of feeling and the energy of thought, the creative power and the intellectual energy in him, “like two rapid streams, that, at their first meeting within narrow and rocky banks, mutually strive to repel each other and intermix reluctantly and in tumult ; but soon finding a wider channel and more yielding shores blend and dilate, and flow on in one current and with one voice.”⁶⁰ The universality of the deep feeling makes it totally impersonal. Coleridge said that “Feelings die by flowing into the mould of the Intellect, & becoming Ideas.”⁶¹ The powerful energy of thought makes it impossible for the mind to be sticky. “The reader is forced into too much action to sympathise with the merely passive of our nature. As little can a mind thus roused and awakened be brooded on by mean and indistinct emotion, as the low, lazy mist can creep upon the

55. “Philosophy, properly so called, began with Pythagoras. He saw that the mind in the common sense of the word was itself a fact, and that there was something in the mind not individual ; this was pure reason, *something in which we are, not which is in us.*” [Additional Table Talk, *Table Talk and Omniana*, p. 319.

56. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 449.

57. Vide *Coleridge's Literary Criticism* (ed. by Mackail) p. 203, quoted later.

58. Cp. N. 1834, quoted later in this chapter. For sexual relation as a relation of opposites see *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay 6.

59. *Table Talk*, Sept. 1, 1832.

60. *B. L.*, II, p. 19.

61. Letter 484, *C. L.*, II, 916.

surface of a lake, while a strong gale is driving it onward in waves and billows."⁶²

"Poetry in its essence (is) a universal spirit, but which in incorporating itself adapts and takes up the surrounding materials, and adapts itself to existing circumstances. What it cloaks itself in, it glorifies, like a plant, dependent on soil for many things, yet still retaining its original form."⁶³

"Poetic Feelings, like the flexuous Boughs
Of mighty Oaks, yield homage to the Gale,
Toss in the strong winds, drive before the Gust,
Themselves one giddy storm of fluttering Leaves ;
Yet all the while, self-limited, remain
Equally near the fix'd and parent Trunk
Of Truth and Nature, in the howling Blast
As in the Calm that stills the Aspen Grove."⁶⁴

Coleridge explains the Imaginative process of universalisation of particulars with an observation about the soul by Sir John Davies :

"Doubtless this could not be, but that she turns
Bodies to spirit by sublimation strange,
As fire converts to fire the things it burns,
As we our food into our nature change.
From their gross matter she abstracts their forms,
And draws a kind of quintessence from things ;
Which to her proper nature she transforms,
To bear them light on her celestial wings.
Thus does she, when from individual states
She doth abstract the universal kinds ;
Which then re-clothed in divers names and fates
Steal access through our senses to our minds."⁶⁵

62. *B. L.*, II, 16.

63. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 204.

64. Lines 34-41 of "To Matilda Betham from a Stranger," *Roems*, pp. 375-6
quoted in Letter 459, *C. L.*, II, 864.

65. *B. L.*, II, 12-13.

The overflowing joy of the poetic experience seeks a channel. The poet cannot rest without communicating this ineffable joy to others. But the worn-out language of common usage becomes unfit to express the joy of this unique union of universal and particulars. Words with fixed meanings become incapable of expressing the infinite gladness of this union. They cannot measure this immeasurable happiness. The infinite depth can hardly be fathomed by anything finite. On the other hand, the poet cannot help using the finite images for communicating his experience. So these finite vehicles of thought are endowed with wings to fly or fins to dive in the immeasurable regions. Thus is the figurative language born. The poet invents a language which becomes symbolical. "A symbol," says Coleridge, "is characterised by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. It always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that unity of which it is the representative."⁶⁶ Strong figures, bold metaphors and rapid associations of distinct images by slight resemblances become the natural language of the passionate poetic experience.⁶⁷ Metaphor, or simile, or poetic image, which comprehends both or more,⁶⁸ or Coleridge's 'symbol', which is still a better word, becomes the only fit vehicle for communicating it. Figures or images are valuable only so far as they help us in entering this unique realm of poetic experience, of passionate joy. "In my opinion," Coleridge says, "every phrase, every metaphor, every personification, should have its justifying cause in some *passion* either of the Poet's mind, or of the

66. *Lay Sermons*, p. 33.

67. *I. S.*, item 174 quoted before.

68. "The word 'image', precisely because it is used to cover both metaphor and simile..."

J. Middleton Murry, 'Metaphor', *Shak. Crit.*, ed. by A. Bradby, p. 229.

characters described by the poet....Poetry justifies...some new combinations of Language, & commands the omission of many others allowable in other composition." He criticised Wordsworth because he "in his system not sufficiently admitted the former, and in his practice...too frequently sinned against the latter."⁶⁹

Coleridge says : "The presence of genius is not shown in elaborating a picture : we have had so many specimens of this sort of work in modern poems, where all is dutchified, if I may use the word, by the most minute touches that the reader naturally asks why words, and not paintings, are used...

"The power of poetry is by a single word, perhaps, to instil that energy into the mind, which compels the imagination to produce the picture. Prospero tells Miranda,

One midnight
Fated to the purpose, did Antonio open
The gates of Milan ; and in the dead of darkness,
The ministers for the purpose hurried thence
Me, and thy crying self.

Here, by introducing a single happy epithet 'crying' in the last line, a complete picture is presented to the mind and in the production of such pictures the power of genius consists...."⁷⁰

Coleridge criticised "The Botanic Garden" of Dr. Darwin as a poem on the ground that throughout the work "there are not twenty images described as a man would describe them in a state of excitement. The poem is written with all the tawdry industry of a milliner anxious to dress up a doll in silks and satins. Dr. Darwin laboured to make his style fine and gaudy, by accumulating and applying all the sono-

69. Letter 444, C. L., II, 812.

70. *Lit. Crit.*, ed. by Mackail, pp. 213-4.

It is interesting to note that Indian critics similarly emphasise the importance of poetic words. Mark the significance of 'bhaṃa' (*Dhvanyāloka*, p. 52) and 'adhama' (*Kāvya prakāśa*, p. 15) in the verses quoted as illustrations of the best poetry.

rous and handsome-looking words in our language. This is not poetry...."⁷¹

Such a composition Coleridge condemned by calling it fanciful, mechanical, dead, artificial arrangement as against imaginative, organic, living, natural poetic expression.

As an illustration of poetic words, that suggest that they are born of an imaginative experience of the poet, Coleridge quotes from Shakespeare :

Full many a glorious morning have I seen

Flatter the mountain tops with sovereign eye.⁷²

The one word 'flatter' successfully conveys the joy of the poet at the sight of the golden or the silvery mountain ridges in the morning.

The difference between the poetic or the imaginative and the unpoetic or the fanciful has been very well illustrated by Coleridge in the following two descriptions of the same thing. He says :

"In the two following lines, for instance, there is nothing objectionable, nothing which would preclude from forming in their proper place, part of a descriptive poem :—

'Behold yon row of pines, that shorn and bow'd

Bend from the sea-blast, seen at twilight eve.'

But with a small alteration of rhythm, the same words would be equally in their place in a book of topography, or in a descriptive tour. The same image will rise into a semblance of poetry if thus conveyed :—

Yon row of bleak and visionary pines,

By twilight-glimpse discerned, mark ! how they flee

From the fierce sea-blast, all their tresses wild

Streaming before them."⁷³

A similar illustration of the contrast of the poetic with the unpoetic expression may be had in the descriptions of Cleopa-

71. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 42.

72. Sonnet 33, quoted in *B. L.*, II, 17.

73. *Poems*, p. 503.

tra's barge as given in North's translation of Plutarch and in Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* (Act II, Se. II) :

The barge she sat in, like a burnish'd throne,
 Burn'd on the water : the poop was beaten gold ;
 Purple the sails, and so perfumed that
 The winds were love-sick with them ; the oars were
 silver,
 Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke, and made
 The water which they beat to follow faster,
 As amorous of their strokes....

This is Shakespeare's poetic transformation of the following original in North :

"She disdained to set forward otherwise, but to take her barge in the river of Cydnus, the poope whereof was of gold, the sails of purple, and the owers of silver, which kept stroke in rowing after the sound of flutes, howboys, cythern, violls, and such other instruments as they played upon the barge...."⁷⁴

As C. Day Lewis remarks, "every image recreates not merely object but an object in the context of an experience, and thus an object as part of a relationship."⁷⁵ Coleridge made understanding a thing in its relations an indispensable test of intelligence.⁷⁶ The intermediary method of Imagination shows the relations of things to the observer or the listener. In poetry "there is a necessary predominance of the ideas (i.e. of that which originates in the artist himself), and

74. Quoted by J. Middleton Murry in his essay on 'Metaphor,' *Shakespeare Criticism*, ed. by A. Bradby, p. 236.

75. *The Poetic Image*, p. 29.

76. "...the rustic, from the more imperfect development of his faculties, and from the lower state of their cultivation, aims almost solely to convey *insulated facts*,...while the educated man chiefly seeks to discover and express those *connections* of things, or those relative *bearings* of fact to fact, from which some more or less general law is deducible." *B. L.*, II, 39. See also *The Friend*, p. 300.

a comparative indifference of the materials.”⁷⁷ In the instances of genuine poetry quoted above we find the working of Imagination. Among other things one proof of it is that nature has been humanised. A human interest has been added to the descriptions of natural phenomena. “Poetry... is purely human ; for all its materials are from the mind, and all its products are for the mind.”⁷⁸ But as explained before, the selfish or the personal feeling is not poetry. Poetry is an apotheosis of feeling. Its deification is brought about by its impregnation with the eternal I AM.

Creation starts from the union of opposites and any probable line of development may serve the poet. While poetry “avails itself of the forms of nature to recall, to express, and to modify the thoughts and feelings of the mind”, it can do so only in the human way, “through the intervention of articulate speech, which is so peculiarly human, that in all languages it constitutes the ordinary phrase by which man and nature are contradistinguished”. Even in phrases like ‘mute Milton’ or ‘dumb poet’, “‘mute’ and ‘dumb’ do not convey the absence of sound, but the absence of articulated sounds”. “As soon as the human mind is intelligibly addressed by an outward image exclusively of articulate speech, so soon does art commence. But please to observe that I have laid particular stress on the words ‘human mind’,—meaning to exclude thereby all results common to man and all other sentient creatures, and consequently confining myself to the effect produced by the congruity of the animal impression with the reflective powers of the mind ; so that not the thing presented, but that which is re-presented by the thing, shall be the source of the pleasure.”⁷⁹

We cannot have a ‘poetry of nature’. That phrase of John

77. *The Friend*, p. 309.

78. “On Poesy or Art”, *B. L.*, II, 254.

79. “On Poesy or Art”, *B. L.*, II, 254.

Keats⁸⁰ can be true only figuratively. Images, therefore, do not become valuable by being faithful presentations or copies of nature, but by being faithful re-presentations or symbols of Ideas. Innumerable examples may be cited as proof:

Heaven lies about us in our infancy.

Wordsworth : *The Immortality Ode*.

Much have I travelled in the realms of gold.

Keats : *On Chapman's Homer*.

Stern Daughter of the Voice of God.

Wordsworth : *Ode to Duty*.

Like a poet hidden

In the light of thought.

Shelley : *To a Skylark*.

O ! the one Life within us and abroad

Which meets all motion and becomes its soul.

Coleridge : *The Eolian Harp*.

(Portentous sight !) the owlet Atheism,

Sailing on obscene wings athwart the noon,

Drops his blue-fringed lids, and holds them close,

And hooting at the glorious sun in Heaven,

Cries out, 'where is it ?'

Coleridge : *Fears in Solitude*.

Where Alph, the sacred river, ran

Through caverns measureless to man

Down to a sunless sea.

A sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice !

Coleridge : *Kubla Khan*.

She speaks poniards, and every word stabs : if her breath

80. Sonnet on *The Grasshopper and the Cricket*. Even Coleridge spoke of poetry "substantiated and realized in nature ;...nature itself disclosed to us,...as at once the poet and the poem" by the science of chemistry. (*The Friend*, p. 313) But poetry which is nature idealized is different from nature. Coleridge himself called poetic emotion artificial. (N. 87.)

were as terrible as her terminations, there were no living near her ; she would infect to the north star.

Shakespeare : *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act II, Sc. 1.

As a matter of fact, poetry delights us by a fine excess rather than by a faithful portrayal of nature. Faithfulness to phenomena is no poetic principle. "It is the representation of it, not the reality, that we require, the imitation, and not the thing itself The true pleasure we derive from theatrical performances arises from the fact that they are unreal and fictitious. If dying agonies were unfeigned, who, in these days of civilization, could derive gratification from beholding them ?"⁸¹ "A poet ought not to pick nature's pocket : let him borrow, and so borrow as to repay by the very act of borrowing. Examine nature accurately, but write from recollection ; and trust more to your imagination than to your memory."⁸² That was Coleridge's advice. Sight or sound is not necessary for poetry, for blind and deaf persons also have been poets. As Wordsworth says,

Whate'er the senses take or may refuse,—
The Mind's internal heaven shall shed her dews
Of inspiration on the humblest lay.⁸³

Some faithful description of natural objects also are poetic. Aristotle explained it on the ground that 'what is' is also a probable development of 'what may be'. But the poet is a poet on account of his developing a theme according to the inner law of necessity or probability.⁸⁴ He is philosophical, not historical. Aristotle said that "the poet or 'maker' should be the maker of plots rather than of verses",⁸⁵ and that "a probable impossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable and yet possible".⁸⁶ Coleridge, who totally

81. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 46.

82. *Table Talk*, Sept. 22, 1830.

83. *The Inner Vision*. Cp. N. 1692 quoted in fn. 18 of this chapter.

84. *Poetics*, ed. by Butcher, pp. 35, 37.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

agreed with Aristotle on this point, made "willing suspension of disbelief" the essential poetic faith.⁸⁷ Coleridge criticised Wordsworth's matter-of-factness, his theory that the language of poetry should be "a selection of the real language of men". "Every man's language varies, according to the extent of his knowledge, the activity of his faculties and the depth or quickness of his feelings",⁸⁸ Coleridge pointed out. Even if the poet paints natural objects faithfully, he presents them with a feeling that never belongs to them.

Thus in the two styles of writing poetry, faithful and figurative, it is neither the faithfulness of portrayal nor the presence of a figure or image that makes writings poetic. The essential poetic quality is "that pleasurable emotion, that peculiar state and degree of excitement, that arises in the poet himself in the act of composition" as a result of the poet's extraordinary sensibility which evokes from him an extraordinary "sympathy with the objects of nature or the incidents of human life".⁸⁹ This is possible on account of the extra-ordinary activity of the poet's mind after its impregnation with the eternal I AM. In the passionate state the mind seeks new connections of thoughts with things and describes them in new symbols and rhythms.

Coleridge points out, therefore, that "images, however beautiful, though faithfully copied from nature, and as accurately represented in words, do not of themselves characterize the poet. They become proofs of original genius only so far as they are modified by a predominant passion ; or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion ; or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity, or succession to an instant; or lastly, when a human and intellectual life is transferred to them from the poet's own spirit, 'Which shoots its being through earth, sea, and air.'"⁹⁰

87. *B. L.*, II, 6.

88. *Ibid*, pp. 101, 4'.

89. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 50.

90. *B. L.*, II, 16.

All the alternatives given here are really different results of one and the same act of impregnation of the mind with the eternal I AM.

It is again on this account that a sense of musical delight is the *sine qua non* of poetry. " 'The man that hath not music in his soul' can indeed never be a genuine poet."⁹¹ What Coleridge meant by the sense of musical delight may be learnt from his following remarks on music :

"I have no technical knowledge of Music. I wish, I had, I receive deep sensations, yea, intellectual activities from it ; but what it is that so affects me, I know not. I love it, as a Blind man in love who thrills at the touch of her he thinks so beautiful because he feels so dear. Music seems to have an *immediate* communion with my Life ; I have no power of tracing it thro' my Ear, no consciousness of it in it's march or passage, except when it ceases to be *music* for me, and becomes mere unpleasant or idle sound. It converses with the *life* of my mind, as if it were itself the Mind of my Life. Yet I sometimes think, that a great Composer, a Mozart, a Beethoven must have been in a state of Spirit much more akin, more analogous, to mine own when I am at once waiting for, watching, and organically constructing and inwardly constructed by, the *Ideas*, the living Truths, that may be re-excited but cannot be expressed by Words, the Transcendents that give the Objectivity to all Objects, the Form to all Images, yet are themselves untranslatable into any Image, unrepresentable by any particular Object than I can imagine myself to be to a Titian, or a Sir C. Wren."⁹²

The foregoing note clearly shows that what attracted Coleridge in music and what he thought important in it was not the sweet sound but the movement, the dynamic force of the *ideas*, those living truths that were identical in essence with the eternal I AM. They affected his soul. Indeed the sweetest part of music is cadence, the measured movement

91. *Ibid.*, II, 14.

92. *I. S.*, item 178.

that characterises the gladness of a 'passion', that is, a feeling impregnated with Reason or the eternal I AM. It is on this account that "the sense of musical delight, with the power of producing it, is a gift of imagination."⁹³

This, again, explains why Coleridge compared the mind of a man of genius with a flowing stream and contrasted it with the mind of an ordinary man, which he compared with a stagnant tank.⁹⁴ Just as "jewel-setting" of images is not poetry,⁹⁵ similarly mere versifying does not make one a poet. However beautiful an image or a line may be, that does not make it a poem. Every image should have its justifying cause in some passion.⁹⁶ Metre pleases only when the matter described is appropriate for the attention and feelings roused by the quick reciprocations of curiosity which metre still gratifies and still re-excites.⁹⁷ "We must not look to the parts merely but to the whole, and to the effect of that whole. In reading Milton, for instance, scarcely a line can be pointed out which, critically examined, could be called in itself good: the poet would not have attempted to produce merely what is in general understood by a good line; he sought to produce glorious paragraphs and systems of harmony, or as he himself puts it,

Many a winding bout
Of linked sweetness long drawn out
L' Allegro."

In the *Eolian Harp* (lines 26-33) the musical delight, 'Rhythm in all thought and joyance every where', is identified with
 'the one Life within us and abroad,
 Which meets all motion and becomes its soul'.

93. *B. L.*, II, 14.

94. *Shak., Crit.*, II, 185.

95. Speaking of Southey Coleridge said: "He wanted modifying power. He was a jewel-setter." *Misc. Crit.*, p. 390.

96. Letter 444, *C. L.* II, 812 quoted above.

97. *B. L.*, II, 51.

Elsewhere it is equated with the life-ebullient stream of the eternal, infinite I AM.⁹⁸

In the ineffable union of the passive feeling with the active Reason lies the secret of the birth of poetry. The following note gives a beautiful account of the passive aspect of a poetic experience :

"The dignity of passiveness to worthy Activity when men shall be as proud within themselves of having remained an hour in a state of deep tranquil Emotion, whether in reading or in hearing or in looking, as they now are in having figured away one hour/ O how few can transmute activity of mind into emotion/ yet there are who active as the stirring Tempest & playful as a May blossom in a Breeze of May, can yet for hours together remain with hearts broad awake, and the Understanding asleep in all but its retentiveness and receptivity / yea, & the Latter evinces as great Genius as the Former."⁹⁹

How to know that Reason is active in our mind has been well explained by Coleridge in the following lines :

Whene'er the mist, that stands 'twixt God and thee
Defecates to a pure transparency,
That intercepts no light and adds no stain,—
There Reason is, and then begins her reign !¹⁰⁰

"Who shall dare to stand alone", Coleridge asks, "and vaunt himself, in himself, sufficient? In poetry it is the blending of passion with order that constitutes perfection : this is still more the case in morals, and more than all in the

98. *The Friend*, p. 343.

99. N. 1834. See also *A.P.*, p. 66. Cp. Wordsworth :

Nor less I deem that there are Powers
Which of themselves our minds impress ;
That we can feed this mind of ours
In a wise passiveness.

'Expostulation and Reply', *Poems*, p. 481.

See also the description of 'the blessed mood' in the *Tintern Abbey* (lines 37-48), *Poems*, p. 206.

100. *Poems*, p. 487.

exclusive attachment of the sexes".¹⁰¹ Coleridge's concept of perfection was a total union of head and heart, which he considered after Plato to be a divine state. His concept of the Trinity was a union of Will and Reason as Love.¹⁰² He claimed something similar on the lower plane for the poetic experience.¹⁰³

When the poet's mind is able to reach 'the immeasurable fount' of Reason, his feeling becomes powerful and so becomes ebullient.¹⁰⁴ It is Reason which makes a feeling powerful and there is a spontaneous overflow of it after it has become powerful. Wordsworth's definition of poetry thus gets Coleridge's philosophical support. As already shown, Coleridge calls such a powerful feeling by the name of passion. Such a powerful feeling or passion alone is the soul of poetry, and not the personal feelings lame with tags of time and place. Imagination, the poetic faculty, "owns no allegiance to time and place". "For the principal and only genuine excitement ought to come from within,—from the moved and sympathetic imagination; whereas, where so much is addressed to the mere external senses of seeing and hearing, the spiritual vision is apt to languish, and the attraction from without will withdraw the mind from the proper and only legitimate interest which is intended to spring from within."¹⁰⁵

Such a powerful feeling or passion is the soul of poetry.

101. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 107; see the seventh lecture, and also *Shak. Crit.*, I, 119-20. See also Coleridge's defence of Shakespeare's passionate love for his friend who inspired many of his sonnets against Wordsworth's attack. (*Misc. Crit.*, pp. 454-5.)

102. *Table Talk*, May 15, 1830,

103. Cp. *N.* 1229: "Love to all the Passions & Faculties as Music to all the varieties of Sound!" See also *Shak. Crit.*, I, 120.

104. Cp. *Religious Musings*, lines 402-4 (*Poems*, p. 124):

Contemplant Spirits! Ye that hover o'er
With untired gaze the immeasurable fount
Ebullient with creative Deity.

105. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 118.

It has to be given a body in order to make it tangible to the readers. The powerful universal feeling or passion cannot but take the help of particular concrete emotions in order to express itself. "Thus we see that no one passion is so predominant, but that it includes all the parts of the character, and the reader never has a mere abstract of a passion.. but the whole man is presented to him—the one predominant passion acting, if I may so say, as the leader of the band to the rest."¹⁰⁶

How to distinguish between a living concrete emotion and a dead counterpart of it, between an imaginative symbol and a fanciful image, is a great task for the critic. Coleridge offers his guidance here. "As soon as it (the mind) is fixed on one image, it becomes understanding; but while it is unfixed and wavering between them (images), attaching itself permanently to none, it is imagination."¹⁰⁷ "The grandest efforts of poetry", he further points out, "are where the imagination is called forth, not to produce a distinct form but a strong working of the mind, still offering what is still repelled, and again creating what is again rejected; the result being what the poet wishes to impress, namely, the substitution of a sublime feeling of the unimaginable for a mere image."¹⁰⁸

106. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 97-8.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 103. Coleridge quotes the description of Death in *Paradise Lost*, Bk. II as an illustration of imaginative description.

108. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 103-4. Raysor cites parallels from German writers. Thus Richter said "The true poet...will surround limited Nature with the infinity of the idea—" Schiller wrote similarly. Raysor points out that Coleridge, Richter and Schiller were all indebted to Kant who wrote: "The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of the object and this consists in limitation, whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of *limitlessness*, yet with a super-added thought of its totality." (Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, ed. by Meredith, Oxford, 1911, p. 90.) Coleridge's indebtedness to Kant and his differences from his master have already been discussed in the previous chapters.

To unite the active Reason with the passive feeling and thus transform the feeling into Passion is the great work of the faculty of Imagination. It is very important but very difficult to understand that "Poetry excites us to artificial feeling" and "makes us callous to real ones",¹⁰⁹ "that Feelings die by flowing into the mould of the Intellect, & becoming Ideas".¹¹⁰

Coleridge spoke of Love and Imagination in similar ways. "The surest friend of chastity is love : it leads us, not to sink the mind in the body, but to draw up the body to the mind—the immortal part of our nature."¹¹¹ Similarly the work of Imagination is to lead the feeling to Reason so that it may shed its passivity and fixity and shine afresh with the infinite eternal light of Reason. That is the significance of making Imagination an intermediate faculty between the active Reason and the passive Understanding. Coleridge never gets tired of repeating this idea in different words. Thus speaking of his ideal poet, Shakespeare, he says: "The wonderful faculty which Shakespeare above all other men possessed, or rather the power which possessed *him* in the highest degree, of anticipating everything, evidently is the result—at least partakes—of meditation, or that mental process which consists in the submitting to the operation of thought every object of feeling or impulse, or passion observed *out* of it."¹¹²

Thus we see that Dr. Richards' criticism of Coleridge's theory of Imagination on the ground that it does not account for passions in poetry seems unjustified. Dr. Richards says :

"Arnold said that great poetry interests the permanent passions ; but this, as so often happens, splits what is one

109. N. 87.

110. Letter 484, *C. L.*, II, 916.

111. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 108. Cp. also N. 189 : "Love transforms the souls into a conformity with the object loved", and the work of Imagination noted in such remarks of Coleridge as "To know is to resemble", "We receive but what we give."

112. Additional Table Talk, Mackail's *Coleridge's Literary Criticism*, p. 203.

into two. For the passions are *in* the poetry and the poetry is only the way this interest and these passions go in it. No description of imagination is of any use to those who do not otherwise sometimes know this way—as poets; or know when they are in it, as readers; yet it is the way—however often fashion, miscomprehension, obstructive pre-possession, or dullness may hide it from us.”¹¹³

Coleridge knew that “Poesy demands th’ impassion’d theme”.¹¹⁴ He knew both the matter and manner of poetry. He knew that the matter of poetry was passions or ‘artificial’ human feelings—artificial in the sense that they were roused not by things but by thoughts of things—and the manner of poetry was *esemplastic* Imagination. He knew the way how feeling becomes poetic passion. He did not analyse the poetic passion in detail, but the fragments and notes quoted above show that he knew the truth about them.

Contrasting the originality of Ben Jonson with that of Shakespeare, Coleridge says that Jonson’s “extra-ordinary opulence of thought..is the produce of an amassing power in the author, and not the growth from within,”¹¹⁵ which latter is characteristic of Shakespeare and the greatest poetry. “Shakespeare goes on creating and evolving B out of A and C out of B, and so on, just as a serpent moves, which makes a fulcrum of its own body, and seems for ever twisting and untwisting its own strength.”¹¹⁶ “In Shakespeare one sentence begets the next naturally: the meaning is all interwoven. He goes on kindling like a meteor through the dark atmosphere [till] the creation in its outline is...perfect...”¹¹⁷ The concrete forms evolve out of the original, potential state.

The experience of the union of head and heart, the “Balance of Thought and Feeling, of submission and mas-

113. *Coleridge on Imagination*, 3rd ed., p. 98.

114. *To the Author of Poems*, line 40, *Poems*, p. 104.

115. *Lit. Rem.* I, 98-100 quoted by Mackail, *Coleridge's Lit. Crit.*, p. 248.

116. *Table Talk*, March 5, 1834, Mackail, p. 202.

117. *Table Talk*, April 7, 1833, Mackail, p. 201.

tery"¹¹⁸ is one of extreme satisfaction, for a like of the same is never experienced by the faculty of Understanding, which alone is active in the mind of the common man and even in the mind of the extra-ordinary men like poets, scientists, philosophers and devotees in their ordinary moments. The imaginative experience is a total experience affecting both the body and the spirit.¹¹⁹

Again even unpleasant experiences are transformed into 'dreams of happiness'. 'Even saddest thoughts mix with some sweet sensations.'¹²⁰ And the reason of all this is that everything is viewed in its universal infinite eternal aspect.

The truly great
Have all one age, and from one visible space
Shed influence ! They, both in power and act,
Are permanent, and Time is not with them,
Save as it worketh for them, they in it.¹²¹

118. Letter 963, *C. L.*, IV, 559.

119. And from the sun, and from the breezy air,
Sweet influences trembled o'er his frame ;
And he, with many feelings, many thoughts,
Made up a meditative joy, and found
Religious meanings in the forms of nature !

—*Fears in Solitude*, lines 20-24, *Poems*, p. 257.

120. *On Observing a Blossom*, *Poems*, p. 149.

121. *To William Wordsworth*, *Poems*, p. 406.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SECONDARY IMAGINATION : A RESUME

In all processes of the Understanding the shortest way will be discovered the last and this perhaps while it constitutes the great advantage of having a Teacher to put us on the shortest road at the first, yet sometimes occasions a difficulty in the comprehension—in as much as the longest way is more near to the existing state of the mind, nearer to what, if left to myself on starting the thought, I should have thought next.—The shortest way gives me the knowledge best ; the longest way makes me more knowing.

N. 3023.

I am pleased that when a mere Stripling I had formed the opinion, that true Taste, was Virtue—& that bad writing was bad feeling.

N. 2728.

Raso vai Sah.

'Taittirīyopaniṣat', *Daśopaniṣadaḥ* p. 302.

Sarvathā rasanātmaka-vītavighnapratītigrahāyo bhāva eva Rasaḥ.

Abhinava-Bhāratī, I, 280.

Ittham ca [Abhinavagupta—Mammatābhāṭṭādi—grantha—swārasyena bhagnāvaraṇa-cid-viśiṣṭo ratyādi-sthāyibhāvo Rasa iti sthitam.

Rasa-Gaṅgādhara, p. 27.

To recapitulate, Imagination is an esemplastic faculty. In its primary form it unifies the percipient with the phenomenal object or objects of perception and thus makes perception possible. It is thus the basis of all types of knowledge. The faculty of Understanding works on the base of the Primary Imagination. Understanding works in the conscious finite region. The Secondary Imagination is fundamentally different from the Understanding which is the

finite mind's knowledge of the finite object and is conceptual and mediate. Concepts are based on percepts, and percepts alone are immediate knowledge. Without the latter we cannot think of the former. Coleridge speaks of the priority of the perceptual mould of the sealing impressing activity and not of the seal or the impress, which latter in the modern empirical psychology is called a percept and which is mingled with concept. It is on the basis of the repetition of the infinite I AM that finite knowing is possible. We are, however, not conscious of this repetition.

The Secondary Imagination is an enlargement of the Primary Imagination. The kind of its activity is the same, but it differs in the mode of its operation, because it has to undo the work of the Understanding in many cases ; to make us unlearn many things we learnt through the Understanding, and to build afresh. Where this undoing is not possible or not necessary, it merely unifies the conscious products of the Understanding with the eternal subject or Reason lying unconscious¹ and thus vitalises them. The Secondary Imagination thus exists with the conscious will, though its function is to unite the conscious with the unconscious, or, more truly, to unite the secondary consciousness with the primary consciousness.² It is the wise passivity that welcomes the active Reason. Imagination, whether of the Primary or the Secondary variety, is an intermediate faculty, functioning between Reason and Understanding. Reason is the highest faculty or power. It is the self-evident activity of the subject free from the tags of time and space. It is the unity of the subject with the object, which is no other than the subject's own duplicate. What is subjectively Will is objectively Reason,

1. Cp. N. 177 :

There is not a new or strange opinion—
Truth returned from banishment—
a river run underground—
fire beneath embers—

2. N. 2784.

but really they are two aspects of the same unified reality that is pure Self-consciousness. Reason is thus I AM I and not merely I. Everything and every knower is Reason's own form which it has assumed out of its own free Will. The power of freedom includes the power of self-limitation. Thus Understanding is a limitation of Reason. Imagination unites the limited knowledge of the Understanding with the infinite knower or Reason; puts the switch on, so to say, so that finite pieces of knowledge may be viewed in the light of the infinite Reason more clearly, calmly and joyfully. Reason alone is the active, living, self-conscious and self-sufficient knower. In every case of knowing therefore the function of Imagination is necessary. To shed the light of Reason is its primary work. But we are not aware of it as it is done in an unconscious way. The Secondary Imagination is a repetition of this very act with the help of the conscious will. Explanation or teaching is of little help here. With faith one must go on trying to have the imaginative experience. While Reason is the prime creative power, and the highest aim of life is to unite one's will with Reason and thus be one with it, the Secondary Imagination is the means of progressive education towards that goal. It is joining the passive, inert part with the active, refreshing part of our inner self. The concrete passive forms appear as "swimming" in the imaginative experience,³ which is thus called Passion, while the faculty active here is called Imagination, the nature of which is to unify, to coadunate. The experience is that of being rather than knowing. Hence either one has it completely or does not have it at all. And unless one has the experience, one cannot realise its sweetness. This is why much cannot be done by way of teaching anything about this experience. Instead of one's occupying, grasping or holding it, this very

3.

So my friend

Struck with deep joy may stand, as I have stood,
 Silent with swimming sense ;...

This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison, lines 37-39, *Poems*, p. 180.

experience holds the man in its grasp and electrifies every nerve of his mind, every aspect of his personality. This is so because the experience is above time and space, the two limiting factors. That is also the secret of the sweetness of even ugly things, horrible incidents, sad aspects of life in this universal experience.⁴ As beauty is only the objective correlative of joy, the beauty-making power—and the priority belongs to the subject, which is active and not to the object, which is passive—the unifying power of the subject makes objects beautiful. So it is not the objective content as such, but the contemplation of that in an infinite eternal background, a timeless placeless meditation of it that causes this experience.

The soul is a vast infinite region and what is called consciousness, or 'common' or 'secondary' or 'spontaneous' consciousness by Coleridge,⁵ is a very small part of it. In ordinary experience this limited part is active and consequently we know everything in a limited way.⁶ On the other hand, in the imaginative experience the subject experiencing is infinite. The whole soul of man becomes active. The tags of time and place, that make the ordinary man's knowledge finite, are cut off; the finite, the limited are thus subdued and sunk in the vast totality of the soul and one experiences with the whole soul. The difference between the ordinary experience and the imaginative experience is great. The latter touches the fringe of the divine. As all objects are merely limitations of the one infinite, eternal subject, they are all of stagnant nature. Understanding also is Reason's limited form; it is limitedly active. Hence it can neither invent anything new nor know anything wholly. Imagination, on the other hand, is infinitely active and hence creative, because it is linked with the active Reason. With the touch of the fire of Reason it is quickly able to

4. *N.* 3092.

5. *B.L.*, I, 164; *N.* 2784.

6. *I.S.*, item 29.

devour all the fuel of finite knowledge. Coleridge illustrates the difference between the working of the two faculties by differentiating between the two classes of readers of Shakespeare. He points out that the imaginative readers are "the recipients of the poet's power", that they feel that by becoming better acquainted with the poet they have become better acquainted with themselves. Imaginative readers "merely feel"; others understand. "Between the two no medium can be endured."⁷ When Reason impregnates feeling, the experience becomes passionate. Passion is felt like an undercurrent and vitalizes the images. Coleridge calls such vitalized images 'symbols'. Reason is equated with God, who possesses the power of omniformity. Imagination possesses this omniformity of Reason, but it can create only ideas, not objects of sense. But as Reason is the Supreme Idea, and creation in its essential, original, true form is ideal, we cannot under-rate the value of ideal creation. Idea is the life of anything. Hence the value of imaginative ideal creation is even greater than that of a scientific invention. Without ideal invention we cannot think of an object invented. Poets, who deal with only ideal inventions, regulate the feelings of men and educate them morally.⁸ Men willingly give their consent to the poets' passionate, enchanting tales, even though they are descriptions merely of what might have happened. A willing suspension of disbelieving the tale till it is completely heard is enough for educating the listener. The poet is able

7. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 125.

8. Cp. "The happiness of mankind is the *end* of virtue, and truth is the knowledge of the *means*; which he (the teacher) will never seriously attempt to discover, who has not habitually interested himself in the welfare of others."

"One use of poetry" is to "make a man independent of his senses".

"To perceive and feel the Beautiful, the Pathetic, and the Sublime in Nature, in Thought, or in Action—this combined with the power of conveying such Perceptions and Feelings to the minds and hearts of others under the most pleasurable Forms of Eye and Ear—this is poetic Genius."

I.S., items 57, 116 and 119.

to induce the listener to have this faith in him because his creation is based on a self-consistent presentation of an Idea. It is convincing to all human minds provided they listen attentively, because they are all of similar build, being diverse forms of the one universal mind.

Imagination is the faculty of moral education. It elevates man by making him better. Understanding gives him mere information; Imagination transforms his character. By sensual wants it unsensualises the mind.⁹ A step further we enter into heaven, the region of the eternal pure subject, Reason or God; a step below is the world of mortals. Imaginative experience thus gives a foretaste of the divine wisdom. It is "a gift of Heaven".¹⁰ It puts us on the threshold of the divine world of Ideas.

Words that come naturally to the poet's lips after such an experience are bound to be figurative, for that is an effort of the finite mind to catch hold of the universal experience, which can never be completely grasped. But that these figures are born of a genuine imaginative experience can be attested only by the fact that they suggest a passion or powerful feeling flowing spontaneously as an undercurrent, and the images appear as floating in an overflow of that undercurrent of passion like glaciers in a Himalayan river. Similarly the movement of the lines has an order, a rhythm which is the natural outcome of the sense of musical delight, that characterizes imaginative experience.¹¹ The lines show a consistent unfolding of a potential. These winged words and their measured movement lead us to think that Imagination is at work and its stream is over-flowing.

Aristotle explained poetry on the basis of *Entelechie*, the

9. *Religious Musings*, lines 209-10, *Poems*, p. 117.

10. *I.S.*, item 119.

11. Images and metres are forms which are "only hieroglyphic" of poetry. Its essence is an undercurrent of passion. Among other references see *N.* 787 and 921; *B.L.*, II, 16.

potential in the finite¹² mind and matter. Poetry means developing the human *Entelechie*, that starts reacting at the the perception of objects or thinking of them. The development follows the law of inner necessity or probability and is ideally true, though sometimes materially false like a hare with horns. The difference between Aristotle's explanation of poetic creation and Coleridge's explanation of it is that while Aristotle makes the object responsible for activating and developing the subjective potential,¹³ Coleridge makes the infinite eternal subject responsible for activating the objective potential. And the finite mind is as much an object as any thing it thinks of. Coleridge makes an important remark about subject and object that "there is no doubt among thinking men that both must be consulted—the question of priority is the point."¹⁴ He differentiates Aristotle from Plato : "Aristotle's mind in the highest degree Objective, and tho' familiar with the Subjective still contemplates it as Objective—Plato's : originally Subjective and widely acquainted with the Objective, but which yet he strove to contemplate subjectively."¹⁵ And Coleridge was a Platonist. Coleridge's concept of joy as the beauty-making power and his equating it with the eternal I AM or pure subject explains the joyous nature of poetry and its cathartic effect more convincingly than Aristotle's undeveloped theory of catharsis.

Imagination and Passion, the faculty and the experience caused by it are the most important factors in poetry. They have, therefore, been called the soul of poetry by turns. The soul has to be given a tangible shape and for that we require other concepts.

12. *P.L.*, pp. 187 and 192 fn.

13. Butcher says that Aristotle defines 'phantasy', the faculty that accounts for artistic creation, as "the movement which results upon an actual sensation".

Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, p. 125.

14. *P.L.*, p. 188.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-2 fn.

Though a full-fledged comparison of Coleridge with Abhinavagupta will be made in Book IV, yet it will be convenient if here we note one important point of difference between Coleridge and Abhinavagupta. It may involve some anticipation and repetition which may be excused for the sake of the convenience of the suitable place.

In Coleridge's analysis of the poetic experience the most important factor is the reconciliation of opposites. Though he has mentioned the opposites in various ways as sameness and difference, unity and multitude, universal and particulars, infinite and finite, uniformity and change, subject and object, old and new, male and female, head and heart, active and passive, yet the most important terms used in this connexion are Reason and feeling as he himself mentions in *The Friend* (pp. 64-5) and the *Note* 1623. Reason is pure infinite eternal self-consciousness, where knowing is being, which makes knowing feeling. Thus the opposites are infinite feeling and finite feeling.

Abhinavagupta also thinks of the poetic experience in terms of a reconciliation of opposites. Indeed reconciliation of opposites—the knower and the known—is a characteristic of all types of experience. Coleridge pointed it out in his theory of the Primary Imagination. The Indian thinkers explain it still better. They say that *savikalpaka* or finite perception is possible only on the basis of *nirvikalpaka* or infinite perception.¹⁶ The opposites reconciled in poetic experience according to Abhinavagupta are both universals. While the subject is the pure or rather the purest universal, the absolute self-consciousness, the object is an impure universal, an appetency with its train of fleeting particular emotions swimming in it. The first objective state of feeling, its first sign-situation may be conceived as an appetency. This is considered by Indian critics to be a universal state of feeling, for it is as yet not limited by any factor, subjective or objective. Indeed it is a sleeping, un-

16. The matter will be further clarified in Books II and III.

conscious, passive, unfelt state of feeling which has to be accepted because concrete feelings or emotions can be explained satisfactorily only as the development of this potential state of feeling. Appetencies move in eight directions.

This feeling may be experienced in the finite way by the finite mind, which Coleridge calls Understanding. Or it may be experienced by the infinite spirit, which Coleridge calls Reason. The experience by the finite mind is the ordinary experience of what we call feeling in life ; that by Reason is the poetic experience or *Rasa*. Two things are essential for creation : the creative spirit and the *formless* matter. The potter, for example, creates idols. The two things he requires are the unformed mud and his own creative idea of the idol. Coleridge made the creative idea itself the unformed stuff.¹⁷ This cannot properly account for differences in kinds of the predominant passions of poetic experiences. He realised the importance of passiveness to the activity of the infinite Reason.¹⁸ But he did not think of a *universal passive* object of the poetic experience. He spoke of the union of a universal with particulars. Indian critics carried the analysis of the opposites of an aesthetic experience to the logical end. They thought of the absolute self-consciousness itself as the highest aesthetic experience. On the basis of the passive universal self of the absolute self-consciousness they thought of the rise of universal potential states of feeling. They are like impurities, residues of past actions done by individuals. They may be understood as an individual's natural appetencies. They are considered to be universals because they are free from any limitation, subjective or objective. A union of the activity of infinite eternal self-consciousness with its own passive aspect, with its own self, is the Primary *Rasa* or *Śānta Rasa*. A union of the same subject with an appetency is one of the Secondary *Rasas*. The former is the purest type of experience ; the latter is the poetic experience.

17. Fn. 55, ch. VII, Bk.I.

18. N. 1834.

CHAPTER IX

FANCY

...it is but Fancy, or the aggregating Faculty of the mind—not *Imagination*, or the *modifying*, and co-adunating Faculty.

Letter 459, *C.L.*, II, 865-6.

It is common to think of Fancy in contrast with Imagination in Coleridgean aesthetics. Coleridge himself did so. While defining Imagination he showed its contrast with Fancy, which latter he called “an aggregative and associative power”,¹ “a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and place”, a faculty that dealt with “fixities and definites”, “materials ready made from the law of association”, a power motivated not by the *a priori* will but by its empirical counterpart, choice.²

Showing the mechanical nature of Fancy as opposed to the organic nature of Imagination, critics have ignored that another remark of Coleridge that Fancy is the drapery of poetic genius. As drapery it cannot but play a part in beautifying the Muse.

The derogatory aspect of Fancy is seen in a mechanical arrangement of images, when it works without the aid of Imagination,

“Fancy is the arbitrary bringing together of things that lie remote, and forming them into a unity. The materials lie ready formed for the mind, and the fancy acts only by a sort of juxtaposition. In imagination, on the contrary, the mind from the excitement of some slight impression generates and

1. *B.L.*, I, 193.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 202.

produces a form of its own." "The excess of fancy is delirium; of imagination mania."³ Fancy and Imagination thus are "two distinct and widely different faculties instead of being, according to the general belief, either two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, the lower and higher degree of one and the same power".⁴

In spite of this clear statement of Coleridge, John Livingston Lowes, that great grave-digger of hermeneutics, differs from him. In *The Road to Xanadu*, (p. 103) he comes to a different conclusion from a study of Coleridge's own poems. He writes :

"Now I suppose that both Coleridge and Wordsworth would insist that we are confronted, in these diverse products with the operations of two different powers : Fancy in the lines from the 'Destiny', Imagination in the stanzas from the 'Mariner'—Fancy, which 'has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites' ; Imagination, which 'dissolves, diffuses dissipates, in order to recreate' ; Fancy, which 'does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch' ; Imagination, which 'recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite.'⁵ But I have long had the feeling which this study has matured to a conviction, that Fancy and Imagination are not two powers at all, but one. The valid distinction which exists between them lies, not in the materials with which they operate, but in the degree of intensity of the operant power itself. Working at high tension, the imaginative energy assimilates and transmutes, keyed low, the same energy aggregates and yokes together those images which, at its highest pitch, it merges indissolubly into one. The utter discordance and intractability of the elements which coalesced, with the ease of blending dew-drops, in the dancing death-fires and the water-snakes and the charmed water

3. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 387.

4. *B.L.*, I, 60-1.

5. Wordsworth : Preface to *Poems*, 1815.

where the ship's huge shadow lay, have established, if anything can, the fact that there is nothing under Heaven which is not plastic as potter's clay to the touch of the shaping spirit, when it moves over chaos with plenary power. Once let that sovereign energy relax, and even the tractable glories of auroral skies may yield no more than materials for a mosaic. The raw stuff with which the imagination works is of secondary moment in determining the character of its achievement. That achievement owes its quality, as miracle or mosaic, to the measure of the synthesising control which the creative faculty itself exerts."

Lowes quotes in his support two critics, H. W. Garrod, who considers the distinction 'useless', and Lascelles Abercrombie, who in *The Idea of Great Poetry* (pp. 52-58) discusses the problem from a different angle of vision and comes to the following conclusion (p. 58):

"Now, the faculty of fancy does not exist; it is one of Coleridge's chimeras, of which he kept a whole stable. Fancy is nothing but a degree of imagination: and the degree of it concerns, not the quality of the imagery, but the quality and force of the emotion symbolized by the imagery."⁶

These critics of Coleridge have been so well vanquished by Dr. Richards that to make further attack on them would be flogging dead horses. Indeed if Lowes and Abercrombie were correct, the whole system of Coleridge would fall like a house of cards, for, as he says, in the *Biographia*, Coleridge started his enquiry into the nature of poetry with the sole aim of showing the difference between true and false poetry—a difference "between an egg and an eggshell", as he himself says.⁷ And at the conclusion of his investigations he formulated this difference between an egg and an egg-shell in poetry as a difference between Imagination and Fancy. Eggshells well placed may often create an illusion of being eggs;

6. Footnote 50, ch. VI, *The Road to Xanadu*, p. 488.

7. *B.L.*, I, 26.

so may the "false beauty of the moderns"⁸ often delude us. But Coleridge says that all his reading and meditation brought him to two conclusions : first, that genuine poetry is an eternal source of pleasure and we return to it again and again ; and, secondly, that mere novelty is not a true sign of genuine poetry. The reason is that genuine poetry has "a continuous *under-current* of feeling ; it is everywhere present, but seldom anywhere as a separate excitement" ; and false poetry has a false beauty. If the under-current of feeling flows at all, the expression is bound to be spontaneous ; a unifying element then holds all the materials together. And if there is no such unifying bond, and the parts fall apart ; if images are broken and heterogeneous, or, rather, "amphibious something, made up, half of image and half of abstract meaning", the natural conclusion is that there is no under-current of feeling ; that there is no life in the poem ; that it is merely an egg-shell, not an egg,⁹ false poetry, not true. At the conclusion of his researches he explained this difference as the difference between the operations of two different mental faculties which he called Imagination and Fancy. Imagination is the *esemplastic* power, Fancy is the aggregative faculty. The difficulty in detecting the difference is due to the fact that even the act of unification requires the act of aggregation. Both music and noise aggregate units of sounds, but the difference is that in music everything is so well ordered that it produces a sweet effect on the mind, but the absence of this order in the aggregation of noise causes an unpleasant effect. If all the books of a huge library like the British Museum were aggregated in a disorderly way, they would only create an ugly effect, while the same arranged and well placed fill the spectator's mind with a sense of admiration, awe and wonder. The one scene would show chaos and lack of intelligence, the other presents a beautiful sight and shows intelligent work. Now, to say that these two

8. *B.L.*, I, 15.

9. *Ibid*, I, 14—15, 26.

acts differ only in degree and not in quality is to rob the words of their significance. All the limbs of an animal slaughtered and put together in a box, blood and everything intact, shall not make it a living animal.

But let us come to the units aggregated in poetry. They are images, says Lowes. Richards rightly criticises him here for choosing an ambiguous word where precision is so necessary in order to maintain one's stand. "An image may be, for example, a visual image, a copy of a sensation ; or it may be an idea, any event in the mind which represents something ; or it may be a figure of speech, a double unit involving a comparison."¹⁰ Even if we accept Lowes and start with images as units, that does not support Lowes' thesis. Images are abstract intangible things which themselves even as units undergo a change when the living power of Imagination is at work. Strong figures, bold metaphors are as much indicative of an under-current of passion in the speaker's heart as their rapid associations.¹¹ Coleridge's emphasis on the under-current of passion modifying the images need not make us blind to the difference made by this under-current in the images themselves. This is partly what Coleridge means when he says that poetry gives "such delight from the *whole*, as is compatible with a distinct gratification from each component *part*".¹² When Fancy works in harmony with the higher power of Imagination, Fancy itself becomes a spontaneous rather than a voluntary power.¹³ Richards very well says that "Coleridge's theory must not be translated, for example, into a view that the step from Fancy to Imagination is across a critical point, like that between ice and water"¹⁴, as the

10. *Coleridge on Imagination*, pp. 32-3.

11. *I.S.*, item 174.

12. *B.L.*, II, 10. I fail to understand why this point has been missed by Dr. Richards, or if not missed, why he calls this part of Coleridge's definition of poetry as "incorrigibly misleading in spite of its obscurity". *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 112.

13. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 50.

14. *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 34.

language of Lowes suggests. To quote Dr. Richards again ; "The metaphor used here is that of an electrical furnace. Turn the current on at low tension and the elements are welded together : turn it on at higher tension and they are melted up and fused."¹⁵

The whole confusion is due to making genuine poetry and false poetry measurable in degrees of the activity of one mental power. Richards quotes the *Basic Rules of Reason* in this matter : "But the only advantage in introducing degrees is if we should be able to measure and compare them", and says that "Here we cannot do this."¹⁶

Coleridge thought of poetry as he did of morality¹⁷ as a process. Process has a principle of progression in it without which he could not think of a true system of education and a true method of acquiring it. He thought of the human mind as having folds, the outer ones covering the inner ones, the inner ones expressing themselves only through the outer ones. And in this scheme of things he viewed Reason or infinite self-consciousness as the inner-most essence of man and Imagination as the faculty joining the finite mind or Understanding with the infinite Reason. Imagination does not lose touch with Reason and retains its unifying nature and plenitude. Therefore Imagination becomes the soul of genius in every field of knowledge. Understanding comes after Imagination, and is not in touch with Reason with the result that it has no capacity of conceiving things infinitely or eternally. This is what Coleridge means by its stagnancy, its fixity, its death, or its being a "distorting medium". But we mortals cannot do

15. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

17. See Letter 164, where Coleridge says : "Christianity regards morality as a process—it finds a man vicious and unsusceptible of noble motives & gradually leads him, at least, desires to lead him, to the height of disinterested Virtue—till in relation & proportion to his faculties & powers, he is perfect 'even as our Father in Heaven is perfect'. There is no resting-place for Morality."

without it in the phenomenal world of ours. However, in order to improve our Understanding we have to see that we do not use this 'faculty' of judging according to sense' in a whimsical manner, that it is not against the common sense of the people. Good Sense is nothing but good common sense of the people at large. Individuals may be wrong or vicious; the whole of mankind cannot be so. Hence Coleridge makes Good Sense the body of poetic genius. Fancy is equally allied to the faculty of Understanding, because the counters it plays with are "fixities and definites", which are products of the limited power of the faculty of Understanding. The only difference between Fancy and Understanding is that the latter views a thing in its proper setting of time and place, the former disregards this setting and is guided by an arbitrary principle of choice. While Good Sense emphasises those aspects of the poet's thoughts that hold him in common bond with his fellow beings, Fancy stresses his individual peculiarities. Naturally Fancy has its own virtues and vices. It emancipates the mind from the grossness of its lowest form, that of sense, the faculty of being completely passive and so of being attached to the material objects. Coleridge praises Fancy in *The Destiny of Nations* (lines 80-86):

For Fancy is the power
That first unsensualises the dark mind,
Giving it new delights; and bids it swell
With wild activity; and peopling air,
By obscure fears of Beings invisible,
Emancipates it from the grosser thrall
Of the present impulse, teaching Self-control,
Till Superstition with unconscious hand
Seat Reason on her throne.

Coleridge calls it the drapery of poetic genius,¹⁸ for being a product of arbitrary choice it can be changed like dress. But Good Sense is the very body of poetic genius, for

18. *B.L.*, II, 13.

the common sense which has the sanction of the good people of a society cannot be changed arbitrarily by a poet wishing to be heard by them. Good Sense is no stricture against new ideas. It is only the proper checking of them so that the new ideas may not be mere aberrations of a whimsical mind.

When Fancy becomes subservient to the higher power of Imagination, it serves a very useful purpose in poetry. In Coleridge's view nothing in this creation of God is useless or bad. It is only our misplacing a thing or misunderstanding its true nature and relative position in the scheme of things viewed together as a whole that brings confusion and error. Fancy is not bad when it is guided by Imagination. But without the unifying power of the latter it becomes not only wild but also life-less.

Lowes considers *The Destiny of Nations* as a work of Fancy and *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* as a work of Imagination on the ground that in the latter Coleridge fuses the materials used whereas in the former he does not. In the *Destiny* "The shaping spirit of imagination is floundering in the fog, intent on pure abstractions, instead of cleaving to the penetralia of fact, and finding beauty." He fumbles "with Properties and Monads and Protoplasts and the Profound cut short by the sharp impact of reality." It is "turgid and nebulous". Here "Coleridge, in Hazlitt's magnificent phrase, was 'like an eagle dallying with the wind.'" By contrast, the *Mariner* presented his "swift and unerring flight", his driving "straight as an arrow to the central substance of these same 'pestful calms' which attracted him in the earlier poem. He quotes from the two poems for contrast :

"Maid beloved of Heaven !
 (To her the tutelary Power exclaimed)
 Of Chaos the adventurous progeny
 Thou seest ; foul missionaries of foul sire,
 Fierce to regain the losses of that hour
 When Love rose glittering and his gorgeous wings
 Over the abyss fluttered with such glad noise,

*As what time after long and pestful calms
With slimy shapes and miscreated life
Poisoning the vast Pacific, the fresh breeze
Wakens the merchant-sail uprising. Night
An heavy unimaginable moan
Sent forth, when she the Protoplast beheld
Stand beauteous on Confusion's charmed wave
Moaning she fled, and entered the Profound
That leads - "*

A similar subject found such a simple expression in the *Mariner* as this :

The very deep did rot : O Christ !
That ever this should be !
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs
Upon the slimy sea.
About, about, in reel and rout
The death-fires danced at night ;
The water, like a witch's oils,
Burnt green, and blue, and white.

The contrast between the two passages is really great. In the *Destiny* Coleridge was making a Miltonic attempt to deal, in an epic manner, with a subject which lacked either the required intrinsic worth or the poet's genuine love and appreciation. 'The maid of heaven' became later his 'Tom Paine in petticoats' and he marked 'the schoolboy wretched Allegoric Machinery' in *The Destiny of Nations*. The poem lacked 'blood, bone, marrow, passion, feeling'.¹⁹ Indeed it suffers from the 'mental bombast' which he marked in Wordsworth's *Immortality Ode*.²⁰ It lacks Good Sense. Coleridge's own comment on the fragment quoted above that "These are very fine Lines, tho' I say it, that should not : but, hang me, if I know or ever did know the meaning of them, tho' my

19. *The Road to Xanadu*, p. 78-9.

20. *B.L.*, II, 109-11.

own composition"²¹ shows his lack of hold over his ideas. His statement is illogical if not insincere. Naturally, all the imagery used lacks the inner support of feeling, of passionate conviction. The poem, in short, becomes fanciful, a wild display of ideas lacking a unifying support.

But this does not prove what Lowes tries to prove by this instance, that Fancy is only a lower degree of the poetic faculty and Imagination a higher degree of the same. Coleridge's concept of the mind having folds may be partly responsible for such a misunderstanding. His essay on "The Prometheus of Aeschylus" shows in an unequivocal manner that the same *nomos* becomes the plant, the animal, and the human being. To say that they differ only in degree because all are manifestations of the same Law is only to misinterpret Coleridge. Coleridge says that "Instinct in a rational, responsible and self-conscious animal is Understanding."²² But that does not make the difference between instinct and Understanding merely a difference of degree, for the instinct or the adaptive power instantly becomes Understanding when it "coexists with reason, free will and self-consciousness". This presence of the faculty of freedom brings a qualitative change in the nature of the faculty of Understanding. Co-existence with Reason or *free* will or *pure* Self-consciousness becomes the differentia of Understanding, which separates it from its genus, the instinctive intelligence. But Fancy, the aggregative power, cannot be said to be allied to Imagination even as genus and species. Fancy, the aggregative power, can really have a place in the hierarchy of mental powers only when it obeys the essential poetic power of Imagination. Otherwise it becomes a wild juxtaposition of empirical impressions. Its wildness is due to its freedom from the order of time and place. That is the significance of Coleridge's calling Fancy the drapery of poetic genius. Dress does beautify a person, but a connoisseur who judges a lady's beauty by the

21. *Poems*, p. 140 fn.

22. *Aids to Reflection—Works* 1, 261 quoted by Sanders, *op. cit.*

prettiness of her petticoat will only make himself the butt of laughter of intelligent persons. When a feeling becomes powerful being impregnated with Reason, it spontaneously overflows and becomes the essential sign of the life and loveliness of poetry. That an impassioned mind is not satisfied with the bare statement of stale facts and naturally uses all sorts of associate impressions stored in the memory does not make these associates essential signs of poetry. Instead of the associates the free power that associates is the poetic essence. Coleridge improves upon Aristotle's statement about the importance of metaphor in poetry ^{22a} when he makes the under-current of passion instead of beautiful images the essential poetic characteristic.

It reminds us of the improvement in Sanskrit poetics when *Alaṅkāra* was replaced by *Rasa* as the essence of poetry. Fancy, the aggregative power, when aided by Imagination, makes language figurative. Coleridge justly calls it the drapery of poetic genius. Its counterpart in Sanskrit poetics is *Alaṅkāra*. But *Alaṅkāra* is not a faculty of the mind like Coleridge's Fancy. *Alaṅkāra* is the ornament of speech or thought. It is a figurative expression. It may be called a product of the faculty of Fancy, that brings strange associations. Neither dress nor ornament, however, can beautify a dead person. They can enhance the beauty of living persons only. Similarly Fancy can be useful for clothing an imaginative or impassioned experience only. The soul, the unifying essence, makes the body living. The soul of poetry is Passion or *Rasa* and the mental faculty at work is Imagination or *Pratibhā*.

The difficulty in understanding Coleridge's analysis either

22a. "As Aristotle said, 'But the greatest thing of all by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others ; and it is also a sign of original genius, since a good metaphor implies the intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.'" J. Middleton Murry: "Metaphor" Shakespeare Criticism (1919-35) ed. by A. Bradby (World's Classics). p. 228

of mental faculties at work or of their products arises from his concept of mind with folds, which makes the workings of the higher powers invisible to us without the working of the lower ones. That the higher powers bring a change in the working of the lower ones is the only objective proof that these higher ones exist. Without a very perfect training we fail to understand when the higher powers shed their light and when they do not, when the switch is on and when it is off. And in a field of knowledge like poetry where the reader has to meet the poet half-way in order to understand and appreciate him, the difficulty is doubled or multiplied. But this is no fault of the Coleridgean system. It is inherent in the nature of the subject of poetry itself, where a distinction between genuine poetry and false poetry can be truly made only by men of Taste, who are even greater men of genius than the poets.²³ It is only by reading the classic works of art, products of genius, that we can develop the capacity to distinguish genuine poetry from false poetry. And yet it cannot be said to be true except in the case of very intelligent persons only. "In energetic minds, truth soon changes by domestication into power; and from directing in the discrimination and appraisal of the product, becomes influence in the production. To admire on principle is the only way to imitate without loss of originality."²⁴ Thus poetry helps criticism as criticism helps poetry. "Man knows God only by revelation from God as we see the Sun by his own Light."²⁵ The same is true of poetry. True criticism, the principle of admiration of poetry, is developed by reading genuine poetry itself. When does Good Sense manifest the working of Imagination and when does it degenerate into Fancy are not very easy to detect. To use Coleridge's simile

23. 'A high degree of Taste is, we believe, scarcely compatible with Genius in its earlier efforts, and only with the highest Genius even in its maturity.' *I.S.*, item 159.

24. *B.L.*, I, 62.

25. *N.* 209.

and add to it our own, when does a house become a palace²⁶ and when a grand hotel is not easy to know from outside. And to penetrate inside the literal or surface meaning of words is not as easy as entering a building of bricks.

Coleridge calls the work of Fancy, a work of memory without judgement.²⁷ It appears that with the adjustments made by proper judgement the same work may show Good Sense and with the light of Reason may further show the working of Imagination. But the point to be emphasised is that as the higher faculties become active the outward show undergoes a radical change at every step.

He illustrates the effects of the separation of Good Sense from Imagination from Cervantes :

"Don Quixote is not a man out of his senses, but a man in whom the imagination and the pure reason are so powerful as to make him disregard the evidence of sense when it opposed their conclusions. Sancho is the common sense of the social man-animal, unenlightened and unsanctified by the reason. You see how he reverences his master at the very time he is cheating him."²⁸

Sancho's common sense does not become Good Sense in contravention of Imagination and Reason, and so of essential humanity, and Don Quixote appears a mad man disregarding the evidence of sense because of his excessive Imagination. The poets become so important because they put "the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity".²⁹ Poetry is the product of a well-balanced mind.

That sometimes, like a river eroding its banks, it fells old ways of thinking and feeling only proves its strength born of a sense of propriety in obeying the inner law of self-consistency, shaking everything that disturbs the natural moral order, adjusting things afresh on a firmer ground and restor-

26. *Table Talk*, May 9, 1830.

27. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 396.

28. *Table Talk*, August 11, 1832.

29. *B.L.*, II, 12.

ing balanced behaviour in the society by making individuals mentally balanced. It broadens the vision so that people may see that there are more ways than one of worshipping truth, 'lest one good custom should corrupt the world'. Its chalking out of new paths should not lead us to think that poets are novelty-crazed. While Coleridge speaks of "the harm that bad poets do in stealing and making unnovel beautiful images",³⁰ he also says that "The great source of bad writing is a desire in the writers to be thought something more than men of sense", when "language is made a sort of leap-frog."³¹ "To find no contradiction in the union of old and new; to contemplate the ANCIENT of days and all his works with feelings as fresh, as if all had then sprang forth at the first creative fiat; characterizes the mind that feels the riddle of the world, and may help to unravel it. To carry on the feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood: to combine the child's sense of wonder and novelty with the appearances, which every day for perhaps forty years had rendered familiar ;

'With sun and moon and stars throughout the year,
And man and woman ;'

this is the character and privilege of genius, and one of the marks which distinguish genius from talents. And therefore is it the prime merit of genius and its most unequivocal mode of manifestation, so to represent familiar objects as to awaken in the minds of others kindred feeling concerning them and that freshness of sensation which is the constant accompaniment of mental, no less than of bodily, convalescence....In poems, equally as in philosophic disquisitions, genius produces the strongest impressions of novelty, while it rescues the most admitted truths from the impotence caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission."³² It is not Imagination alone, but "a high degree of talent, combined

30. *N.* 470.

31. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 226.

32. *B.L.*, I, 59-60.

with taste and judgement, and employed in works of imagination, [that] will acquire for man the *name* of a great genius".³³ It is because of the poet's necessity of putting his whole soul into activity in his composition that Coleridge says that "There is no profession on earth which requires an attention so early, so long, or so unintermitting as that of poetry; and indeed as that of literary composition in general, if it be such as at all satisfies the demands both of taste and of sound logic."³⁴

Hence Coleridge refutes Dryden when he says that "Great wits are sure to madness near allied."³⁵ Coleridge says that it is "true so far as this, that genius of the highest kind implies an unusual intensity of the modifying power, which, detached from the discriminative and reproductive power, might conjure a platted straw into a royal diadem; but it would be at least as true, that great genius is most alien from madness,—yea, divided from it by an impassable mountain,—namely, the activity of thought and vivacity of the accumulative memory, which are no less essential constituents of 'great wit'."³⁶

Fancy is the power of jewel-setting.³⁷ Howsoever beautiful the jewels and howsoever skilled the jeweller, he cannot be the pearl-oyster that produces pearls out of its womb. The merely fanciful writer cannot evolve images out of his feeling or thought. He works with materials ready-made. His is mere memory work and that also an arbitrary one if it is not guided by the higher powers of Understanding and Imagination. Coleridge made it a criterion of genius that it progresses and evolves and does not only spin upon itself.³⁸ He said the same thing in another way by comparing genius with spring

33. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

35. *Absalom & Achitophel*, I, 163.

36. *Table Talk*, May 1, 1833.

37. *Misc. Crit.*, pp. 390-3.

38. *Table Talk*, Aug. 6. 1832.

and talent with tank.³⁹ Both are forms of water but the one stagnates and stinks, the other always remains flowing and fresh.

Fancy juxtaposes images ; Imagination enlivens them and "incorporating the reason in the images of the sense, and organising, as it were, the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols."⁴⁰ Whether the language of Imagination is plain⁴¹ or figurative,⁴² it is convincing, for that alone touches the heart that comes from the heart.

Coleridge's concept of Truth is not that of objective facts of sense or their subjective impressions stored in the memory. He conceived of truth as a "life-ebullient stream",⁴³ "a streaming fountain, if her waters flow not in perpetual progression, they stagnate into a muddy pool of conformity & tradition."⁴⁴ It is on this basis that he explained truly religious behaviour in life and the genuine nature of poetry.⁴⁵ He thus made the under-current of a predominant passion⁴⁶ instead of the presence of one or two beautiful images the criterion of true poetry. Naturally, he believed in Milton's statement that the language of true poetry is simple, sensuous and impassionate.⁴⁷ When the language is highly imaginative, poetry does not require even the use of the drapery of

39. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 185.

40. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 396.

41. *I. S.*, item 139.

42. *Ibid.*, item 174.

43. *The Friend*, p. 343.

44. *N.* 119.

45. See Letter 221, *C.L.*, I, 372 : "To the cause of Religion I solemnly devote all my best faculties—and if I wish to acquire knowledge as a philosopher and fame as a poet, I pray for grace that I may continue to feel what I now feel, that my greatest reason for wishing the one & the other, is that I may be enabled by my knowledge to defend Religion ably, and by my reputation to draw attention to the defence of it."

46. *B.L.*, II, 16.

47. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 212.

Fancy. But Coleridge noted also that in an excited state of mind the natural language is figurative,⁴⁸ that genius sometimes becomes fancy-crazed. In such cases it has to be seen whether the work of Fancy is in consonance with Imagination or in contravention of it.⁴⁹ Thus in Spenser Coleridge noted the working of imaginative fancy,⁵⁰ in Beaumont and Fletcher, merely the work of Fancy or, rather, Fancy that was opposed to Imagination.⁵¹

In an early note⁵² Coleridge speaks of Imagination as the drapery of an ode where the style is "peculiar, not far-fetched—natural, but not obvious; delicate, not affected; dignified, not swelling; fiery, but not mad; rich in Imagery, but not loaded with it—in short, a union of harmony, and good sense; of perspicuity, and conciseness". Coleridge says that "Thought is the *body* of such an Ode, Enthusiasm the Soul, and Imagination the Drapery." Coleridge corrected himself later on and the relative position of the various constituents of poetry was finally stated by him in Chapter XIV of the *Biographia*, where he says :

"Finally, GOOD SENSE is the BODY of poetic genius, FANCY its DRAPERY, MOTION its LIFE, and IMAGINATION the SOUL that is everywhere, and in each, and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole."

The concept of *Motion* as the life of poetry is not well developed by Coleridge and so we have not dealt with it in a separate chapter. The nearest equivalent to it in Sanskrit poetics is the concept of *Guṇa*, which will be dealt with in Book III. But it will be profitable to say something of the equivalents of Fancy and Motion in Sanskrit poetics here.

There are two styles of writing poetry. They are plain and figurative. The poetic passion which is the real fountain of

48. *I.S.*, item 174.

49. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 64.

50. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 38.

51. *Table Talk* July 1, 1833 ; *Lit. Crit.*, pp. 250-2

52. *N.* 36.

poetry is self-ebullient. Poetry comes out spontaneously from the poet's pen, and just as figures of speech, bold metaphors come to his aid, similarly he can often do without them. Here is Shakespeare's description of winter for example :

When icicles hang by the wall
And Dick the shepherd blows his nail,
And Tom bears logs into the hall,
And milk comes frozen home in pail;
When blood is nipt, and ways be foul.
Then nightly sings the staring owl
Tuwhoo !

Tuwhit ! tuwhoo ! A merry note !
While greasy Joan doth keel the pot.

And the song of Amiens in *As You Like It* (Act. II, Sc. v) :

Under the greenwood tree
Who loves to lie with me,
And turn his merry note
Unto the sweet bird's throat —
Come hither, come hither, come hither.
Here shall he see
No enemy
But winter and rough weather.

Both these are free from beautiful images or figures of speech but both are fine pieces of poetry. Plain facts are described but the selection of the facts, their arrangement, the rhythm of the lines—all indicate the undercurrent of a feeling that shows the presence of true poetry. Facts or thoughts stated here taken separately are 'bare' and 'obvious' But their arrangement in this order makes them 'natural' poetry. If Fancy is the drapery of poetry, such poems may be called nude, but such nudity pleases like the nudity of lovely babies.

It is very important to remember that 'natural' is not 'obvious' and 'plain' is not 'bare'. Wordsworth, perhaps the greatest poet of the 'plain' style in English, often forgot the

difference between the two in his partiality for the "real language of men."⁵³

The counterparts of Fancy as Drapery and Motion as Life of poetry are *Alaṅkāra* and *Guṇa* in Sanskrit poetics. But there is a difference. *Alaṅkāra* means ornament, not dress; and *Guṇa* means quality, merit or excellence, not motion. Vāmana, in whose opinion style is the soul of poetry, differentiating *Alaṅkāra* from *Guṇa* says that *Guṇa* beautifies poetry; *Alaṅkāra* enhances that beauty;⁵⁴ and poetry is acceptable because it is beautiful.⁵⁵ *Guṇa* remained a somewhat misunderstood concept in Sanskrit poetics for long till the author of the *Dhvanikārikās* finally settled its nature. Dhvanikāra very well points out that the critics who consider style as the soul of poetry do understand the essence of poetry, though rather vaguely. They are unable to analyse this essence⁵⁶ which is *Rasa*. *Rasa* is the soul of poetry. *Guṇa*, which means 'quality', belongs to the soul; while *Alaṅkāra* beautifies the body.⁵⁷ Abhinavagupta explains that the quality always presupposes a substance as ornament does that which is adorned thereby.⁵⁸ That substance of poetry which is 'qualified' by *Guṇa* and 'adorned' by *Alaṅkāra* is *Rasa*. *Rasa* or the poetic passion itself is the beautiful and the beauty-making essence. As the quality always inheres in a substance and the two can never

53. Wordsworth's Preface to *Poems*, quoted in *B.L.*, II, 41.

54. Kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā Guṇāḥ ; tadatiśayahetavas tu Alaṅkārah.

KSV. III, 2, 1-2.

55. Kāvyaṁ grāhyam Alaṅkārat.

Ibid., I, 1, 1.

56. *Dhvanyāloka*, kārikā 46, Uddyota III (p. 517) :

Asphuṭa-sphuritaṁ kāvya-tattvametaḍ yathoditaṁ ;
Aśaknuvadbhir vyākartaṁ Rīṭayaḥ sampravartitaḥ.

57. *Dhvanyāloka*, kārikā 6 of Uddyota II (p. 204) ;

Tamarthamavalambante ye'ṅgināṁ te Guṇāḥ smṛtāḥ ;
Angāśrītāstvalaṅkāraḥ mantavyāḥ kaṭakādivat.

58. *Locana*, p. 204.

be separated, *Rasa* always appears 'qualified' by some *Guṇa*. But 'ornaments' adorn the soul only secondarily through adorning the 'body', which is word and meaning in the case of poetry. The two styles of writing are the 'natural' and 'oblique' ways of statement, *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti*. In the former the 'qualities' alone are present, in the latter we have the additional charm of 'ornaments'. The ornaments beautify the images, words and meanings; the 'qualities' show the beauty of their arrangement.⁵⁹ *Guṇa* primarily belongs to the soul of poetry which is Passion or *Rasa*. In this primary sense it means the purification of the finite mind as a result of its contact with the pure infinite knower, Reason. *Rasa* is the union of feeling with Reason; *Guṇa* is the purification of feeling as a result of this union. This purification means only the widening of sympathy, a large-heartedness, called *Prasāda*⁶⁰ in Sanskrit poetics. The mind is volatilized in the poetic experience. Its finite nature melts away or is burnt up. And impurity is nothing other than this finiteness, fixity, rigidity, lack of open-mindedness or large-heartedness. The finite mind appears melting or burning.

'As fire converts to fire the things it burns,
As we our food into our nature change',⁶¹

so does the infinite knower convert the nature of the finite mind and give it his own infinite, immortal, joyous, joy-producing and beauty-making nature. So does the poet become a blessed creature with his heart and head purified by the touch of the divine. His finite self loses its stagnancy and

59. Dvididhaṁ cārutvaṁ—svarūpamātraniṣṭhaṁ, saṅghaṭanāśritaṁ ca. Tatra śabdānāṁ svarūpamātrakṛtāṁ cārutvaṁ śabdālāṅkārebhyaḥ; saṅghaṭanāśritaṁ tu śabda-guṇebhyaḥ. Evam arthānāṁ cārutvaṁ svarūpa-mātraniṣṭhaṁ upamādibhyaḥ; saṅghaṭanā-paryavasitaṁ tu artha-guṇebhyaḥ. *Locana*, p. 16.

60. Akāluṣyam prasannavtam nāma sarva-rasānāṁ guṇaḥ.

Locana, pp. 212-3. See also pp. 207-8.

See also KP, VIII, kārikā 70-1 and *Pradīpa* on it, p. 393.

61. Sir John Davies quoted by Coleridge to explain the process of Imagination. *B.L.*, II, 12.

flows ebullient. That which over-flows contains the new purified stuff of poetic passion and not the impure feeling and emotions of life; and in the motion of the stream, in the order of the poet's statement of his experience, we get the visible signs of this purity. The most common sign is the freshness, *Prasāda*,⁶² of what formerly appeared stale owing to the distorted vision of the unenlivened finite mind. This freshness is mainly due to the shift of the mental perspective from the finite to the infinite.⁶³ Naturally, the heart learns the difficult art of deep sympathy. And so, when the feeling depicted is delicate, love or sorrow, for example, the words and meanings delineating the poetic passion are equally soft and heart-melting. When the feeling concerned is fierce, harsh, like anger or courage, the expression also becomes likewise fiery. The quality of delicacy is called *Mādhurya* and that of fieriness *Ojas*. But both are only two different expressions of unselfishness or the capacity to sympathise with others totally.⁶⁴

Coleridge knew the freshness of poetry, the volatilization of the finite mind in the poetic experience, the melting of the heart, or the fire-like capacity of the poetic passion to consume the finite nature of the human mind. The only difference between him and Abhinavagupta is that Coleridge did not clearly distinguish between the experience of the poetic passion and the experience of its cathartic effect on the finite

62. *Prasādas tu svacchatā śabdārthayoḥ. Sa ca sarva-rasa-sādhāraṇa-guṇaḥ, sarva-racanā-sādhāraṇaś ca.*

Dhvanyāloka, p. 213.

63. Cp. '...we are speaking of Infinity, consequently, where there can be no center any where if not every where—but of an Infinity that is at the same time absolute Unity—of that therefore, in which the center contains the circumference—' an idea for which all the forms of Space are inadequate, & contradictory; we therefore seek for less obtrusive Dissimilars in our *minds*, and express it as Omnipresence, All in Each, &c."

Letter 1033, *C.L.*, IV, 689.

64. *Locana*, pp. 207-8.

mind. Abhinava clearly distinguishes between the cause and its effect. The former is *Rasa*, the latter, *Guṇa*. Moreover, the concept of *Guṇa* is necessary for another reason also. It is the first visible or tangible sign of the touch with the intangible spirit that the poet and his reader have in a poetic experience. The concept of *Guṇa* is a unique gift of Sanskrit poetics to aesthetics.

Fancy as a faculty of the mind is not unknown to Indian critics, who think of the whole universe as a work of Fancy, *Kalpanā* as the Vedāntins and Grammarians think. But they do not show the antithesis between genuine poetry and false poetry in such terms as indicate the existence of different faculties of the mind : Fancy and Imagination. The method followed by Coleridge is Kantian—explaining the objective differences in terms of differences in the subjective faculties involved. Indian critics are more *objective* in their analysis. They study the cause in terms of the effect While they are Platonists in their idealism, they are Aristotelians in the analysis of their faith. Thus they use the terms *Dhvanikāvya* and *Citra-kāvya*, to show the difference between true and false poetry. The former is a product of the finite mind purified by the touch of the infinite knower ; the latter is a product of the finite mind not so purified.

CHAPTER X

GOOD SENSE

Poetry is certainly something more than good sense, but it must be good sense, at all events ; just as a palace is more than a house, but it must be a house at least.

Table Talk, May 9, 1830.

The great source of bad writing is a desire in the writers to be thought something more than men of sense.

Misc. Crit., p. 226.

Those only who feel no originality, no consciousness of having received their Thoughts & opinions from immediate Inspiration, are anxious to be thought originals—the certainty & feeling is enough for the other, & he rejoices to find his opinions plumed & winged with the authority of venerable Forefathers.—

N. 1695.

We ought to suspect reasoning, founded wholly on the differences of man from man, not on their commonnesses—which are infinitely greater.

N. 1699.

I devote myself to such works as encroach not on the anti-social passions...

Letter 238, *C.L.*, I, 397.

Good Sense is the body of poetic genius, says Coleridge.¹ Without the aid of Coleridge one may like to say that the body of poetry is words, the most tangible thing in poetry. But when we enquire into the nature of words, the difficulty arises. Is word a mere collocation of letters seen or their sounds heard, or such a collocation with some meaning ? And what is meaning ? Is it the thing referred to, or the thought of it,

1. *B.L.*, II, 13.

or both, or, together with these, all their associates ? Or is it the speaker's intention, or his feeling, or something that includes both ? Thus what seemed very easy and tangible does not remain so.

Coleridge's concept of the ultimate reality is a union of word and meaning. Logos is both "communicative and communicable Intellect, in God and man".² Self-consciousness in its simple pure state above the limits of time and place is both a mirror and a focus.³ The focal point is word;⁴ conjured up as mirror it becomes its own meaning. Self-consciousness reflecting is word and self-consciousness reflected is meaning. The eternal infinite subject objectizes itself and that primary object is Reason. The eternal I AM or self-consciousness is a unity of Reason and Will. Coleridge considers Reason as the object and Will as the subject. Will is self and Reason is consciousness. They are united together in the primary self-consciousness. This is the soul of the whole universe. God's Will made things as they are. Natural things are God's language. In the *Frost and Midnight* Coleridge speaks of a literal truth when he exhorts his child to

see and hear

The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible
Of that eternal language, which thy God
Utters, who from eternity doth teach
Himself in all, and all things in himself.^{4a}

Coleridge asks : "Is Logic the *Essence* of Thinking ?' in other words—Is *thinking* impossible without arbitrary signs ? &—how far is the word 'arbitrary' a misnomer ? Are not

2. Letter 1031, *C.L.*, IV, 687.

Cp. "To the Will Absolute, the One, the Good !
The I AM, the Word, the Life, the Living God !"
The Destiny of Nations, Poems, p. 131.

3. "On Poesy or Art", *B.L.*, II, 259.

4. *I.S.* item 73.

4a. *Poems*, p. 242.

words &c parts & germinations of the Plant ? And what is the Law of their Growth ? In something of this order I would endeavor to destroy the old antithesis of *Words & Things*, elevating, as it were, words into Things & living Things too."⁵

How did the one eternal I AM become many and how can the many again be one are the greatest questions Coleridge sought to answer. In his answers to these questions we understand his philosophy.

When the phenomenal world came into existence, things and thoughts became separate ; the word and the object represented by it became different. We had to take recourse to the common usage for accepting a word for meaning a particular object. Again there were abstractions and generalisations from sense and thus grew complex thoughts and words representing them. In all this multitude the absolute self-consciousness shows its omniformity. Of the two types of relations, "the relations of all to each beheld as in God" show the soul of things, while "the relations of finites to finites" explain their individuality.⁶ The one shows the Reason, the other shows the Common Sense. Coleridge's philosophy is a reconciliation of "the dictates of Common Sense with the conclusions of scientific Reasoning".⁷ Being and becoming, soul and body, subject and object are both important, for both are symbols of the same truth.⁸ Reason is as essential as Understanding. It is through Understanding that Reason manifests itself. Ordinary men live in the phenomenal world or "the World of Particulars"⁹ and exercise their Understanding only. Poetry takes them a step forward by enlarging the scope of their consciousness by making their latent unconscious faculty of Imagination come up to

5. Letter 352, *C.L.*, I, 625-6.

6. Letter 1033, *C.L.*, IV, 689.

7. Letter 1043, *C.L.*, IV, 706.

8. Letter 1033, *C.L.*, IV, 690.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 689.

the conscious level, and enables them to have an experience of their unity with the object. It is a divine experience. But the poet cannot perform this great task, if he does not start his work with the realities of the phenomenal world, with what are commonly accepted as facts of experience. Just as a teacher educates his student by making a start at the latter's stage of mental development, so does the poet start his uphill journey from the lower mental planes of the common man. The poet's deeper knowledge cannot be communicated if he neglects the common sense of the people at large. He has, therefore, to observe the laws of grammar, logic and psychology. If he makes any outrage upon them, his readers ignore him as they ignore a mad man.

It should not be taken as pleading for the familiar stale facts of life, which are not important for poetry. It is true that poetry shows us not things but the life of things. But things, facts of common experience, cannot be ignored, if to show their life is the poet's aim. In order to rouse the higher faculty of Imagination, the lower faculty of Understanding shared by all healthy human beings has to be given its due, for the higher faculty can manifest itself only through a lower faculty.¹⁰

In a way, all figurative language is an outrage upon common sense.^{10a} There must be found a justification for the use of such phrases as Milton's "blind mouths"¹¹ or Shakespeare's "speaking poniards".¹² Such excited and condensed expressions can be justified only on the ground that the feeling required to be conveyed cannot be conveyed

10. *Table Talk*, April 20, 1833.

10a. See Vyāsa-bhāṣya on Yogasūtra, p. 62 :

Naveva śaśaṅkalekhā kamanīyeyam kanyā madhvamṛtāvayava-nirmiteva candram bhītvā nihsṛteva jñāyate, nīlotpalapatrāyatākṣī hāvagarbhābhyām locanābhyām jīvalokam āśvāsayantīveti kasya kenābhisambandhaḥ ?

11. *Lycidas*, line 119.

12. *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act II, Sc. I.

otherwise. Similar is the justification of the incorrect grammar in such lines as

'Irks care the maw-crammed beast'¹³

or

'Breathes there the man with soul so dead

Who never to himself hath said

This is my own, my native land ?'¹⁴

Rules of grammar may be violated only to observe the "logic of passion". Contradictions involved in Coleridge's lines,¹⁵

'And sank in *tumult* to a *life-less* ocean'.

or

'A *sunny* pleasure-dome with caves of *ice*'.

only urge the reader's mind to resolve them into extraordinary and deeper meanings.¹⁶

The neglect of grammar, logic or psychology cannot be advised in either of the two ways of writing poetry, natural and supernatural, plain and figurative, direct and oblique. If logic and grammar are neglected, there must be a "logic of passion" to justify such a neglect.¹⁷

In the supernatural style, Coleridge pointed out, a human interest and semblance of truth are necessary. They show the common reader's demands for logical and psychological consistencies. Without them supernatural descriptions have little significance for us and will be justifiably neglected as unnatural.

Verisimilitude is no poetic principle. Imagination, not image; meditation, not observation, is the key to the inner-

13. *Rabi Ben Ezra* by Robert Browning.

14. *Patriotism* by Sir Walter Scott.

15. *Kubla Khan* by Coleridge.

16. Among other books see G.W. Knight, 'Coleridge's *Divine Comedy*', a chapter of *The Starlit Dome*, reprinted in *English Romantic Poets* (Modern Essays in Criticism) by M.H. Abrams for the deeper meanings.

17. See the present author's article on "The Two Styles of Writing Poetry" for a detailed discussion of the subject.

most shrine of poetry. These statements are true when one talks of the soul of poetry. An ignorance or neglect or subordination of the soul of poetry leads to defects which Coleridge illustrated from Wordsworth's poetry. Thus Coleridge criticised Wordsworth's "matter-of-factness in certain poems", "a laborious minuteness and fidelity in the representation of objects, and their positions", and "the insertion of accidental circumstances in order to the full explanation of his living characters, their dispositions and actions". Coleridge pointed out that "circumstances might be necessary to establish the probability of a statement in real life, where nothing is taken for granted by the hearer ; but appear superfluous in poetry, where the reader is willing to believe for his own sake." This accidentality bedims the essence of poetry. It takes away the poet's liberty and fetters "his feet in the shackles of an historian". It is not the "narrative" truth but the "operative" truth that is "the mistress of poets, who hath not her existence in matter, but in reason".¹⁸ It is not truth but pleasure that is the immediate object of poetry, and "the communication of pleasure is the introductory means by which alone the poet must expect to moralise his readers."¹⁹ All this is said to emphasise the importance of Imagination, the soul of poetry, a neglect of which becomes a defect.

But the violation of Good Sense is equally a source of defect in poetry. Wordsworth again serves as an illustration. Thus his third defect in Coleridge's list, that of "an undue predilection for the *dramatic* form in certain poems"²⁰ amounts to logical or psychological inconsistencies in the ultimate analysis. If a character is made to speak in a style different from that of the poet, there arises psychological inconsistency, and if he speaks in the poet's style there is logical inconsistency, for one man's speaking is falsely

18. *B.L.*, II, pp. 101-2.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

represented as two men's speaking. Similarly the fifth defect in the list is a defect because it violates Good Sense. Coleridge calls it "mental bombast" as distinguished from verbal bombast: "for, as in the latter there is a disproportion of the expressions to the thoughts, so in the former there is a disproportion of thought to the circumstance and occasion." Coleridge points out that this is a fault of which none but a man of genius is capable, and gives the reason: "It is the awkwardness and strength of Hercules with the distaff of Omphale".²¹ Coleridge culls many lines from Wordsworth's poems to illustrate this defect. Thus he objects to the lines,

'They flash upon that inward eye
which is the bliss of solitude !'

in the familiar *Daffodils* as a too pompous description of the subject matter, and marks the abrupt sinking of thought in the couplet that follows:

'And then my heart with pleasure fills
And dances with the daffodils'.

Similarly he objects to many of the epithets used for the child in the *Immortality Ode*. He finds it offending to Good Sense to call a child, "a six years' darling of a pigmy size", a "mighty prophet", or a "seer blest", or "the eye among the blind", or the "best philosopher",

'On whom those truths do rest,
Which we are toiling all our lives to find !
Thou, over whom thy immortality
Broods like the day, a master o'er a slave,
A presence that is not to be put by !'

Coleridge's burthen of criticism is that the child cannot be supposed to have such divine visitations, such mysterious gifts, in a conscious manner. Coleridge is not forgetful of his philosophy that everything that exists is a modification of the eternal I AM. But he says that "it would be strange

21. *B. L.*, II, p. 109.

language to say, that *I* construct my *heart* ! or that *I* propel the finer influences through my *nerves* ! or that *I* compress my brain, and draw the curtains of sleep round my own eyes !”²² It is to confuse “the distinction between the individual and God, between the Modification and the one only Substance”. If such a confusion is made, there can hardly be any difference shown between one modification and another, between a child and a bee, or a dog, or a field of corn. “The omnipresent Spirit works equally in them, as in the child; and the child is equally unconscious of it as they.”²³

The lines immediately following Wordsworth’s eulogy of the child need not be taken as explanation of any unique character of the child,

‘To whom the grave
Is but a lonely bed without the sense or sight
Of day or the warm light,
A place of thought where we in waiting lie’.

It seems to be a comment on the poem, “We are Seven”. Wordsworth’s assertion comes to this that the child does not differentiate between sleep and death. Coleridge says that at the age of six he should have been better instructed in most Christian families. Even if his idea of death be only that of “lying in a dark, cold place”, he cannot be said to think of death as “*a place of thought*”, of “the frightful notion of lying *awake* in his grave”. “The analogy between death and sleep is too simple, too natural, to render so horrid a belief possible for children.” And if the child’s belief be only this much that ‘he is not dead, but sleepeth’, Coleridge asks, “wherein does it differ from that of his father or any other adult and instructed person ?”²⁴ Coleridge means to say that the adult and the child alike realise that the dead child in the grave is lying asleep never to rise again. But does an adult confuse death with sleep ? He knows that one gets up from sleep,

22. *B.L.*, II, p. 112.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

not from death. The sadness consequent upon this inability to get up again and mix with living companions is felt by the adult more, because he knows this nature of death. The child does not become so conscious of it. It is the absence of this consciousness of the difference between sleep and death in the child's mind that distinguishes it from an adult's mind, and it is this character of the child that is depicted in "We are Seven".

This, however, is a side issue. Coleridge's main argument stands. Both the adult and the child accept death and sleep as analogous. The child's difference from the adult lies in the absence of the consciousness of the sadness of a sad experience. On neither of these two grounds can he be called a prophet, seer or philosopher. In his criticism of Wordsworth's defects Coleridge is very humble and apologetic. He says that he pointed out these defects in Wordsworth's poetry only because his blind admirers would very likely admire and imitate his defects rather than his merits. Coleridge shows that the secret of Wordsworth's merit or of any other poet lies in a proper combination of Imagination and Good Sense. Without an equivalence of the two either "the sense would want its vital warmth and peculiarity" or Imagination would be foggy and sickly.²⁵

Dr. Richards takes exception to Coleridge's analysis of the *Immortality Ode*. He does not agree with Coleridge's view that Wordsworth's treatment of the child offends the common-sense view. Richards criticises Coleridge for giving a too literal interpretation of Wordsworth's words and defends Wordsworth on the ground that he creates a myth, that he is not dealing with the psychology of the child and therefore to expect any scientific treatment will be a wrong attitude towards the poem. He pleads for the acceptance of the weakest lines, "as the frame of what they support".²⁶ He

25. *B.L.*, II, 114-5

26. *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 137.

quotes a passage from the *Statesman's Manual* to show that Coleridge himself wrote in a similar manner. But it appears to me that the passage quoted defends Coleridge rather than Richards. Coleridge there says, "Never can I look and meditate on the vegetable creation without a feeling similar to that with which we gaze at a beautiful infant...as the accidental and dividuous in this quiet and harmonious object is subjected to the life and light of nature...which shines in every plant....But what the plant is by an act not its own and unconsciously—that must thou make thyself to become...in that light of consciousness which inflameth not, and with that knowledge which puffeth not up."²⁷

Coleridge points out the similarity among a child, a bee, a dog or a field of corn in the *Biographia*. The point that he stresses there is that the child, like the plant, is *not conscious* of the light and life of nature, and in this passage he exhorts him to be conscious of that. Dr. Richards perhaps missed this difference.

In a letter Coleridge says: "I can *at times* feel strongly the beauties, you describe, in themselves, & for themselves—but more frequently *all things* appear little—all the knowledge, that can be acquired, child's play—the universe itself—what but an immense heap of *little things*?—I can contemplate nothing but parts, & parts are all *little*! My mind feels as if it ached to behold & know something *great*—something *one & indivisible*—and it is only in the faith of this that rocks or waterfalls, mountains or caverns give me the sense of sublimity or majesty! But in this faith *all things* counterfeit infinity."²⁸

But to describe all things as infinite can hardly be convincing. It will be foggy mysticism, not poetry. The point stressed by Coleridge in his concept of Good Sense is that the poet should be conscious of the exact position held by any individual thing in this mighty universe of little things, that

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-6.

28. Letter 209, *C.L.*, I, 349.

he must not confuse their individuality with the one indivisible life running through them all. If he does so, he will lose the capacity of catching the common reader on his mental level and so of leading him to the higher stage of Imagination, the stage of consciousness where he could be "struck with the deepest calm of joy". In order to initiate the reader into the world of poetry or into the imaginative consciousness of the one indivisible universal spirit lying within all things the poet has to talk to his reader in a language of strong common sense, for otherwise the poet is likely to be misunderstood or not understood at all. Just as Imagination stresses the underlying unity of things, so Good Sense emphasises their individuality. Both are necessary, for poetry is unity in difference. When we think of a thing as a part of the universe, we cannot neglect the faculty of Understanding, which is the faculty of the common-sense view of things. It is there that Wordsworth's child in the *Immortality Ode* fails to convince us, fails to generate that willing suspension of disbelief which constitutes poetic faith. The spirit of the *Ode* is not like that found in a poem like *Kubla Khan*. Coleridge would not have accepted Dr. Richards' suggestion that Wordsworth was creating a myth. Even a myth has to be made probable in order to be acceptable. Wordsworth failed to make his myth acceptable, if he created one. His failure here is due to his utter disregard of the common-sense view of the child. His exuberant Imagination disturbed methodical thinking. He attempted to open the doors of a window with a gunshot. Shelley's line to the Skylark,

'Blithe spirit, bird thou never wert',

offends on this very ground of disregarding the common-sense view of the bird. Wordsworth's expression of a similar idea has a greater appeal on account of its avoiding this defect.

'O Cuckoo, shall I call thee bird
Or, but a wandering voice?'

T. S. Eliot's criticism of Shakespeare in his handling of the

story of Hamlet may be found in the ultimate analysis to have this very ground. The point may be clear if we read Eliot's criticism in the light of Coleridge's concept of the defect called the "mental bombast". Eliot's lines will bear me out.

"The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative' ; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion ; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. If you examine any of Shakespeare's more successful tragedies, you will find this exact equivalence....The artistic 'inevitability' lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion, and this is precisely what is deficient in *Hamlet*. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in *excess* of the facts as they appear."^{28a}

In short, the emotion sought to be expressed lacks objective equivalence. A detailed examination of Eliot's criticism of *Hamlet* is out of point here. What is to be noted is the point of similarity between him and Coleridge in the analysis of an important aspect of poetry. Both of them plead for the adequacy of the objective facts described to delineate the passion sought to be roused. It is all a question of means and ends. While the end is to shed the light of Reason over our feelings or to experience the unity underlying the subjective feeling and the objective reality, the means is the presentation of the objective reality, the objective correlative of the subjective feeling. Here Understanding, the faculty of the common-sense view of things, must be given its due. Just as "imagination is the distinguishing characteristic of man as a progressive being",²⁹ leading him to divinity, to Reason, so does a perfect Understanding give him a strong common sense, which makes him appreciate the individualities of

28a. *Selected Prose*, (Penguin), pp. 107-8.

29. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 195.

things, their distinctive features. The faculty of Understanding becomes stagnant and a blind guide when it loses touch with a superior power like Imagination. But when it functions in harmony with the higher powers of Reason and Imagination, it becomes a good faculty and extremely valuable, for it is the common faculty of all sane men and makes them intelligible to their brethren in this phenomenal world of particulars and differences. The man of genius cannot be helpful to the common man by disregarding this faculty.

Perhaps Longinus was the first critic to speak against 'bombast'. He said: "Speaking generally, it would seem that bombast is one of the hardest things to avoid in writing. For all those writers who are ambitious of a lofty style, through dread of being convicted of feebleness and poverty of language, slide by a natural gradation into the opposite extreme. 'Who fails in great endeavour, nobly fails' is their creed. Now bulk, when hollow and affected, is always objectionable, whether in material bodies or in writings, and in danger of producing on us an impression of littleness: 'Nothing', it is said, 'is drier than a man with the dropsy'."^{29a}

Spirits commune in silence, said Coleridge; that is, they do not require a tangible medium for understanding each other. But the medium of communication among human beings has to be something tangible, some symbol of time and place. In poetry as in common life it is language. While the language of common life is "the language of today" only, that of poetry has to be the "language for ever" also. It is the combination of these two aspects that makes Coleridge suggest "as the infallible test of a blameless style" "its untranslatableness in words of the same language without injury to the meaning", when by the meaning of a word he understands "not only its correspondent object, but likewise all the associations which it recalls. For language is framed

29a. Longinus: *On the Sublime* translated by H.L. Havell (Everyman's Library)

to convey not the object alone, but likewise the character, mood and intentions of the person who is representing it."³⁰

Coleridge who as a philosopher liked to explain the "propriety" of everything, that is, "why the thing *is* at all, and why it is there or there rather than elsewhere or at another time", who considered the relations of objects as prime materials of method and contemplation of relations as the indispensable condition of thinking methodically,³¹ makes it necessary for a poet to maintain that propriety and make a proper start. Coleridge knew, as few others knew so well before him, that the poet has to take the reader to a higher consciousness, which may enable him to listen to that eternal language which his

God

Utters, who, from eternity, doth teach

Himself in all, and all things in himself.³²

But in order to raise him to this sublime position the poet has to make a proper start from the lower phenomenal level. This is the value of Good Sense, which is, therefore, rightly called "the body of poetic genius". Dr. Richards' opinion that it is merely "a peroration in the eighteenth century manner, not designed to be taken too seriously",³³ is not convincing. According to Coleridge the body is the "Spirit appearing".³⁴ Good sense, similarly, is the visible appearance of Imagination. Richards understands by Imagination a speculative instrument and by Good Sense the technique of handling that instrument.³⁵ But Coleridge's concept of Imagination as the soul and of Good Sense as the body of poetic genius is more easy and clear. The poet should not only have Imagination but that "opulence of Imagination, Lofty-

30. *B.L.*, II, 115-6.

31. *The Friend*, pp. 298, 305 ; and *Table Talk*, March 1, 1834, quoted in the Introduction, fn. 87.

32. *Frost at Midnight*, lines 60-2, *Poems*, p. 242.

33. *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 126.

34. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 298.

35. *Coleridge on Imagination*, pp. 129-130.

paced Harmony or that toil of thinking which is necessary in order to plan a whole".³⁶ Sound sense and sound feeling are equally necessary for a good writer.³⁷ Common sense and Imagination are "the two main constituents of sound intellectual and moral action". Put together, they form a perfect intellect, so said Coleridge in his appreciation of *Don Quixote*.³⁸ Coleridge required this perfection in the poet. "High poetry", he says, "is the translation of reality into the ideal under the predicament of succession of time only. The poet is an historian, upon condition of moral power being the only force in the universe." This necessity of expressing himself in symbols of time and place makes it necessary for the poet to make his expression appear as Good Sense. He has to manifest his "power of contracting universal truth in particulars".³⁹ Coleridge said that "unbiased mind" was "an absurdity".⁴⁰ Naturally he liked to give the mind a good bias. To give a good bias is to give it a proper object; for propriety of conduct is to be judged not only "in relation... to the affections which it exhibits", but also "to the objects which called forth these affections. That sorrow which we should approve as highly proper in a Widow for her husband, we condemn and are disgusted with in &c—Lap

36. Letter 170, *C.L.*, I, 293-4.

37. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 226. See also Letter 170, *C.L.*, I, 294 :

"I think, that an admirable Poet might be made by *amalgamating him* (Southey) & *me*. I think too much for a Poet; he too little for a great Poet. But he abjures *thinking*—& lays the whole stress of excellence—on *feeling*.—Now (as you say) they must go together."

38. Sancho was "the common sense without reason or imagination" and Don Quixote is "a substantial living allegory, or personification of the reason and the moral sense divested of the judgement and the understanding". "Put him and his master together and they perform a perfect intellect....To impersonate them, and to combine the permanent with the individual, is one of the highest creations of genius, and has been achieved by Cervantes and Shakespeare almost alone."

Misc. Crit., pp. 102-3.

39. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 162.

40. *N.* 59.

dogs—"41 Imagination being a natural centripetal power of the mind, has in itself a safeguard against impropriety, for what is truly natural cannot be immoral.⁴² Nevertheless it is essential for the man of taste to see that the poet does not go against the common good sense of mankind. Coleridge, who explained the many as God's omniformity and realised the necessity of individual perceptions being in conformity with those of other good persons in society,⁴³ did not like that poets should delineate anti-social passions.⁴⁴

Again, while the "vital passion...is the practical cement of logic, and without which logic must remain inert",⁴⁵ the poet must not commit the error of "forcing Nature's course against the grain",⁴⁶ because "the deadness to truth occasions the blindness to beauty."⁴⁷ "The trite and the extravagant are the Scylla and Charybdis of writers who deal in fiction."⁴⁸ "Accuracy is akin to veracity",⁴⁹ and poets "should never deviate from the common mode of expression without being able to adduce an adequate and distinct justifying reason."⁵⁰ As "poetry is the *identity* of all other knowledge, so a poet cannot be a *great* poet but as being likewise and inclusively an historian and naturalist in the light as well as the life of philosophy. All other men's worlds...are his chaos."⁵¹

41. *N*, 154.

42. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 14.

43. *N*. 6: "IV. The three modes in which each mind acts—1. by its own perceptions—2. by its own deductions—3. by believing the perceptions & deductions of others. Instance the strength & weakness of each—& how the third mingles with & assists the first & the second—in common life—& from the multitude & generality of these instances deduce the congruity of the third faculty with our nature, its necessity in Society & how it is this which hath so eminently enabled man to excel the brutes—"

44. Letter 238, *O.L.*, I, 397.

45. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 277.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 281.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 356.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

Poets may write supernaturally as Coleridge himself did, but they must not write against nature. "The extent of the powers that may exist we can never ascertain; and therefore we feel no great difficulty in yielding a temporary belief to any, the strangest, situation of *things*. But that situation once conceived, how beings like ourselves would feel and act in it, our own feelings sufficiently instruct us; and we instantly reject the clumsy fiction that does not harmonise with them."⁵² "Figures that shock the imagination and narratives that mangle the feelings rarely discover *genius*, and always discover a low and vulgar taste."⁵³

Propriety in action is morality; in thought it is Good Sense; in expression it is perfect style. While science is an exercise of the head, poetry is that of both the head and the heart, of the whole soul. Good behaviour is obedience to the voice of God in us. Good Sense is obedience to what Matthew Arnold, that great propagator of good sense, called "conscience in intellectual matters".⁵⁴ It is necessary that poetry should move us, but it is equally necessary that it should do so *rightly*. Looseness is a defect equally in thought, feeling and behaviour. Feelings should not only be roused but also be properly roused. "The great business of real unostentatious virtue is—not to eradicate any genuine instinct or appetite of human nature; but to establish a concord and unity betwixt all parts of our nature, to give a feeling and a passion to our purer intellect, and to intellectualise our feelings and passions."⁵⁵ That is done best by poetry and that is the source of its value in life. Coleridge who defined poesy or art as "the excitement of emotion for the purpose of immediate pleasure through the medium of beauty",⁵⁶ under-

52. *Ibid.*, p. 373.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 372.

54. 'The Literary Influence of Academies'. *Matthew Arnold, Poetry and Prose*, ed. by John Bryson, p. 378.

55. *Misc. Orit.*, p. 255.

56. "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B. L.*, II, 224.

stood by beauty "that which *ought* to please",⁵⁷ and said that poesy stamps all the elements it combines "in the mould of a moral idea".⁵⁸ Great poets have to be good men. Genuine poetry cannot be the product of either a bad heart or a wrong head.

Good sense is thus a very important and comprehensive concept in Coleridgean theory of poetry. Its synonyms are propriety and beauty. Whatever materials are utilised in poetry—words, thoughts, human actions, inanimate objects must be proper, beautiful, that which ought to please, for noble pleasure is the means as well as the end of poesy.⁵⁹

57. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 321.

58. "On Poesy or Art", *B.L.*, II, 253.

59. *Misc. Crit.*, p. 321 ; On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B.L.*, II, 224. Cp. *B.L.*, II, 92 :

"The office and duty of the poet is to select the most dignified as well as

'The happiest, gayest attitude of things'.

The reverse, for in all cases a reverse is possible, is the appropriate business of burlesque and travesty, a predominant taste for which has been always deemed a mark of a low and degraded mind."

The passage should be read along with another of a different tone lest one may have a wrong impression about the poetic matter.

"O strange is the self-power of the imagination—when painful sensations have made it their interpreter, or returning gladness or convalescence has made its chilled and evanished figures and landscape bud, blossom, and live in scarlet, green and snowy white...—strange is the power to represent the events and circumstances, even to the anguish or the triumph of the quasi-credent soul, while the necessary conditions, the only possible causes of such contingencies, are known to be in fact quite hopeless ;—yea, when the pure mind would recoil from the eve-lengthened shadow of an approaching hope, as from a crime ;—and yet the effect shall have place, and substance, and living energy, and, on a blue islet of ether, in a whole sky of blackest cloudage, shine like a firstling of creation."

Misc. Crit., p. 199.

CHAPTER XI

ALLIED CONCEPTS

—/ Yet 'the Joy within me', which is indeed my own Life and my very self,....

Letter 550, *C.L.*, II, 1053.

This beautiful and beauty-making power.
Joy, virtuous Lady ! Joy that ne'er was given,
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour,
Life, and Life's effluence...

Dejection; An Ode, lines 63-66.

...universal Ideas are the Souls of all things.

Letter 381, *C.L.*, II, 681.

A great poet must be a profound metaphysician.

Letter 444, *C.L.*, II, 810.

...and the word imitation itself means always a combination of a certain degree of dissimilitude with a certain degree of similitude.

...and poetry results from that instinct—the effort of perfecting ourselves,....

That blending of thoughts into each other, or rather, into one passion, at the time it contemplates, was one of the greatest criterions of a true poet....

Shak. Crit., II, 53, 65.

WE now discuss a few other concepts like those of Judgement, Meditation, Genius, Talent, Joy, Beauty, Taste, Poetic Illusion and Imitation, which Coleridge used in explaining his principles of poetry and criticism, as they throw more light on his main theory of Imagination.

1. MEDITATION

Meditation is hardly different from Imagination. Coleridge contrasted meditation with observation¹ and gave the former

1. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 201.

priority in poetic composition. He lectured on Shakespeare as the ideal poet, who illustrates what genuine poetry is and should be. He said that "Shakespeare's observation was preceded by contemplation: 'he first conceived what the forms of things must be and then went humbly to the oracle of nature to ask whether he was right. He enquired of her as a sovereign; he did not gossip with her.' Shakespeare describes feelings which no observation could teach."² "Where, from observation, could he learn the language proper to Sovereigns, Queens, Noblemen or Generals? Yet he invariably uses it. Where, from observation, could he have learned such lines as these, which are put into the mouth of Othello, when he is talking to Iago of Brabantio?

Let him do his spite :

My services, which I have done the signiory,
Shall out-tongue his complaints. 'Tis yet to know,
Which, when I know that boasting is an honour,
I shall promulgate, I fetch my life and being,
From men of royal siege ; and my demerits
May speak, unbonneted, to as proud a fortune
As this that I have reach'd : for know, Iago,
But that I love the gentle Desdemona,
I would not my unhoused free condition,
Put into circumscription and confine
For the sea's worth.

Act 1, Sc. 2.

I ask where was Shakespeare to observe such language as this? If he did observe it, it was with the inward eye of meditation upon his own nature: for the time, he became Othello, and spoke as Othello, in such circumstances, must have spoken."³ Coleridge pointed out that in the character of the Nurse in *Romeo and Juliet* "all the qualities and peculiarities that can possibly belong to a nurse" were

2. *Ibid.*, II, 14.

3. *Ibid.*, II, 101-2

included and that this was not possible by mere observation. "The great prerogative of genius (and Shakespeare felt and availed himself of it) is now to swell itself to the dignity of a god, and now to subdue and keep dormant some part of that lofty nature, and to descend even to the lowest character to become everything, in fact, but the vicious."⁴ "Poetry," Coleridge said, "is rationalised dreaming, dealing to manifold forms our own feelings, that never perhaps were attached by us consciously to our own personal selves. What is the *Lear*, the *Othello*, but a divine dream, all Shakespeare; and nothing Shakespeare."⁵

Coleridge does not belittle observation. He only gives it a place second to meditation. He distinguishes between two types of observation. "It is comparatively easy for a man to go about the world, as if with a pocket-book in his hand, carefully noting down what he sees and hears: by practice he acquires considerable facility in representing what he has observed, himself frequently unconscious of its worth, or its bearings. This is entirely different from the observation of a mind, which, having formed a theory and a system upon its own nature, remarks all things that are examples of its truth, confirming it in that truth, and above all, enabling it to convey the truths of philosophy, as mere effects derived from, what we may call, the outward watchings of life." He calls the latter type of observation "the child of meditation"⁶ or the incarnation of an idea, which is always *a priori*.⁷ He further explains that "mere observation may be able to produce an accurate copy", and "what is produced can only consist of parts and fragments, according to the means and extent of observation"⁸; but poetry is a united whole. It is imitation, which is "always a combination of a

4. *Ibid.*, II, 99.

5. Note-book 15 quoted in *Shak. Crit.*, II, 85-86.

6. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 98.

7. *Ibid.*, I, 203.

8. *Ibid.*, II, 85.

certain degree of dissimilitude with a certain degree of similitude" and so differs from copying.⁹ If poetry were merely copying, "merely the same as looking at a glass reflection, we should receive no pleasure. A waxen image after once it had been seen pleased no longer, or very little, but when the resemblance of a thing was given upon canvas or a flat surface, then we were delighted."¹⁰ Now, this mixing of opposites and this unity of effect are characteristics of the faculty of Imagination.¹¹ Thus we see that meditation is an act of the faculty of Imagination. It hardly differs from Imagination.

2. DRAMATIC ILLUSION

The foregoing remarks may be helpful in understanding another concept of Coleridge, that of Poetic or Dramatic Illusion, which constitutes poetic faith. Aristotle said that poetry was "the art of telling lies 'skilfully'".¹² Coleridge explained that the skill lay in creating an illusion, so that poetic description appeared neither true nor false. On this very basis he criticised the Greek concept of the unities of time and place as unnecessary and merely accidental aspects of the Greek drama that only checked its growth and limited its range.¹³ The effect of the observance of the unities of time and place was to "confine the drama to as few subjects as might be counted on the fingers, or involve gross improbabilities far more striking than the violation (of the unities) would have been....What play of the ancients, taking their ideal (as the standard), does not hold out grosser absurdities than any in Shakespeare?"¹⁴

"On the Greek stage the chorus was always before the

9. *Ibid.*, II, 53

10. *Ibid.*, II, 53.

11. *Ibid.*, II, 63.

12. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, Butcher, p. 95.

13. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 54-5.

14. *Ibid.*, I, 180.

audience-no curtain dropt. *Change of place* was impossible ; the absurd idea of its improbability was not indulged. The scene cannot be an exact copy of nature, but only an imitation. If we can believe ourselves at Thebes in one act, we can believe ourselves at Athens in the next. There seems to be no just boundary but what the feelings prescribe. In Greece, however, great judgement was necessary where the same persons were perpetually before the audience. If a story lasted twentyfour hours or twentyfour years, it was equally improbable. They never attempted to impose on the senses, by bringing places to men, though they could bring men to places."¹⁵

He pointed out that "the unities grew mainly out of the size and construction of the ancient theatres : the plays represented were made to include within a short space of time events which it is impossible should have occurred in that short space. This fact alone establishes, that all dramatic performances were then looked upon merely as ideal. It is the same with us : nobody supposes that a tragedian suffers real pain when he is stabbed or tortured ; or that a comedian is in fact transported with delight when successful in pretended love.

"If we want to witness mere pain, we can visit the hospitals : if we seek the exhibition of mere pleasure, we can find it in ballrooms. It is the representation of it, not the reality, that we require, the imitation, and not the thing itself ; and we pronounce it good or bad in proportion as the representation is an incorrect, or a correct imitation. The true pleasure we derive from theatrical performances arises from the fact that they are unreal and fictitious. If dying agonies were unfeigned who, in these days of civilization, could derive gratification from beholding them ?"¹⁶

Coleridge is certainly one of the few critics who, in his own words, "have followed with the eye of the imagination

15. *Ibid.*, II, 214-5.

16. *Ibid.*, II, 46.

the imperishable yet ever wandering spirit of poetry thro' its various metempsychoses and consequent metamorphoses, or who have rejoiced in the light of clear perception at beholding at each new birth, at each rare avatar, the human race form itself a new body by assimilating to itself the different materials of nourishment out of the then circumstances, and new organs of power and action appropriate to the new sphere of its motion and activity."¹⁷

He saw in the Shakespearean drama a new avatar of poetry and distinguished it from the Greek tragedy. He named "the true genuine modern poetry the romantic"; and said that the works of Shakespeare were "romantic poetry revealing itself in the drama". They differed from the Greek drama not in degree but in kind and were altogether "a different genus" which he named "romantic dramas, or dramatic romances."¹⁸ He said that "deviation from the simple forms and unities of the ancient stage is an essential principle and of course, an appropriate excellence, of the romantic". As distinct from the Greek drama, "the romantic poetry, the Shakespearean drama, appealed to the imagination rather than to the senses, and to the reason as contemplating our inward nature, the workings of the passions in their most retired recesses."¹⁹ In the romantic poetry or the Shakespearean drama there was a greater independence for the poet and he was bound by the laws of Imagination only. "The reason is aloof from time and space; the imagination (has) an arbitrary control over both; and if only the poet have such power of exciting our internal emotions as to make us present to the scene in imagination chiefly, he acquires the right and privilege of using time and space as they exist in the imagination, obedient only to the laws which the imagination acts by."²⁰

17. *Ibid.*, I, 174-5

18. *Ibid.*, I, 175

19. *Ibid.*, p. 175-6.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

Thus the first "indispensable condition not only of just and genial criticism, but of all consistency in our opinions... is contained in the words, probable, natural".²¹

"As rules are nothing but means to an end previously ascertained...we must first ascertain what the immediate end or object of the drama is." About the end there were two opposite views prevalent. The French critics thought it was perfect delusion and Dr. Johnson said it was reality. According to Coleridge, the true aim of poetry or drama was to create illusion, a state akin to dream; it was neither reality nor delusion.²² Thus defining the stage as "the most important and dignified species" of theatre, he said that "in its Idea, or according to what it does, or ought to, *aim at*" it is "a combination of several or of all the fine arts to an harmonious whole having a distinct end of its own, to which the peculiar end of each of the component arts, taken separately, is made subordinate and subservient; that, namely, of imitating reality (objects, actions, or passions) under a semblance of reality".²³ All "stage presentations are to produce a sort of temporary half-faith, which the spectator encourages in himself and supports by a volun-

21. *Ibid.*, 114

22. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 115-16.

Abhinavagupta says exactly the same thing though in a different way. See *Abhinava-Bhārati* I, 285, quoted in Book III, ch. I, fn. 9,

23. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 177.

Abhinavagupta more comprehensively says : Nāṭyaṁ nāma loka-
padārtha-vyatiriktaṁ tadanukārapratibimbālekhyā-sādṛśyāropādhyā-
vasāyotprekṣā-svapna-māyendrajālādi-vilakṣaṇaṁ tadgrāhakaśya samya-
gjñāna-bhrānti-saṁśayānavadhāraṇānādhavyasāya-vijñāna-bhinna-vṛttān-
tāsvādanarūpa-saṁvedanasamvedyaṁ vastu rasa-svabhāvaṁ iti vakṣyā-
mah. *Abhinava-Bhārati*, I, 3.

Abhinava means to say that drama in both its meanings of dramatic performance and dramatic experience is different from all types of worldly objects and means of knowing them, namely, the mediate forms of knowledge. Thus the actors on the stage do not appear as copies, or reflections, or photographs, of the original characters. Again they are not persons similar to the characters, or superimpositions on their

tary contribution on his own part, because he knows that it is at all times in his power to see the thing as it really is."²⁴

With the analogy of dreaming, Coleridge makes a close analysis of this essential constituent of poetry. He calls it variously as the "willing illusion",²⁵ "negative belief",²⁶ "temporary half-faith",²⁷ or "willing suspension of disbelief"²⁸. He says that our mental state while reading a deeply interesting novel or witnessing a play is similar in *kind* to that of dreaming. It is wrong to say that while sleeping we take our dreams to be real, because in sleep there is "a suspension of the voluntary and, therefore, of the comparative power". The fact is that dreams are neither accepted as real nor as unreal. "We pass no judgement either way." As we do not take them to be unreal the images act on our minds by their own force as images. The difference between dreaming and poetry, which is rationalised dreaming, is three-fold: first, the images in dreams are more vivid on account of the absence of all outward impressions on our senses; secondly, the emotions and passions are the *effects* of the images presented to us in waking hours and their *causes* in sleep; and thirdly, in sleep we pass at once by a sudden collapse into this suspension of will and the comparative power, whereas in reading or seeing an interesting play the suspension of will is gradual and only as far as it is requisite or desirable and is produced by the *art* of the poet and the actors "and with the consent and positive aidance

originals, or identical entities, or suppositions, or persons in a dream, or those conjured up by jugglery, or produced by mesmerism. The dramatic experience is not an experience of reality or delusion or doubt in any form—that between two known objects, or one caused by a totally strange thing, or that on seeing a known thing not clearly seen. It is a joyful immediate intuitive experience, which we shall clarify later on.

24. *Shak. Crit.*, 178. The reasoning part of the sentence is weak and can hardly be justified.

25. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 117.

26. *Ibid.*, I, 179.

27. *Ibid.*, I, 178.

28. *B.L.*, II, 6.

of our own will. We *choose* to be deceived."²⁹ Explaining this concept of stage illusion Coleridge further says :

"I have often noticed that little children are actually deceived by stage-scenery, never by pictures, tho' even these produce an effect on their impressible minds which they do not on the minds of adults. The child, if strongly impressed, does not indeed positively think the picture to be the reality, but yet he does not think the contrary." He gives the instance of his own son, who was deluded by a picture of Rubens representing a storm at sea without any boat introduced. He "tumbled in" upon the picture with the remarks : 'And where is the ship ? But that is sunk—and the men all drowned !' still keeping his eye fixed on the print. "Now, what pictures are to little children, stage-illusion is to men, provided they retain any part of the child's sensibility, except that in the latter instance this suspension of the act of comparison, which permits this sort of negative belief, is somewhat more assisted by the will than in that of the child respecting a picture."³⁰

"The poet does not require us to be awake and believe ; he solicits us only to yield ourselves to a dream ; and this too with our eyes open, and with our judgement *perdue* behind the curtain, ready to awaken us at the first motion of our will : and meantime, only, not to disbelieve."³¹

Aristotle says that the poet relates "what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity".³² Coleridge's further analysis of this Aristotelian concept clearly shows the limits of acceptability of this probability. On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the dramatic or poetic illusion he infers the rule that "Whatever tends to prevent the mind from placing itself or from being gradually placed in this state in which the images have a negative reality must

29. *Shak. Orit.*, I, 116.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-9.

31. *B. L.*, II, 189.

32. *Poetics*, Butcher, p. 35.

be a defect,³³ and consequently anything that must force itself on the auditor's mind as improbable, not because it is improbable (for that the whole play is foreknown to be) but because it cannot but *appear* as such.

"But this again depends on the degree of excitement in which the mind is supposed to be. Many things would be intolerable in the first scene of a play that would not at all interrupt our enjoyment in the height of the interest. The narrow cockpit may hold

The vasty fields of France, or we may cram
Within its wooden O the very casques
That did affright the air at Agincourt ?

(*Henry V.* Prologue, ll. 11-14).

And again, on the other hand, many obvious improbabilities will be endured as belonging to the groundwork of the story rather than to the drama, in the first scenes, which would disturb or disentrance us from all illusion in the acme of our excitement, as, for instance, Lear's division of his realm and banishment of Cordelia."³⁴

Coleridge makes the production of this illusion as the chief end of the poet. "But besides this dramatic probability, all the other excellencies of the drama, as unity of interest, with distinctness and subordination of the characters, appropriateness of style, nay, and the charm of language and sentiment for their own sakes, yet still as far as they tend to increase the inward excitement, are all means to this chief end, that of producing and supporting this willing illusion." He adds, however, "that tho' the excellencies above mentioned are means to this end, they do not therefore cease to be themselves *ends*, and as such carry their *own* justification with them as long as they do not contravene or interrupt the illusion."³⁵

33. For Abhinavagupta's concept of the seven obstacles to realisation of the poetic experience see Book III, ch. IV.

34. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 116-7. Aristotle's discussion of this subject is not different from that of Coleridge (*Vide Poetics* sec. XXIV, 8-10, Butcher, pp. 95-97).

35. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 116-7.

3. IMITATION

This again leads us to the fundamental principle of all fine arts—Imitation, which combines art with nature, artificiality with naturalness, and leads us further to the great principle of “condition of all consciousness, without which we should feel and imagine only by discontinuous moments and be plants or animals instead of men. I mean that ever-varying balance, or balancing, of images, notions, or feelings (for I avoid the vague word, idea) conceived as in opposition to each other; in short, the perception of identity and contrariety, the least degree of which constitutes likeness, the greatest absolute difference; but the infinite gradations between these two form all the play and all the interest of our intellectual and moral being, till it lead us” to the Eternal I AM where “alone are all things at once different and the same”, where alone “does distinction exist unaided by division—will and reason, succession of time and unmoving eternity, infinite change and ineffable rest.”³⁶

“The common end of all *narrative*, nay, of *all* Poems is to convert a *series* into a *Whole*: to make those events, which in real or imagined History move on in a *strait* Line, assume to our Understandings a *circular* motion—the snake with it's Tail in it's Mouth. Hence indeed the almost flattering and yet appropriate Term, Poesy—i.e. poesis=*making*. Doubtless to *his* eye, which alone comprehends all Past and all Future in one eternal Present, what to our short sight appears *strait* is but a part of the great Cycle—just as the calm Sea to us *appears* level, tho' it be indeed only a part of a *globe*. Now what the Globe is in Geography, *miniaturizing* in order to *manifest* the Truth, such is a Poem to that Image of God, which we were created into, and which still seeks that Unity, or Revelation of the *One* in and by the *Many* which reminds it, that tho' in order to be an individual Being it must go forth *from* God, yet as the *receding* from *him* is to *proceed* to-

36. *Ibid.*, p. 181-2

wards Nothingness and Privation, it must still at every step turn back toward *him* in order to *be* at all—Now a straight Line continuously retracted forms of necessity a circular orbit. Now God's Will and Word CANNOT be frustrated."³⁷

Aristotle discussed this subject in his own way in sections VII and VIII of the *Poetics*. His concepts of 'whole', 'beauty' and 'unity of action' discuss this very subject. A 'whole' is "that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end". And "a beautiful object, whether it be a living organism or any whole composed of parts, must not only have an orderly arrangement of parts, but must also be of a certain magnitude ; for beauty depends on magnitude and order."

Indian critics discuss the subject under the concept of *pānakarasa*, which will be discussed in Book III.

Thus all the foregoing concepts become subservient to the soul of poetry, which is the esemplastic Imagination, a repetition of the eternal I AM in the mind of the poet and that of the reader.

That all art is imitation is a Greek concept according to Western scholars.³⁸ Instead of 'fine arts,' the Greek phrase was 'mimetic' or 'imitative' arts or 'modes of imitation'.³⁹ The word 'mimesis' (or imitation) was disparagingly used before Aristotle. It was Aristotle who first made it a dignified term. In short, he made 'mimesis' mean an expression of the permanent and universal element in human lifelying immanent and not getting proper expression always in material existence. Hence he stated that "it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened,

37. Letter 956, *C.L.*, IV, 545.

38. I say 'according to Western scholars', for the idea very clearly occurs in Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra* and as dates of ancient Indian texts are fixed not always on good grounds, it is very difficult to say whether the idea went to Greece from India or came to India from Greece. However, the idea of imitation as 'copying' has been very well and clearly refuted by Abhinavagupta in his commentary, *Abhinava-Bhārati*, on *Nāṭya-śāstra*, Ch. 1.

39. Butcher : *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, p. 121.

but what may happen, — what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity." To imitate *ēthē*, *pathē* and *praxeis*, that is, "character, emotion and action", is art or poetry.⁴⁰

Coleridge, the great Platonist, interpreted the term 'imitation' on the basis of the Platonic concept of 'idea'. He agreed with Aristotle that imitation was idealisation, but he did not agree with him in the explanation of the process of imitation. As Sydney explained, 'mimesis' was interpreted by Aristotle as a "speaking picture".⁴¹ The process, as Butcher explains, is this. A work of art is a likeness of an original, and not an arbitrary symbolic expression of it by signs like words, which have no natural connexion with the things signified. It is only an agreed convention that a word has a particular meaning. On the other hand, mental impressions are not signs or symbols but likenesses of things themselves. In the act of sensuous perception objects stamp upon the mind an impress of themselves like that of a signet ring and the picture is so engraven on the memory that even when the object is removed we do not forget it. The phantasy,⁴² or the image-making faculty, lying on the borderline of the receptive sense and active intellect, recalls pictures previously presented to the mind. Later the intellect abstracts the universal concepts.⁴³

How the words, the arbitrary signs, are able to express the universal ideas of the intellect are not clearly explained by Aristotle. Locke developed the Aristotelian psychology,

40. *Poetics*, Butcher, pp. 35 and 9.

41. 'An Apology for Poetry', *English Critical Essays*, (Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries) ed. by Edmund D. Jones, p. 10.

42. Phantasy is defined as "the movement which results upon an actual sensation", or "the after-effect of a sensation, the continued presence of an impression after the object which first excited it has been withdrawn from actual experience". Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

43. See Butcher, the chapter on 'Imitation as an aesthetic term' and also Coleridge, *P.L.*, Lecture 5.

though, as Coleridge showed in his philosophical letters,⁴⁴ he misinterpreted Aristotle. Addison explained the poetic imagination on Lockean psychology.⁴⁵ But Aristotle did not fully discuss the matter and naturally his explanation as a "likeness of the original" remains unexplained to us when applied to the words that make a poem.

Aristotle's concept of a poem as an entelechy, a development of a potential, may be undisputed, but when he gives priority to particular objects of sense, not to the mind of the poet, in working out the potential, he makes the work of art a freak of nature. Nor has he any philosophy of word and meaning to explain the phenomenon of art. At least this has to be conceded that the Aristotelian thesis regarding imitation still remains an unworked out concept on the basis of the Aristotelian philosophy, which is empirical.

Coleridge accepted the definition that art is imitation of nature, of human nature. But he interpreted imitation as a Platonist. He says that imitation is neither a copy of the original nor the original itself but a likeness of the original; that likeness includes difference; that this admixture of likeness and difference shows the artist's freedom as well as veracity,⁴⁶ which he can utilise when he exercises the faculty of his mind that is free and truthful. This faculty is Imagination,

44. Letters 381-4, 387-8.

45. *Spectator* Nos. 411-21. See the analysis of Addison's thesis in the present author's article on "The Pre-Coleridgean Conception of Imagination".

46. Cp. "I need not again remind you of the difference I pointed out between imitation and likeness, in reference to the attempt to give reality to representations on the stage. The distinction between imitation and likeness depends upon the admixture of circumstances of dissimilarity; an imitation is not a copy, precisely as likeness is not sameness, in that sense of the word 'likeness' which implies difference conjoined with sameness. Shakespeare reflected manners in his plays, not by a cold formal copy, but by an imitation; that is to say, by an admixture of circumstances, not absolutely true in themselves, but true to the character and to the time represented."

which is an echo of Reason in the finite mind. Thus in imitation predominance should be given to the seal and not to the impression of the seal.⁴⁷ The impression also is imitation but only because it shows the functioning of the sealing faculty. Because words and meanings are, in ultimate analysis, two aspects of the same self-consciousness, and because the faculty of Imagination that conceives them is only a repetition of pure self-consciousness, we can have an easy traffic both ways: from the words of the poem to the Imagination that brought them into existence and from the Imagination to the words that manifest its working. The lower faculties of the Understanding, Fancy and Sense are not neglected as the lower faculties are automatically affected by the working of the higher faculties. The question is of priority and predominance only. Thus, in ultimate analysis, imitation is only a work of Imagination.

However, even Coleridge did not fully develop the idea contained in the Aristotelian remark that art imitated *ēthē*, *pathē* and *praxies*, nor did he develop his own semasiology.

Showing how the open stage helped Shakespeare in imitation, Coleridge says:

"The stage, indeed, had nothing but curtains for its scenes, but this fact compelled the actor, as well as the author, to appeal to the imaginations, and not to the senses of the audience: thus was obtained a power over space and time, which in an ancient theatre would have been absurd, because it would have been contradictory. The advantage is vastly in favour of our own early stage: the dramatic poet there relies upon the imagination, upon the reason, and upon the noblest powers of the human heart; he shakes off the iron bondage of space and time; he appeals to that which we most wish to be, when we are most worthy of being, while the ancient dramatist binds us down to the meanest part of our nature, and the chief compensation is a simple acquiescence of the mind in the position, that what is represented might possibly have occurred in the time and place required by the unities. It is a poor compliment to a poet to tell him that he has only the qualifications of a historian." (*Shak. Crit.*, II, 123).

47. 'On Poesy or Art', *B.L.*, II, 255.

Both these aspects of poetics received the fullest attention of the Indian critics led by Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana as will be seen in Book III.

4 JUDGEMENT

'Judgement' does not refer to any particular faculty. It is the mental capacity of taking decisions and whether judgement is wrong or right depends on the faculty that is taken as a guide. The value of judgement likewise depends on the relative importance of the faculty consulted. Thus Understanding is 'the faculty judging according to sense'. And while Understanding has its own value in judging objects of the phenomenal world, it is of very little use in judging spiritual objects. It is Reason alone that can judge the noumenal objects. In poetical matters, similarly, judgement has to be taken in consultation with the faculty of Imagination. Imagination, as Coleridge says, is the soul of poetic genius and genius is defined as the capacity of living in the universal. But the poetic genius has its body, its life and its drapery also. They all show the working of genius in different ways. And genius, when comprehended as an all-embracing concept like this, does not differ from judgement. Coleridge says "that the contra-distinction itself between judgement and genius, rested on an utterly false theory;"⁴⁸ that they "are as much one as the fount and the stream that flows from it."⁴⁹ Thus Coleridge takes account of the relative importance of all the constituents of poetry and gives every constituent its due.

5. TASTE

Like Judgement, Taste is also an all-embracing concept and hence Coleridge said that even among men of genius, men of Taste were rare, for true Taste was a very ripe stage of

48. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 244-5.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

genius. Genius and Taste differ in degree only, in kind they are the same.⁵⁰ In a "Fragment of an Essay on Taste"⁵¹ Coleridge analyses this concept. He says that among the five senses, the senses of sight and hearing are organic and the other three are mixed.

Senses have been divided into "organic and semi-organic. By an organ in its strictest import we mean an instrument, a mean to an end, not blended with that end. Thus a telescope is an instrument or organ for the eye, the eye an organ for the mind, that which we call an organ an instrument for the musician. And in this view the eye and ear have been classed as comparatively perfect *organs*, inasmuch as they present objects to us without necessarily referring our attention either to themselves or to our own being." Our eyes and ears make "their objects possess the whole of our attention. No man thinks of his eyes or of seeing when he looks at anything, or of his ears or hearing when he listens to any sound, unless some unusual circumstance forces him to it. We have simply a sense of the object without any sense of the perception or mode thro' which we perceived it, whereas in our other senses we always combine the perception with the object, and become conscious of the object only as far as we are conscious of the modification produced by it on its appropriate sense. The eye and ear seem wholly inactive...and afford us no consciousness of their being reacted on; but the remaining senses seem in part passive and always combine a sense of our own life with the perception of the outward object."⁵²

Taste, as opposed to sight and hearing, teaches us to expect in its metaphorical use not merely a distinct notion of an object in and for itself but a coinstantaneous reference of

50. *I.S.*, item 159.

51. There are two such fragments, one with this title is printed along with *Biographia* by Shawcross (II, 247-9) and is dated 1810, and another entitled 'The Definition of Taste' is printed in *Shak. Crit.*, ed. by T.M. Raysor (I, 158-163) as a part of Coleridge's lectures of 1808.

52. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 159-60.

the object to our own being. It differs from touch, on the other hand, by adding to this reference of our vital being some degree of enjoyment or dislike. "In this definition of taste, therefore, is involved the definition of fine arts, namely, as being such, the chief and discriminative purpose of which it is to gratify the taste—that is, not merely to connect, but to combine and unite, a sense of immediate pleasure in ourselves with the perception of external arrangement."⁵³ Taste, again, is equated with the faculty of Imagination, and is defined by Coleridge in almost the same terms as define Imagination. "Taste is the intermediate faculty which connects the active with the passive powers of our nature, the intellect with the senses; and its appointed function is to elevate the *images* of the latter, while it realises the *ideas* of the former."⁵⁴

Notwithstanding our liability to error each man at the moment of enjoying a work of art legislates for all men; he believes of necessity that if it be right and beautiful for him, it would be so for all men. The reason is that the enjoyment of a work of art is the work of that faculty in which all men are one.⁵⁵

6. BEAUTY

There are three words on the distinct and clear meaning of which depends the solution of the main difficulty concerning Taste—the good, the beautiful and the agreeable.⁵⁶

Beauty is not a term of Aristotelian poetics. It was Plotinus who first introduced it in the West as a key concept. Absolute beauty, however, was described in the *Republic*. Coleridge, who was influenced by Plato and Plotinus, introduced Beauty in his definition of poetry, but he defined

53. 'Fragment of an Essay on Taste', *B.L.*, II, 248.

54. 'On the Principles of Genial Criticism', *B. L.*, II, 227.

55. 'Fragment of an Essay on Taste', *B.L.*, II, 249.

56. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 163.

Beauty after Pythagoras. Coleridge's definition of poetry is "the excitement of emotion for the purpose of *immediate* pleasure through the medium of beauty".⁵⁷ He desynonymised 'beauty' from the words of allied meaning like grand, sublime, picturesque and agreeable, especially the last.⁵⁸ Whatever agrees with our nature, whatever is congruous with the primary constitution of our senses is 'agreeable'. The word involves a pre-established harmony between the organs and their appointed objects, as green is naturally agreeable to the eye. Similarly, even those things that agree with our habit, (which is called the second nature), like tobacco, for example, become agreeable. Even base things become agreeable thus on account of some pleasure or advantage to be had afterwards. So does love make base things dignified.⁵⁹ A dish is agreeable because it pleases, but a work of art pleases, because it is beautiful.⁶⁰ The 'agreeable' thus depends on association, natural or acquired. But beauty has nothing to do with association. Often it depends on the removal of associations.⁶¹ After such a negative discussion of the concept, Coleridge defines beauty as "Multeity in Unity", "in which the *many*, still seen as many, become one".⁶²

Coleridge explains that "by many I do not mean comparative multitude, but only as a generic word opposed to absolute unity." He asks that by the word 'many', as expressing kind and not degree, we should mean simply "that the complex object is not absolutely one. In this sense the simplest triangle combines the many with the one." He says that if we accept this definition of 'many', "we shall at once understand why in correct language beauty has been

57. "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B.L.*, II, 224.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

A definition adopted from Pythagoras who, Coleridge himself points out, defined beauty as "the reduction of many to one". (*Ibid.*, p. 238).

appropriated to the objects of the eye and ear, for these senses are the only ones that present a whole combined with a consciousness of its parts; but inasmuch as such a combination is not generally called beauty, unless it is accompanied with pleasure, it is easy to understand that whatever external object gives pleasure may by association be incorrectly called beautiful, inasmuch as the result in sensation is more important to common minds than the external cause of that result."⁶³ Hence taste, not eye or ear, in its metaphorical sense, denotes that faculty which is "the enterer and percipient of beauty".⁶⁴

Thus "beauty is harmony, and subsists only in composition." He gives the instance of "the polished golden wheel of the chariot of the Sun" as the poets have described it. He points out that "of all 'the many', which I actually see, each and all are really reconciled into unity: while the effulgence from the whole coincides with, and seems to represent, the effulgence of delight from my own mind in the intuition of it."⁶⁵ It has to be noted that only the first species of the agreeable, that "which is naturally consonant with our senses by the pre-established harmony between nature and the human mind" can be a component part of the beautiful, and that even of this species only those objects "which belong to the eye and ear, because they alone are susceptible of distinction of parts". In short, "the shapely (i.e. *formosus*) joined with the naturally agreeable, constitutes what, speaking accurately, we mean by the word beautiful (i.e. *pulcher*)."⁶⁶ Again, the perception of beauty is intellectual. "We have a sensation of sweetness in a healthy palate, from honey; a sense of beauty, in an uncorrupted taste from the view of the rising or setting sun."⁶⁷ Hence we have a taste for a work of art;

63. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 163.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

65. 'On the Principles of Genial Criticism'. *B.L.*, II, 233.

66. *Ibid.*, II, 234.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

we do not taste it.⁶⁸ Sensations are incommunicable parts of our nature and can be reduced to no universal rule. In them we have no right to expect that others should agree with us. We cannot blame them for disagreement.⁶⁹ On the contrary, we expect universal acceptance in our sense of the beautiful, though we feel no right to *demand* it. And this differentiates the beautiful from the good.⁷⁰

Coleridge distinguished the sense of the beautiful not only from that of the agreeable, which is beneath it, but also from that of the good, which is above it, for both the latter "have an interest necessarily attached to them: both act on the Will, and excite a desire for the actual existence of the image or idea contemplated: while the sense of beauty rests gratified in the mere contemplation or intuition, regardless whether it be a fictitious Apollo, or a real Antinous."⁷¹ "The GOOD consists in the congruity of a thing with the laws of the reason and the nature of the will, and in its fitness to determine the latter to actualise the former: and it is always discursive. The Beautiful arises from the perceived harmony of an object, whether sight or sound, with the inborn and constitutive rules of the judgement and imagination: and it is always intuitive. As light to the eye, even such is beauty to the mind, which cannot but have complacency in whatever is perceived as pre-configured to its living faculties." A beautiful object calls on the soul, which welcomes it as something connatural.⁷² The mystics meant

68. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 160.

69. "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B.L.*, II, 241.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

There is an excellent analysis of the concept of 'good' in the *Philosophical Lectures*, (p. 153). Coleridge says: "You preassume, I say, that *Good* is nothing more than a reflex idea of the mind after a survey and calculation of agreeable or delightful sensations included within any given time, the whole of our life for instance. Now this I utterly deny. *I know—intuitively know*—that there is a power essential

the same when they defined "beauty as the subjection of matter to spirit so as to be transformed into a symbol, in and through which the spirit reveals itself". The beauty increased in accordance with the number of obstacles overcome in its manifestation.⁷³

Thus we find that beauty is the objective counterpart of the subjective power of Imagination and Taste.

7. JOY

In Coleridge's definition of poetry, joy or pleasure or complacency—words used by him almost promiscuously—has a very important place. It is the purpose of immediate pleasure which differentiates art or poetry from science, which has truth for its purpose. I. A. Richards has taken objection to this part of Coleridge's definition, though not justly. Nor do I find any justification in the remark of Shawcross, in the face of Coleridge's clarifications,⁷⁴ that

to my nature, and which constitutes it, human nature, the voice of which is I ought, I should, I ought not, I should not, and that this voice is original and self-existent, not an echo of a prior voice—I mean the voice of prudential self-love—but the very source out of which self-love itself must flow. And I am a wicked man, I feel myself say, if I call that good which I feel I desire, instead of endeavouring to desire that only which I know to be *good*. If you answer, 'I do not understand what this good is which determines what is desirable, instead of deriving its meaning from it', we are both in the same predicament, for it is *the peace of God* which passeth all *understanding*....There is a point which is above all intellect, and there are truths derived from that point which must be presumed....There is a will, a consciousness of something which, independent of desire, dictates what is desirable; and when such principles are denied you may at least candidly say, 'We differ on principles', and charitably think that that man must be made a better before he can be made a wiser man".

73. "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", *B.L.*, II, 239.

74. As to the merit of these words in his scientific definition of poetry, Coleridge's following statements may be noted. "The term, pleasure, is unfortunately so comprehensive, as frequently to become

"Both Kant and Coleridge seem at fault in reducing the emotional element in the enjoyment of Beauty to a mere *feeling of pleasure*; for the substitution of the word 'complacency' by Coleridge does not help us much."⁷⁵ Indeed, Coleridge uses pleasure in a very wide sense and distinguishes its varieties, species or kinds. In the third philosophical lecture⁷⁶ there is an interesting and clear discussion of four "different species of pleasure". There he says that "the question of what kind it is must be referred to the accident of the organs which are to be the means of conveying it."⁷⁷ The four kinds are: first, bodily pleasurable or 'agreeable sensation' produced by "a perfect correspondence of the external stimulants to the frame to be stimulated"; second, 'a certain joyousness' or 'gladness' or 'intellectual pleasure' or 'intellectual harmony' as when Pythagoras (or Archimedes) discovered the proposition that made him cry out 'Eureka'; third is called " 'happiness' when things happen well" arising from the consideration of our extreme dependence upon external things, and fourth is " 'the peace of God' which every man who has had an approving conscience must know".⁷⁸

equivocal: and yet it is hard to discover a substitute. *Complacency*, which would indeed better express the intellectual nature of the enjoyment; essentially involved in the sense of the beautiful, yet seems to preclude all emotion: and *delight*, on the other hand, conveys a comparative *degree* of pleasurable emotion, and is therefore unfit for a *general* definition, the object of which is to abstract the *kind*. For this reason, we added the words "through the medium of beauty". ('On the Principles of Genial Criticism', *B.L.*, II, 224).

We have already seen that Coleridge distinguished the meaning of the word 'beauty' from its other synonyms. Here we draw the attention of the reader to *Dejection: an Ode* where he calls Joy as "the beautiful and the beauty-making power".

75. *B.L.*, II, notes to p. 241 on p. 313.

76. *P.L.*, pp. 140-143.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

It may be noted that the first and the third varieties of pleasure depend upon external circumstances, while independence from them is a characteristic of both the second and fourth varieties. The latter two are purely ideal. Poetic pleasure is of the second variety and is different from the fourth or pious pleasure in this that while in the poetic pleasure external objects are not necessary, their impressions are. A semblance of objective reality is always necessary for the poet. The pleasure of the highest kind, the peace of God, which is a state of satisfaction arising out of the union of one's will with Reason requires nothing of the phenomenal world. Poetry deals with impulses⁷⁹ and its main work is to lead them to perfection by shedding over them the light of Reason. This union of impulse with Reason is called Passion and the faculty that unites the two, Imagination, by Coleridge. Impulse is ultimately the finite form of the infinite will. "In everything the blending of the similar with the dissimilar is the secret of all pure delight",⁸⁰ and this is a characteristic of the poetic as well as pious pleasure, which alone are the pure varieties.⁸¹

79. For a difference between impulse and will see *P.L.*, p. 119 : "But if you prefix or presuppose any act influencing the will necessarily, we see at once that it is no longer the will but an impulse, a billiard ball moving against another billiard ball, and we lose the very notion of will."

80. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 107.

81. Coleridge seems to include the exclusive attachment of the sexes also in the pure variety. He says : "Who shall dare to stand alone, and vaunt himself, in himself, sufficient ? In poetry it is the blending of passion with order that constitutes perfection : this is still more the case in morals, and more than all in the exclusive attachment of the sexes. (*Shak. Crit.*, II, 107).

In Letter 127, he says : "Great indeed are the moral uses of Marriage.—It is *Variety* that *Cantharidizes* us. Marriage that confines the appetites to one object, gradually causes them to be swallowed up in affection." *C.L.*, I, 213-4. The Hindu view is the same.

8. POETRY and RELIGION

Coleridge's concept of education was that of a continuous progress. The first in the hierarchy of subjects are the natural sciences, which give intellect a training in causal relations, where knowledge is in the form of knowing. The second is poetry. It represents a higher subject, because it is here that men have the first glimpse of that type of knowing which is being, where knowledge is not mere acquisition but transformation. It is thus a step towards the perfection of man. Religion is the last and the highest stage of knowledge, because it is complete and perfect realisation of the reality, union of will with Reason. Showing points of similarity between religion and poetry Coleridge says that religion is the poetry of mankind. He shows that both poetry and religion generalise our notions and compel us to shake off our narrow selfish interest and lead us higher above our circumstances and broaden our sympathies. Thus they throw the object of our deepest interest to a distance from us and raise us up from our slavery to our senses by rousing our higher mental faculties of Imagination and Reason. They have a common aim of human perfection. They point out to us the improvement of our nature and fix our attention upon that.

It is significant that all great poets "have joined to support all those delicate sentiments of the heart...which may be called the feeding streams of religion." "An undevout poet is mad" as are all those persons who fix their attention only on the ground they tread upon and do not look beyond in spite of being gifted with indefinite hope and fear. In fact, "an undevout poet is an impossibility." "The poet is not only the man made to solve the riddle of the universe, but he is also the man who feels where it is not solved. What is old and worn-out, not in itself, but from the dimness of the intellectual eye, produced by worldly passions and pursuits, he makes new" by contemplating them "with the freshness and the wonder of a child." He admires as far as he understands, "and where knowledge no longer permits admiration,

gladly sinks back again into the childlike feeling of devout wonder."⁸²

The essential female quality is passivity and the essential male quality is activity.⁸³ It is the union of these two aspects of reality that is Coleridge's absolute I AM, neither subject only nor object only but both unified. Great minds are similarly androgynous. Coleridge cites the instance of Shakespeare. This aspect of Shakespeare's mind was misunderstood by Wordsworth and Coleridge points it out.⁸⁴ His philosophy offers an explanation and he not only defends Shakespeare but also points out that androgynous nature is a characteristic of all great minds.

He had a very high idea of love : "it leads us, not to sink the mind in the body, but to draw up the body to the mind—the immortal part of our nature."⁸⁵ He gives a Platonic definition of love when he says that "Love is a desire of the whole being to be united to some thing, or some being, felt necessary to its completeness, by the most perfect means that nature permits and reason dictates."⁸⁶ "One infallible criterion in forming an opinion of a man is the reverence in which he holds women. Plato has said, that in this way we rise from sensuality to affection, from affection to love, and from love to the pure intellectual delight by which we become worthy to conceive that infinite in ourselves, without which it is impossible for man to believe in a God. In a word, the grandest and most delightful of all promises has been expressed to us by this practical state—our marriage with the Redeemer of mankind." The highest state of wisdom

82. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 111-2.

83. The Trika philosophy as well as the Sāṃkhya considers the active quality as female and the passive as male. This well suits the theory that the phenomenal world is a "reflection" of the ideal real one. Reflections in the mirror as elsewhere always appear the reverse of the original.

84. *Misc. Crit.*, pp. 454-5.

85. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 108.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

and joy conceived by Christianity as interpreted by Coleridge is to be united with God or the eternal I AM.⁸⁷ Coleridge conceives of that state in terms of marriage, yet in Christianity there is nothing like the Hindu concept of *Ardhanārīśwara*. Coleridge's philosophy seems to point towards such an idea, though he does not fully develop it.

9. POETRY, METRE and FIGURES OF SPEECH.

Coleridge says that the antonym of poetry is not prose but science; that metre is not essential to poetry; that Imitation or Imagination is its essence; and that music is more an ideal movement than a movement of sound. Yet he knows the importance of metre for poetry and considers "metre the proper form of poetry, and poetry imperfect and defective without metre".⁸⁸ Essence in its primary sense "means the principle of individuation, the inmost principle of the possibility of anything, as that particular thing. It is equivalent to the *idea* of a thing, whenever we use the word, *idea*, with philosophic precision."⁸⁹ In this primary sense the essence of poetry is imitation or imagination. But the word 'essence' has a secondary sense also, "in which it signifies the point or ground of contradistinction between two modifications of the same substance or subject".⁹⁰ It is in this secondary sense that metre is considered essential to poetry by the general opinion. And Coleridge upholds the correctness of general opinion against the contrary opinion of Wordsworth on this point. Wordsworth said that "there neither is (n)or can be any essential difference between the language of prose and metrical composition." In short, Wordsworth considered the language of poetry as identical with that of prose in all respects. Coleridge criticises this standpoint. "Things identical must be convertible." The

87. *P.L.*, p. 226.

88. *B.L.*, II, 55.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

question is not whether there exists a neutral style equally suitable to both prose and metrical composition. "The true question must be, whether there are not modes of expression, a *construction*, and an *order* of sentences, which are in their fit and natural place in a serious prose composition, but would be disproportionate and heterogeneous in metrical poetry; and vice versa, whether in the language of a serious poem there may not be an arrangement both of words and sentences, and a use and selection of (what are called) *figures of speech*, both as to their kind, their frequency, and their occasions, which on a subject of equal weight would be vicious and alien in correct and manly prose. I contend that in both cases this unfitness of each for the place of the other frequently will and ought to exist."⁹¹

Coleridge argues his case from both sides, the origin of metre and its effects. His argument from the first point is based on the same principle of the union of opposites, which is the key to his whole philosophy. He traces the origin of metre to "the balance in the mind effected by that spontaneous effort which strives to hold in check the workings of passion". He points out that metre is a peculiar union of art and nature. If "the elements of metre owe their existence to a state of increased excitement,...these elements are formed into metre *artificially* by a *voluntary* act, with the design and for the purpose of blending *delight* with *emotion*." There is a union, "an interpenetration of passion and of will, of *spontaneous* impulse and of *voluntary* purpose".⁹²

The poet's use of the figures of speech also is on the same line. They are the offsprings of passion but are used under the control of will for the purpose of beautifying the parts in consonance with the beauty of the whole. In the metrical composition the reader expects a more frequent employment of picturesque and vivifying language and the poet is bound to supply this pleasurable excitement.⁹³

91. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

92. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

Arguing from the effects of metre Coleridge says that metre "tends to increase the vivacity and susceptibility both of the several feelings and of the attention."⁹⁴ It supplies "quick reciprocations of curiosity, still gratified and still re-excited", and its "continued excitement of surprise" not only indicates the movement of the life-ebullient stream of joy in the poet's heart but also sets the reader's mind on the proper tune with it. Nobody is totally bereft of the capacity of enjoying this music in his innermost soul. That everybody does not understand or enjoy poetry is to be explained by the fact of the ordinary man's inattention to good poems owing to his lack of interest on account of a defective intelligence, or to his lack of faith in poetry, based on a misconception that poets are liars or at best those who indulge in wishful day-dreaming.

The effect of metre, however, is "dependent on the appropriateness of thoughts and expressions, to which the metrical form is superadded".⁹⁵ Metre rouses attention and feeling, but if the matter or thought is not proper for the feeling and attention thus roused, there is a disappointment felt "like that of leaping in the dark from the last step of a stair-case, when we had prepared our muscles for a leap of three or four". When the appropriate matter is provided, the metre betters it "like wine during animated conversation".⁹⁶ Metre may not be itself essentially poetic; it may be a mere stimulant of the attention; it may be even worthless in itself in the absence of appropriate poetic matter; but it has to be conceded that it has a peculiar fitness for poetry. The metre often is as much responsible for poetry in a poem as the materials described in it.

"The vividness of the descriptions or declamations in Donne or Dryden is as much and as often derived from the force and fervor of the describer, as from reflections, forms

94. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

or incidents which constitute their subject and materials. The wheels take fire from the mere rapidity of their motion."⁹⁷

The spiritual instinct of the human being that impels him to seek unity by harmonious adjustment, which is at the root of poetry and is its essential nature as an imitative art, seeking sameness in difference and difference in sameness, guides metre also. Motion, says Coleridge, is the life of poetry and metre gives it that motion.

An analysis of the foregone concepts was made only to show that Coleridge's guiding principle in explaining poetry is the same union of opposites and he does not suffer from self-contradiction in analysing it in various ways.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

INTERCHAPTER II

In the eleven chapters of Book I an analysis was made of the Coleridgean standpoint in poetics. Coleridge had a "passion for clear ideas"¹ and studied a thing deeply. He used his words only after fully understanding their meanings. Studying poetry and analysing the root cause of its creation and appreciation, he studied almost everything—thing and thought, phenomena and noumena, knowing, feeling, and willing, word and meaning, existence and consciousness, God and Truth and Joy—and found in the key concept of the infinite eternal self-consciousness, the I AM, an explanation of all kinds of knowing faculties and knowable objects. His main thesis is based on the Pythagorean principle that Truth is a unity of the Subject and Object, and that Object is ultimately a duplicate of the Subject and does not essentially differ from it, for totally dissimilar things can never unite. Knowing in every form is a unity of subject and object. Plato's concept of Idea was based on this very Pythagorean principle. Coleridge was a Pythagorean and a Platonist more than a Kantian. His contribution to poetics and aesthetics is an analysis of both poetic creation and appreciation, of both the poem and the poetic experience, as a reconciliation of opposites, which, he said, was the work of the *esemplastic* Imagination, an intermediate faculty of the mind below the infinite Reason and above the finite Understanding. He contrasted the *co-adunative* modifying shaping power of Imagination with the aggregative associative faculty of Fancy and pointed out that true poetry was the product of Imagination as false one was that of Fancy. He judged the merit of a poem by referring it to the mental faculty or source from which the pleasure given by it was derived. Thus while in his theory of 'the reconciliation of opposites' he is a Pythagorean and a Platonist, in his concept of Imagination he is a Kantian, for it was Kant

1. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 177.

from whom he learnt the art of explaining a thing with reference to the mental faculty involved in knowing it. Similarly, in his judging the merit of a poem from the kind of pleasure derived from it he had a great predecessor in Longinus, though he did not speak of being influenced by him. It was Longinus who first made the enjoyment, the transport, the carrying away of the reader or auditor out of himself as the most important thing in poetry.

Another great contribution of Coleridge is his comprehensive scheme of total education—his science of method. He clearly distinguishes among three stages of mental development or three mental disciplines. The lowest discipline is that provided by the physical sciences, which study things in terms of the causal relation, a theoretical dualistic relation. The highest discipline or method is that of religion and philosophy, which views everything in relation to the absolute truth and explains it as an aspect of the infinite eternal spiritual wisdom. It is an esemplastic relation. The fine arts and poetry hold a middle position between these two relations and there lies the secret of their cathartic quality. Coleridge did not speak of catharsis as he spoke of imitation, but he considered poetry as the work of the pure mind and spoke of the purification by poetry.²

What has been said in the foregone Book may be summarised as follows :

Poetry is not unnecessary or useless. It is not mental indulgence in lies or wishful thinking. It is no mechanical exercise either in praise or denunciation of things or persons one chooses to like or dislike. It has a definite place in man's real education, the essential characteristic of which is continuous progression. The highest aim of education, the chief goal of life, its perfection, which can be achieved only by human beings, is to attain perfect wisdom, which is not a

2. See N. 2435; *The Friend*, p. 272 : "...he (the philosophical poet) transfers, in the transport of imagination, the law of moral to physical natures...."

kind of knowing but a kind of being one with the eternal reality itself, which is a perfect union of the subject and the object, the knower and the known.

Truly speaking, any kind of knowing is being. The idealistic realism of Coleridge explains that 'to know' is 'to be' in every case. Mutual interaction between two completely dissimilar things cannot be possible. Hence it has to be supposed that the knower and the known, the subject and the object, are two aspects of one and the same reality. The phenomenal multitude can be explained only on the basis of the power of freedom or omniformity of that reality. This reality can be no other than the self-evident self-consciousness, the I AM, free from all limitations of time and space. All types of existence and all types of experience are mere repetitions of this self-evident eternal principle.

But we are not conscious of the unity of subject and object in ordinary perception or knowing. Physical sciences, which study phenomena, therefore explain any object as a cause or effect of some other object. Causal relation is their final principle, on which they explain all phenomena. But progress of knowledge ought not to stop there, as even cause and effect can be intelligible only as two poles of manifestation of one and the same power by relative opposites.³ Even in scientific investigation, the value of the mental initiative, which is the prior half of the knowledge discovered, cannot be denied.⁴ It is a pointer to the fact that reality is more subjective than objective, *a priori* first and *a posteriori* later. While ordinary perceptions and empirical sciences cannot do without the assumption of the *a priori* subjective reality, they emphasise the *a posteriori* aspect of knowledge so much that

3. *B.L.*, II, 207. That objective observation varies according to the circumstance in which the subject is placed is a matter of common experience and the theory of Relativity has proved that this subjective bias can never be removed and completely unbiased observation is an impossibility—a Kantian conclusion. Coleridge said that an unbiased mind was an absurdity. *N.* 59.

4. *The Friend*, pp. 309, 315.

their criterion of the reality of any experience is objective verification only. But such a criterion is defective, for it proves only the objectivity of a thing, not its reality.⁵

Poetry gives us an experience of the type of knowing where objective verification is of no consequence and where the criterion of truth is therefore not defective. It is self-evident self-consistency. Time and space so intrude upon us in ordinary perception that we forget the intuitive and self-evident aspect of perception or knowing and separate knowing from being. Hence feeling where knowing is of the type of being is considered a lower grade of knowing and a sort of prejudice is developed against it by all seekers of true knowledge. Though the predominance of feeling in life cannot be ignored, its value in the field of scientific education is almost completely ignored. Poetry sees in it, however, a path of further progress in the search for truth and shows that the prejudice against feeling on account of its mixing the subjective factor with observation, identifying knowing with being, is not proper, for the subjective factor can never be completely set aside from experience. And if the defect of 'feeling' be spatial and temporal limitation, they equally belong to 'knowing' as understood by those who make objective verification the criterion of truth. It is poetry that removes these defects from both 'feeling' and 'knowing' by raising the experience above the limitations of time and space. We are so delighted mentally by the descriptions of a true poet that we never try to verify the objective reality of what he says. He holds us in his grip by presenting things beautifully bound by the law of inner necessity or self-consistency. This law is so pervasive that even irrational behaviour is a part of it. We willingly suspend verifying descriptions objectively and accept the poet's statement on a higher test of truth, the test of self-consistency.^{5a} If a thing may possibly be, we do not question whether it really exists

S. I.S., item 172.

5a. See B.L. II. 186.

or not. If an action may happen, we do not bother whether it ever actually happened or not. Even though it may never find actual expression in life, its capacity to do so can never be denied.

Thus removing the prejudice against feeling and seeing its importance in man's education, poetry utilises it as much as it utilises knowing, if not more, for it tries to educate man only in the delightful way. The real trouble with knowing and feeling is their being limited by space and time. And if selfishness or attachment of temporal and spatial types be deemed sufficient for rejection of feeling in man's search for truth, objective verification should equally be rejected as a criterion for deciding the reality of knowledge, for objectivity is nothing but a spatio-temporal limitation. Knowing the essential nature of truth as *a priori*, subjective, intuitive, immediate and self-evident, and that of prejudice as a temporal and spatial limitation, the poet seeks to raise man above these limitations and brings both head and heart, knowing and feeling, into a union, and thus gives him an experience of truth of a higher stage. It is here that poetry imitates and asks its reader to imitate his master, God, whose essential form of existing, knowing or creating is the eternal infinite I AM, which is the only self-evident form that truth can take when unalloyed by the limitation of time and space. But poetry does not completely do away with the objects of sense. Indeed it unsensualises the mind by sensuous presentations. That is the secret of its appeal to the masses and attraction for the unregenerate. But once it holds its reader in its grip by this lure, it leads him up to a delightful state where pleasure is intellectualised and it is realised that the sensual contact with the object is not essential for pleasure. Indeed true pleasure can be had only intellectually and not sensually. In giving him this joyous experience, in creating the proper atmosphere for such an experience, all the elements of poetry play their part, so that the reader may not play truant. Metre and figures of speech, Fancy and Good

Sense, are all a well-organised pageant of poetry to lead the reader to realise the "exquisite harmony of all the parts of the moral being, constituting one living total of head and heart",⁶ a realisation of which experience alone is capable of the spontaneous creation of genuine poetry. Not what man is but what he may be, what he ought to be, is the poet's main concern. "For it is in the primacy of the moral being only that man is truly human; in his intellectual powers he is certainly approached by the brutes, and, man's whole system duly considered, those powers cannot be considered other than means to an end, that is, to morality."⁷ For this purpose alone poetry utilises everything as its means—all the varieties of human behaviour, all the circumstantial details of description. Poetry leads man upwards, makes him better by spiritualising his feelings. That is the most important work of the Secondary Imagination, its esemplasticity, its uniting the passive matter with the active Reason. The poet weaves the cobweb of material descriptions only to entice the unregenerate man, who runs after sensual pleasures. His purpose in so doing is to unsensualise his pleasure. Once his reader realises the unnecessary of the objective touch in enjoyment, once he realises that the fountain of joy is within him and not in the object outside, the ground is prepared for a still higher stage when even intellectual pleasures will be discarded for the experience of the deepest delight, the peace of God, the experience of the total union of will with Reason, which is the greatest joy and higher than which nothing can be conceived in knowledge or existence. That is the aim of religion and philosophy and that is the end of all education. Poetry is the training ground for living in this highest universal ideal world, a type of life which is the characteristic merit of the man of genius to live.⁸

In this scheme of total education Coleridge shows that

6. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 120.

7. *Shak. Crit.*, I, 120.

8. *B.L.*, I, 30; *Shak. Crit.*, II, 111; *P.L.*, p. 179.

man knows the objective world only as much as he unfolds his mind. The Sense, Understanding, Fancy, Imagination and Reason present a hierarchy of his mental faculties. The value of poetry lies in its being a product of Imagination or that faculty which unites all the lower faculties with Reason and thus makes them function in harmony with the highest essence of himself and the universe. That is the moral and natural way of living.

After having discovered this truth Coleridge does not seem to have given much thought to the details of the poetic process. Again, poetry is an affair of word and meaning and a sound semasiology is essential for a poetic training. Here also he knew the essential truth that word and meaning are two aspects of the same reality—namely, self-consciousness. As focus it is word; as mirror it is meaning. But he did not develop it further. His *Logosophia* remained unwritten. Similarly he neglected a detailed analysis of feelings and emotions. His essay on passion remained a fragment. It is in these respects that Abhinavagupta's exposition of poetic principles offers a supplement and an improvement.



BOOK II

Vidyā pramāṇatāmeti paryanta-pramiti-sthitau

MVV., I, 866



CHAPTER I

INDIAN POETICS : AN INTRODUCTION

Raso vai Saḥ. Rasaṁ hyevāyaṁ labdhvā ānandībhavati. Ko hyevā-
nyāt kaḥ prānyāt yadyeṣa ākāśa ānando na syāt. Eṣa hyevānandayati.

DU, p. 302.

Kāvya-lāpāś ca ye kecid gītakānyakhilāni ca,
Śabdāmūrtidharasyaite Viṣṇor aṁśa mahātmanaḥ.

Viṣṇupurāṇa quoted in KPV, p. 4.

Niyati-kṛta-niyama-rahitāṁ hlādaikamayim ananya-paratantrām
Nava-rasa-rucirām nirmitimādadhatī Bhāratī kaver jayati.

Kāvyaṁ yaśase'rthakṛte vyavahāravide śivetarakṣataye
Sadyaḥ para-nirvṛtaye kāntā-sammitatayopadeśayuje.

KP, kārikās 1-2.

Na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate.

NS, I, 272.

...all Virtue subsists in and by Pleasure.

N. 2210.

... I am convinced that a true System of Philosophy (=the Science
of Life) is best taught in Poetry as well as most safely....

Letter 1031, C.L., IV, 687.

Pleasure, most often delusive, may be born of delusion. Pleasure,
herself a sorceress, may pitch her tents on enchanted ground. But
happiness (or, to use a far more accurate as well as more compre-
hensive term, solid well-being) can be built on virtue alone, and must
have truth for its foundation.

The Friend, p. 21.

IN India as in the West, poetics began with dramaturgy.
The oldest extant work on poetics is the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of
Bharata. The very title of the book suggests its dramatic
bias. Abhinavagupta, the great commentator on this work,

points out that poetry is essentially of dramatic nature.¹ *Nāṭyaśāstra*² is an encyclopaedic work and presents a very comprehensive study of the different aspects of drama. Notwithstanding all its emphasis on actual presentation, Sanskrit drama is more poetry than play.

In India in poetry as well as in drama emphasis was always on the main purpose: moral education through the medium of, and in the form of, poetic or dramatic delight.³

For imparting moral education words may be used in three ways according to ancient Hindu critics. They may be used as the master's dictation or the friend's advice or the beloved's sweet persuasion.⁴ These three ways

1. Vayam tu brūmaḥ : Kāvyaṃ tāvaṃ mukhyato daśarūpātmakameva.

Abhinava-Bhāratī, I, 291.

2. Shri Ramakrishna Kavi, the editor of the work in Gaekwad's Oriental Series, says: "The term 'theatrics' is perhaps the most appropriate word to represent its Sanskrit denotation in preference to any accepted terminology which would not be free from the ideas suggested by the European theatre. The science is intended as a guide alike to the poet and the player."

Nāṭyaśāstra, vol. I, Intro., p. 57.

3. Nāṭyaṃ nāma...vastu rasasvabhāvaṃ...svarasata eva tāvaṃ manoj-
ñaviśayāsvāda-pravṛttasya...tan-manojña-vastu-madhye tādṛg idaṃ
vastvanupraveśitaṃ yad-balādeva pumarthopāyavagatiṃ karoti.

Abhinava-Bhāratī, I, 3-4.

Rasacarvaṇātmakam paraprītimayam eva nāṭyam.

Ibid., I, 16.

4. Etacca prabhu-mitra-sammitebhyaḥ śāstreṭihāsebhyaḥ prītipūrvakam
jāyā-sammitatvena nāṭya kāvyagataṃ vyutpattikāritvam pūrvameva
nirūpitaṃ asmābhiḥ.

Locana, p. 399.

There is yet another division of words made by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. Abhinavagupta quotes his opinion with approval. They are *Śāstra*, *Ākhyāna* and *Kāvya*. In the first, words are predominant; in the second, meaning; in the third, neither word nor meaning but their relations. Such a definition of poetry or *Kāvya* is similar to Coleridge's view. See *Abhinava-Bhāratī* II, 298:

Śabdaprādhānyamāśritya tatra śāstram prthag viduḥ;

Arthe tattvena yukte tu vadantyākhyānametayoḥ;

Dvayor guṇatve vyāpāraprādhānye kāvyagīr bhavet.

of using words are respectively employed in the three branches of Sanskrit literature, namely, *Vedas*, *Purāṇas* and *Kāvya*s. Development of mere intellect was not the aim of education in Hindu India. All scientific and philosophical works were made subservient to the moral purpose of learning.⁵ In all these three ways of imparting education the purpose was the same, namely, to make man perfect in thought, feeling and behaviour.⁶

Theatrical performances are important owing to the fact that they help all.⁷ Access to the *Vedas* is rightly denied to all and sundry, for to obey their orders, which are of the nature of 'do this and do not do that', is not an easy task. A life of rigorous self-sacrifice and moral discipline, which is the first requisite for admission to a Vedic course of study, is beyond the capacity and perseverance of ordinary men. The *Purāṇas* have moral and devotional bias so much pronounced and dogmas and theology so much mixed

5. Sciences and philosophies were thus called *Vedāṅgas*, the *aṅgas* or limbs of the *Vedas*, that were the *aṅgī*. A true *pañḍita* is one who lives according to Vedic behests and not one who simply reads or teaches them. (Yaḥ kriyāvān sa pañḍitaḥ).

It is said that there is hardly any art or science which does not become subservient to poetry :

Na tat padaṁ na tad vākyaṁ na sā vidyā na sā kalā
Jāyate yaṁ na kāvyāṅgam aho bhāro mahān kaveḥ.

Sāhitya-mīmāṃsā quoted by Gokulanātha, *KPV*, p. 20.

6. *Nāṭyaśāstra* quoted in *Abhinava Bhārati*, I, 4 :

Ya imam śṛṇuyād proktaṁ nāṭyavedaṁ svayambhuvā
Kuryāt prayogaṁ yaścainaṁ tathādhīyita vā naraḥ
Yā gatir vedaviduṣāṁ yā gatir yajñavedināṁ
Yā gatir dānaśilānāṁ tāṁ gatim prāpnuyāt tu saḥ.
See also *Abhinava-Bhārati*, I, 13 :

Na kevalam pradhāna-puruṣārthopāyadarśakaṁ yāvat...ekena
yatnena samasta-vastu-siddhir yato bhavati tan nāṭyam.

7. Sārvavarṇikam iti : adhikṛtānām anadhikṛtānām api sukumārāṇām
vyutpattidāyītyarthaḥ. Sarve varṇāḥ prayojanaṁ vineyatvena yasya....
Aśrutaśāstrāṇāmapi saṁvādād avicala-kāryākārya-vivekasiddhir iti.

Abhinava-Bhārati, I, 12.

with them that ordinary men, who are not interested in these, find them uncongenial to their taste. A theatrical performance has a universal appeal. It attracts and pleases everybody. There is no restriction to this course of study as there is in the Vedic one;⁸ and there is no escape from it either, so firm is its hold on the heart.⁹ Nobody can play truant here, for instead of a hard task he gets a pleasant play to entertain him with additional attractions of dance and music.¹⁰ Man forgets the nature of the theatre as a course of study when he finds there a variety entertainment where all types of feelings and behaviours of all types of persons, actual or possible in all the three worlds, are portrayed.¹¹ It holds the spectator in its grip with such a transcendental charm that he can hardly escape its effect. Its appeal goes straight to his heart.¹² He finds a kind of pleasure generated in his heart, which is the same as the end of all education. It is the peculiarity of a dramatic presentation that it makes

8. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Adhyāya I, Verse 12 :

Na veda-vyavahāro'yaṁ saṁsrāvyāḥ śūdrajātiṣu,
Tasmāt sṛjāparaṁ vedam pañcamam sārva-varṇikam.

So asked by gods Brahmā created this fifth Veda, the *Nāṭyaveda*, which helped all including those who had access to the Vedas :

Evam śāstrādhikṛto'pi janaḥ nāṭyena sukhaṁ vinīyata iti.

Abhinava-Bhāratī, I, 11.

9. Sarveṣāṁ varṇānāṁ sarasa-sukumāreṇa nayena svakartavya-nirūpaṇam yatra kāvyे tasmin bhavam tadāśritam. Yena sarvo janaḥ sarasa-sukumārānuraajyadāśayaḥ tadupabhoganāntarīyakatayaiva kār-yākāryajñānamapi upayunkte kṣīramadhyāvasthitaṣadhopayogavat.

Abhinava-Bhāratī, I, 12.

10. Kṛīḍanīyakam icchāmo dṛśyaṁ śravyaṁca yad bhavet.

Nāṭyaśāstra, I, 10.

11. Trailokyasyāśya sarvasya nāṭyam bhāvānukīrtanam.

Ibid., I, 35.

12. Kāvye tu guṇālaṅkāra-manohara-śabdārtha-śarīre lokottara-rasaprāṇake hṛdayasaṁvādavaśāt nimagnākārikā tāvad bhavati cittavṛttiḥ ; kintu sarvasya pratyakṣa-sākṣātkāra-kalpā tatra na dhīr udeti.

AB, I, 36

Ahṛdayānāṁca tadeva [nāṭyameva] nairmalyādhāyi. *AB*, I, 287.

this ideal pleasure its means also. This pleasure is named *Rasa*¹³ in Sanskrit poetics. It is the most important concept in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and in all later important critical works.

Bharata points out that *Rasa* is the very root of poetic feelings.¹⁴ It is impossible to talk of anything regarding poetry or drama without first talking of *Rasa*.¹⁵ Emphasis is always laid on the standpoint of the spectator, and the main purpose of his moral education is always kept in view. Ancient Indian critics discuss literature mainly from the viewpoint of the reader or the spectator.¹⁶ How it affects people is their main concern ; it is only by the way that they explain how it is created.¹⁷ But this is no drawback of Sanskrit poetics. This is the more natural way of treatment of the subject if we keep the main purpose of writing in view.¹⁸ So far as the essence of literature is concerned, it is one and the same, whether we discuss it from the creative or the appreciative standpoint.¹⁹

The concept of *Rasa* has its origin in the *Veādas* and *Āgamas*. In both it is equated with the essence of the highest absolute

13. *Abhinava-Bhāratī*, I, 36.

14. Yathā bijād bhaved vṛkṣo vṛkṣāt puṣpam phalaṁ yathā,
Tathā mūlaṁ rasāḥ sarve teṣu bhāvā vyavasthitāḥ.

Nāṭyaśāstra, I, 294.

15. Na hi rasādṛte kaścidarthaḥ pravartate.

Ibid., I, 272.

16. *Abhinava-Bhāratī*, I, 36-37.

17. There are a few works, however, that take up the creative standpoint prominently. *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* of Rājaśekhara is one good instance. *Kāvya-koutuka* of Bhaṭṭa Tota, a teacher of Abhinavagupta, (referred to in *Abhinava-Bhāratī*, I, 37), is said to be another important work of this type. But the work seems to have been lost. *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana emphasises both the creative and the appreciative aspects equally.

18. Even Longinus, the great Greek critic, adopted a similar standpoint. See George Saintsbury, *History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe*, Vol. I, p. 172.

19. Abhinavagupta succinctly but precisely points it out in his *Locana*, verse 1 : Sarasvatyāstattvaṁ kavi-saḥṣṛdayākhyam vijayate. Cp. also *Abhinava-Bhāratī*, I, 294 : Kavir hi sāmājikatulya eva.

reality. The same is the end of poesy or fine arts in general.²⁰ How *Rasa*, the absolute knowledge or joy, is attained in other branches of learning is no concern of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, but so far as fine arts are concerned, Bharata gives a formula that explains how *Rasa* is generated in a work of art. The formula, however, has been studied in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* mainly in its application to poetry and drama. The formula reads as follows :—

Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād Rasa-niṣpattiḥ.

These two compound words are unparalleled in the history of Indian aesthetics. They succinctly but clearly state the means and the end of education through fine arts. No other two words in any language have been found so far to define poesy or fine arts so fully and successfully. Even the Greek definition of art as *mimesis* cannot match its comprehensive thoroughness. If the nature of art is *mimesis* according to Plato and Aristotle, its aim is *katharsis*; and even these two concepts put together fail to account for the creative imagination that brings art into existence. But Bharata and his commentator, Abhinavagupta, say emphatically that *Rasa* is not only the essence of art or poesy, but also its cause and its effect, its means and its end.²¹ The success does not lie in coining one word of manifold connotation. It lies in finding a solution of the knotty problems that arise on accepting a divergence among these aspects of art or poesy. The aphorism is still the bed-rock of Indian poetics.

There are schools of Indian critics that challenge the high claim of *Rasa* in poetry. But any dispassionate thinker will

20. Abhinavagupta clearly says in *Abhinava-Bhārati* that not only in poetry and drama but also in arts like dancing and music *Rasa* is the main purpose.

21. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Adhyāya VI, verse 38 quoted in fn. 14 above. *Abhinava-Bhārati* on this reads as follows :

Kavigata-sādhāraṇībhūta-saṃvinmūlaśca kāvya-purassaro
naṭavyāpāraḥ. Saiva ca saṃvit paramārthatō rasaḥ. Sāmājikasya ca tat-
pratītya paścād apoddhāra-buddhyā | vibhāvādi-pratītir iti prayojane,
nāṭye, kāvye, sāmājikadhiyi ca.

accept that such critics put a limitation to the scope of poetics by their theories. They can hardly explain the use of poetry and the use of criticism in the comprehensive scheme of education unanimously accepted by Indian writers of different branches of learning. All of them agree that there are four aims in life, two divine and two mundane. The most important aim of life is *Mokṣa* or the attainment of perfect knowledge and bliss, and its means is *Dharma* or purity of thought, feeling and action. *Kāma* or the attainment of worldly desires, and its means, *Artha* or wealth, also become proper aims of life when they do not go against *Dharma* and thus do not obstruct the realisation of perfect wisdom and happiness that *Mokṣa* is. Those who make *Alaṅkāra* or *Vakrokti* the essence of poetry may be taken together as presenting almost the same standpoint. They both emphasise the beauty of the manner of presentation in poetry.^{21a} But the word *Alaṅkāra* has two meanings. It means beauty as well as the means of beautifying. A third school of *Guṇa* was founded on the basis of the first interpretation. Vāmana, the author of this school,²² makes confusion all round and gives the essence of *Guṇa* to another concept, *Rīti*, which he defines as a style of writing having *Guṇa*²³, and enumerates under the head of *Guṇa* such qualities as are rightly shown by later mature critics like Mammaṭa to be mere *alaṅkāras*,²⁴ that is, magnifiers rather than makers of beauty.²⁵

21a. *Vakrokti* is defined as *vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇitīḥ*.

Vakroktijivita.

22. For the two interpretations of the word *alaṅkāra* see Vāmana, *Kāvyaṅkāraśāstra-vṛtti*, vṛtti on the second sūtra, p. 7:

Saundaryamalaṅkāraḥ : alaṅkṛtir | alaṅkāraḥ. Karaṇavyutpattyā punaḥ alaṅkāraśabdo'yam upamādiṣu vartate.

23. *Ibid*, pp. 14-15, Viśiṣṭā pada-racanā Rītiḥ and Viśeṣo Guṇātmā. (Sūtras 7 and 8 of I ii).

24. *Kāvya-prakāśa*, ullāsa VIII, verse 72 and the commentary on it.

25. Vāmana's differentiation between *Guṇa* and *Alaṅkāra* is that while the former produces beauty, the latter only magnifies it.

Kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ ; tadatiśaya hetavas tu alaṅkāraḥ. *Kāvyaṅkāra-sūtra-vṛtti*, pp. 113, 316.

None of these writers deny the four aims of life, though they can hardly show that poetry can lead us to attain these aims on the basis of their theories. They have to accept these recognised aims as borrowed concepts in poetry. Rightly have these critics been thrown into the shade by those who make the concept of *Rasa* supreme in poetry. Not only does poetry lead to the attainment of the three aims of life, but also does it lead to the highest goal of *Mokṣa*. The poetic concept of *Mokṣa* is that of *Rasa* in its most primary and essential form, the *Śānta Rasa*, as will be made clear later on. The poetic concept of *Rasa* has the superiority of offering the highest experience, viz., *Mokṣa*, in this very world. It awards us *jīvanmukti*.

In the present essay we shall confine our discussion of poetics to one writer, namely, Abhinavagupta, who heads the *Rasa* school of criticism. Abhinavagupta wrote commentaries on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, the two classics of Sanskrit poetics. But *Abhinava-Bhārati* and *Locana*, the two commentaries on these classics respectively, have become even more important than the original texts. It is owing to the philosophic acumen, poetic insight and clear exposition of Abhinavagupta that he became the most important critic of this school, surpassing even the masters he commented upon. He was a man of versatile genius: poet, philosopher and ascetic combined together. He led the celibate life of a saint and seems to have learnt the secrets of knowledge from Śiva (God) himself.²⁶ He enriched the *Trika-darśana* or the Trinitarian philosophy of Kashmir by his interpretation and exposition in many works, the most important of which are the encyclopaedic *Tantrāloka*, the poetic *Mālinīvijayavārtika*, the grammatical *Parātrimśikā* and the two commentaries on his teacher Utpaladeva's work, *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā*,

26. See *Parātrimśikā*, pp. 281-2, verse 18. For detailed information about Abhinavagupta's life and works see K. C. Pande : *Abhinavagupta, An Historical and Philosophical Study*.

namely, *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī* and *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛtivismarśinī*.

Almost a thousand years have gone by since Abhinavagupta wrote in Kashmir.²⁷ There has hardly been any serious challenge to his interpretation of Bharata and Ānandavardhana in this long period. Those who differed from him made mistakes in explaining *Rasa*. Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha who attempted to give a *Vedāntic* explanation of *Rasa* in his *Rasa-Gaṅgādhara*, failed to give a convincing explanation of the words of the sage Bharata.²⁸ King Bhoja of Dhārā in his *Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa* tried to explain *Rasa* without accepting the difference between the eight basic feelings and the thirty-three transitory emotions, accepted by every other Indian critic, and this deviation from Bharata and Abhinavagupta made his theory defective.²⁹ On the other hand, the great *Vaiṣṇava* philosopher saints of Bengal like Rūpa Goswāmi and Jiva Goswāmi, who explained the essence of the Bhāgavata philosophy as *Bhakti* or devotion and explained this highest experience as *Rasa*, accepted the *Trika* logic of *bhedābheda* or distinction without difference, and explained the concept of *Bhagavān* as a unity of the Absolute (*Śakti-mān*) with his Power (*Śakti*).³⁰ Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa, the author of *Kāvya-prakāśa*, the most famous compendium on poetics, mentions Abhinavagupta as a great Ācārya, accepts his view and quotes him with reverence.³¹

Poetics in Sanskrit is a vast structure. Any attempt to deal with it exhaustively in one book will be unwieldy. The

27. The life-time of Abhinavagupta is the 10th century A.D. See K.C. Pande, *op. cit.* p. 8.

28. See below, Book III, ch. 2.

29. See below, Book III, ch. 4.

30. It is very difficult to say with any definiteness how much the *Vaiṣṇava* philosophers owed to the *Saiva* and *Śākta* philosophers of Kashmir, but there is no doubt that the latter influenced the former. *Vide* S.K. De : *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal*, pp. 21-2.

31. *Kāvya-prakāśa*, ullāsa 4, pp. 96-102.

present essay makes no claim to an exhaustive survey of the whole field. It will be confined to the exposition of *Rasa* and will show its points of similarity with, and superiority to, the Coleridgean theory of Imagination. The main purpose of this essay is to show that these two theories have the same basic structure. They have the same philosophical basis and the same purpose and agree even in most of the details. But on the whole, Abhinava is more correct and exhaustive. Coleridge did not complete his work ; but Abhinava presents a complete and comprehensive theory. We can elaborate his theory but can hardly improve upon it.

CHAPTER II

TRIKA : A PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISTIC REALISM

Yasyām antar viśvam-etad vibhāti
Bāhyābhāsam bhāsamānam viśṣṭau
Kṣobhe kṣiṇe' nuttarāyam sthitau tām
Vande Devīm Svātma-Saṁvittim-ekām.

PT, benedictory verse 2, p. 2.

Saṁvidātmani viśvo' yam bhāvavargaḥ prapañcavān
Pratibimbatayā bhāti yasya Viśveśvaro hi saḥ.

TA, Ahn. III, v. 268, vol. II, p. 246.

Sārametat samastasya yac-citsāraṇ jaḍaṇ jagat ;
Tadadhīna-pratiṣṭhatvāt tat-sāram hṛdayam mahat.

TA, Ahn. IV, vv.785-6, vol. III, p. 215.

...a History of *Philosophy* as the gradual evolution of instinct of Man to enquire into the *Origin* by the efforts of his own reason, is a desideratum in Literature, and...it is almost a necessary Introduction to my *magnum opus*....

Letter 1177, C.L., IV, 917.

Every man asks—*how* ? This power & instinct is the true substratum of philosophy—Hence called by Wolff "a science of all possible things, how and why they are possible".

N. 891.

...Philosophy is the Science of IDEAS....

Letter 1033, C.L., IV, 690.

Constancy lives in realms above.

A.P., p. 304.

BEFORE the exposition of the concept of *Rasa* it is necessary to explain the philosophical basis of this concept. It is here that the similarity between Abhinavagupta and Coleridge becomes most apparent. Abhinavagupta does not discuss his philosophy in his critical works. For that he has written

separate books, the most important of which have been noted in the previous chapter. Though the Trika philosophy was most elaborately explained by Abhinavagupta, it was none of his inventions. There were many writers who developed it before Abhinava. The most important among them were Utpaladeva and Somānanda.

The philosophy of Abhinavagupta and his school has various names: the *Trika darśana*, the Trinitarian philosophy, or *Ābhāsavāda*, the theory of Manifestation, or *Svātantryavāda*, the theory of Freedom. It is a monistic philosophy propounding the freedom of self-consciousness to appear totally or limitedly. In order to understand this philosophy of the Kashmirian worshippers of Śiva, it is better to begin with the exposition of another monistic philosophy, the *Vivartavāda* of Śaṅkarācārya, for that will facilitate our understanding the Trika standpoint.

Śaṅkarācārya began his famous commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* with the remarks the substance of which is as follows :—

Consciousness, which shines as the essence of Self, the light that one feels within oneself, the 'I' of everybody, is as different from all objects of which we are conscious as light is from darkness. Therefore both consciousness and its object cannot be true. Either of the two must be false. Consciousness, self, I, the knower is self-evident and ever-shining and can never be negated. Objects, that are of opposite nature, are therefore false. Yet people from time immemorial have been mixing the two together. They have been equating 'I', which is of the nature of pure consciousness, with objects like the body, and saying 'I have done it, I have enjoyed it'; and similarly have superimposed consciousness on things that do not have it, by making them belong to the first person, saying 'this is mine'. This admixture of truth

A. Śrī-Somānanda-sambodha-Śrīmad-Utpala-niḥsṛtāḥ
Jayanti samvidāmoda-sandarbhā dik-prasarpiṇaḥ.

MVV, I, 7.

with falsehood is a great calamity of our life. *Vedānta* is taught only to save people from its disastrous consequences and to show the bare truth that consciousness, which is the essence of Self, is the only reality and the whole objective existence is of illusive nature like apprehending the rope as a snake.¹

Abhinavagupta, the exponent of *Ābhāsavāda*, says in refutation of this monistic theory of knowledge and reality that it will not be proper to say that all objects are illusive, when all of us suffer from that illusion. What human beings have been doing so naturally from time immemorial cannot be challenged. Rather a different explanation has to be given of the nature of reality itself. He says that it is better to accept everything as real and then to show the different kinds or grades of reality, which have to be clearly distinguished. No doubt the nature of reality is consciousness, for consciousness is the very principle of knowing. Without its aid we can neither affirm nor deny anything. But if that consciousness does not hold the object in its grasp, it will be empty. As consciousness is of the nature of being conscious of something, that something must be included within consciousness itself.² In order to retain its nature consciousness must be self-consciousness. This paves the way for the most natural explanation of the problem of knowledge at every stage. In both the stages—pure and impure, noumenal and phenomenal, ideal and worldly, by whatever adjective we may choose to describe them, self-consciousness is the great principle that

1. *Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara-bhāṣya*, Introduction, pp. 6-46.

2. 'Samvit tāvat prakāśate' iti tāvat na kecid apahnūvate. Sā tu samvid yadi svātmamātraviśrāntā, arthasya sā katham prakāśaḥ ? Sa hi arthadharma eva tathā syāt ; tataśca arthaprakāśaḥ tāvatyeva paryavasitaḥ ; iti galito grāhya-grāhakabhāvaḥ. Ato'rthaprakāśarūpaṁ samvidam icchatā balādeva artho'pi tadrūpāntargata eva aṅgikartavyaḥ.

explains the possibility of knowledge. To have any kind of experience, divine or mundane, is to be self-conscious³.

In statements like 'I know this' or 'This is mine' there is an imposition of the subject over the object, or the object is taken as a part of the subject. The two are somehow united. This is said by the Vedāntin to be a characteristic of impure consciousness as distinguished from pure consciousness. In the latter, object is totally absent and subject shines alone. The Trika philosopher accepts such a distinction. He, however, points out that it is absurd to deny consciousness, the very principle of knowledge, the capacity to know its own self or nature. But to think of the self of consciousness as something different from consciousness would deprive the self of its essence and would drag the Trika philosopher to a dualistic position and he would be put to difficulty in explaining the coalescence of two dissimilar things, as according to his own principle things of different natures can have no meeting ground.⁴ So the Vedāntin may say by way of objection to the Trika exposition of knowledge and reality. To save himself from self-inconsistency the Trika philosopher says that the self has consciousness in it not as a quality in a substance as the materialists say,⁵ but as power which is the

3. Prakāśamāna eva yat 'na prakāśate' ityabhimananam tad apasāryate. Tadapasaraṇameva hi Parameśvaratā-lābho muktiḥ. Tadanapasaraṇameva saṁsāraḥ. Abhimananamātrasāraṁ hi etad dvayam. Ubhayaṁapi cedam Bhagavad-vijñāmbhitameva.

IPV, II, 129-30.

4. Nāṭadrūpaṁ prakāśaṇca kartuṁ Vidhirapi kṣamaḥ.

MVV, kānda I, verse 66.

Abhivyaṁkiṭṭh saṁānasya saṁānena vidhīyate.

Ibid., I, 481.

5. *Tantrāloka*, vol. VI, p. 67 :

Dharmād dharmiṇi yo bhedaḥ, samavāyena caikatā,
Na tad bhavadbhiruditaṁ kaṇabhojanaśiṣyavat.

Coleridge holds exactly the same view as Abhinava has.

very essence of the self.⁶ This power of consciousness includes all kinds of powers in it. It is the self's power of absolute freedom (*svātantrya*) that accounts for all kinds of knowledge and existence.⁷

Thus the self may choose to appear simply as existence without an attempt to be conscious of its own nature. It is the state of pure existence. But it cannot be said to be a state of unconsciousness, for then we cannot prove its existence. Consciousness is the only proof of any kind of existence. Pure existence or the most primary state of existence means that its nature, that is consciousness, lies hidden as it were (*antarliṅga-vimarśa*). It is a state of all-pervasive light (*prakāśa*). As a prior state cannot be thought of, this state of existence is called *anuttara*. Bereft of consciousness the absolute would hardly differ from a piece of stone⁸. Existence and consciousness are two sides of the same reality. What appears as luminous existence (*prakāśa*) from one side appears as consciousness (*vimarśa*) from the other. A change in this dynamic nature of the absolute would rob it of its nature of freedom and consciousness.⁹

The absolute is thus a self-duplicating reality, which, as Abhinavagupta points out, may better be thought of as self-

6. Śaktiśca no śaktimato vibhinnā.

MVV, I, 969.

Sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālaviśeṣiṇī

Saiṣā sāratayā proktā hṛdayam Parameṣṭhinā.

PK, Adhyāya I, kārīkā 45.

7. Na ca vikalpa anubhavād vikalpāntarād vā bhinnāḥ, api tu sa eva ekaḥ svātantrya-bhedita-bhāvoparāgalabdhabheda-bhūtādyabhidha-vijñānacakraprabhuḥ.

Parātrimśikā, p. 45.

See also PK, I, 47-60.

8. Svabhāvamavabhāsasya vimarśaṁ viduranyathā

Prakāśo'rthoparakto'pi sphaṭikā diḍaḍopamaḥ.

PK, I, 42.

MVV, I, 29-30 is a slightly variant reading of the same verse.

9. Asthāsyadekarūpeṇa vapuṣā cen Maheśvaraḥ

Maheśvaratvaṁ saṁvittvaṁ tadatyakṣad ghaṭādivat.

TA, II, 108.

expressive or as self-conversing.¹⁰ The most primary state of *prakāśa* or pure existence is static. We can hardly say anything about it, though it can hardly be denied, as it is the very ground of all manifestations, subjective and objective.¹¹ The true glory of the absolute reality, however, is found in the dynamic state of self-consciousness (*vimarśa*).¹² But these two states are only two sides of the same reality.¹³ *Vimarśa* or consciousness is the manifestation of *prakāśa* or luminous existence.¹⁴ Thus the Trika absolute of *prakāśa-vimarśa* may be studied as a unity of existence and consciousness, or subject and object.¹⁵ In fact, the two states of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* are never separate, because consciousness is always of the nature of self-consciousness. It has a peculiar tendency

10. Pratyavamarśaśca antarabhilāpātmaka-śabdana-svabhāvaḥ.

IPV, I, 205.

11. Ekaḥ prakāśaḥ svātantryāt citrarūpaḥ prakāśate.

MVV, I, 76.

12. Vimarśa eva pradhānam ātmano rūpam.

IPV, I, 200.

Citih pratyavamarśātmā Parā Vāk svarasoditā
Svātantryametan mukhyaṁ tad aiśvaryaṁ Paramātmanāḥ.

PK, I, 44.

13. Idamityucitāḥ sarvit prakāśo' nyasya vastunaḥ
Pratiṣṭhātmakatām gacched ahamityātmanā punaḥ.

APS, verse 11.

14. Tasmāt prakāśa evāsau gīto yaḥ Paramaḥ Śivaḥ ;
Sa evācintya-mahimā svātantryoddama-ghūrṇitāḥ
Prakāśate tathā taistaiḥ svabhāvair acyuta-sthitaiḥ.

MVV, I, 69-70.

Tasmād yena mukhenaiśā bhātyanaṁśo'pi tat tathā
Śaktiritiyeṣa vastveva śakti-tadvat-kramaḥ sphuṭaḥ.

TA, I, 114-5.

15. That the Trika philosophy is very similar to the Pythagorean and Platonic has already been noted. It is profitable to compare the Trika concept of the absolute as the unity of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* with the Platonic concepts which Coleridge translates as "living Sparks" and "kindle-fuel." See Letter 381 (C.L., II, 680).

Coleridge's absolute as the union of subject and object has already been discussed.

to be, and *being* cannot be proved without being conscious of it. All objects are indeed projections of self-consciousness.¹⁶ It is owing to the unequal manifestation of the Power of Freedom that we have manifold varieties of objective existence and subjective knowledge. This is so because the Power of Freedom naturally includes in it the Power of Limitation. To restrict the freedom of the absolute self, which is Self as Freedom and not Self plus Freedom, is to make freedom meaningless. The absolute self has freedom to manifest itself both in totality and in limitation. The power of total manifestation is called *Vidyā* and that of limited manifestation, *Māyā*. The former is the freedom to unite the subject with the object and the latter is the freedom to separate them.¹⁷

The total manifestation of the self is called its divine state (*Śakti-daśā*) and the limited manifestation its worldly state, which is promiscuously called *paśu-*, *nara-*, *jīva-*, or *jaḍa-daśā*. The most *a priori* state (*Śiva-daśā*) when even divinity remains unmanifested is really the state of great void as well as plenitude, existence pervaded by the light of total consciousness, a state of illumined darkness or all-pervasive light when subject and object remain so closely united that one cannot think of them separately. And as thinking presupposes the thinker separate from the object of thought, this state can hardly be thought of in the ordinary sense of the term 'thinking'. We can describe the absolute only as indescribable, a state of existence which is so formless as to be said to be nothing, or a state of consciousness that is so united with its self that there is hardly any difference between the two at this stage. It is a state of nothingness which is at the same time a state of plenitude out of which everything

16. Etadeva hi pratyavamarśasya mähātmyam yad viśvaṁ svātmaikyena antaḥ sthitam bahir idantayā udbhāsayan udbhāsyamānamapi punaḥ punaḥ pūrṇāhantā-viśrāntyā abhedam āpādayet.

APS, comm. on verse 14.

17. Saṁyोजना-viyojanātmakam svātantryam...

Comm. on APS, verse 14.

See also PK, III, 6-8, 16 ; MVV, I, 227-9.

came and will come even in future. Consciousness being dynamic, that is, having the nature of movement, has a natural tendency to rest somewhere. Here there is nothing other than itself and so it rests in itself¹⁸. It is thus an active as well as a passive state. To think of it is to be it.

The Upaniṣadic concept, *Saccidānanda*, which is the highest Vedic concept of the absolute, may be said to indicate the unity of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* thus :

The prior state of *anuttara prakāśa* or pure existence is indicated by *sat*. The state of *vimarśa* or consciousness includes both *cit* or consciousness and *ānanda* or joy. *Vimarśa* is the power of *prakāśa* or *sat*. This power is the power of Freedom, which includes all kinds of power in it, and *ānanda* or joy is nothing other than the consciousness of this freedom.¹⁹ *Saccidānanda* is the concept of the purest form of existence and its nature is unrestricted consciousness and joy. *Ānanda* or joy is nothing other than the plenitude of self-consciousness, freedom from all kinds of want.

The concept of *Saccidānanda* represents yet another trinity of will, knowledge and action. Freedom of Self, which can mean only freedom to do or to know, can easily be equated with Will which is the prior state of both knowing and doing, and thus *cit* or *vimarśa* may mean Will. Will is thus the power as well as the nature of Self or *sat*. Freedom of the self to know and to do²⁰ anything is the highest type of joy. The absolute created the whole universe out of its own free will without any external assistance and is able to know everything with-

18. *Prakāśasyātmaviśrāntir ahambhāvo hi kīrtitah.*

APS, v. 17.

19. *Anyanirapekṣataiva paramārthata ānandaḥ, aiśvaryam, svātantryam, caitanyam ca.*

IPV, I, 207

20. 'Doing' is explained as elaboration of knowledge :

Jñāna-pallavasvabhāvaiva hi kriyā.

IPV, I, 32

out any aid. This is the joy of the absolute, which is its highest state.

In the absolute self thus we have five powers of consciousness (*cit*), joy (*ānanda*), will (*icchā*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and action (*kriyā*). These are known as *brahma-pañcaka* or the divine pentad. In the theological language of the Trika philosophy these are called the five mouths of Śiva. In all the three states, phenomenal, noumenal and absolute, the self has all these five powers, though in different proportions. They remain unified in the absolute, the most primary state of self-consciousness (*Śiva-daśā*). Hence the Trika philosophy does not lose its monistic nature in spite of this five-fold nature of the power of the absolute. Śiva, the absolute, is thus said to possess one power or three or five powers or even innumerable powers.²¹

Object as such still remains unmanifested. Still object is no other than the very self of the subject. Subject and object are relative terms. Neither the one nor the other can be proved to exist singly. They are not separate entities but two phases of the same entity. Their unity is the absolute. Hence it is called self-consciousness, for consciousness (*vimarśa*) has nothing other than its own self (*prakāśa*) as its object.²² As in this state there is no objective manifestation, it is a state when the absolute may be viewed as smaller than the smallest thing, for still there is no thing, no this. It is the potential energy of everything. And as all objects came out of it, are rather its limitations, it may be viewed as higher than the highest. *Trika* is not a pantheistic philosophy.

21. *MVV*, I, 92-4. Cp. also *IPV*, I, 213 :

...asaṅkhyā-śaktiśreṇīśobhita-vapuṣi Parama-Śive vimarśaśaktireva
iyam itthaṅkāram abhiśicyate....

22. Aham-pratyavamarśo yaḥ prakāśatmā'pi vāg-vapuḥ,
Nāsau vikalpaḥ sa hyukhto dvayāpekṣhi viniścayaḥ.

It views the highest truth as transcendental as well as immanent. In this respect it is one with *Vedānta*.²³

Two types of creation follow from the absolute self-consciousness.²⁴ One is pure and the other impure. First there is pure creation. Creation means objective manifestation. When objective manifestation is distinct but not different from the subject, that is, when object is not a limited but a total manifestation of the subject, it is called a pure creation, (*śuddha vikalpa*), for the true nature of object as the subject's projection of its own self is retained in this stage of creation. Object is seen as the self of the subject. As the object may be dimly or distinctly seen, there may be a subtle distinction made between two such states. That is the difference between what are called the *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara* states of self-consciousness. But the main thing to remember about this pure creation is that the object is *not different* from the subject. In this state of pure creation, objects are totally self-conscious entities, and hence it is known as the state of pure knowledge (*Śuddha vidyā*); and because they retain the fivefold powers of the absolute self-consciousness in totality, it is known as the state of Power (*śākta-daśā*).

The phenomenal multitude of our universe came into existence simultaneously when we view creation from the divine side. The absolute self-consciousness manifested itself thus. But we may read the story of the evolutionary process of creation from our side of limited self-conscious think-

23. Aṇoraṇīyān mahato mahīyān.

Kaṭhapaniṣad, DU, p. 76

Sa bhūmim sarvataḥ sprktvā'tyatisthad daśāṅgulam.

Ṛgveda. Puruṣa-sūkta.

Viśvottīrṇaṁ viśvamayaṅca iti Trikāḍidarśanaividyaḥ.

PH, p. 18.

24. Dvidhā sa eṣa evātmā mito'parimitas tathā,
Prāpādinā niruddho'ṇuḥ Paramātmā tvakhaṇḍitaḥ.

APS, verse 16.

Coleridge also thinks of the creation of "pure Intelligences". See A.P. pp. 36-40.

ers. Indeed, 'simultaneous' and 'evolutionary' are words that have meaning only from our standpoint, because we are ourselves limitations of self-consciousness. So far as the absolute self-consciousness is concerned, phenomenal creation is the type of manifestation when the absolute self-consciousness chooses to hide itself. Who can check the all-powerful Śiva from hiding himself? He hides himself in order to seek himself. The One became the Multiform by his power of self-limitation. Self-limitation means limiting all the five powers above enumerated.

The Trika philosophers in their emphasis on the importance of the knowledge of the absolute original state of reality make a summary treatment of the multiform creation of the phenomenal universe. They make no distinction between inanimate and animate objects. For the purpose of philosophical discussion they find no essential difference (*viśeṣa*) between animate and inanimate forms of existence.²⁵ They define both these together as limited self-consciousness.²⁶ This state (*daśā*) of objective manifestation is promiscuously called human (*nara*), animal (*paśu*), animate (*jīva*) or inanimate (*jaḍa*). It has to be remembered that all these forms of phenomenal objects, conscious or unconscious, animate or inanimate, are merely limitations of self-consciousness, which means that self-consciousness cannot be said to be totally absent from any form of existence. The apparently qualitative differences are reducible to quantitative differences. It is the degree of limitation in the manifestation of self-consciousness that causes variety in creation. Objects merely as objects cannot exist. They are of the nature of nothing.²⁷ It is only on the

25 Yathā sadasatām naiva viśeṣo'sti nijātmani
Jaḍajāḍānāmapyevaṁ nāstyaśāviti niścayaḥ.

APS, v. 1.

26. Paricchinna-prakāśatvaṁ jaḍasya kila lakṣaṇam.

MVV, I, 80.

27. Evam ātmanyasatkalpāḥ prakāśasyaiva santyami
Jaḍāḥ...

IPV, I, 42.

Yat tatra na hi viśrāntaṁ tannabhaḥkumāyate.

TA, V, 3.

subjective base that they can be seen or known. That 'this is' can only be said on the base of 'I am'. Objective existence must have consciousness as its basis. Even objects which do not manifest consciousness in them have it in them hidden, for otherwise they cannot exist.²⁸

Objects have existence only as reflexions in a mirror. Reflections in a mirror cannot be said to be unreal for we see them, but they have no independent existence. Similarly objects exist only so far as they are known by the subject.²⁹ Here the peculiarity is that both the mirror and that which reflects itself in the mirror are one and the same subject which is no other than the absolute self-consciousness. Even if it be said that things exist whether we see them or not, we cannot say that they exist without being perceived by anybody. Indeed, somebody must see an object in order to prove its existence. And if it is so, existence of objects is necessarily related with existence of the subject. All limited subjects or knowers are merely limitations of the absolute self-consciousness, which is the real knower. Objective existence simply means existence of self-conscious-

28. Na ca jñānam idantayā bhāti, idantā hi ajñānatvam. Na ca anyat vapuṣā bhātam bhātam bhavet. Tat jñānam bhātyeva param, bhāti ca yat tadeva ahamityasya vapur iti para-jñānamapi svātmaiva. Paratvam kevalam upādheḥ dehādeḥ. Sa cāpi vicārito yāvat nānyaḥ. Iti viśvaḥ pramātṛvargaḥ ekaḥ pramātā, sa eva ca asti. Yaduktam—
...Prakāśa evāsti svātmanāḥ sva-parātmabhiḥ.

IPV, I, 48.

Tat tad-rūpatayā jñānam bahir-antaḥ prakāśate,
Jñānād ṛte nārtha-sattā jñāna-rūpaṁ tato jagat,
Na hi jñānād ṛte bhāvaḥ kenacid viṣayīkṛtaḥ.

TA V, II, 66.

See also fn. 13 of this chapter.

29. Yathā mukhasya tad-vyakti-sthāne'psu mukure maṇau/
Khaḍge cañcalasadvṛtta-sūkṣma-dīrghādikā sthitiḥ.
Tad ittham parame rūpe prodbhūtā jñāna-sampadaḥ
Anavacchinna-hṛdaya-bījātma-traya-sundarāḥ.

MVV, I, 38-9.

See also TA, II, 53-5, verses 44-6.

ness in a limited form. In other words, objects are limitations of the subject, which alone exists.³⁰

We, limited subjects, can think of existence only in limited forms. It is true that for us existence means the limited objective state. We admit the reality of a thing because we perceive it. But if we stretch our imagination a little further and try to know the truth about our perception, we shall have to admit that the objectivity of a thing is no proof of its reality. Its reality can be proved only by consulting the mind. Without the appearance of self-consciousness our perception can have no meaning. Self-consciousness or 'I am' is the very form of perception. This is what is meant when it is said that consciousness is the mirror in which it sees things as its own duplicates. To show a thing that is different as identical with one's own self without losing one's nature is purity or transparency, Abhinava says on the authority of his grand teacher, Utpaladeva.³¹ If consciousness is limited, its self gives a limited reflection. Phenomenal objectivity is to be understood as mere limitation of self-consciousness. All objects are thus limited manifestations (*ābhāsas*) of the absolute self-consciousness. Hence all objects are really unities of subject and object. There is nothing as mere object. The unity of subject and object which begins in the absolute self-consciousness continues till the grossest forms of phenomena.³² The real subject cannot be finite. Even

30. *IPV*, I, 48 quoted above and the following :

Ekaiva cānusandhānāt sā proktā sarva-saṁvidāṁ
Sva-saṁvedana-paryāya-māṭṭ-tattvamanādi tat.
Cp. S.T.C. N. 1379, the quotation from Plato.

31. Svastinnabhedād bhinnasya darśanakṣamataiva yā
Atyakta-svaprakāśasya nairmalyam tad Gurūditam.

TA, II, 9.

32. Nirāsaṁsāt purnād aham iti purā bhāsayati yad
Dviśākhā āśāste tadanu ca vibhāṅktaṁ nija-kālāṁ
Svarūpād unmeṣa-prasaraṇa-nimeṣa-sthiti-juṣas
Tadadvaitaṁ vande Parama-Śiva-Śaktyātma nikhilam.

IPV, the benedictory verse, vol. I, p.1.

infinity has gross and subtle forms. The grosser forms become the objects for the subtler forms, that become their limited subjects.⁸³ The absolute has practically no objectivity.

This idea becomes clear in the divine stage. Even the very first manifestation of 'this', which is considered as distinct but not different from 'I am' or self-consciousness or the subject, and hence the experience of which is in the form, 'I am this' instead of 'I know this', is after all an object for the absolute, whose form is 'I am I.'⁸⁴ As a matter of fact, there is only one subject everywhere and that is absolute self-consciousness.⁸⁵ That alone really exists in manifold forms. The subject-objects that are the stuff this universe is made of owe their existence to the omnific freedom of the absolute self-consciousness. The freedom which is retained in the divine state is lost in the worldly state. The worldly subject-objects are bound in chains on account of their impurity, which limits their activity.

Limitation and impurity are concepts which have to be clearly understood in order to understand phenomenal existence and knowledge. It has already been said that the power of freedom of the absolute self-consciousness naturally includes the power of self-limitation. It is Śiva's power of hiding himself for playing the game of hide and seek.⁸⁶ It is necessary, for he wants to know his own self in manifold ways.⁸⁷ Indeed he is himself the teacher and the students whom he teaches. All the different branches of learning are only different ways of knowing him, who is the self-evident

33. *TA*, VII, 81-2.

34. *Yat Sadāśivaparyantam pārthivādyañ ca suvrate,
Tat sarvam prākṛtañ jñeyañ vināśotpattisamyutam.*

PT, p. 144.

35. See fn. 28 of this chapter.

36. *Māyā nāma śaktiḥ Śivasya śaktimato'vyatirekiṇī svarūpagopanātmikā kṛdā.*

APS, p. 10.

37. *Nānābhāvaiḥ svamātmānañ jñannāste svayañ Śivaḥ.*

Śivadr̥ṣṭi quoted in *IPV*, I, 49.

reality of one's own self-consciousness but becomes the most mysterious secret when he hides himself, so much so that it is proper to say that no one except himself knows him fully.

The Vedic Ṛṣi of the *Nāsadiya Sūkta* went a step further and wondered if even the absolute knower knew himself. (*So aṅga veda yadi vā na veda.*) Yājñavalkya in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*³⁸ asks: "How can we know Him, the knower, with whose help we know everything?" *Vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt ?* Abhinavagupta also says that Parama Śiva or Parā Devī or the Absolute Self-consciousness can never be an object and naturally can never be known. But that He knows Himself cannot be doubted.³⁹

In spite of the fact that limitation of the freedom of the absolute self-consciousness is the root-cause of all ignorance and consequent evil in this world, we cannot ignore the good aspect of this self-limiting power of the absolute. It is the very principle of objective creation. Without the limitation of the absolute there would have been neither any objective existence nor any development of knowledge. The question of enquiry about the absolute truth arises only when we do not know it fully, and when we do know it partially. It is incomplete knowledge that whets our craving for complete knowledge. Complete knowledge is only the removal of limitation. Worldly knowledge is a limitation, a limited self-consciousness or self-consciousness limited by the object.⁴⁰ Absolute self-consciousness is total self-consciousness, a removal of all limitations.⁴¹ Everything is a form of self-consciousness. What in the limited form is the hidden means becomes in the unlimited form the end of knowledge.⁴²

The total unity of existence and consciousness in the monistic absolute self-consciousness splits up after its self-

38. *DU*, p. 944.

39. See *PT*, pp. 10-11 : Ahameva satataṁ sarvaṁ abhedena vimśāmi parā-bhūmau.

40. Jñānam baudhaḥ. *SSV*, sūtra 2, p. 5. Cp. Coleridge, *I.S.*, item 29.

41. *TA*, Ahn. XI, vv. 41-42, vol. VII, p. 35.

42. *Ibid.*, Ahn. XI, vv. 44-47, vol. VII, pp. 37-8.

limitation, and what is one suddenly becomes many. This is done in no time, for Time itself is manifested after Limitation (*Māyā*).⁴³ It appears as if somebody shakes a tree laden with ripe fruits and all of them fall together. Yet from the standpoint of the limited self it appears that there is some order in this manifestation and it is from the standpoint of the limited self that a story of evolution of manifold manifestations based on the causal relation may be told.⁴⁴

Thus as soon as the absolute *limits* itself, it becomes atomic (*aṇu*), and a veil of darkness appears all round its limited form. It seems like falling into sleep and forgetting all the former glory.⁴⁵ All on a sudden this atomic self finds its freedom of all the five types gone and itself bound by time and causality. It becomes partially conscious and partially unconscious, to a great extent ignorant, suffering and sad, full of wants and restricted in activity.

As soon as the absolute self-consciousness limits itself thus, the limited self-consciousness feels itself *separate* from its parent absolute form. Though as a matter of fact there is no such separation, yet it appears as such, for the limited atomic self-conscious subject feels so. And if it feels itself separate, separation cannot be denied. We have to explain facts; we cannot deny or ignore them. The explanation is that the limited self-consciousness appears separate, because the unlimited, universal self-consciousness appears covered, veiled on account of its being limited.

It cannot be overstated that in the Trika philosophy whatever appears is said to be true. If Śaṅkarācārya's monism refuses to accept any appearance as true or real, Abhinavagupta's monism accepts all appearances as manifestations of the one absolute self-consciousness. Herein lies their similarity as well as their contrast.

43. See chapter IV Book, II

44. *TA*, Ahn. IX, vv. 164-66 ; vol. VI, p. 128.

45. *Māyā hi cinmayād bhedaṁ Śivād vidadhatī paśoḥ*
Suśuptatām ivādhate tata eva hyadrkkriyaḥ.

TA, Ahn. IX, v. 175 ; vol. VI, p. 136.

The universal self-consciousness is complete in itself for it finds no obstruction to its freedom to know, do or enjoy. But the limited self-consciousness has no such freedom. Its limitation thus appears as an appetency, a seeking after⁴⁶. The freedom of the absolute becomes an appetency of the limited subject. Free Will degenerates into want. The ignorant, limited subject forgets that all objective manifestation is only a projection of the subject, of one's own self in the absolute universal form, and naturally tries to satisfy itself by enjoying objects. Appetency is nothing but a search for the satisfaction which the subject experienced in its own prior state of plenitude on account of its total union with the object. But its seeking it in the limited objective sphere only whets its appetite. Remaining unsatisfied with the possession of objects it further runs after objects to get satisfaction and in this foolish behaviour only aggravates its appetency. In this blind seeking and blind enjoyment the heart becomes hardened and the mind grows ignorant. This is the story of appetency (*vāsanā*) leading to sensual enjoyment (*karma* or *bhoga*) and vice-versa. Even thinking of sensual enjoyment is not free from defect. Rather it is a greater sin, for it makes a false show (*mithyācāra*) of abstention from sensual enjoyment⁴⁷. This has to be understood and remembered in order to distinguish it from poetic enjoyment.

By the way, this explains the Hindu theory of the cycle of births. Every appetency seeks satisfaction and for that it requires a particular body. Limited self-consciousness goes on repeating this exercise of enjoyment and craving till it realises its futility by knowing the true nature of all objects as projections of the subject and consequent futility of running

46. The *āṇava māla* which is explained by Abhinavagupta as *avachhidojjhitā lolikā* (TA, vol. VI, p. 56) may be translated by what I.A. Richards calls 'appetency' or 'seeking after' (*Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 47) without any fear of inexactness.

47. Karmendriyāṇi saṁyamya ya āste manasā smaran
Indriyārthān vimūḍhātmā mithyācāraḥ sa ucyate.

after the phantoms, that are creations of its own absolute form. This chasing the will-o'-the-wisp ends as soon as the individual self realises that it is one with the absolute self-consciousness. For such a realisation, however, it has to change its method of enjoyment. It has to make itself introvert and carry on the up-hill journey till it reaches the summit by out-growing its limitation. Man becomes liberated only when somehow he extricates himself from this vicious cobweb of appetency (*vāsanā*) and sensual enjoyment (*bhoga*). This is possible only by overcoming limitation. As limitation is objectivity or separation from the universal self-consciousness, to overcome limitation is to seek union with the subject, which is no other than the universal self-consciousness. In the limited sphere union is a misnomer, for truly speaking, objectivity is the very negation of reality. Whatever reality objects possess is of the apparent image-of-the-mirror type, a shadow of the real subject, the universal self-consciousness. Naturally, in seeking union (*yoga*) with the subject or the universal self-consciousness, sensual enjoyment or seeking joy in objects is the greatest hindrance. The greatest task before man is to remove limitation. As soon as limitation is removed man comes to the end of his journey, for he finds himself one with the absolute, the only reality, the all-pervasive universal self-consciousness. Nothing remains hidden or unknown then. He gets complete satisfaction when he finds that he is himself all in all and wants nothing from any extraneous source.

On account of the powers of freedom and limitation, the absolute self-consciousness may be viewed in three forms. The most *a priori* state of the ineffable unity of existence (*prakāśa*) and consciousness (*vimaśa*) is called *Śiva-daśā*. The divine state of the full display of the freedom of consciousness, which is the very power or heart of Self, is known as *Śakti-daśā*. It is like the Platonic ideal state, where existence is distinct but not separate from self-consciousness. And the lowest state of the limited manifestations of phenomenal

existence and consciousness is known promiscuously as human (*nara-*), animal (*paśu-*), animate (*jīva-*), or inanimate (*jaḍa-*) state (*daśā*). It is to be remembered that both in the divine unlimited and the worldly limited forms, existence (*prakāśa*) and consciousness (*vimarśa*), subject and object are united together. In the divine state their unity is total; in the phenomenal state it is partial. It is a different matter altogether that consciousness of every object does not become manifest, but its non-manifestation cannot be a proof of its absence. Indeed, objects are not quite the same for every subject, even though they appear to be so for all practical purposes. A change in the consciousness of the subject is bound to bring a corresponding change in the apprehension of the object. As Coleridge pointed out, facts appear insulated, unrelated to an ordinary man. But a wise man seeks relations among facts and these relations are not the same for different persons^{47a}. It is significant that the Trika carries the common sense view of reality to the logical extreme by accepting all sorts of appearances as real—not only that which appears to be real but also that which is imaginary. The Trika philosophers argue that the reality of any object depends on the subject's apprehending it. Apprehension is the work of self-consciousness. The sense-organs are only instruments of apprehension. The real perceiver is the eternal I AM, pure self-consciousness⁴⁸. Truly speaking, pure perception is not possible in the phenomenal stage. As soon as we perceive, conception comes to play its own part. But concept, on the other hand, is possible only on the basis of percept. Concept is a limitation of the percept. Percept is of the form of I AM I. To conceive is to limit one's perception. If we conceive of anything, that thing has an objective

47a See com. on kārikā 2 of SS, pp. 1-10 See also BL., II. 39.

48. *Īśvara eva kasyāpi veditur bhinnam vedyam ahanṭayā paśyati,*

PT, p. 115.

existence⁴⁹. To think is to thingify, as Coleridge said. What proof have we got to deny its existence when we can conceive of it? The Trika philosopher says that whatever is conceived of has an outward existence, for conception is a limitation of self-consciousness or primary perception, and only limited forms of self-consciousness can be seen manifested outside as objects. Thus if a flower or a tower hanging in the void of the sky can be conceived of, it is impossible to deny its existence and be self-consistent at the same time. If the acceptance of a tower in the sky be denied because it is not seen, the Trika philosopher says that non-existence of any object only means that it does not exist at a particular place and time⁵⁰, for self-consciousness, which is above time and space and is not seen, cannot be denied existence. So, imaginary objects that can be conceived of cannot be said to be non-existent. Their existence can be denied only at a particular time and place⁵¹.

Such is the idealistic realism of the Trika philosopher⁵². Every person lives in a world of his own. It is the will of the absolute that sometimes there is a complete unity of perceptions of several perceivers as, for example, during the performance of a play⁵³. This is because of the shedding of their limitations as will be explained later.

There is another shock treatment to the common-sense standpoint. The Trika philosopher says that the division of objects as living and not living, conscious and unconscious,

49. Tathāvabhāsacitraṇca rūpamanyo' nyavarjitam
Yad bhāti kila saṅkalpe tadasti ghaṭavad bahiḥ.

TA, Ahn. IX, v. 159, vol. VI, p. 123.

Yat saṅkalpyaṁ tathā tasya bahir deho'sti cetanaḥ. *Ibid.*, v. 161.

50. Kha-puṣpaṁ kāladiṁmātrasāpekṣam, nāsti-śabdataḥ,
Dharādivat.....

TA, Ahn. IX, v. 160, vol. VI, pp. 124-5.

51. *Ibid.* vv. 159-162, vol. VI, pp. 123-6,

52. Croce's theory of intuitive reality which includes perceived as well as unperceived objects (*Aesthetic* p. 3) does not materially differ from the Trika standpoint.

53. See fn. 47, ch. iv, Book II.

is based on confused or incorrect thinking.⁵⁴ Self-consciousness or Life, which is the only self-evident reality, cannot be made the principle of division, for that cannot be negated of any form of existence⁵⁵. Instead, limitation should be made the principle of division. We may speak of such a division as limited self-consciousness or unlimited self-consciousness.

The main reason of making such a mistake is the supposition that self-conscious persons think because they have intellect or understanding (*buddhi*). The philosopher says that it is wrong to say so. Intellect or *buddhi* is really a material instrument. It has transparency of a mirror and sensitiveness of a photographic plate. But all the same it is matter and as such it is passive. Simple reflection in a mirror or imprint on a sensitive plate is not knowledge. We know a thing when we are conscious of knowing it, when we can say we are now sure that we know it. This surety is not a gift of the passive intellect. This cannot be the work of anything other than the eternal I AM or self-consciousness. Coleridge said almost the same thing in his distinction between Understanding and Reason. If it be said that our knowing a thing is not in the form, 'I am this', but in the form, 'I know this', the answer is that this second form comes later.⁵⁶ Perception in the primary stage is in the form, 'I am this'. It is only in the secondary stage that the form, 'I know this', appears. This is due to the limitation caused by our mingling conception with perception. The primary form of perception, its pure form, is that when no limitation appears. The primary form of knowing is only a repetition of the eternal 'I am this', when the experience is in the form, 'I am so', and not 'I know this'.⁵⁷

54. *APS*, v. 1.

55. *Śivo na bhidyate svaika-prakāśaghanacinmayah.*

Bhedo hi pratiyogyaapekṣah. Na ca param prakāśam apekṣya anyah kaścid pratiyogī sambhavet.

TA, Ahn. X, pp. 3 and 6. See also *PT*, pp. 44-5.

56. *Vide PH*, pp. 51-2.

57. Coleridge's concept of Primary Perception and Abhinava's concept of Prime Perceiver will be compared in Book IV.

CHAPTER III

TRIKA : A PHILOSOPHY OF WORD AND MEANING

Kim rūpam tattvato Deva ?
Śabda-rāśi kalāmāyam.

VB, v. 2, p. 4.

Vāgarthau nitya yuktau parasparam Śakti-Śiva mayāvetau,
Sṛṣṭi-sthiti laya-bhedau tridhā vibhaktau tribīja-rūpeṇa.

KKV, v. 12, p. 15.

A-mūlā tat kramā-jñeyā kṣāntā sṛṣṭir-udāhṛtā
Sarveṣāmeva mantrāṇām vidyānāṁ ca yaśasvini.

PT, v. 8, p. 98.

Asmākaṁ tu sva-prakāśa-Śivatā-mātra-vādinām
Anyam prati cakāṣṭi vaca eva na vidyate.

TA, vol. VII, p. 50.

Ata eva yadā yena vapoṣā bhāti yad yathā
Tadā tathā tat tad rūpam ityeṣopaniṣat parā.

Ibid, p. 65.

THE Trika absolute, the unity of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, can be studied as the unity of intuition and expression or that of meaning and word¹. It is perhaps its most important aspect for study. Intuition has been defined as self-evident truth². Who can argue against intuition? No argument can disprove intuitive experience. But intuition must express itself, otherwise it will remain unknown and lose its self-

1. Abhinavagūpta studies this aspect of self-consciousness in *Parā-triśikā* and *Tantrāloka* in detail.

2. Tat svasamvedanam proktam avicchedaprathāmayam.

PT, p. 212.

evident nature. Intuition is never bereft of expression, otherwise the very existence of intuition may be doubted³. This expression may be free or total, or it may be restricted or limited. Limitation, as has been explained, is not due to any extraneous force ; it is only an aspect of the freedom of intuition. When intuition expresses itself freely, that is, totally or without obstruction, its true nature is perceived. Limited expression gives a blurred vision no doubt, but vision or intuition cannot be totally denied. Without the basis of vision or intuition different means of knowledge lead us nowhere. Conception is ultimately based on perception. Different means of knowledge ultimately lead us to truths that are self-evident because truths are perceptible by nature. When intuition expresses itself totally, its self-evident nature admits no doubt. It becomes inevitably accepted. But in the case of limited expression, different means of knowledge like sense-perception, inference, testimony and others come into play. They become means of knowledge only so far as they establish self-evident truths.⁴ The former cannot hold ground against the latter. That is why logic becomes valuable and self-consistency becomes such an important principle of knowledge. Indeed, there is hardly any difference between self-consistent and self-evident truths⁵.

Word and meaning are not two separate entities but two aspects of one and the same reality. Indeed they are never separate. In the noumenal sphere, expression or word is merely a self-duplication of intuition or meaning. But in the phenomenal sphere word and meaning and object—all the

3. Vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī
Na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī.

Vākyapadīya quoted in *IPV*, I, 212.

4. Indriyāṇi trirūpaṇca līṅgaṃ paravacaḥ-kramaḥ
Sārūpyamanyathāyogaḥ pratītyanudayo yamaḥ
Ityādiko yasya sarvaṃ dvāramātre nirūpyate,
Tat svasamivedanam proktam avicchedaprathāmayam.

PT, p. 212.

5. Sattarkaḥ śuddhavidyaiva.

TA, III, 39.

three appear separate, though even here a unity has to be assumed, in order that language may be of any use. This aspect of the absolute as the unity of word and meaning has to be thoroughly understood in order to have a clear concept of anything, more so of literature, which according to Hindu critics is a unity of word and meaning (*sāhitya*).

Word in its ultimate essential form is equated with consciousness by Hindu grammarians led by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. It is the very nature, essence or self of meaning or pure being or existence. Bhartṛhari says that existence or meaning can hardly be able to manifest itself without consciousness or word.⁶ In India we have *Brahmavāda* instead of existentialism; and *Brahma* is equated with consciousness⁷ and consciousness with word.⁸ Reality is called *Śabda-Brahma* and the whole universe is explained as its manifestation. And as the most primary state of word (*vāk*) is known as *parā*, another name of the absolute is *Para-Brahma*. We cannot say that *Para-Brahma*, the highest passive state of existence, is devoid of consciousness.

The theory of word as consciousness was not originated by Bhartṛhari. He first made a detailed analysis of this in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of his famous *Vākyapadīya*. The truth about it was known to Patañjali and its origin lay in the *Ṛgveda*

6. Athāyamāntaro jñātā sūkṣme vāgātmani sthitaḥ
Vyaktaye svasya rūpasya śabdatvena vivartate.
Vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī
Na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarṣini.
Saiśā saṁsāriṇām saṁjñā bahirantaśca vartate
Tanmātrāmapyatikrāntaṁ caitanyaṁ sarvajātiṣu.

VP, *Brahmakāṇḍa*, vv. 112, 124 and 126.

7. Vijñānam Brahma.

Taittirīya, DU, p. 293.

8. Anādinidhanam Brahma śabdatattvaṁ yadākṣaram.

VP, *Brahmakāṇḍa*, v. 1.

See also v. 126 quoted above.

itself.⁹ Bhartṛhari himself quoted the Vedas to prove his theory of *Śabda-Brahma*.

Abhinavagupta totally agrees with Bhartṛhari in this respect and quotes the great semasiologist with reverence in his commentary on Utpaladeva's work, *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.¹⁰ In *Parātrimsikā* Abhinava gives an excellent exposition of the absolute as a unity of word and meaning and explains the whole creation as a projection of Word and all types of reality as verbal. The absolute known as *Parama Śiva* or *Para-Sarvit* is the all-inclusive unity with omnific potentiality.¹¹

Though it is a truism, yet it has to be remembered that the phenomenal word and the phenomenal object the word represents are two different things. The word 'cow', for example, either in its written shape of a combination of letters or in the heard form of a combination of sounds of those letters is not taken to be the individual cow that people see. Similar is the case of a sentence, which is a combination of words, or a paragraph, which is a combination of sentences, or an essay consisting of many paragraphs. In the same way we may think of stanzas and poems or similar units within larger units. Everywhere words or sentences appear separate from things or ideas they represent. But nobody can deny that a change in the words or in their order has a corresponding effect on the meaning and that this is not possible without some connexion among the word and the meaning and the object represented by the word. We have seen how logical positivism failed to establish any unity between word and its meaning, because a physical unity in such a case is impossible. But that there exists such a meta-physical unity cannot be denied. Indeed, truth in its purest form should mean only this unity. Otherwise any speaker of truth is so only by a consensus or a majority vote. He can-

9. See the quotations in the beginning of the book.

10. See *IPV*, I, 212.

11. See fn. 15 of this chapter.

not claim inevitable acceptance of his statement or have any personal conviction of a self-evident truth.

The *mantra-śāstra* of India is a study of this metaphysical unity of word, meaning and object. *Mantra* is the total expression of meaning.¹² It is the fundamental science of truth, without which a discussion on truth cannot be started. It is not possible to go into details of this fundamental science here, but its fundamentals can hardly be ignored in a discussion of truth whether of literature or of any other thing.

In this background we may study the Trika absolute as a unity of word (*vimarśa*) and meaning (*prakāśa*). The Trika philosopher starts with the letter as unit and says that if we try to think of what actually is an unthinkable state of the absolute self-consciousness or *Aham* or I AM I, we may imagine *Aham* as sinking in itself, as *m-ha-a*, or simple *a*, a noumenal point (*bindu*). As a matter of fact, we can hardly say anything regarding this state, for thinking or self-consciousness itself lies asleep then. Pure existence can hardly fall within the ken of consciousness. As soon as the self or existence or meaning tries to know itself it finds its self as power or pure consciousness or joy or will or knowledge or activity, which really is the primary word. Abhinavagupta calls self-consciousness therefore as self-conversation. Consciousness is a non-symbolic language and hence is an unlimited expression, the very ground of all types of limited expressions, symbolical, alphabetical or of other varieties.¹³ Sleeping self-consciousness or *m-ha-a* in the waking state is *aham*. Self-consciousness is thus a unity of passivity and activity. While nothing can be said about the passive aspect, the active aspect is the mean-

12. *MVV*, I, 967 ; II 63, 118.

13. *Pratyavamarśaśca antarabhiḥlāpātma-śabdanasyabhāvaḥ, tacca śabdanam saṅketa-nirapekṣameva avicchinnaśabdatkāramakam antarmukhaṣironirdeśaprakhyam akārādīmāyīya-sāṅketikaśabdajīvitabhūtam.* *IPV*, I, 205.

ingful word. In the phenomenal state word is dead letters on paper or sounds that quickly vanish away in the sky. So is meaning the passive object that can be destroyed. In the noumenal state word is consciousness of self or existence or meaning and is one with it. The absolute self-consciousness never loses this duality in its expression, otherwise it will lose its all-powerful nature.¹⁴

It is necessary to concentrate on the Sanskrit word for 'I', *aham*, in order to penetrate into the secrets of the verbal nature of reality.¹⁵ The word *aham* is a combination of two letters, *ah* and *am*. In Sanskrit these two vowels are called bindu (.), a noumenal point, and *visarga* (:), a projection, a throwing out. In both these letters the primary *a* sound is common. The primary letter-sound *a* represents the most primary pure existence, *mahāsattā*, *sat* in the concept of *Saccidānanda*, the self or *Ātmā*. It projects itself out. This projection is the *visarga* (:) or *h*, the last letter of the Sanskrit alphabet. The whole universe is the projection of the absolute self. It is the outward manifestation of the absolute reality. What has been ever before and what is ever going to happen, everything, past, present and future, is nothing but the projection of the absolute reality or self. In the same way, whatever remains unmanifested is also the absolute reality. The letters *ah* and *am* indicate the manifested and the unmanifested aspects of the absolute self-consciousness or *Aham*, which is the union of the two. *Ah*, the manifested, and *a*, the unmanifested are both unified together and the union is indicated by the bindu (.) in *Aham* (*Ah-a-m*). Self-consciousness or *Aham* may thus be viewed as the noumenal triangle consisting of the noumenal point (bindu, .) and its self-expression (*visarga*, :) and creation thus appeared in its divine primary form as an eternal noumenal triangle, the projection of the noumenal immortal point

14. See fn. 9, Book II, Chapter II.

15. Abhinava clearly states that reality is actually verbal: *Atra tu darśane viṣayasyāpi vimarśamayativāt abhilāpamayatvameva vastutaḥ.*

IPV, I, 227.

with the base above, ∇ , and destruction as another triangle with the point above, \triangle . According to Abhinava *Vāk* (Word) means that which creates all and destroys all.¹⁶

The superiority of the Sanskrit alphabet as well as the Sanskrit language is evident from the analysis of self-consciousness as *Aham*. What is self-evident in the analysis of *Aham* is not so in its equivalent in any other alphabet. The Latin *SUM* and the English *I AM* do not show this unity. Coleridge made a fettered attempt in this regard :

“It is sticking up little *i* by itself, *i* against the whole alphabet. But one word with meaning in it is worth the whole alphabet together—such is a sound Argument, an incontrovertible fact.”¹⁷

Sanskrit grammarians claim therefore that all languages other than Sanskrit are incorrect, unscientific, away from truth. This again explains that translations of *mantras* cannot have the value and significance of the original.

Every letter-sound of the Sanskrit alphabet expresses a meaning, a *tattva*, a principle ; and the order of the letters in the alphabet exactly represents the process of creation and its disappearance in the absolute self-consciousness again.¹⁸ Before phenomenal creation (*bhūta-sṛṣṭi*) there was ideal or noumenal creation (*bhāva-sṛṣṭi* or *pratyaya-sarga*). This latter is explained in this philosophy as unities of word and meaning or *mantras*.¹⁹ And word, truly speaking, is the noumenal letter.²⁰ These noumenal letters really express the meaning as they are unified with meaning.²¹

16. *IPV*, I, 205 : Vakti viśvam apalapati pratyavamarśena iti ca vāk.

17. Letter 388, *C.L.*, II, 709.

18. *PT*, pp. 113-121.

19. *PT*, pp. 209-11 ; p. 190 : vastutastu āntara evāsau nādātma mantrah.

20. *Avyakto varṇātmaiva śabdaḥ.*

PT, p. 190.

21. *Varṇānāmeva paramārthato arthatādātmya-lakṣaṇaṁ vācakatvam.*

PT, p. 191.

The most primary place in this ideal creation is given to vowels (*svara*). They are the primary sounds, and are expressions of self-consciousness as knower or subject. Consonants, that cannot be pronounced without the help of vowels, are expressions of self-consciousness as objects.²² Objects in the purest form are totally subjective. That is what is meant when we call them primary or pure. They gradually become grosser and assume the shape of consonants. Abhinava has shown that consonants, representing phenomenal objective principles, came out of vowels or noumenal subjective principles.²³

Aham or self-consciousness is the totality of the Sanskrit alphabet, where every letter is an aspect of self-consciousness, out of which the whole creation thus became manifest. Letters are really focal points of self-consciousness and hence, according to the principle of distinction without difference, every letter stands for all letters and all letters show the same reality of self-consciousness.²⁴

The noumenal unity of word and meaning has three states. The most primary (*parā*) state is that of the noumenal

22. Bijātmanāṁ svarāṇāṁ vācakatvaṁ yonirūpāṇāṁ ca vyañjanānāṁ vācyatvaṁ.

PT, p. 148.

23. PT, pp. 182-3 ; pp. 202-3.

24. Iha tu pañcāśad varṇā viśvamaṇi vā akramam ekameva.

PT, p. 202.

Śiva eva hi pramāṭṛbhāvam atyajan vācakaḥ syāt. Prameyāṁśāvagāhini ca Śaktireva vācyā. Bhede'pi hi vācakaḥ pratipādyapratipādakobhaya-rūpa pramāṭṛ-svarūpāvicchinna eva prathate. Śivātmakasvarabijarūpā śyānataiva śaktavyaṇjanayonibhāvo bijādeva yoneḥ prasa-raṇāt.... Vayam ekāṁ tāvad anantacitratāgarbhiṇīm tām sarividātmikāṁ girāṁ saṅgirāmahe. Māyīye'pi vyavahārapade lokaikakramikavarṇa-pada-sphuṭatāmāyī ekaparāmarśasvabhāvaiva pratyavamarśakāriṇī prakāśarūpā vāk.

PT, p. 148-50.

Eko nādātmako varṇaḥ sarvavarṇavibhāgavān;
So' nastamitarūpatvād anāhata ihoditaḥ.

TAV. III. 444.

point (*bindu*) when self-consciousness or the unity of word and meaning does not split itself. It is the state of pure *Aham* which may be translated as I AM I, I AM, or I.²⁵ It is the state where both the subject and the predicate are in the first person (*uttama puruṣa*). Here the word and the meaning are not felt even as distinct.²⁶ It is the most perfect unity of word and meaning and hence is known as *parā*, which is also called *parama-mahā-paśyanti*.²⁷

In the second state, self-consciousness splits itself. In its own most transparent mirror it reflects itself. The experience of this state is like 'I am this'. It is a pure perceptive state (*paśyanti*), where there is still the unity of word and meaning, for the subject sees the object as its own creation or its own reflection in its own mirror as distinct but still undifferentiated. In the former primary state, the predicate 'I' is not even felt as distinct from the subject 'I'. In Sanskrit 'I am I' is really one unit : *aham*. But in this second state the predicate appears as distinct from the subject. Still the predicate 'this'

25. In I AM I, the predicate I stands for *aḥ*, the subject I for *a* and *am* for the 'Bindu' (.) or unity of both. In the translation 'I AM', 'I' appears as the subject which is affirmed by 'am'; but in *aham*, *aḥ* is the predicate I and *am* is the subject I plus the copula. Another translation may be I-I, but they both are not two ; hence *aham* is rightly translated merely I.
26. Atra tu paraśamīdī yathāiva bhāṣāḥ (i.e. meanings) tathāiva vyavahāramayo'pi vimarśaḥ (i.e. word). Tena jala iva jalam jvālāyāmiva jvālā sarvathā abhedamayā eva bhāvā bhāṣante, na tu pratibimbakalpenāpi kevalam.

PT, p. 133.

27. *IPVV*, II, 197. In *MVV*, I, 427-8, it is called merely *Paśyanti* :

Svapraśāśātmikā yeyam samvittiḥ pāramārthikī

Tat svasamvedanam proktaṁ yato viśvavyavasthitiḥ.

Sā ca iṣṭā na vimarśātmāśvarūpam ativartate ;

Vimarśo'syāḥ paro bhogaḥ pūrṇaḥ paśyantyudāhṛtā.

In v. 429 *Paśyanti* is called the means of knowledge (*mānam*). But in *Parātrimsikā* it is *Parā vāk* which is said to give unity to word and meaning both in the noumenal and the phenomenal stages (p. 71). There is no contradiction here, because *parā* (I) is the same as *parama-mahā-paśyanti* (I am I).

is felt as undifferentiated from the subject 'I'. It is the state of manifestation of the second rather than the third person. The whole universe, past, present and future—which is represented by the predicate 'this'—is experienced on a par with the subject, possessing the same quality or essence as the subject has.²⁸

This perceptive state gradually changes into the conceptive state, though still it is the state of divine concept and still there is only distinction but no differentiation. The only difference between the second, perceptive state and the third, conceptive state is that in the former the predicate 'this' is very dimly distinct from the subject, and in the latter, 'this' becomes clearly distinct though not different from the subject. 'This' here is felt as an indifferent unit, as a third person. The Sanskrit word for the third person is *anya puruṣa*, 'another person', or *prathama puruṣa*, 'first person'. Really the predicate for the first time appears as distinct from self-consciousness and hence it is the experience of the first objective state, though still the object is experienced as essentially the same as the subject. It is called *madhyamā*, the intermediate state. One reason for calling it so may be that we have both divine and worldly conceptive states. In the divine state, word as concept, a universal, is distinct but not different from percept or meaning and hence is felt as one with the subject. In the worldly state, concept, still a universal and deriving its truth from the percept, is felt as different from it,²⁹ because the limited mind or the impure ego can never perceive the

28. Parāparā saiva devī mānamityavadhāryatām,
Yatrāparāṁśagam meyam tādātmyād vyavatiṣṭhate.

MVV, I, 429.

29. ...Sādākhyaiśvaryaśampadi
Paśyanti-madhyamādhāmani...

MVV, I, 401-2.

Māyīc'pi vyavahārapade...ekaparāmarśasvabhāvaiva pratyavamarśa-
kāriṇi prakāśarūpā vāk.

PT, pp. 149-50. See also pp. 130-3.

universal concept. It always remains an inferred reality for the empirical subject. The unlimited pure ego or the noumenal subject actually perceives the universal concept intuitively as its own duplicate. There may be yet another reason for calling it by this name, *madhyamā*, for just after this state comes the phenomenal (*vaikhari*) state where word and meaning and object all fall apart and their unity is only assumed, not actually perceived.

In the theological language of the Trika philosophy, the three states of word — *parā*, *paśyanti* and *madhyamā* — are called *Śiva*, *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara*,³⁰ respectively represented by the divine experiences of 'I am I' and 'I am this' perceived and 'I am this' conceived.³¹ All the three are experiences of universal ideas. The predicate, which is of the nature of the projection (*vikalpa*) of the self, the essence of which is imagination (*kalpanā*),³² is accepted to be essentially the same as the subject (*svabhāva-parāmarśa*).³³ Hence this imagination and the imagined predicates of these states are both accepted as true or pure (*śuddha*). The knowledge of these states is therefore called *Śuddha-vidyā*³⁴ or pure or true expression of the nature of self-consciousness. It is far superior to our mundane

30. Vastuto hi tridhaiveyam jñānasattā vijṛmbhate,
Bhedena bhedābhedena tathā cābhedasandhinā.

MVV, I, 391-2.

See also *MVV*, I, 397, 399-403 ; *PT*, pp. 129-30.

31. Īśvaro bahirunmeṣo nimeṣo'ntaḥ Sadāśivah.

IPV, vol. II, p. 193.

32. *TA*, vol. III, pp. 115, 283-4.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-7.

34. Śuddhavidyā hi tannāsti satyaṁ yad yan na bhāsayet.

Ibid., p. 49.

Śuddhavidyātmakam sarvamevedamahamityalam.

Ibid., p. 116. See also p. 117.

Vide again *IPV*, II, pp. 197-8, kārikā 4 and its com., esp the following :
Avalokanam prathanam vedanam vidyā yathāvastutva m vastvanusā-
ritvaṁ ca ; tasyāḥ śuddhir aviparītātā.

knowledge, where predicates, whether in the second or in the third person, are treated as different from the first person, the subject.

So far the different phenomenal letters of the alphabet have not become manifest. Though letters exist even in these divine states, yet they exist only as distinct focal points of one and the same reality, namely self-consciousness, and naturally are one undifferentiated reality. The second and third states are called *nāda*³⁵, which is explained as mere consciousness of the self³⁶. The first, or the most primary, state is called *bindu* or the noumenal point. Or viewed as the highest state of *paśyantī* (*parama-mahā-ṣaśyantī*) it may be called the highest state of *nāda* (*parama-mahā-nāda*).

Whether it be in the phenomenal state of letters seen or letter-sounds heard, or in the noumenal state of their originals perceived as shining entities made up of pure self-consciousness so focussed or heard as divine *nāda*, the unity between these letters, which are the primary words, and their meanings is established by the primary form of self-consciousness.³⁷ In the phenomenal state when we see a person, we are able to know him only by remembering some previous perception of him. Proper names, that have no connotation and so are not conceptual are thus known by direct perception. In other cases, when, for example, we see a cow, we at once remember to have heard the word 'cow'; or, vice versa, when we hear the word 'cow', we remember the object 'cow'. This is so, because both the word and the

35. *PT*, p. 129 : *Paśyantyākhyam jñāna-śaktereva paryantadhāma rādā-khyarūpam*. Similarly *madhyamā* is also called *nāda*.

36. *Nādaḥ svātma-parāmarśa-
Śeṣatā...*

TA, vol. III, p.204.

37. *Saṅkalanam ca Bhagavatī saiva Parā Parameśvarī karoti.*

PT, p. 71.

Ekaiva advayaparipūrṇarūpa-saṁvedanasattābhaṭṭārikeyam Parā Bhagavatī Parameśvarī.

Ibid., p. 197.

object had a prior state of union, the remembrance of which is knowledge. It is the conceptive state. Concept is the universal state of word³⁸, where there is unity of word and meaning, where all the different objects, the individual cows in the present case, and all the words in all the languages for the object (cow) have a common ideal existence. Hindu semasiologists say that the meaning of the word is not the individual object it represents but the concept, which is a universal including all individual objects of that class in the past, present and future³⁹. If it be not so, they say, every word will have so narrow a scope as to mean only one particular object and no other. If the word 'cow' means only one particular cow, a new word will have to be coined for another cow every time even in the same language and consequently the language will fail to achieve its purpose of communication in the confusion that will thus follow. The individual cow is really accepted as an individual representative of that class. It is concept, therefore, that is the meaning of a word. Concept is the universal language of all human beings. It is this universal form of language which not only makes translations possible but also renders them intelligible. It is the basis of communication among speakers of the same language. It saves the world from the curse of Babel. But it should not be forgotten that concept is merely a limitation of percept⁴⁰. Without a perceptive basis concept

38. *IPV*, I, 226 :

...Saṅketakāle sa śabda viśayatvena idambhāvena apratyavamaṣya-
mānatvāt bhedāt pratyutya nirbhāsamāno vijñānaśarīraśī. āntikṛto
vācaka iti bhavati, tat vijñānasya svarūpam cet bhūti, tat abhilāpa-
mayameva iti.

39. Uktam hi *Vākyapadiye* : Na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gauḥ, nāpyagauḥ,
gotvābhisambandhāt tu gauḥ.

KP, p. 32.

40. Vikalpānām ca avikalpaṁ vinā nodayaḥ, asvātantryāt ; asvātantryaṁ
ca saṅketādismaraṇopāyatvāt, saṅketādismaraṇaṁ ca anubhavaṁ vinā
kutaḥ.

PT, pp. 107-8.

is not only insignificant but also impossible. It is pure perception alone that is self-evident and true. But pure perception of anything is beyond the scope of ordinary human experience. It is the divine experience of 'I am this'. The Trika philosophers say that the real perceiver in every case, phenomenal as well as noumenal, is the eternal I AM I or *Aham*⁴¹. What we read in the books of modern psychology as an account of perception is only misleading⁴², for pure perception is pure self-consciousness, a unity of word and meaning, which, though always present as the background, can hardly be experienced except by the regenerate. Here the language itself will be of the nature of complete silence, verbal as well as mental. Pure perception is the repetition of pure self-consciousness, the eternal I AM I. As soon as we try to express what we have perceived we have to use language in a limited way, that is, conceptively rather than perceptively, though concept has significance only on account of its perceptive basis. For as soon as we use a word we have to remember the prior use of it by someone else trying to express a similar object. From him we learned it. He learnt it similarly from others and this process goes on *ad infinitum* till we have to accept that this word, truly speaking, is not a combination of phenomenal letters with an arbitrary dictionary meaning but a concept, which is a limitation of the self-evident perceptive reality of self-consciousness. It is only in the divine state that concept is not a limitation of percept but is felt as one with it.

Concepts are formed only after perception. We perceive

Cp. also *IPV*, I, com. on verse 19, pp. 225-8, esp. the following :
Vikalpo hi pratyakṣasya vyāpāraḥ...na ca vyāpāraḥ tadvato bhinnō yuktaḥ, tatsvarūpabhūto hi saḥ (p. 228).

Cp. Coleridge : "Conception is consequent on perception. What we cannot *imagine*, we cannot, in the proper sense of the word, *conceive*." *I. S.*, item 29.

41. *APS*, vv. 17, 20, 23, 25 and com. ; *PK*, I, 22-23, 26, 51, 64, 65.

42. There is a full-fledged discussion on this point in *MVV*, I, 437-588.

an object, note its distinguishing features, and form a concept of it, relating it to a genus and finding out its differentia. It is perception that gives life and reality to the concept. The only difference between human concepts and divine concepts is that in the divine concepts or ideas in the Platonic sense, the form is 'I am this'; that is, the object 'this' of which the concept is formed is *non-different* from the subject or self-consciousness or the infinite I, though it is clearly perceived as *distinct* from it. The forms of human concepts, on the other hand, are 'I see this', 'I know this'; that is, the object represented by 'this' is seen or known as *different* from 'I', the knower, the self-consciousness.

It is therefore said that God sees all the multitude as himself.⁴³ He feels in every experience 'I am so'.⁴⁴ One who can convert all his experiences to this form attains divinity.⁴⁵

On the basis of the analysis of the Trika philosophy made in this chapter it will be very easy to understand that the truth of the meaning or the concept cannot be established by comparing the ideal concept with the phenomenal object perceived, for the object itself has true existence only because it is a projection or reflection of the self-evident self-consciousness. The truth of the concept lies in the fact that it is felt as a reflection of self-consciousness in its own mirror, that is, as a form (*rūpa*) of the self itself. Indeed in the divine state alone, the form (*rūpa*) of the object and its name (*nāma*) have true existence and oneness, because they are not differentiated from the self-evident self-consciousness. That is the significance of the form of divine experience of 'I am this'. Hindu logicians and grammarians, therefore, say, like the Trika

43. Nānābhāvaiḥ svamātmānaṁ jānannāste svayaṁ Śivāḥ.

Śivadarśi quoted in IPV, I, 49.

44. PT, p. 160 : Sarvakriyākālāpe evamrūpatāsūcakam.

45. Sarvo mamāyaṁ vibhava ityevam parijānataḥ
Viśvātmano vikalpānāṁ prasare'pi Mahēśatā.

IPV quoted in PT, p. 238.

philosopher, that the true meaning of every word is a work of self-consciousness itself.⁴⁶

Abhinavagupta lays down a self-evident principle that can easily be universally accepted. He says that that without which a thing cannot be is its true nature. In other words, the true nature of a particular word is its immediate higher universal. Thus, for example, the true nature of a mango tree is that it is a tree. Taking the aid of this principle we may explain the nature of word as concept, for meaningless conglomeration of letters is not called word.⁴⁷ Concepts again are limitations of percepts and percepts are duplications of self-consciousness. Hence ultimately word is self-consciousness itself, where it is one with its self or meaning.⁴⁸

The Trika philosophers' treatment of the problem of word and meaning does not materially differ from the view of the Hindu grammarians. In short, grammarians thus explain the problem. Phenomenal letter-sounds disappear in the sky as soon as they are heard, but they leave an impression on the mind of the listener which does not die out. The impression created by one letter-sound makes his mind curious and thus prepares it for listening to another letter-sound. He gets satisfaction only after his curiosity is satisfied. This is done only when the last letter-sound is heard and the meaning of the speaker is completely expressed. Actually the listener gets

46. Na hi saṅketo nāma anyañ kaścid ūte Parameśvarecchātaḥ.

PT, p. 125.

Asmāt padāt ayamartho boddhavyaḥ iti Īśvarasaṅketāḥ śaktiḥ. *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, p. 51. This is the view of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*, the Hindu materialists, who do not accept the view of the unity of word and meaning. But in the phenomenal state even Trika philosophers accept that word as separate from its meaning.

That is, again, the significance of Plato's remark that "it is not possible for us to have an insight into things human...without a previous contemplation (or intellectual vision) of things divine....

The Friend, p. 306, footnote.

47. Śaktam padam. TS, p. 50.

48. Citīḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk...

IPV, I, 203.

complete satisfaction only when the speaker has completely expressed what he desired to express. But there are even smaller units of satisfaction. Thus it is the final mental impression after hearing the last letter uttered which is the true word or sentence as the case may be. The phenomenal letter-sounds do not directly express the meaning. They only leave an impression on the mind. The impression left by the first letter mixes with that left by the second and this mixing continues till the impression of the last letter. This last impression thus becomes a unified total impression, which really is nothing but self-consciousness focussed in a particular way. Thus a word or a sentence in the ultimate analysis is nothing other than self-consciousness focussed in a particular way. In the perceptive state alone, where word and meaning are one, we see that the word *is*—not *has*—the power of consciousness and is united with its self, pure existence or meaning.⁴⁹

Abhinavagupta says that even when things are known or ideas expressed by mere movements of limbs and not by letter-sounds, we cannot say that letter-sounds or words are not used. In such cases we can only say that phenomenal letter-sounds are not used. As a matter of fact, such an instance only proves clearly that even when they are used, it is not they that directly express the meaning. They are only instrumental in focussing our self-consciousness in a way, for the real power that expresses the meaning is self-consciousness. It is the noumenal focal points of self-consciousness, the divine shining self-conscious units that are really the life of the phenomenal letters.⁵⁰ In this noumenal state one letter is of the nature of all letters.⁵¹ The difference in the different

49. *Amiṣām varṇānām parā-vāg-bhūmiriyam iha nirṇīyate yatraiva eṣām asāmayikam nityam akṣtrimāṁ saṁvinmayameva rūpam. Saṁvinmaye ca vapuṣi sarva-sarvātmakatā satatoditaiva.*

PT, p. 102.

50. *TA*, *Ahn.* XI, vol. VII, pp. 32-63; *PT*, p. 102.

51. *Eko varṇaḥ sarva varṇasvabhāvaḥ.*

See *MVV*, I, 641; *PT*, pp. 209, 235.

languages is only due to the difference in the outward manifestation of these noumenal focal points of self-consciousness. The true word is the divine concept.⁵² What follows afterwards—the phenomenal letters and their combinations, that differ in each language—are only helpful in suggesting the true shining letters of the noumenal state, that are all of the stuff of pure self-consciousness. Concept (*madhyamā nāda*) is the true form of word and that is the lowest grade of truth about word in the divine state, the highest being self-consciousness (*parā, sphoṭa*). In the phenomenal state percept, like the geometrical point or line, is only an assumed reality. But as a matter of fact, it is a divine self-evident experience of one's own duplicate. In the phenomenal state, concept alone is possible, and that is therefore the highest grade of word in this state. It is only in the divine state (*Īśvara-daśā*) that concept is seen as distinct but still identical with the percept, which is the perceiver's own duplicate reflected in the mirror of his own self-consciousness, which is the perceiver as well as the perceived. This is the significance of the theory of the Hindu grammarians that the true word is *sphoṭa*, which is really nothing other than self-consciousness.⁵³ This *sphoṭa* or self-consciousness is really suggested by the phenomenal concept (*madhyamānādābhivyaṅgya*). The view of some noted by Nāgeśa that concept (*madhyamā nāda*) itself is word has also sound reasons for its support. In the phenomenal state, concept is the last form of word. Among the divine forms it is the only form to be clearly felt objectively; and word is self-consciousness as object. But as concept can be made only on a perceptive base, Trika philosophers and grammarians equate

52. ...Tacca saśabdam madhyamāntam. Śabdanam hi śabdaḥ; tacca madhyamaiva, vaikharyāḥ taccheṣṭātmakatvāt ityuktam bahuśaḥ.

PT, pp. 263-4.

53. Śabdasāmānyam sphoṭākhyam brahma śabdatattvam arthabijam upadarśitam.

VPA, p. 1.

word with absolute consciousness. The unity of concept and percept, though essential for true knowledge, is only an assumption for the empirical worldly experience.

Logical positivism came to a blind alley when it tried to find unity between word and meaning in the phenomenal state. The true world is noumenal, where word and meaning are two aspects of the same unity of self-consciousness. In the phenomenal world, though all our behaviour presupposes such a unity, yet, as a matter of fact, word has an existence separate from the concept as well as the object it represents.

The analysis of the Trika absolute as unity of word and meaning has been presented in a somewhat elaborate manner only because the analysis of a poem as *Dhvani* or Suggestion, of which the most perfect form is *Rasa*, is merely an elaboration of this theory of self-consciousness as the unity of word and meaning, as will be seen later on. For *Dhvani*, in the ultimate analysis, is the total expression of the intention of the speaker and is different from the literal or the commonly accepted meaning of the word, as will be explained later.

We may here summarily note a few more facets of the Trika absolute which may now be considered. First, the absolute may be studied as the unity of the universal (*prakāśa*) and the particular (*vimarśa*),⁵⁴ or, again, as the unity of male (*prakāśa*) and female (*vimarśa*).⁵⁵ It is to be noted that while female is the active, and male the passive, aspect of the absolute, their positions are altered in the phenomenal state. The phenomenal state is a reflection in the mirror of the absolute self-consciousness. Things are reflected differently in a mirror. Again, the absolute is

54. Śiva-Śaktirūpaḥ sāmānya-viśeṣātmā tadvyākhyātam.

PT, p. 208.

55. Bija-yoni-samāpatti-visargodaya-sundarā
Mālinī hi Parā Śaktir nirṇītā viśvarūpiṇī.

TA, vol. II, pp. 222-3, verse 233.

the unity of cause and effect.⁵⁶ Indeed an object in itself can hardly be a cause of any other object. It is only the nature of a thing that is manifested, and we give the name 'effect' to the manifestation and call the original thing its 'cause'. Causality becomes really a confusing principle when we try to find its working in objects as objects. For example, what shall we say about the causal relation between a tree and its seed? Which is the cause and which the effect? We come to a blind alley here for the tree is the cause of the seed and the seed is the cause of the tree. This makes causal relation itself a meaningless principle. Hence it is proper to say that the cause-and-effect relation is really a relation of the free subject and his work.⁵⁷ This free subject is self-consciousness, which is present everywhere, both in the tree and in the seed, and this freedom alone brings out, as its own manifestation, the seed from the tree and the tree from the seed. If we ask, why is the sand not able to produce oil, the answer is that the sand has no capacity to produce oil, but the absolute self-consciousness may produce it if it so desires. That is the secret of divine miracles. In the limited worldly forms the manifestation is according to the nature of the thing (*Niyati*) as fixed by the absolute self-consciousness.⁵⁸

56. Sarvāvabhāsānām pramātaryeva viśrānteh tat tayoraikātmyameva aṅgikāryam, yena kāraṇameva tattadrūpatayā pariṇamat kāryamityucyate.

TAV, VI, 24.

57. Ata eva kartṛkarmabhāva-sataiva eva kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ iti naḥ siddhāntaḥ.

TAV, VI, 24.

58. Kāryakāraṇabhāvo yaḥ śivecchāparikalpitaḥ.

TA, VI, 7.

Coleridge also says almost the same thing. See *B.L.*, II, 207.

CHAPTER IV

TRIKA EXPLAINS CREATION

Kintu durghaṭakāritvāt svācchandyaṁ nirmalād asan
Svātma-pracchādana-kriḍā-panḍitaḥ Parameśvaraḥ.
Anāvṛtte svarūpe'pi yadātmācchādanaṁ Vibhoḥ
Saiva Māyā yato bheda etāvān viśva-vṛttikaḥ.

TA, Ahn. IV, vv. 10-11, vol. III, pp. 9-11.

Sṛṣṭyādi-tattvamajñātvā na mukto nāpi mocayet ;
Uktañ-ca Śrī-Yogacāre mokṣaḥ sarva-prakāśanāt.

TA, Ahn. VI, v. 58, vol. IV, p. 50.

It is the principal felicity of Life, and the chief Glory of Manhood
to speak out fully on all subjects.

Letter 164, C.L., I, 279-80.

I would make a pilgrimage to the deserts of Arabia to find the man
who could make me understand how the *one can be many*. Eternal
universal mystery ! It seems as if it were impossible, yet it is, and it is
everywhere ! It is indeed a contradiction in *terms*, and only in terms.
It is the co-presence of feeling and life, limitless by their very essence,
with form by its very essence limited, determinable, definite.

A.P., p. 61.

Is't then a mystery so great, what God and the man, and the world
is ? No, but we hate to hear ! Hence a mystery it remains.

A.P., p. 210.

Devo vijñāna-mahimā prodbhūto' yam prapañcitaḥ.

MVV, I, 47.

Prajāpatis' carati garbhe antar-ajāyamāno bahudhā vvi jāyate ;
Tasya yonim paripaśyanti dhīrās tasmin ha tasthur bhuvanāni vviśvā.
Śukla Yajurveda

To recapitulate, there are two states of existence, divine
and mundane. Reality in both forms is of the nature of self-
consciousness, which may be viewed as several types of
unity : of self and consciousness, universal and particular,
subject and object, meaning and word, intuition and expe-

ssion, male and female, I and this, spirit and matter, cause and effect. The absolute is thus the identity of unity and omneity. It is difficult to distinguish between the dualities enumerated above in the absolute, for they remain completely identical. If the absolute were not the identity of inner dualities, it would lose its all-powerful nature¹. The second factors are only aspects of the Power of the absolute Self and can be conceived only as such. The absolute self-consciousness has no externality.

Creation is a story of concentric manifestation or externalisation (*abhāsa*) of the Power (*Śakti*) of omniformity of the absolute self-consciousness, which itself remains the centre everywhere—in every form externalised.

In the divine world, which is the first form of creation, its germinal state (*bijāvasthā*)², all existent units are of the nature of self-consciousness. It is a world of spiritual substance, of self-evident realities.

Creation always is an outcome of the union of parents. In the absolute, which is the form of their eternal union, consciousness is the female, active aspect and self is the male, passive aspect. Absolute self-consciousness looks into its own self, which, on account of its purity, is as transparent as a mirror. By its very look it creates a number of selves, distinct but not different from itself (*svānśas*). These distinct units may be conceived as waves in the ocean of absolute self-consciousness. Just as waves rise and sink, we may distinguish between two types of these units of self-consciousness. In the one, the male, existential aspect, that is, consciousness sinking in itself, becomes conspicuous; and in the other, the female, conscious aspect, rising on its self, showing its freedom and joy. These two types of units of self-consciousness as well as the distinction between them are too subtle to be described, for, actually speaking, they do not possess any

1. See fn. 9 of chapter II of Book II.

2. See Kavirāj, Gopīnāth, 'Śākta Philosophy', *History of Philosophy*, Eastern and Western, p. 408.

externality as such. Consciousness is existence and existence consciousness. They are absolutely identical. The *śāmbhavas* and *śaktijas*, as they are theologically called according to the predominance of the conscious and the joyous aspects respectively, are nothing other than repetitions of I am I. Though they are themselves universals, they are within higher universals which respectively are named *Śiva* and *Śakti*, representing self-conscious (*cit*) and self-rejoicing (*ānanda*) aspects of the purest self-consciousness. In the former the subject 'I' is predominant; in the latter the predicate 'I'. *Śiva* and *Śakti* are indeed two aspects of the same reality and are included in the highest universal, absolute self-consciousness (*Parama Śiva*).

But the absolute is all-powerful and externalises its form. Thus there is a manifestation of 'I am this'. But still 'this' is nothing but a great void (*mahāśūnya*)³ and does not obstruct the self-evident light of self-consciousness. It may be said that on account of the emptiness of 'this' the self-evident light of self-consciousness gets externalised. Here also three states are distinguished. The first shows the predominance of the subjective aspect; the second, that of the objective aspect; and the third, the equivalence of the two. The unity between the subject and object is not yet broken. These three divine states may be understood as the aspects of willing (*icchā*), knowing (*jñāna*) and feeling (*kriyā*)⁴ of the absolute. The lower universal units here are theologically called *mantra-maheśvaras*, *mantrēśvaras* and *mantras* existing within their higher universals of *Sadāśiva*, *īśvara* and *Saavidyā*, respectively.

The divine forms can be comprehended only on the basis of identity in difference, or distinction without difference if

3. Kaviraj, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

4. Activity being subjective at this stage is of the nature of feeling. It may be clear from the fact that the limitation of *sadvidyā* is called *rāga* (*TA*, IV, p. 39). *Kriyā*, again is defined by Abhinava as extension of knowledge : *Jñāna-pallava-svabhāvaiva hi kriyā*.

we use a Coleridgean phrase of the same connotation. Otherwise they are one as the Power or Might or Freedom or Essence of the absolute self-consciousness. It is only on account of the predominance of one aspect over others that such a distinction is made. The distinction does not show the exclusion of the other aspects. Along with the previous two, these are therefore known as the five mouths of the absolute (*Parama Śiva*). Another name of theirs is *brahma-pañcaka*. They are also called the five *gaṇas*⁵ of *Parama Śiva*. Thus the absolute self-consciousness projects itself in five distinct ways as *Śiva*, *Śakti*, *Sadāśiva*, *Īśvara* and *Sadvidyā*.

So far the percipient and the perceived are not separated and the self-evident, truthful nature of knowledge and existence admits no doubt. The divine world consists of these five types of self-evident realities. It is an infinite, free and true world, where every entity possesses these characteristics.

Though all these five aspects of consciousness, joy, will, knowledge and action or feeling of the absolute self-consciousness are divine, yet the distinction between the former two on the one hand and the latter three on the other is to be noted. The former two are the immanent un-externalised forms of self-consciousness ; the latter three are the transcendental external ideal entities made up of the total light of the absolute subject. It should be remembered that still there is no manifestation of objective reality as such, for object still has no constituent other than the light of self-consciousness.

Ideal creation, that is, creation of creative ideas or divine forms, comes to a stop here. Having manifested itself totally in all the five possible ways, the absolute self-consciousness chooses to hide itself in order to realise itself in more ways. The splitting of the unity of self and consciousness thus gets confirmed and distinction between the subject and object comes to mean difference. The whole phenomenal world

5. See *TA*, VI, 48-55.

with all its natural varieties came into existence all at once though one may read the story of an evolution in its creation from the standpoint of the limited individual. When the absolute self-consciousness hid itself, its transcendental form was disguised, but its immanent form was still there, for it can never be totally absent.⁶ There can hardly be any objective existence or subjective experience without it. The hiding of the absolute is the appearance of the phenomena just as the appearance of the absolute is the hiding of all objectivity. As soon as the power of self-limitation (*māyā*) of the absolute becomes active as an expression of its own freedom, all the five forms of freedom of total manifestation are lost. Thus consciousness, joy, will, knowledge and activity or feeling become limited and the absolute in this limited form becomes helpless in every way. This creation of limitation is not an event in time, for empirical time is manifested after limitation.

Thus consciousness (*cit*) becomes unconsciousness (*acit*) and hence existence (*sat*, *Śiva*) becomes nothing or void (*asat*, *śūnya*). Freedom, power or joy (*svātantrya*, *Śakti* or *ānanda*) becomes limitation, helplessness or inappetency (*māyā*, *pariccheda* or *lolikā*). Thus absolute self-consciousness (*Śiva-Śakti*) becomes the cosmic unconscious (*māyā*). Free will or intuitive perception (*icchā*, *paśyanti* or *Sadāsiva*), which is total projection of the pure I, becomes split up into two limited powers of activity (*kalā*) and knowledge (*vidyā* or *aśuddha vidyā*).⁷ There is little difference between willing and perceiving in the divine state, because both are mere duplications of self-consciousness, being either total knowledge (percept) or total activity (will). It has to be remembered that knowing is the primary activity.⁸ Divine concept, knowledge or activity (*jñāna*, *kriyā*, *Īśvara*), when

6. See fn. 27, chapter II, Book II,

7. *TA*, IV, pp. 38-40.

8. See fn. 4 of this chapter.

limited, turns into the powers of Time⁹ (*kāla*) and causality (*niyati*). *Kāla* or Time expresses itself as continuity both in subjective action called time (*kāla*)—for time is known only as continuity, as process, which can be known or felt only as movement or action (*kriyā*)—and in objective extension called space (*deśa*). The equivalence of the subject and object (*sadvidyā*), which is the divine plenitude of self-contentment¹⁰ turns into bias (*rāga*) or loss of balance.

First, there is limitation of the most primary existential or conscious aspect. The absolute self or pure existence or pure consciousness (*Śiva*) in the limited form becomes 'nothing-knower' (*śūnya-mātā*), a totally unconscious subject with nothing or void as its object. It consequently appears as void (*śūnya-rūpa*).¹¹

In the divine 'I am I' the form is self-consciousness; that is, though objectively it is nothing, yet it is such a plenitude of the subject that there is self-sufficiency in the experience and the question of objectivity or the consequent consciousness of nothingness or void does not arise. This differentiates *Śiva* or the eternal I AM from the *śūnya-mātā* or the nothing-knower, which is the first objective state of the limited self-consciousness.

It has to be remembered that it is only a limitation, a hiding of the absolute self-consciousness and does not bind

9. Cp. Coleridge :

"Kant's merit consisted (mainly) in explaining the ground of the apodeixis in Mathematics which neither Leibnitz nor Plato had attained to—and this he did by proving that Space and Time were 1. neither general terms, 2. nor abstractions from things, 3. nor Things themselves; but, 4. the pure a priori forms of the intuitive faculty....They are the Acts of the perceptive Power, of which all particular acts of perception are modifications, directions, &c. Time = unity, the point, resistance—Space = Multeity, area, absence of resistance. In the circle all possible Truths are symbolized."

Letter 1126, P.S. C.L., IV, p. 852.

10. *Sad vidyā* is the expression of the intuition of *Sa-āśiva* just as *Śakti* is the expression of the intuition of *Śiva*.

11. *TA*, IV, p. 8, verse 10.

the absolute as such. Had unconsciousness been a negation of consciousness and not merely its hidden state, there would have been no development of limited consciousness out of it.¹²

This invisible nothing-knower finding its consciousness totally lost and the object totally separated from it owing to the absolute's power of splitting or self-limitation (*māyā*)¹³ develops an appetency and appears as *prāṇa-mātā* or the subject as *Prāṇa*, which may be understood as vitality, life, heart, inner movement, rest or instinctive capacity.¹⁴ The absolute self-consciousness (*Samvit*) as *prāṇa-mātā* is still universal and unconscious, a movement still not materialised, a life still without a body. It is the expression of the activity of the absolute, that is, of *Īśvara*, but having lost its substantive identification with the total objective universe, it appears individualised in the bodies where it is manifested. Its omnipresence is felt immanently in different forms, *Samvit* as *prāṇa-mātā* is immanent, not transcendent. Motion is no longer free or total. It is mixed with unconsciousness or passivity everywhere. Motion and rest are both its expressions. The story of life from the unconscious passive piece of stone to the human form is a story of the more or less manifestation of this very life-principle (*prāṇa-tattva*), which takes an objective phenomenal shape. All limited or phenomenal manifestations of the divine activity (*Īśvara-tattva*) are spatio-temporal. The innumerable types of bodies or forms have to be understood as manifestations of

12. See the following prayer :

Trṇāt parṇācca paṣāpāt kāṣṭhāt kuḍyāt sthalāj jalād
Udgaccha yaccha me trāṇam Vibho kva nu na te sthitiḥ.

TAIV, Āhn. X, vol. VII, 89.

13. Māyā hi cinmayād bhedaṁ Śivād vidadhātī paśoḥ
Suṣuptatām ivādhatte tata eva hyadrk-kriyaḥ.

TA, VI, 136, verse 175.

14. Iyaṁ sā prāṇanāśaktir āntarodyogadohadā,
Spandaḥ sphurattā viśrāntir jivo hṛt pratibhā matā.

TA, IV, 12, (Āhn. VI, v. 13)

effects from causes in the shape of actions done by limited individuals in previous lives. This causal relation which appears as an unbreakable chain or bondage is conquered by a total surrender of one's desires or expressions of limited freedom to the freedom of the divine in whom the causal relation is merely an aspect of freedom. The development of life or *prāṇa* in the innumerable phenomenal forms being no concern of ours at present, we confine our discussion to the human form only.

As soon as *prāṇa* or inner activity expresses itself, it gets a body and pervades it and thus becomes limited by it spatially as well as temporally. *Prāṇa* thus becomes the limited life or activity of the subject with a body or *deha-mātā*, who is the limited form of the divine equivalence of the subject and object (*Saavidyā*). The essence of time and space is the same. It is the manifestation of continuity. Continuity expressed in the objective form is space and that in subjective action is time. Action primarily is the expression of the subject. *Prāṇa* is the first phenomenal expression of self-consciousness.¹⁵ Thus life in this world is a spatio-temporal expression of the eternal activity of the absolute, which is bound in a chain of causal relations as soon as it becomes spatio-temporal.

This *prāṇa* or life becomes the basis of further development.¹⁶ *Citta* or *antaḥkaraṇa* or the inner sense organ or mind is a development of this life-principle. *Citta* is the universal of all the ten organs, sensory and motor.¹⁷ It has three names according to its three functions. There is a process in the manifestation of these functions. Thus the first in the order of manifestation is *buddhi*, the faculty of knowing or judging or ascertaining. The second is *ahaṅkāra* or

15. Saṁvit prāk prāṇe pariṇatā.

TA, IV, 11, verse 12.

16. Antaḥkaraṇatattvasya vāyurāśrayatāṅgataḥ.

17. Samastendriya-saṁcāra-caturam.

TA, VI, 220.

the faculty of feeling that I do it or know it.¹⁸ The third is *manas* or the faculty to imagine, think or desire (*kalpanā, icchā*). Thus knowing, feeling and desiring are the three aspects of the same inner organ.¹⁹ The name *citta* only *reminds* us that this inner organ of knowledge is only *citi* (which is the same as *sañvit*) in the limited form.²⁰

The intelligent subject (*buddhi-mātā*) is the limitation of *Sadāśiva*, or the will of the absolute.²¹ The absolute knows or does or feels anything by its own free will. The limited individual is limited by his mind, *antaḥkaraṇa*, in his knowing, feeling and doing.

When after the manifestation of the power of self-limitation the absolute self-consciousness turns into an unconscious, atomic, unknowable, invisible entity, there appear in it all the powers of the absolute in a limited way. Thus the limited self-consciousness enjoys its limited phenomenal objects. Here there are three types of manifestation. One is subjective or active, another is objective or passive and in between them there is a third, which serves as an instrument (*karaṇa*) for the inter-connexion between the former two.

Kalā is the power of doing limitedly, It is the first manifestation on the subjective side. Being a product of *māyā* or the power of limitation, passivity or materiality, it is not wholly active.²² *Vidyā*²³ or the power of knowing limitedly; *rāga* or attachment to, or feeling for, an object ; *Kāla* that is both time and space; and *niyatī* or causal relation

18. *TA*, VI, 196.

19. *TA*, VI, 189-91.

20. *PH* sūtra 5 : Citireva cetana-padād avarūḍhā cetyasaṅkocinī cittam. *VP* assigns recollection as a separate function to *citta*. (para 58)

21. Anāśritaḥ śūnya-mātā, buddhi-mātā Sadāśivah, *Īśvaraḥ prāṇa mātā, Vidyā deha-pramāṭṛtā*.

TA, IV, 39-40.

22. *TA*, VI, 134 : Māyāntvāt kalā jāta kinchit-karṭṭvalakṣaṇā. See also vv. 176 and 179 on , ages 136 and 138 respectively.

23. In order to avoid its confusion with *sadvidyā*, it is better to call it *aśuddha vidyā* and *sadvidyā* as *śuddha vidyā*.

—all these are products of *kalā*. In their evolution *kalā* uses *māyā* as the material cause. All these six are the folds (*kañcukas*) that wrap the atomic individual,²⁴ who is already impure on account of its three inner impurities in consequence of its separation from the absolute.

Though primarily it was the absolute's own free will that it limited itself,²⁵ yet when once limitation became a fact, it became a quality of the individuals so limited. The most primary impurity is the atomisation of the absolute (*āṇava mala*), the essence of which is appetency²⁶ on account of forgetting its previous free nature.²⁷ It is an inducement to sensual enjoyment, which is another impurity (*kārma mala*) and which being insubstantial aggravates desires instead of satisfying them. Thus a vicious circle is created, as a result of which the limited individual always feels himself separate from the absolute. This feeling of separation is the third impurity (*mayīya mala*).

With these three internal impurities, *āṇava*, *kārma* and *māyīya*, and six folds *māyā*, *kalā*, *vidya*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati*, the phenomenal individual forgets his previous glorious divine state.²⁸

The relation between the phenomenal individual (*aṇu*, *pumān* or *pudgala*) and his power of limited activity (*kalā*) is the same as that between the absolute *Śiva* and his power

24. *Māyā kalā'suddhavidyā rūgaḥ kālo niyantraṇā*
Ṣaḍetānyāvṛtīvaṣāt kañcukāni mitātmanah.

TA, VI, 164.

Sometimes folds are enumerated as five (Kavirāj, *op. cit.*, p. 409; *IPV*, II, 207). *Māyā* being the principle of limitation, which manifests the other five folds, is omitted. *Māyā* is the total unconscious state where the object is nothing and the subject totally unconscious.

25. *Svātmapracchādanechhaiva vastubhūtas tathā malaḥ.*

TA, VI, 59.

26. *Bhoga lolikā abhilaṣātmakam āṇava-malam.* *TA V*, VI, 55.

27. *...āṇavam malamidam sva-svarūpāpahānitaḥ.* *TA*, VI, 57.

For a full discussion of the three impurities see *TA*, VIII, pp. 1-76.

28. Coleridge also spoke of the folded nature of the mind but was not so clear about the nature of the folds.

of freedom, *Śakti*. While *kalā* is the main active power of the limited subject (*aṇu*),²⁹ his chief instrument of action is *vidyā* or the power of knowing limitedly.³⁰ Knowledge precedes action and hence becomes the universal instrument of action without which the passive *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot work. All passive instruments require active power for their functioning.

It is for this reason that *prāṇa* or the vital air is not called an instrument. *Prāṇa* moves in the body without our active control. It moves on involuntarily and has lost touch with the will or consciousness, the active power of the limited subject. Thus *prāṇa* is called *jaḍa*³¹ or matter. On the objective side *kalā* limits the cosmic unconscious (*māyā*) for the different limited individuals. Thus is created the limited unconsciousness known as *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* of each individual subject.³² A doubt may arise here. How do we

29. *Kalā hi kiñcit-kartṛtvaṁ sūte svāliṅganād aṇoḥ. TA, VI, 136, v. 176. Kalāyās tāvat kiñcidrūpatāviśiṣṭaṁ kartṛtvaṁ lakṣaṇam.*

TA V, VI, 171.

30. *Seyaṁ kalā na karaṇam mukhyaṁ vidyādikam yathā Pūṁsi kartari sā kartrī prayojakatayā yataḥ. Karaṇena yena bhogyaṁ karotī pūṁsaḥ pracodya mahadādīn Bhogye bhogaṅca punaḥ sā vidyā, tat paraṁ karaṇam. TA, VI, 142. See also pp. 199-201.*

31. *Prāṇasca nāntaḥkaraṇaṁ jaḍatvāt preraṇātmanaḥ Prayatnecchā-vivodhāmśa-hetutvād iti niścitam. TA, VI, 190, v. 237.*

32. *Vedyaṁātraṁ sphuṭaṁ bhinnam pradhānam sūyate kalā. TA, VI, 171, v. 214.*

See also v. 215, p. 172.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopināth Kavirāj explains the *Śakta* view of *prakṛti* as follows :

"*Prakṛti* with which the lower creation begins is indeed the assemblage (*samaṣṭi*) of the dispositions and tendencies (*vāsanās*) of all persons with various and beginningless *karmans* : it may be fitly described as the body of the *kārma* dispositions of the *jīvas* considered as inhering in *cit-śakti* or self. This *karma-vāsanā* or *prakṛti* is three-fold according as the experience which is its moral outcome is pleasant or painful or of the nature of comatose condition in which neither pleasure nor pain is felt." *Op. cit.*, p. 409.

see a common world if *prakṛti*, the universal of all phenomenal and empirical manifestations, be personal to each individual? Just as it is true that everyone's pleasure and pain are his own, so also it appears certain that we all have the same earth and sky. Here, however, it should be remembered that this earth and air and sky are creations of *Ananta*, the lord of all phenomenal manifestations, and not of the limited individual (*paśu*). Everything is the absolute Parama Śiva's self-limitation. There are microcosmic as well as macrocosmic manifestations. While every *ānu* has its own microcosmic *prakṛti*, the macrocosmic *prakṛti* belongs to *Ananta*. The absolute as the subjective power behind macrocosmic phenomenal manifestations is called *Ananta*, just as that behind macrocosmic noumenal manifestations is called *Śiva*.³³

While primarily limitation is an aspect of the freedom of the absolute self-consciousness, once creation starts—and nobody can ever know when it started—the *karma-vāsanās* or the results of actions of all the living individuals that have not yet attained salvation (*mokṣa*), existing in the form of basic dispositions, become the secondary or accessory or material (*upādāna*) cause of the creation of this phenomenal universe for their different types of experiences (*bhogas*).

The first evolute of all the three qualities of *prakṛti-sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—taken together is the objective passive instrument of *buddhi*, which, like an extra-ordinary mirror, reflects not only the object perceived or dreamt, but also the light of the limited subject. *Buddhi* is a passive material instrument, howsoever transparent and sensitive it may be. It is the subjective instrument of *vidyā* that makes it active and conscious. Discrimination, the distinctive character of *buddhi* is really the work of *vidyā* which is able to discriminate between this and that only on account of its expression through this passive instrument. While on the one hand,

33. Śuddhe' dhvani Śivaḥ kartā prokto 'nanto' site prabhuḥ.

buddhi by itself is unable to ascertain or discriminate, *vidyā* would see everything as one with the absolute without the aid of this material instrument. The expression of *vidyā* through *buddhi* makes it impure.³⁴

From *buddhi* evolves *ahaṅkāra*, which not only functions as inner ego-sense, the limited self-consciousness, the feeling that 'I do, know or feel this,' but also excites the movement of *prāṇa* or the vital air, which thus appears in five forms distinguished according to the place where its movement is felt.³⁵

The difference between the pure absolute I AM and the impure empirical I am is that the former is all-powerful, able to do or know or feel anything in totality ; but the latter is active only in the limited fields like those of intellect, *prāṇa* or breath, body, sleep and void.³⁶

From *ahaṅkāra* evolves, first, *manas*, the inner organ that makes the senses perceive objects or imagine them and makes the organs active; next, the five sensory and the five motor organs; and last, the universals of the qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

There is difference of opinion on the point whether *manas* evolved out of *ahaṅkāra* owing to the predominance of *sattva* or that of *rajas*. Abhinava himself holds the view that *rajas* is predominant in the evolution of *manas*, *sattva* in that of the ten sensory and motor organs,³⁷ and *tamas* in that of the universals of objects of sense (*tanmātras*).³⁸

The five elements evolved in this order : sky, air, fire, water and earth. The sky is the particularisation of the universal sound (*śabda-tanmātra*) which requires space for

34. *TA*, VI, 181-4, 152-5.

35. *Ibid.*, VI, 184-5.

36. *IPV*, II, 204-5, v. 8 and com.

37. *Śrīpūrva-śāstre tu mano rājasāt, sāttvikāt punaḥ
Indriyāṇi samastāni, yuktañcaitad vibhāti naḥ.*

TA, VI, vv. 276-7 ; see pp. 223-4.

38. *Tanmātrastu gaṇo dhvāntapradhānāyā ahaṅkṛteḥ.*

TA, VI, p. 225.

itself. Air is the particularisation of the universal touch; fire, that of the universal sight; water, that of the universal taste; and earth, that of the universal smell. The elements gradually became grosser because of the mixing of the universals of all the previous elements. Thus earth is the particularisation of smell mixed with the universals of all the other four elements; water, that of taste with the universals of the three higher elements, and so on.³⁹

It has not to be forgotten that the sensory and motor organs and the inner sense-organ in all its three forms of *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas* are all passive and material (*jaḍa*), and so is *prāṇa* or the vital air in the body. They are all activated by the subjective powers of *kalā* and *vidyā*.⁴⁰ Had the sense-organs been really active, the blind would never have seen and the lame would never have moved. But the blind man's ability to read by touch and the lame man's movement with the help of hands or other parts of the body show that the sense-organs or motor organs are not completely localised. Their localisation simply means that they express themselves best at those places.⁴¹

One doubt still persists and requires clarification. How does the whole phenomenal world with all its varieties of things from the gross earth to the subtle sky come out of self-consciousness? Here it has to be remembered that the Trika philosopher believes against the materialists that all outward manifestations are the products of self-consciousness.⁴² Matter, which exists in the absolute self, or existence

39. *TA*, VI, 228-231.

40. *Vidyām vinā hi nānyeṣāṁ karaṇānām nijā sthitiḥ,*
Kalām vinā na tasyāśca kartṛtve jñāṭṛtā yataḥ ;
Kalā-vidye tataḥ puṁso mukhyān tat-karaṇām viduḥ.

TA, VI, pp. 200-1.

41. *TA*, VI, pp. 201-210.

42. *Tathā hi vedyatā nāma bhāvasyaiva nijaṁ vapuḥ.*

TA, VII, 14.

Cp. Coleridge : Dejection : An Ode :

Oh lady, we receive but what we give
 And in our life alone does nature live.

as its very essence in the form of consciousness, comes out of it when the absolute hides or limits itself in the forms above explained. This omniformity is the becoming of the absolute Being.⁴³

This, in short, is the story of the creation of this universe owing to the self-limitation of the absolute self-consciousness, when the absolute throws itself in the background and manifests the phenomenal world consisting of finite subjects and finite objects on its own canvas.

When the blindfolded individual bound by his limitations, his powers curbed by his finite instruments, desires to overcome these limitations and know the reality as it is, he can know it provided he uses the proper instrument, follows the proper method. This proper instrument or method is no other than what has earlier been called *śuddha vidyā* or the balanced universal self-consciousness, which shows objects undifferentiated from the subject, the absolute self-consciousness. The method for this is total meditation on an object⁴⁴ and perception of its universal form above the limits of time and space.⁴⁵

The importance of literature or fine arts in general lies in the fact that it is one of the ways of over-coming

43. Tasmāt prakāśa evāyam pūrvoktaḥ Paramaḥ Śivaḥ
Yathā yathā prakāśeta tattad bhāva-vapuḥ sphuṭam. TA, VII, 43.
See also *MVV*, 1, 69-70 quoted in fn. 14, chapter II, Book II.

44. The essential qualification of a *sahṛdaya* or a man of genius is empathy with the object : 'manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavana-yogyatā'. (Locana p. 38).

45. Bhāvānām yat pratighāti vapur māyātmakam hi tat.

Teṣāmevāsti sadvidyāmayam tvapratighātakam.

Pūrvam (māyātmakam) pratibimbātmakam, idam tu tad-grāhi iti
tu viśeṣaḥ.

TA, and TAV, II, 11.

limitations and seeing things in their universal perspective.⁴⁶ That such a universalization of experience is possible is one of the fundamentals of the poetic or artistic faith in India and the West.⁴⁷

46. Sarvathā rasanātmaka-vītavighna-pratītigrahāyo bhāva eva rasaḥ.

AB, I, 280.

47. See the following as a few examples :

- (a) Tasmāt kalādikō vargo bhinnameva kadācana
Aikyametiśvarechhāto nṛtagītādivādane.

TA, VI, 132.

Samvit...kvacit ābhāse pramāṭṛn ekīkaroti, nītabhinīṣṭa iva
prekṣakān. Tāvati hi teṣāmābhāse aikyam.

IPV, I, 194-5.

- (b) The theories of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* in Indian poetics and of impersonalization (T. S. Eliot, *Tradition and the Individual Talent*) and universalization (Aristotle and Coleridge) in Western poetics. Coleridge defined the man of genius as one who "lives in the universal". Gokulanātha defines him similarly :

sahṛdayasya sādharmaṇīkṛtavibhāvādīparāmarśakasya.

KPV, p. 17.

INTERCHAPTER III

Coleridge promised to explain creation with a nature having two contrary forces¹ but did not do so. His essay, *The Prometheus of Aeschylus* is not a complete story of creation. There are some incomplete attempts in Letters². The Trika philosopher explains the whole creation with two forces of the absolute self-consciousness moving in opposite directions. They are *Vidyā* and *Māyā*. *Vidyā* leads to the centre and *Māyā* to the circumference of this concentric universe. *Vidyā* is introvert, centripetal; *Māyā* is extrovert, centrifugal. *Vidyā* universalizes; *Māyā* particularizes. *Vidyā* subjectizes an object; *Māyā* objectizes the subject. The absolute self-consciousness is both one and omnific. The purest primary self-consciousness remains the universal noumenal centre of every kind of existence. The particular phenomenal centre of every individual thing is its *prāṇa*, the vital principle of motion and rest, which in higher forms of life has *antaḥkaraṇa* or the mind as its offshoot. The human mind is the most developed *antaḥkaraṇa*. *Prāṇa* is the first concrete or phenomenal form of the activity of pure self-consciousness (*Samvit*), and *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind is the most developed form of *prāṇa*. In order to experience the pure self-consciousness the aid of *antaḥkaraṇa* and *prāṇa* cannot be ignored, for it is these two that make an individual an individual. As *antaḥkaraṇa* is only a developed form of *prāṇa*, the secret of overcoming the limited region of half-truths (*Māyā*) and entering the region of total Truth (*Vidyā*) lies in overcoming one's own mind or one's own *prāṇa*.

In all its forms of thinking (*buddhi*), feeling (*ahaṅkāra*) and desiring (*manas*), mind suffers from a peculiar limitation. It knows a thing only conceptually, while true knowledge is total perception, of which concept is only a limitation. Our feeling always has an object in time and space, and a spatio-temporal object exists only conceptually. Thus the conceptive *ahaṅkāra* limits the perceptive *Aham* both in

1. See Book I, Chapter IV, p. 83.

2. See Letters 1033 and 1077.

knowing and feeling. Desiring or hankering only shows the insufficiency of the empirical self-consciousness, while the pure self-consciousness is always self-sufficient.

The secret of catching the ideal symphony of Creation lies in total attention to an object. Total attention is total unity with the object. Object has its importance even for the idealistic realist. The difference between the materialist and the idealistic realist lies in the fact that by perception the former means what actually is not pure perception but that limited by conception, and the latter understands by it pure preception, a total vision of truth, which cannot be anything other than I am I, and thus makes the law of identity the fundamental law of logic, the science of correct thinking. The self-sufficiency of Truth equates it with the highest Joy. Thus the experience of Truth becomes the most natural as well as the highest goal of life. All misery is deviation from this natural path. Deluded by half-truths, that is, objects, which are of the nature of conceptual limitations of the subject, man forgets the subject, which is the only self-evident truth. He has to extricate himself from the cobwebs of his own conception in order to experience this self-evident pure truth and realise the joy of his own self-sufficiency.

Total attention to any object universalizes the object as well as the subject and the experience. All limitations are then crossed—limitations of time and space, cause and effect, thing and thought. This is the secret of the education of the heart, of seeing its infinite pure self-conscious background (*cidākāśa*), which is equally the essence of the outside object as well. The experience is a peculiar spiritual union of one's heart with the soul of the object, a soliloquy, which is also a dialogue. When in total attention man crosses the barriers made by his individual phenomenal self and finds his universal noumenal self, he is capable of a spiritual communion. *Nāda* is only an experience of the noumenal spiritual *bindu*. I am I can be repeated only when the pure 'I' is found. Coleridge said that God alone can say 'I am I'. The Trika philosopher says that the individual soul becomes regenerate only when he also can emulate God and

repeat it. The regenerate souls are all *svamśas* of the absolute, the waves of the ocean of the purest self-consciousness.

But it is not easy to repeat this small sentence truly and experience its total spiritual significance. We always identify our true self, the real subject, the pure 'I', with a wrong predicate, with something which is not 'I', and thus falsify our own true self and consequently distort our vision and lose the capacity to know the true nature of objects. To repeat the activity of the pure self-consciousness is to know perfect truth. It is so in every experience. Every object of the universe, the microcosm as well as the macrocosm, is identified with one's own self in this experience.

That is why *vimarśa* is more important than *prākāśā*, *caitanya* *avāda* more significant than existentialism. Nobody can obliterate his self even if he wishes to do so. He only circumscribes it, enchains it, limits it. But who can see it totally except by a total attention to it? To extend one's consciousness so far as to cross all objective frontiers and make one's total self the object of attention is to be a true lover of self, of perfect truth.

In this task of realisation of the perfect truth any object may do, provided it is so charming that it holds the perceiver's attention completely. There lies the significance of beauty. Total attention to an object so universalizes the object that the object is realized as a duplicate of the subject. The experience is of the nature of 'I am this' rather than 'I perceive this'. The experience of 'I am this' has a still higher stage of 'I am I'. That is the total experience of one's total self-sufficiency. But even the ideal timeless and spaceless experience of 'I am this' has its charm because the unity between 'I' and 'this' is not lost.

As we have seen in Book I and shall see in Book III, the value of the poetic experience lies in the spiritual nature of a unified total experience. This is the justification for including a metaphysical exposition of noumena and phenomena and the absolute immanent in both as well as transcending both. For that not only gives the poetic experience its proper place in the scheme of total education but also shows, very clearly, its spiritual nature.



BOOK III

Lokasyalva mitopayogarasikasyaiṣā puuṣaḥ khaṇḍanā.

IPVV, Vol. III, p. 406.



CHAPTER I

THE THEORY OF RASA

Sā caikacittavṛttiḥ sva-parakīyamitī pratīyamānānantacittavṛtṭiyantara-śataviśeṣitā, १ laukika-gīta-geya-padādi-lāsyāṅgadaśakopajīvana-svikṛta-lakṣaṇa-guṇā, alaṅkāra-gītātodyādi-samyak-sundarībhūta-kāvya-mahima-prayoga-mālabhyāsa-viśeṣāśrayatvāt pracyāvitā, ata eva sādharmaṇībhūtata-yā sāmājikān api svātmasadbhāvena samāveśayanti, tādātmyād eva ca anumānāgama-yogipratyakṣādi-karaṇaka-taṭastha-pramāṭṛ-prameya-parakīya-laukika-cittavṛtti-vilakṣaṇatayā nirbhāsamānā, parimita-svātmānyāś-rayatānirbhāsanāviraḥceca laukika pramadādi-janita-nija-rati-śokādivat... cittavṛtṭiyantarajanānākṣamā tata eva nirvighna-svasaṁvedanātmaka-viśrāntilakṣaṇena २ rasanāparaparyāyeṇa vyāpāreṇa gṛhyamāṇatvāt rasaśabdena abhidhīyate.

AB, I, 266-7.

Happiness in general may be defined, not the aggregate of pleasurable sensations—for this is either a dangerous error and the creed of sensualists, or else a mere translation or wordy paraphrase—but the state of that person who, in order to enjoy his nature in the highest manifestation of conscious *feeling*, has no need of doing wrong, and who in order to do right is under no necessity of abstaining from enjoyment.

AP, p. 142.

THE *Vidyā Śakti*, which is really the proper means of knowledge, gives us both types of experiences, universal and particular. When it works through the material instrument of *citta*, it becomes impure and enables us to know objects or particulars. When the *citta* is subdued, the pure *Vidyā Śakti* gives us a universal experience. The powers of *Mayā* and *Vidyā* are respectively the powers of limited and total

1. *Vidyā-māyobhayātmā Parameśvara eka eva cidghanah...*

Māyā-vidyā ubhe tasya māyā tu caturāṅdikā ;

Vidyā svarūpasānvittir anugrahamayī śivā.

PT, p. 250.

manifestation of the eternal I AM.¹ The subject of the empirical or phenomenal experiences is called *buddhimātā*, because the instrument of *buddhi* is used in such experiences. The subject of ideal or noumenal experiences is called *para-pramātā*, because the instrument of *buddhi* is subdued. The secret of human nature lies in this two-fold capacity of the human consciousness. It is "created half to rise and half to fall".² Coleridge's inspired description of the "philosophic consciousness"³ is nothing other than the description of the total manifestation of the eternal I AM, which Abhinava calls the power of *Vidyā*. It is the organ of Spirit as the *antaḥkaraṇa* or the mind is the organ of sense. This philosophic consciousness, which may easily be equated with *Vidyā Śakti*, is present in all alike, but it does not develop in all in the same manner, for, as Abhinava points out, it requires a great effort⁴ to subdue one's organ of sense, that is *antaḥkaraṇa*, and thus receive the total light of self-consciousness. For a *māyā-pramātā* that a human being naturally is,⁵ to be *para-pramātā* or *Vidyā-pramātā* is an uphill journey.

Referring to Coleridge's description of the philosophic consciousness, I.A. Richards says: "Many have enjoyed this passage, few have ventured seriously towards the test of the fact."⁶ Though very few persons have the capacity of philosophic consciousness, as Coleridge himself said,⁶ yet

1(a) See *Vyāsaśāstra* on *Yogasūtra*, I, 12, p. 17.

2. See *B.L.*, I, 163-9.

3. *TA*, vol. IV. Ahn. 6, p. 177; Ahn. 7, p. 2.

Coleridge similarly said of the philosophic consciousness that "it is actualised by an effort of freedom" and is therefore an "artificial consciousness". *B.L.*, I, 164.

4. Abhinava's *māyā-pramātā* may be equated with Coleridge's "spontaneous consciousness" (*B.L.*, I, 164) or "common consciousness" (*ibid.*, p. 167). *Māyā pramātā* is self-consciousness working through the *antaḥkaraṇa* or *citta* (*PH*, sūtra 6), which is what Coleridge calls "the distorting medium of unenlivened understanding". (*B.L.*, I, 169).

5. Coleridge on *Imagination*, p. 8.

6. *B.L.*, I, pp. 168-9.

there are eloquent instances of eminent poets getting perfect light or full knowledge. One of the most famous instances may be cited from Wordsworth, who gives a graphic description of such an experience in the *Tintern Abbey*.

that blessed mood
In which the burden of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened : that serene and blessed mood,
In which the affections gently lead us on, —
Until the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul,
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy
We see into the life of things.

D. G. Rossetti records a similar experience in *The Monochord*. Coleridge experienced it as

A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud
Enveloping the Earth,

or as Joy,

Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
A new Earth and a new Heaven.⁷

The great Indian poet, Vālmiki's spontaneous outburst at the sight of the crying curlew whose male partner was shot dead by a hunter at the time of their mating is commonly accepted as the beginning of classical Sanskrit poetry. It is perhaps the most popular instance of a similar experience. Vālmiki himself was surprised at his wonderful experience, which found expression in a completely unpremeditated couplet of extreme simplicity and deep sympathy for the bereaved.⁸

7. *Dejection : an Ode*.

8. Mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhāṁ tvam agamaḥ śāśvatīḥ samāḥ
Yat krouñca-mithunādekam avadhīḥ Kāma-mohitam.

Rāmāyaṇa, Bālakāṇḍa, II, 15.

All such experiences are those of the total self-consciousness or *Vidyā-pramātā* subduing the limited self-consciousness or *māyāpramātā*. Such experiences are called *Rasa* in Indian aesthetics. *Rasa* is the supreme art-experience and when it is successfully expressed through words, they become the highest type of poetry.

Let us now analyse the spectator's experience of a drama in a theatre.⁹ He sees the actors and actresses dressed in costumes suited for their different parts and is willing to accept them as the characters they represent. But he finds it difficult to accept them as original characters as they are actually not so. A peculiar illusion¹⁰ is created in which he completely forgets the time and place associated with either the actors or the characters they represent. He does not exclude his own self from the experience. The more he enjoys the dramatic action performed on the stage, the more he identifies himself with the action. The result is that his whole personality, body and soul together, gets electrified.¹¹ In a unique mood of sympathy or rather empathy he weeps or laughs with the actor. He does not remain a detached spectator but joins in a unique experience of a universal feeling along with other sensitive souls in the gallery.¹²

9. Ayamatra saṅkṣepaḥ :

Mukṣa-pratiśīṣakādīnā tāvan naṭabuddhir ācchādyate. Gāḍha-prāktanasaṁvit-saṁskārācca kāvyabalānīyamānāpi na tatra Rāmadhīr viśrāmyati. Ata eva ubhaya-deśa-kāla-tyāgaḥ. Romāñcādayaśca bhūyasā rati-pratīkārītayā dṛṣṭāḥ, tatrāpi laukika-deśa-kālānīyamenā tatra ratiṁ gamayanti, yasyām svātmāpi tadvāsanāvattvād anupraviṣṭāḥ. Ata eva na taṣasthatayā ratyavagamah. Na ca niyata-kāraṇatayā, yena arjanābhiṣaṅgādi-sambhāvanā. Na ca niyataparatmaikagatayā, yena duḥkha-dveṣādyudayaḥ. Tena sādharāṇibhūtā santānavṛttir ekasyā eva vā saṁvido gocarabhūtā ratiḥ śrṅgāraḥ.

AB, I, 285-6.

10. Cp. Coleridge's concept of "willing suspension of disbelief". (B.L., II, 6). Abhinava's explanation is more natural and easy,

11. Sarvāṅgīnamivāliṅgan... brahmānandāsvādamiva anubhāvayan...

Mamṣa's exposition of Abhinava's view in KP, p. 99.

12. TA, VI, 132 and IPV, I, 194-5 quoted in fn. 47, Ch. IV, Book II.

The suspension of the spatio-temporal tags is one of the most essential characteristics of the *Rasa* experience.

The total nature of the poetic experience (*Rasa*), though super-psychic, includes psychic things as its subordinated parts and has its effect felt on the body as well. It led a critic like A. E. Housman to give an undue emphasis on the physical aspect of this experience. In his essay *On Reading Poetry* he says: "Poetry indeed seems to me more physical than intellectual." He rightly pointed out that poetry belongs to the class of things which may be called *secretion*, though he was wrong to think that it was either natural or morbid secretion. Indian critics point out that the essence of poetry is *Rasa*, which may perfectly correctly be translated as 'secretion'. But they say that it is a transcendental ideal secretion of the infinite subject enjoying an aspect or total of its own universal nature.

Universalization of experience may be viewed as forgetting the worldly nature of the feeling. Feeling in the common worldly experience is prejudiced. We are glad at the prosperity of our friends and sad at that of our foes and indifferent at that of others.¹³ Such prejudices are possible because our feelings are attached to particular persons. If in the theatre also a spectator suffers from such prejudices, he can hardly have a taste of the universalized experience called *Rasa*. The importance of the theatrical performance lies in its compelling attraction, which persuades the spectator "to surrender himself at that moment to something more valuable", and shed his personal prejudices which means removal of the tags of time and place from the feelings roused by the theatrical performance. Spatio-temporal tags are removed both from the object and the subject. The subject enjoying and the object enjoyed are both univer-

13. Mamaivaite, śatrorevaite, taṣṭhasyaivaite, na mamaivaite, na śatrorevaite, na taṣṭhasyaivaite iti sambandha-viśeṣa-svikāra-parihāra-niyamānadhavasāyāt sādharmaṇyena pratītaiḥ abhivyaktaḥ.

Mammaṭa's exposition of Abhinava's view in *KP*, p. 97.

salized. It appears that various individual spectators are individually enjoying the performance. But actually speaking, the individuals subdue their individuality, that is, their finite mind, *citta*, or Understanding, and the one universal knower, *Vidyā-pramātā* or *Para-pramātā*, enjoys the basic feeling portrayed. (Such an impersonal universal experience is called *Rasa*,¹⁴ ; This is the way feeling is purified or sublimated. Spectators come out of the theatre retaining the memory of this universal experience in their minds (*cittas*), purified by that divine experience. Sinking of the finite self-consciousness or the individual mind in the infinite self-consciousness brings about the purification, the *katharsis*, of the former.

This universalization of experience is a continuous process (*santānavṛtti*), though continuity is not felt, because only one feeling flowing as an undercurrent is predominantly felt.¹⁵ This one basic feeling lies in the unconscious. In life it is felt only when it comes to the conscious level through sensual contact with its appropriate object. That makes it limited in life. In poetry also the predominant undercurrent of the basic feeling (*sthāyī bhāva*) cannot be experienced without a suitable objective correlative. The objective correlative of the basic feeling becomes the centre of attraction in a drama. It is generally its hero or heroine, who is the centre of the plot, round whom the whole plot is woven. The objective correlative of the basic feeling is thus the central theme of the dramatic plot. Around this central *ethos* hover

14. *Sāmājikānām vāsanātmatayā sthitaḥ sthāyī ratyādiko niyata-pramā-
tṛgatatvena sthito'pi sādharāṇopāyabalād tatkalavigalita-parimita-
pramāṭṛbhāva-vaśonmiṣita- vedyāntara-samparka-śūnyāparimitabhā-
vena pramātrā sakala-sahṛdayasamvādabhājā sādharāṇyena svākāra
iva abhinno'pi gocarikṛtaḥ.*

Mammaṭa's exposition of Abhinava's view in *KP*, pp. 97-9.

15. Cp. Coleridge : "Our genuine admiration of a great poet is a continuous *under-current* of feeling ; it is everywhere present, but seldom anywhere as a separate excitement."

many floating emotions (*sañcārī bhāvas*). They are roused by the actions of the hero as well as less important characters introduced as the objective correlatives of these floating emotions. Again, the psycho-physical expressions of these ephemeral emotions also play an important part in giving an idea of the nature of the basic feeling and the accessory floating emotions. The basic feeling is expressed in life also through finite ephemeral emotions and their psycho-physical effects in behaviour. In life, however, the process is extrovert, centrifugal, and the result is that a feeling becomes pleasant or unpleasant according to the congenial or uncongenial relation between the subject and object. Even where such a relation is congenial as, for example, in love between a handsome young lover and a beautiful young beloved, it has a tinge of sorrow. The reason is that both the subject enjoying and the object enjoyed are finite and so arrest the continuity of enjoyment and in the very moment and act of satisfaction produce a sense of dullness or sadness.

The poetic experience of a basic feeling reverses this process and purifies it. The various minor characters and situations contribute to the understanding of the main character, the hero; and it is his feeling that becomes the predominant feeling of the drama. All these—the hero, the heroine, the minor characters, portrayed as passing through a variety of situations and experiences, are merely objective correlatives; and what the spectator enjoys is not these objects but the feelings they rouse. As a matter of fact, just as the problem of poetic creation is to express a poetic experience, that is *Rasa*, through suitable objective correlatives, making the universal experience tangible through finite symbols suggestive of the self-ebullient *Rasa*, that holds these units together and gives them an organic unity, similarly the problem of poetic enjoyment is to feel the universal experience of which the objective correlatives on the stage are symbols. In the universal experience of the basic feeling lying in the unconscious but brought to the conscious level

through its accessories and psycho-physical expressions there is a peculiar union of the conscious and the unconscious aspects of the basic feeling.¹⁶ The conscious concrete emotions, the finite units of accessories (*sañcāri-bhāvas*), and psycho-physical expressions (*anubhāvas*), that give a unique expression to the basic feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*)—all these are universalized, which means that their spatio-temporal tags, attachments to objects, are removed. On the other hand, the sleepy passivity of the unconscious basic feeling is removed and it begins to move as an under-current in which the former concrete units are mixed like the various ingredients that variegate the taste of a drink and cannot be tasted separately or part-wise but only as parts subsisting in a whole.

Now the feeling and emotions and their expressions enjoyed by the spectator cannot be that of any person other than himself. How can he feel with another man's heart? Hence it is not correct to describe the artistic experience as "an escape from emotion" or "an escape from personality" as T.S. Eliot did. It is better to call it an "inscape" into one's own heart,¹⁷ into one's deep-seated basic feeling, which is common to the spectator and the poet and the character and the actor, in fact, to all persons past, present or future in any corner of the universe and hence is unconscious and universal. It is this experience of the universal feeling that is *Rasa*. The unconscious region is brought into conscious grasp. But as the unconscious region is infinite, it is only the infinite self-consciousness that can hold it; the limited self-consciousness cannot. Thus the subject as well as the object

16. Tadgrāhakaṁ ca pramāṇaṁ na nirvikalpakam, vibhāvādiparāmarśa-pradhānatvāt. Nāpi savikalpakam, carvyamāṇasya aloukikānandamayasya tasya svasaṁvedanasiddhatvāt. Ubhayābhāve svarūpasya ca ubhayātmakatvamapi pūrvavat lokottaratāmeva gamayati, na tu virodham iti Śrīmadācāryābhinavaguptapādāḥ. KP, pp. 101-2.

17. Hṛdayamiva praviśan
Tatra svātmāveśena Rasa-carvaṇā ityuktam.

KP, p. 99.

AB, I, 267.

of the *Rasa* experience—which is the artistic experience *par excellence*—is infinite and universal. But it has to be remembered that the subject is a higher universal than the object, for as already explained in the metaphysical section, the infinite eternal self-consciousness is the highest universal, the most *a priori*, of which all other universals are ideal manifestations (*bhāva-srṣṭi*) and all particulars phenomenal manifestations (*bhūta-srṣṭi*). It is only in the case of the most fundamental or primary *Rasa* known as *Śānta Rasa*, that both the subject and the object may be said to be of the same level, as we shall presently see.

The universal experience (*Rasa*) of a basic feeling (*sthāyī-bhāva*) is different from any particular experience (*rāga*) of the same. The latter circumscribes our personality, brings prides and prejudices and thus belittles it. The former sublimates it by a removal of all such prejudices, for removal of the spatio-temporal limitations of the feeling is the *sine qua non* of the *Rasa* experience.¹⁸ Feeling becomes a prejudice only on account of these limitations and so is rightly discarded in science, which is concerned with the objective universal principles lying behind the phenomena. Otherwise, even in worldly life the importance of feeling cannot be minimised. It is no less important than knowing. Removal of limitations gives a value to the feeling and makes art or poetry a proper means of moral education.

Poetic creation and poetic enjoyment are two types of manifestations, centrifugal (*kriyātmaka*) and centripetal (*jñānātmaka*), of the universal self-consciousness enjoying a basic feeling. Abhinava stresses the identity of the power behind these two manifestations.¹⁹

18. Uktam hi deśa-kāla-pramāṭṛbhedānīyantrito rasa iti. *AB*, I, 291.

19. Sarasvatyāstattvaṁ kavisaḥṛdayākhyam vijayate. *Locana*, v. 1.

Cp. "But sensory and motor systems are not independent ; they work together ; every perception probably includes a response in the form of incipient action."
P.L.C., p. 107.

How are the time-limits and place-limits removed? Let us consider that once again for further clarification of this important point. Whose feeling do we enjoy when we see the *Rāmāyaṇa* staged? Rāma's? But Rāma lived in the hoary past and his feeling cannot be an object of our experience. Then the actor's? No, because he is only acting, playing the feeling of another person, Rāma, and does not present his own feeling on the stage. Is it our own feeling then that we enjoy? But we have not lost our *Sitā*. It is this buffeting from every corner where the feeling tries to locate itself that does not allow it to be arrested anywhere. But in order to be felt at all the feeling has to be felt individually. The only possible explanation of this riddle is that the dramatic or the poetic presentation of the feeling does not allow the spectator's or the reader's narrow self (*ahankāra*) to stagnate the feeling in the narrow selfish fold of his mind and consequently it is universalized and becomes an object fit for the experience of the pure universal self (*Aham* or *Vidyā-pramātā* or *Para-pramātā*).

The theatrical attractions, dance, music, and acting, and the dramatist's style, his way of presentation of the poetic passion (*Rasa*), the words and their order – indeed, everything that the poet and the actor have to offer to attract the spectator to the dramatic action displayed is necessary.²⁰ But the spectator also should make his own contribution. He must give a close attention to the dramatic presentation. The wonderful overpowering experience of *Rasa* is possible only when he gets so completely absorbed in the dramatic world as to forget his own.

Poetic experience is a bilateral affair. While the objective correlatives have their own importance in rousing the passion, they are helpful only to those spectators who offer themselves to be attracted by them. The object as object is

20. Na taj jñānaṁ na tacchilpaṁ na sā vidyā na sā kalā
Nāsau yogo na tatkarma nāṭyē'smin yan na dr̥syate.

always passive and so is the finite subject, limited by its passive instrument of mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*). The subject, however, is limitedly active. The *Vidyā Śakti*, the totally free and active power works through the audience who gives life to the poem by appreciating it. The superiority of the theatrical presentation lies in the fact that there the spectator finds poetry in action. The attractions are so powerful that the mind is not allowed to remain passive or self-centred or inattentive, loitering from one object to another. This compulsive attraction of the drama makes it superior to poetry,²¹ where the reader has to exercise his imagination more in order to portray the poetic action described before his mental eye. Still not only in poetry but also in drama the spectator should be a qualified man. Everybody cannot understand it. In every branch of learning Indian scholars prescribe a minimum qualification for the student to understand a particular subject. The reader of poetry as well as the spectator of drama must be a man with such a sensitive nature as can be one with the subject-matter of poetry or drama, can unify himself with the feeling and emotions roused. Such a person, who is called *sahṛdaya*,²² literally meaning a man with heart, alone can understand poetry or drama.

That the function of the whole plot consisting of so many characters and events is to make the main action more and more clear is a common assumption underlying all dramas. Coleridge explains that there is only one unity, the unity of impression. Abhinava says in the clearest possible terms that the unity of impression leads the spectator to sympathise with the feeling of the hero to such an extent that he identifies himself with the depersonalized hero.²³ This identi-

21. *Ahṛdayānām ca tadeva [nāṭyameva] nairmalyādhāyi.*

AB, I, 287.

22. *Yeṣāṁ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā, te svahṛdayasaṁvādabhājāḥ sahṛdayāḥ.*

Locana, pp. 38-9.

Adhikarī cātra vimalapratibhānaśālīhṛdayaḥ.

AP, I, 279.

23. See fn 27 of chapter 2, Book III.

fiction is possible by the spectator's completely forgetting that the feeling belongs to a particular person at a particular time and place. In such a time-less and place-less experience it is his own deep-seated feeling lying hidden in his unconscious but roused to the conscious level that the spectator enjoys. It is the varying sensitiveness of readers that accounts for the variations in the meaning of a poem.²⁴ This experience of one's own basic feeling along with its associate emotions and their psycho-physical expressions felt in a universal manner by one's universal self-consciousness is *Rasa*.

The different characters, situations, actions and emotions amplify and enrich the predominant basic feeling of the hero, which flows as an undercurrent in the plot. In fact, the special function of the poet is to give the basic feeling lying in the unconscious of all mankind a conscious expression by a unique combination of these accessories and correlatives. All his experience of life, all his learning of arts and science, his mastery of technique and his style are brought into play in this important task.²⁵ His main purpose is to direct the basic feeling of his reader to a proper object and thus make it valuable for himself and others. This is the moral aim of the poetic course of education.²⁶

In thus giving a life-size portrait of the basic feeling, lying latent in everybody's heart, there are various factors at work. It is necessary to understand them clearly with the help of an example.

24. Tasya hṛdayasaṁvādatāratamyāpekṣayā śrotṛpratipatṛsphuraṇaṁ
sphuṭāsphuṭatvena ativicitram. AB, I, 291.

25. Na tat padaṁ na tad vākyaṁ na sā vidyā na sā kalā
Jāyate yan na kāvyāṅgam aho bhāro mahān kaveḥ.

Sāhitya-mīmāṁsā quoted in *KPV*, p. 20.

26. Tanmanojñavastumadhye tādṛgidaṁ vastu anupraveśitaṁ yadbālādeva
pumarthopāyāvagatiṁ karoti. AB, I, 4.
Rāmādivad vartitavyaṁ na Rāvaṇādivad ityupadeśaṁ ca yathāyogaṁ
kaveḥ saḥṛdayasya ca karoti it sarvathā tatra yatanīyam.

KP, p. 7.

You see a tiger coming towards you in a lonely forest and load your gun at once, aim at him, shoot him dead and are glad to bag him at the first shot. Here the tiger roused in you your basic feeling of courage lying latent in you in your unconscious. You acted in a brave manner and stood with bristled hair, exhilarated at your success. Here you and the tiger are the causes (*upādāna kāraṇa* known in poetry as *vibhāva*) of excitement of the basic feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*), you being the person in whom the feeling is roused (*ālambana*) and the tiger being the person who rouses it (*uddīpana*). The lonely forest also excites the feeling and hence falls in the second category of the cause (*uddīpana vibhāva*). In between the act of killing the tiger and that of first sighting him you pass through various emotions like anger, pride, fear, impatience and so on, quickly changing according to your varying moods, all giving expression to the basic feeling of courage and making your experience of it unique. All these associates (*sahakāris*) are known in poetry as *sañcāri-* or *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*. These ephemeral emotions bring out various psycho-physical expressions on your face and physique. They are the effects (*kāryas* known in poetry as *anubhāvas*) of the ever-changing moods of the basic feeling.

This is how it happens in life. We see such a scene enacted on the screen—such a scene can only be reported on the stage—or read its description in poetry. We at once

27. *AB*, I, 284 : Tatra loka-vyavahāre kārya-kāraṇa-sahacārātmakaliṅga-darśane sthāyīātma-para-cittavṛttyanumānābhyāsa-pāṭavādadhunā taireva udyāna-kaṭākṣa-vikṣādibhir loukikīm kāraṇatvādibhuvam atikrāntair vibhāvanānubhāvanā-samuparañjakatva-mātra-prāṇaiḥ, ata eva aloukika-vibhāvādi-vyapadeśabhāgbhiḥ prācya-kāraṇādi-rūpa-saṃskāropajīvana-khyāpanāya vibhāvādi-nāmadheya-vyapadeśyaiḥ bhāvādhyāye'pi vakṣyamāṇa-svarūpa-bhedaiḥ guṇa-pradhānatā-paryāyeṇa sāmājika-dhiyi samyag yogam sambandham aikāgryam vā āśāditavadbhir aloukika-nirvighna-saṃvedanātmakacarvanā-gocaratām nīto'rthaḥ carvyamāṇataikasāro, na tu siddhasvabhāvaḥ, tātkālika eva, na tu carvaṇātirikta kālāvalambī sthāyī-vilakṣaṇa eva Rasaḥ.

identify ourselves with the hero, the hunter,²⁸ and in such an identification we forget that the feeling of bravery or courage displayed actually belongs to the real hunter and not to the actor playing his part or to us, spectators or readers. We subdue our limited selves, make an inscape into the depth of our unconscious and the result is that our universal self-consciousness (*Para-pramāṇa* or *Vidyāpramāṇa*) embraces the basic universal feeling and the joy of this embrace is *Rasa*. It is a total experience affecting both our body and soul. It is a super-psychic joy (*brahmāsvādasahodara*). As we suspend the limits of time and place, we have a transcendental super-psychic experience of a universal feeling where all the particulars of experience are so mixed together that while they make the experience unique and rich, they themselves do not become obtrusive in any way and yield to the self-ebullient stream of the infinite self-consciousness, presenting a unique taste of multitude in unity like a high class drink. *Rasa* is the transcendental delightful perception of one's own nature (*svabhāva*) tinged with the predominant feeling excited by the dramatic display.²⁹

Rasa is an experience without obstacles³⁰ in contrast with a worldly experience, which is full of them. In the latter the subject and the object are both limited. In the former the subject is infinite self-consciousness, which over-

28. We identify ourselves with the hunter and not the tiger, because in the instance given it is the hunter's action that rouses our courage. Our sympathy with the tiger will excite a different basic feeling. Thus though both together along with a third, the lonely forest, excite our basic feeling of courage, the chief objective correlative of the basic feeling is the hunter. The idea has been stated by Abhinava precisely thus :

Bhoktaiva ca sthāyisaṁvidrūpaḥ.

AB., I, 311.

Avighnabhogātmakasambhogo Rasaḥ.... Sa ca vibhāvasākātkārāt-maka eva.

AB., I, 305.

29. Asmanmate saṁvedanameva ānandaghanam āsvādyate. Tatra kā duḥkhaśāṅkā. Kevalam tasyaiva citratākarāṇe ratiśokādivāsanāvypāraḥ ; tadudbodhane ca abhinayādivyāpāraḥ.

AB., I, 292.

30. Sarvathā rasanātmaka-vītavighnapratītigrahyo bhāva eva Rasaḥ.

AB., I, 280.

comes all obstacles to its total grasp of the object. The multitude of objects in a poetic experience do not destroy its unity. The reason is that the objects themselves lose their objectivity. They have no existence separate from the subject. *Rasa* purifies the worldly personal feelings and emotions by subduing them in their universal form and making them fit for embrace by the infinite self-consciousness. The main task of the objective correlatives is to remove the obstacles to a total manifestation of the spirit.³¹

The difference between the poetic *Rasa* experience and the divine experience is that in the latter the object is of the nature of total void and the light of the subject itself takes an outward form and becomes the object. In the poetic experience objects are felt but unobtrusively just as the constituent units of a drink modify its taste but are not separately felt.³² In the worldly experience we equate existence with objectivity. Whatever does not appear as object is considered non-existent. In short, feelings and thoughts become figments of imagination while objects are supposed to be real. This position is reversed in a poetic experience. Here substantiality belongs to subjective things—feelings, emotions and psychic actions, and objects—characters and their physical actions as well as other things—are valuable only so far as they are able to rouse their subjective correlatives, the emotions and the basic feeling. Hence it is of no consequence whether the objective correlatives have factual existence at any time or not. The only significance of their portrayal is to help the audience know their own nature (*svabhāva*), and see that nothing obtrudes as an obstacle to it.³³ As

31. Tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhṛtayaḥ,

AB, I, 280.

32. The analogy is called pānakarasanyāya.

See NS and AB, I, 287-9, 285.

33. Apradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṁvid viśrāmyati. Tasyaiva pratyaśasya pradhānāntaram pratyānūdhāvataḥ svātmani aviśrantatvāt. Atāḥ Apradhānatvam jaḍe vibhāvānubhāvavarge vyabhicārinicaye ca saṁvidātmakē'pi niyamena anyamukhasamprekṣiṇi sambhavati iti tadatiriktaḥ sthāyīveva tathā carvaṇāpātram.

AB, I, 281.

time and space are the most obstinate forces to raise a massive material structure between the self and its nature, so the first and foremost task of the poet is to remove these obtrusive forces. Both the poet and the reader have to join hands in removing them. One does it by his attractive presentation, the other by his close attention.³⁴ Thus the action described is a movement on the ground only for a take-off from the lower world of particulars to a higher world of universals. The particulars, the objective correlatives are used to subdue their particularity,³⁵ just as one thorn is used to remove another from a limb. The state of perfect health is the state of *being in one's own self* as the Sanskrit word, *svāsthya* indicates. The nature of true happiness is freedom from obstacles, perfect rest. Objects of the world that entice our sense organs and make our mind restless, are thus detrimental to perfect health and happiness. Poetry restores mental health.³⁶ This explains why an actual love-affair does not produce the *Rasa* experience while a poetic description of the same does.³⁷ This general rule has exceptions. For great men of genius who have an innate capacity for universal experience or have cultivated it through other ways, the poetic description is not the only means of having the *Rasa* experience. Vālmiki and Wordsworth are the most eloquent examples known to all.

34. Ekāgre ca sāmājike tanmayibhuta āsvādayitṛtā.

AB, I, 289.

35. The method may be compared to that of nurses, who lull the babies to sleep not by silence but by singing, not by holding them quiet but by rocking them in their arms. See Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, p. 250 and *Republic* VIII, 560D referred to by him. See the present author's article on "The Concepts of *Katharsis* and *Guṇa*".

36. Antarāyaśūnya-viśrāntiśārīratvāt sukhasya, aviśrāntirūpataiva duḥkham. ...ityānandarūpatā sarva-rasānām. Sā [rasapratipattiḥ] ca avighnā Saṁvid.

AB, I, 282, 279.

Cp. *P.L.C.*, ch 32, p. 248.

37. Nāṭya eva raśā na loke.

AB, I, 291.

THE PRIMARY RASA

Saṁsāra-nāṭya-nirmāṇe yāvakāśa-vidhānataḥ
Pūrvaraṅgāyate vyoma-mūrtiṁ tām Śaṅkarīm numaḥ.

AB, I, 207.

Tad ya eva sato bhāvān śūnyikartuṁ tathāsataḥ
Sphuṭikartuṁ svatantratvād īśaḥ sa Parameśvaraḥ.

MVV, I, 1059.

Ucchalat-saṁvidāmātra-viśrāntyāsvāda-yogināḥ
Sarvābhidhāna-sāmarthyād anīyantrita-śaktayaḥ.

MVV, I, 1020.

Mokṣādhyātma-nimittāḥ tattvajñānārtha-hetu-saṁyuktāḥ
Niḥśreyasadharmayutāḥ śāntaraso nāma vijñeyaḥ.

Svaṁ svaṁ nimittam āsādyā śāntād bhāvaḥ pravartate
Punar nimittāpāye tu śānta eva praliyate.

AB, I, 340.

...Parameśvara-viśrāntyānandaḥ prakṛṣyate, tadānanda-vipruṇmātrāva-
bhāso hi rasāsvāda ityuktam prāg asmābhiḥ.

Locana, p. 510.

In the deep Sabbath of meek self-content ;
Cleansed from the vaporous passions that bedim
God's image...

Coleridge : *Ode to the Departing year*, 11. 159-61, *Poems*, p. 168.

"...deep sky is, of all visual impressions, the nearest akin to a feeling.
It is more a feeling than a sight, or, rather, it is the melting away and
entire union of feeling and sight !"

AP, pp. 125-6.

RASA is a universal experience. In the ultimate analysis
Rasa is one and is no other than the absolute self-conscious-
ness itself, the total consciousness of total existence, the
vimarśa of *anuttara prakāśa*, the highest universal, the Joy
and Peace that God is. It is therefore called the *Śānta*
Rasa. *Raso vai Saḥ*, says the *Śruti*.¹ Abhinava calls it the

1. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, DU, p. 302.

supreme *Rasa*, *Mahārasa*, or the ultimate universal *Rasa*, *Rasa-sāmānya*?, to differentiate it from the lower universal experiences of similar nature. Man can participate in this divine experience, because as a regenerate soul (*muktāṇu*) he is a wave of that great stream of life that the absolute self-consciousness is. In the theological phraseology of the Trika philosophy we may say that the highest perfection that can be achieved by man is to be *Śiva*,³ who is an ideal self-conscious reality, a *svāṁśa* of the absolute *Parama Śiva*.⁴ *Śānta Rasa* is an experience of the joy of being *Śiva*.⁵

To participate in this divine experience is the highest goal of life.⁶ Joy is the highest form of the Divine.⁷ That is therefore the supreme experience. Scholars have raised doubts if this divine experience can ever be objectified, be the subject-matter of poetic creation or enjoyment. Even if a poet of the highest spiritual experience write a poem of the *Śānta Rasa*, and a reader of similar capacity enjoy it, it is almost impossible to dramatize it, they say.⁸ Abhinava does not agree with such critics and shows that the *Śānta Rasa* is not only fundamental, without which other *Rasas* cannot exist, but also presentable on the stage. He says that it would not be proper to deny the highest achievement of life to a man who makes literature his means of knowledge. The value

2. *Tatēśca mukhyabhūtāt mahārasāt sphoṭadṛśīva asatyāni vā, anvītābhidhānadṛśīva upāyātmakāni satyāni vā, abhihitānvayadṛśīva tatsamudāyarūpāṇi vā, rasāntarāṇi bhāgābhiniveśa dṛṣṭāni rūpyante.*

AB, I, 267.

Sāmānyamapi tu vivecakena prthageva gaṇaniyam iti...

AB, I, 339.

3. *Yatrādharaḍharapadāt Paramam Śivānta-*

Māroḍhumapyadhikṛtiḥ kṛtinām anarghā.

TA, XII, 403.

4. *Kaviraj, Gopinatha, op. cit., p. 408.*

5. Abhinava's following verse points to the same truth :

*Ratyādi-śaktyaṣṭaka madhyavṛttir yasya svahṛnmaṇḍala-samprayojyaḥ
Sthāyī Śivaścetaṣi tena vṛttiḥ kṛtā rasādhyaya iha krameṇa.*

AB, I, 341.

6. *Tatas trivargātmaka-pravṛttidharmaviparīta-nivṛttidharmātmako
mokṣaphalaḥ Śāntaḥ.*

AB, I, 267.

7. *Ānand īti Param Brahma.*

SB on TU ; DU, p. 295.

8. *Na hi ceṣṭāvyuparamaḥ prayogayogyah.*

AB, I, 333.

of literature would diminish if participation in the divine wisdom were denied to its readers.⁹ Moreover, even the other types of *Rasa* cannot be explained without first accepting this fundamental *Rasa*. All types of *Rasa* have the common nature of being the experience of perfect peace.¹⁰ Lower universals are naturally based on a higher universal.

But how is it possible for a man to experience the highest universal that the *Śānta Rasa* is? Let us once more understand the process of the *Rasa* experience.

The first condition of this experience is that the object to be experienced should be an affection, a feeling (*bhāva*) and not mere knowledge (*jñāna*).¹¹ Knowledge and feeling are not mutually exclusive terms. Knowledge that affects is feeling. Feeling is being or becoming, while knowledge is mere knowing. Becoming shows a transient phase and being a timeless one. The difference is that between an ephemeral emotion and a permanent tendency or trait of character. Transient emotions do not lead to the *Rasa* experience; a basic feeling does.

It is a common belief among Indian philosophers that an individual's experiences and actions leave impressions on his mind, which stores them.^{11a} They are known as *samskāras* or *vāsanās*. They are psychic potentials. The Trika philosopher explains them as impurities resulting from the individual's

9. Yathā ca kāmādiṣu samucitās-cittavṛttayo ratyādiśabdavācyaḥ kavi-naṭa-vyāpāreṇa āsvāda-yogyatā-prāpaṇa-dvāreṇa tathāvidha-hṛdaya-saṁvādavataḥ sāmājikaṁ prati rasatvaṁ śrṅgārāditayā niyante tathā mokṣābhidhāna-parama-puṁśārthocitā cittavṛttiḥ kimiti rasatvaṁ nāniyata iti vaktavyam. AB, I, 333.

'Nāṭya', by definition does not exclude any achievement :

Ekena yat nena samastavastu-siddhir yato bhavati tan nāṭyam.

AB, p. 13.

10. Sarva-rasānām śāntapraya evāsvādaḥ, viṣayebhyo viparivṛtṭyā.

AB, I, 339.

11. Bhāvā rasān bhāvayanti niṣpādayanti.

AB, I, 293.

11a. A similar view has been expressed by Dr. I. A. Richards.

See P.L.C., p. 103.

biased activities (*kārma mala*).^{11b} They are the directional impulses, the formative principles, that determine not only a man's character but also his birth.¹² These basic innate tendencies are eight in number, four primary and four secondary. Love, resentment, courage and aversion are the primary character-traits and mirth, sorrow, wonder and fear are the secondary ones according to Bharata.¹³ They direct the course of man's life. What direction man would take depends upon what basic tendency predominates in his heart. Life continues rolling one way or the other owing to these basic tendencies. There is not a single living creature who can be said to be bereft of these. Their different proportions explain the different character-traits of people. Another cause of such differences is the propriety or impropriety of the objects to which they are tagged.¹⁴

These tendencies are called *sthāyī* or permanent. But they should be called permanent only from the worldly stand-

11b. Though the concept of *vāsanā* or appentency is not so well developed in the Western philosophy as in the Indian, both Richards and Coleridge speak of it. See *P.L.C.*, p. 47 ; and *AP*, pp. 305-6 :

To the right understanding of the most awfully *concerning* declaration of Holy Writ there has been no greater obstacle than the want of insight into the nature of Life—what it is and what it is not. But in order to this, the mind must have been raised to the contemplation of the *Idea*—the life celestial, to wit—or the distinctive essence and character of the Holy Spirit. Here Life is *Love*—communicative, out-pouring love. *Ergo*, the terrestrial or the Life of Nature ever the shadow and opposite of the Divine is appropriative, absorbing *appetence*.

12. Vācaspati Miśra and Vyāsa on *Yogasūtra*, IV, 9-10.

See also the concept of *mala* in the Trika philosophy discussed in Book II.

13. Śrīṅārāddhi bhaveddhāsyō roudrācca karuṇo rasah

Virāccaivādbhutopattir bibhatsācca bhayānakah. NS, I, 295, v. 39.

14. Na hyetat-cittavṛttivāsanāśūnyaḥ prāpī bhavati. Kevalam kasyacit kācid adhikā cittavṛttih kācid ūnā. Kasyacid ucitaviśaya-nīyantritā kasyacid anyathā.

AB, I, 282-3.

point, as Abhinava points out,¹⁵ for no form of limitation can be permanent as has been shown in Book II. The point is of considerable importance for determining value in poetry. So the word *sthāyī* is translated better as 'basic' than as 'permanent'.

This is the unconscious state of feeling (*bhāva*) and its vast region is compared to an ocean.¹⁶ Sometimes it is called the root-feeling;¹⁷ and at others it is compared to the thread that holds flowers in a garland.¹⁸ Continuous under-current is the nature of the basic feeling. These basic psychic tendencies cannot be effaced completely, even by their contraries. Bharata calls them masters of the psychic region as they have many satellites.¹⁹ Abhinava explains them as innate appetencies or impulses owing to the cumulative psychic affections of actions done in the vast period of a beginningless past²⁰ and distinguishes them from the concrete desires for worldly objects. Appetency thus is the first stage of feeling.

Taking the analogy of the ocean we may explain the second stage of feeling as the stage of psychic waves that take their rise from the first unconscious stage only to disappear in it after a momentary stay. We prefer to call them emotions, which, according to the modern usage, denotes a more

15. Lokāpekṣayā ye sthāyino bhāvāḥ. AB, I, 288.

16. Viruddhair aviruddhair vā bhāvair vicchidyate na yaḥ
Ātmabhāvaṁ nayatyanyān sa sthāyī lavaṇākaraḥ.

DR, IV, 34, p. 142.

17. Aviruddhā viruddhā vā yaṁ tirodhātumakṣamāḥ
Āsvādāṅkurakando'sau bhāvāḥ sthāyīti sammatāḥ.

SD, III, 174, p. 157.

18. Śrak-sūtravṛtṭyā bhāvānām anyeṣāmanugāmakaḥ
Na tirodhīyate sthāyī tairasau puṣyate param.

SD, III, p. 157.

See also fn. 24 of this chapter.

19. Bhāvāśrayatvāt svāmibhūtāḥ sthāyino bhāvāḥ. NS, I, 349.

20. Antargato'nādi-prāktana-saṁskāra-pratibhānamayo, na tu lauikika-
viṣayajo, rāgaḥ. AB, I, 345.

See also fn. 23 of this chapter.

complex state than that denoted by the word 'feeling'. Such transient emotions are thirtythree in all according to the Hindu psychologists.²¹ Every basic feeling does not emerge in all these thirtythree forms.²² Whether a feeling is of the primary basic type or of the secondary transient type may be easily judged. For example, the sight of a ferocious tiger strikes terror in the heart and that of a lovely maiden excites love. At once we become *anxious* for running away in one case and for a *tete-a-tete* in the other. Anxiety, that is an offshoot of both fear and love, is evidently secondary. A transient emotion cannot exist without the object which excites it. A basic feeling exists in the unconscious state irrespective of the presence or absence of the object.²³ A basic feeling may often have a transient phase in association with another basic feeling. Thus, for example, the lover's love for his beloved excites *courage* in him to overcome obstacles to a rendezvous. Courage becomes a transient emotion here. But none of the thirtythree transient emotions (*vyabhicāri-bhāvas*) can ever assume a permanent form. The difference between a basic feeling and a transient emotion is sometimes explained with the example of a garland where the thread that keeps the beads together represents the basic feeling while the beads represent the transient emotions.²⁴

21. Śāradātanaya, the author of *Bhāvaprakāśa*, says that if there be found any transient emotion besides the thirtythree enumerated in the works on poetics, that should also be included in this category. (p. 25).

22. Tatra anubhāvānām vibhāvānām vyabhicāriṇām ca prthak sthāyini niyamo nāsti. AB, I, 284.

23. Tathā hi glāno'yamityukte kṛta iti hetuprasṇena sthāyi tasya sūcyate. Na tu Rāma utsāhaśaktimān ityatra hetuprasṇamāhuḥ. Ata eva vibhāvās tatra udbodhakāḥ santaḥ svarūpoparaṇjakatvam vidadhānā ratyutsāhāder ucitānucitatvamātramāvahanti. Na tu tadabhāve sarvathaiva te nirupākhyāḥ, vāsanātmanā sarvajantūnām tanmayatvena uktatavāt. Vyabhicāriṇām tu sva-vibhāvābhāve nāmāpi nāsti iti. AB, I, 283.

24. Tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasyūtā evāpi vyabhicāriṇaḥ, etc. AB, I, 283.

The second stage of transient emotion is still a purely psychic stage, something to be felt inside, to be inferred and not to be perceived by others. It is in the third stage of expression that it shows symptoms and can be perceived. The stage is not purely physical however; it is psycho-physical.²⁵ Expression starts in the mind and ends in the physical signs on the body of the individual whenever he responds to any outside situation. These expressions in their psychic rather than physical aspect are said to be eight in number.

On account of this double aspect of expression, there are two words for it. The word *sāttvika* emphasises its mental aspect, and the word *anubhāva* its physical aspect. Bharata often uses the terms promiscuously and so does Abhinava. In many later works on poetics the word *anubhāva* is favoured and the word *sāttvika* is neglected.

Thus *vāsanās* or the cumulative psychic affections of past actions and experiences pass through three stages. The first is that of an appetency, which in contact with an object becomes felt and is called feeling but remains in our mind even without the presence of the object. The second is the stage of its momentary effusion, which is complex and secondary, being based on the first. The last is that of psycho-physical expression. The one energy passes through three stages.²⁶ *Ethē*, *pathē* and *praxeis* are of similar connotation in Aristotle's *Poetic*.

When the objective correlatives of these psychic states are presented through dramatic action or poetic description, they attract the spectator's or the reader's heart to such an extent that he forgets his narrow selfish existence for the time being and identifies himself with the feeling of the hero, who is the objective correlative of the basic feeling, which gets a unique expression through the associates that make up

25. Antarbahirātmanā sāttvikena.

AB, I, 343.

26. Evaṁ rasāśca bhāvāśca tryavasthā nāṭake smṛtāḥ.

NS, I, 380.

the plot.²⁷ The spectator's own feelings are roused.²⁸ It is something like soliloquy mixed with dialogue, to use an expression of Coleridge. The narrow self giving way, the infinite eternal spirit appears and enjoys the universal basic feeling so variegated. The touch of the infinite spirit not only sublimates the basic feeling but also its associates.

The transcendental 'self-consciousness overwhelms the objects in such a manner that they lose their objectivity and become parts in a *totally* subjective experience. This seems to be the secret of calling even the objective correlatives of an artistic feeling by such a name as *vibhāvas*, which indicates their being mental and pure, though in actual life only a physical object or its remembrance rouses a feeling.²⁹ Because of the loss of the physical touch even unpleasant types of feelings and emotions give a pleasant taste when presented poetically. The same situation, feeling or emotion is pleasant or unpleasant according as the man finds it favourable or unfavourable to himself in actual life. In poetry the question of its being favourable or unfavourable does not arise, because the subject enjoying a poetic feeling is the all-pervasive

27. How the centripetal *Rasa* experience gradually unifies the various parts into a whole has been well shown by Abhinava in the following passage :

Tatra nāṭyam nāma naṭagatābhinayaprabhāva-sākṣātkārāyamā-
ṇaikaghana-mānasa-nīscalādhyavaseyaḥ samasta-nāṭakādyanyata-
makāvya-viśeṣaḥ dyotaniyo'rthaḥ. Sa ca yadyapi anantavibhāva-
dyātmā tathāpi sarveṣāṃ jaḍānāṃ sarhvidi tasyāśca bhoktari
bhoktṛvargasya ca pradhāne bhoktari paryavasānān nāyakābhi-
dhānabhoktṛ-viśeṣa-sthāyi-cittavṛtti-svabhāvaḥ. AB, I, 266.

28. Hṛdayasamvāda āsvādaḥ. Ibid., I, 323.

29. Na hi loke vibhāvānubhāvādayaḥ kecana bhavanti, hetu-
kāryāvasthā mātratvāt loke teṣāṃ. Atha ta eva rasanopayogitve
vibhāvādirūpatām pratipadyante. Tarhi Rasaprasādād bhāvā
vibhāvādayaḥ. AB, I, 292.

Cp. Coleridge : "A Passion is a state of emotion, having its immediate cause not in Things, but in our Thoughts of the Things....."
I. S., item 52.

universal I and not the finite I, and the object is a universal feeling and not a thing of the outside world.

Yet everybody cannot enjoy every variety of *Rasa*. People differ in taste on account of the predominance of one appetency over another in them. What is favourable to one may be unfavourable to another. What is liked by one may be disliked by another. The finite subject's constitutional differences persist in the phenomenal state. Therefore the eight basic feelings of love, laughter, sorrow, anger, courage, fear, hatred and wonder are not equally enjoyed by all, though they are present in all in different proportions.

Again, everybody cannot have a *Rasa* experience. Majority of men are fickle-minded and can never experience it. Such people can at best enjoy the transient emotions of the hero. They can never appreciate his basic feeling, the depth of his character. They will always be carried away by one of the minor incidents and will never have the total impression of the action in their grasp. The first requisite qualification for the experience of *Rasa* is the capacity to stabilise one's feeling, which is possible only for a man who gives a close attention to the object of his meditation.

Thus men of low character cannot enjoy the display of love in separation (*vipralambha śṛṅgāra*). They have no feeling of constancy in love and they cannot appreciate a lover's pining for his beloved when she is away from him. Naturally such readers or spectators cannot identify themselves with a lover pining for his beloved.³⁰

Abhinava's comments primarily mean that in a poem depicting love in separation, the hero should not be a man of low character, for he cannot have the constancy of love required for the depiction. This is an advice to the poet, who creates. But the remark holds good also for the reader, who appreciates; for, if he is unable to identify himself with the

30. Adhamaprakṛtes tāvan na vipralambhaḥ, sthāyabhāvāt, tadabhāvo vibhāva-sāmagrīvaikalyāt. AB, I, 130

hero, the objective correlative of the basic feeling, he will not be able to enjoy the poetic passion that the hero excites. That poetic creation and poetic appreciation are two aspects of one and the same power is a fundamental postulate of Abhinava.

For the realization of the most fundamental *Śānta Rasa*, the basic feeling that has to be stabilised is that of spiritual calm, which is an affection caused by one's true knowledge of one's own pure infinite eternal universal self.³¹ It is not one of the eight feelings that are all impurities, appetencies, *lolikās*.³² It is a feeling of having no appetency : *trṣṇā-kṣaya-sukha*.³³ One incapable of stabilising this feeling of having no selfish feeling has no chance of either creating or appreciating *Śānta Rasa*.

Śānta Rasa is a super-psyhic realization of the feeling of *tattva-jñāna*. To understand the true nature of reality or one's own nature or self is *tattva-jñāna*. It is an intellectual apprehension, a kind of knowing (*jñāna*). The knowledge of total reality or total truth burns up the impurities, appetencies. But when one begins to enjoy this destruction, it may be said to be the feeling that becomes the object of the eternal subject. Indeed the object of *Śānta Rasa* is no other than one's pure will, *svabhāva*, which³⁴ after being free from the three types of impurities shines as a pure duplicate (*śuddha vikalpa*) of the eternal self-consciousness. This

31. Tatra [śānte] svātmāveśena rasacarvaṇā ityuktam. AB, I, 267

32. Bhāvā vikārā ratyādyāḥ, śāntastu prakṛtir mataḥ.
Vikāraḥ prakṛter jātaḥ punas tatraiva liyate. NS, I, 334-335.

33. Śantaśca trṣṇākṣayasukhasya yaḥ paripoṣaḥ tallakṣaṇo rasaḥ pratiyata eva. DA, p. 390.

34. Iha tattvajñānameva tāvan mokṣasādhanaṁ iti tasyaiva mokṣe-sthāyitā yuktā ; tattvajñānaṁ ca nāmā ātmajñānameva.
Tadidam ātmasvarūpameva tattvajñānaṁ samatā ca.
Tena ātmaiva jñānānandādi-viśuddha-dharmayogi parikalpita-
viśayoparāga rahito' tra sthāyī.

is therefore called the most permanent³⁵ among basic feelings, that are the predicates or objects of the *Rasa* experience. It may be noted that *Rasa* is a higher type of realization than ordinary knowledge or feeling. *Śānta Rasa* is an experience superior even to *tattva-jñāna*. It is very difficult to realize this subtle distinction, but none the less it has to be understood for understanding the nature of *Rasa*.

Tattva-jñāna or knowledge of Truth is really a kind of feeling rather than knowing. Yet there seems to be a subtle distinction—it is a distinction rather than difference—between knowing Truth, *Tattva-jñāna* or *Brahmāsvāda*, and feeling Truth or *Rasāsvāda*. The subtle distinction may be understood thus. *Brahmāsvāda* or *Tattva-jñāna* is a negative realization of Truth. Spiritual Self, the only Reality, is negation of all objectivity, *neti neti vimarśa*. *Rasāsvāda* is a positive realization by the purest subject of its own duplicate. In other words, if *Brahma-jñāna* is the experience of the pure 'I', *Rasāsvāda* is that of 'I am I'. *Brahma* is neuter; *Rasa* is masculine, *Śiva*, *Ardhanārīśvara*, androgynous.

The subtle distinctions made here are of considerable importance. Panditarāja Jagannātha, who ignored them, could not give a convincing exposition of the text of the *Nāṭya-śāstra*³⁶ and explained *Rasa* on the basis of the Vedāntic concept of *Brahma*.

Panditarāja Jagannātha differentiates his view of *Rasa* from that of Abhinavagupta. Jagannātha explains *Rasa* on the basis of Śaṅkarācārya's concept of the Absolute as Unqualified Consciousness (*nirviśeṣa cit*) and says that *Rasa* is the experience of this unqualified consciousness, which lies covered or qualified in the worldly common consciousness of

35. Bhāva-vaicitryasahisṇubhyo ratyātibhyo yaḥ paramaḥ sthāyīśīlaḥ
sa eva hi sthāyīyantarāṇām upamardakaḥ.

AB, I, 333

36. Bharata says : Stthāyibhāvan-śca rasatvam upaneṣyāmaḥ.

Stthāyino bhāvā rasatvam āpnuvanti.

NS, I, 299, 288.

objects, which covering is removed by the portrayal of the objective correlatives of *Rasa*. Thus according to Jagannātha, in the secondary *Rasas*, the primary *Rasa* or *Cit* or Consciousness is the substantive and the basic feelings like love, mirth, etc., are adjectives that qualify the universal substantive. Abhinava made the basic feeling substantive and the absolute self-consciousness adjective.³⁷

Jagannātha's language shows that he does not attach much importance to this difference between his view and that of Abhinava. So far as the Secondary *Rasas* are concerned, Jagannātha's explanation may not present any difficulty, but it is not easy to explain the Primary *Rasa* according to his theory. If unqualified consciousness be the Primary *Rasa*, what would be its basic feeling? The Vedāntic Absolute does not tolerate a predicate, a second. Abhinava's explanation does not present such difficulty. His Absolute is not merely the subject but the unity of subject and object. It is the unity of *sat* and *cit*, *prakāśa* and *virmaśa*. In the primary *Rasa*, *ānanda* or joy as *prakāśa*, i.e. as predicate or object, is the basic feeling; and as *virmaśa*, i.e. as subject it enjoys itself and the consciousness of that object, i.e. the unity of both is *Rasa*. This is possible because the Trika Absolute is capable of both self-duplication and self-unification.³⁸

It appears strange that Panditarāja Jagannātha did not seriously meditate over the problem. He not only refers to

37. Itthaṁ ca Abhinavagṛpta-Mammaṭabhaṭṭādigrantha-svāsyena bhagnāvaraṇacidviśiṣṭo ratyādiḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasa iti sthitam. Vastutastu vakṣyamāṇa-śrutisvāsyena—[referring to the Upaniṣadic text, *Raso vai Saḥ*]
—ratyādyavacchinnā bhagnāvaraṇā cideva rasah. Sarvathaiva cāsyā viśiṣṭātmano viśeṣaṇaṁ viśeṣyaṁ vā cidanṣāmādāya nityatvaṁ svaprakāśatvaṁ ca siddham. Ratyādyanṣa-mādāya tu anityatvaṁ itarabhāsyatvaṁ ca. Carvaṇā cāsyā cidgatāvaraṇabhāṅga eva prāguktā; tadākārāntaḥkaraṇavṛttir vā. RG, p. 27.

38. Vimarśo hi sarvaṁ-saḥ; paramapi ātmikaroti, ātmānaṁ ca parikaroti; ubhayamapi ekikaroti, ekikṛtaṁ dvayamapi nyag-bhāvayati ityevaṁ-svabhāvaḥ.

Abhinava with reverence all along but also explains *Rasa* in his main text on Abhinava's lines.³⁹ It is only in his commentary that he differs and, as he thinks, only a little from him.

If Jagannātha's interpretation be accepted, there would be two processes of realization, one for the primary *Rasa*, another for the secondary *Rasas*, the latter with a basic feeling, the former without it. The former would thus be equated with *Brahmāsvāda*, and the latter would be *Brahmāsvāda-sahodara*. Uniformity of method being the essence of a philosophic system, Abhinava's view is more correct.

Even if experienced, the *Śānta Rasa* cannot be displayed on the stage. The basic feeling of spiritual calm, which is actually a negation of all feelings, cannot be staged. To critics holding such views Abhinava says that this is not a legitimate objection, for such an objection may be raised against the secondary *Rasas* also, for, in the ultimate analysis even their experience is of this very spiritual calm. Again, the basic feeling is portrayed only in its particular manifestations, the transient emotions and the actions resulting from them. Though the hero is said to be the objective correlative of the basic feeling,⁴⁰ the basic feeling as such is never portrayed, for it is impossible to portray it as it is in itself.⁴¹ It cannot be portrayed by mere mention of name, and its own form is unconscious and universal. The only way, therefore, to bring it to the conscious level is to display it through its particular concrete forms. It is for this

39. The relevant portion of his text reads :

.....nijasvarūpānandena t saha t gocarīkriyamāṇaḥ t prāgviniṣṭa-
vāsanārūpo ratyādireva rasaḥ.

RG, p. 25.

40. Bhoktaiva ca sthāyi-samīdvrūpaḥ.

AB, I, 311.

41. Vibhāvā hi kāvyabalānusandheyāḥ ; anubhāvāḥ śikṣātāḥ ;
vyabhicārīṇaḥ kṛtrima-nijānubhāvārjanabalād. Sthāyi tu kāvyabalā-
dapi nānusandheyēḥ.

AB, I, 272-3.

It is important to note that the basic feeling always remains an undercurrent and can be displayed only through its finite off-shoots.

reason that Bharata did not mention it in the list of the causes that excite *Rasa*. Very intelligently he avoids to mention it in his *Rasa-sūtra*.⁴² Even in the case of the secondary *Rasas* only the earlier stages can be portrayed, not the climax.⁴³ Such a portrayal is possible in the case of the primary *Rasa* also.

Again it will be wrong to assume that the ultimate spiritual knowledge makes a man totally inactive. A totally inactive state hardly differs from a lifeless state. Equating a regenerate soul, who has made himself a part of the eternal life-stream, with a lifeless piece of stone is hardly a feasible proposition. The true differentia of a man with spiritual realization is that his actions are not guided by the limited narrow self. He does not do anything for personal gain, for nothing remains to be done for his own self. As a matter of fact, his little self is completely merged in the infinite eternal self. Kindness to others is therefore his most predominant characteristic.⁴⁴ Thus he also is active and his unselfish actions for the good of all mankind can be displayed on the stage in as concrete a manner as the selfish actions of inferior men. It cannot be said in objection that effort (*utsāha*) and effortlessness (*śama*), action and inaction, cannot exist together, for such selfless actions are only casual with him. Even con-

42. ...Sthāyibhāvo 'bhinīyate, na tu ucyate. Avagamaṇaśaktir hi vācakatvād anyā. Ata eva sthāyīpadam sūtre bhinnavibhaktikamapi noktam. AB, I, 273.

43. Rati-śokādāvapi paryantadaśāyām aprayogasyaiva yuktatvāt.

AB, I, 339.

44. Svātmani ca kṛtakṛtyasya parārthaghaṭanāyāmeva udyama ityutsāho'sya paropakāraṇīyachhāprayatnarūpo dayāparaparyāyo abhyadhiko'ntaraṅgaḥ. Ata eva kecid dayāvīratvena vyapadiśanti, anye dharma-vīratvena. AB, I, 337.

Yata eva paridṛṣṭaparāparatvena svātmōddeśena kartavyāntaram nāvaśīsyate, ata eva śāntahṛdayānām paropakārāya śarīrasarvasvādīdanam na śāntavirodhi. AB, I, 338.

tradictory transient emotions can be seen in a man and are manifested one after another.⁴⁵

Thus the primary *Rasa* is the most exalted spiritual experience. To experience it is to be regenerate. This is the salvation offered to the students of poetry. It is on this basis that the secondary poetic *Rasas* are explained.

45. Nanūtsāho' haṅkāraprāṇaḥ, śāntastu ahaṅkāraśaithilyāt tad viruddh-
ātmakaḥ, vyabhicāritvaṁ hi viruddhasyāpi na nocitam ratāviva
nirvedādeh.

AB, I, 337.

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF PROPRIETY (AUCITYA) AND THE SECONDARY RASAS.

Ucitam prāhurācāryāḥ sadṛśaṁ kila yasya yat ;
Ucitasya ca yo bhāvas-tadaucityam pracakṣate.

AVC, v. 7, p. 2.

Ucitaireva vacanaiḥ kāvyam āyāti cārutām ;
Adainya-dhanya-manasām vadanam viduṣāmiva.

Ibid, v. 22, pp. 19-20.

Kurvan sarvāśaye vyāptim aucitya-ruciro rasaḥ.
Madhumāsa ivāśokaṁ karotyaṅkuritam manaḥ.

Ibid., v. 16, p. 7.

Anaucitya-tyāgaḥ sarva-puruṣārtheṣu vyutpādyāḥ.

AB, I, 296.

Trailokyasyāsya sarvasya nāṭyam bhāvānukīrtanam.

NS, Adhyāya I, v. 107, vol. I, p. 35.

Yo'yam svabhāvo lokasya sukha-duḥkha-samanvitaḥ.

So'ṅgādyabhinayopeto nāṭyamityabhidhīyate.

Ayamiti pratyakṣakalpānuvyavasāya-viśayah. Loka-prasiddha satyā-
satya-vilakṣaṇatvāt yac chabda-vācyaḥ. Lokasya sarvasya sādharmaṇatayā
svatvena bhāvya-mānaṣ carvyamāṇo'rtho nāṭyam. Sa ca sukha-duḥkha-
rūpeṇa vicitreṇa samanugataḥ. Na tu tadekātmā.

NS, Adhyāya I, v. 119 and AB on it, vol. I, pp. 42-3.

Itthaṁ ca Abhinavagupta-Mammaṭabhaṭṭādi-grantha-svārasyena
bhagnāvaraṇacidviśiṣṭo ratyādiḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasa iti sthitam.

RG, p. 27.

Let us do our duty ! all else is a dream, life and death alike a dream.
This short sentence would comprise, I believe, the sum of all profound
philosophy, of ethic and metaphysics conjointly, from Plato to Fichte !

AP, pp. 132-3

Modern poetry is characterized by the poet's anxiety to be always
striking...Every line nay, every word, stops, looks full in your face, and
asks and begs for praise ! As in a Chinese painting, there are no
distances, no perspective, but all is in the foreground ; and this is
nothing but vanity. I am pleased to think that, when a mere stripling
I had formed the opinion that true taste was virtue, and that bad writing
was bad feeling.

AP, p. 165.

WE repeat that only a basic feeling can be sublimated to the *Rasa* experience. A transient emotion cannot be so transformed. That the Primary *Rasa* is rarely experienced only emphasizes the fact that very few among human beings have the spiritual calm as their permanent natural tendency.¹

That tastes differ is a matter of general acceptance. This difference is due to the predominance of one basic feeling over others. There is an infinite variety of character-traits owing to the unequal combinations of these basic feelings. But even these multitudinous character-traits may be classified. Thus there are love, mirth, sorrow, anger, courage, fear, aversion and wonder. A child is born with all these² and his life is a development of their peculiar combination in him.

These innate tendencies again take either proper objects or improper ones according to the right or wrong education a man receives through associations of books, places and living beings. The purpose of an artistic education is to purify these feelings, which means their dissociation from the objective world—both spatial and temporal—and association with the true subject, the infinite, eternal I AM. The poetic method is neither to thwart any basic impulse nor to rouse it for physical or mental gratification. It is idealizing or universalizing it and presenting it as an object for the universal subject, the pure spiritual self. Idealization is a very delicate method and is liable to be misunderstood, and misapplied if misunderstood.

Poetry has to be differentiated from the fanciful contemplation of a *mithyācāra*, who is defined as one who enjoys

1. *Manuṣyānām sahasreṣu kaścid yatati siddhaye*
Yatātāmapī siddhānām kaścin mām vetti tattvataḥ.

EG, VII, 3.

2. *Jāta eva hi jantur iyaṭibhiḥ saṁvidbhiḥ parīto bhavati.*

AB, I, 282.

objects by remembering them and not by sensual contact.¹¹ His is an untruthful behaviour, a life of mental indulgence, a false show of abstinence. Such a person's dissociation from objects is hypocritical, for he hankers after sensual pleasure and in the absence of actual objects feels pleasure in a fanciful contemplation of objects. The dissociation from the worldly objects in a poetic experience is not false, because the reader's mind is driven away from the worldly objects and made introvert. Removal of the spatio-temporal tags of a feeling is the essential condition of a poetic experience. Hence the poetic dissociation is conducive to mental health. An artificial restraint from the physical gratification produces mental diseases. There is a world of difference between these two types of dissociation. The subject of the poetic experience is the infinite self. A hypocrite can never rise above his finite self.

It is here that the materialistic explanation of the poetic experience becomes unsatisfactory. Even I.A. Richards, who is the best exponent of the materialistic thesis in the West, seems to have made a mistake here and it amounts to a fall of his psychological theory of value of poetry. He says that "imaginal action and incipient action which does not go so far as actual muscular movement are more important than overt action in the well-developed human being. Indeed the difference between the intelligent or refined, and the stupid or crass person is a difference in the extent to which overt action can be replaced by incipient and imaginal action. An intelligent man can 'see how a thing works' when a less intelligent man has to 'find out by trying'. Similarly with such responses as are aroused by a work of art. The difference between 'understanding it' and failing to do so is,

3. Karmendriyāṇi samīyamyā ya āste manasā smaran
Indriyārthān vimūḍhātmā mithyācāraḥ sa ucyate.

BG, III, 6.

See BG, III, 7 for contrast between *mithyācāra* and *asakta-karmayogī*:
Yastvindriyāṇi manasā niyamyārabhate' rjuna
Karmendriyaiḥ karmayogam asaktaḥ sa viśiṣyate.

in most cases, a difference between being able to make the required responses in an imaginal or incipient degree, adjusting them to one another at that stage, and being unable to produce them or adjust them except overtly and at their fullest development."

It is difficult to differentiate between a mental indulgence and a poetic experience if this analysis of Richards be accepted as correct. Richards, again, seems to make a factual mistake when he speaks of "the absence of any overt movements or external signs of emotion in an experienced reader of poetry or concert-goer, compared to the evident disturbances which are sometimes to be seen in the novice".⁴ Is not a tearful eye an external sign of emotion? Is it not a fact that even a connoisseur drops tears at Rama's banishing Sita or Othello's killing Desdemona while reading their descriptions or seeing them dramatised? How is it that A.E. Housman emphasised the physical aspect of the poetic experience in his essay 'On Reading Poetry'? Speaking of the total nature of the poetic experience Abhinava clearly says that though spiritual in essence it includes the psychic and the physical aspects also. The *Rasa-sūtra* of Bharata clearly points it out. The object of the *Rasa* experience is the universal feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*) but that universal feeling includes the psychic concrete emotions (*vyabhicāri-bhāvas*) and their psycho-physical expressions (*sāttvika bhāvas* or *anubhāvas*). Nay, in the uniqueness of the poetic experience, even *vibhāvas*, the objective correlatives of the poetic passion, have a part to play as the *Rasa-sūtra* indicates.⁵ The only-but the very important-difference is that all these three states of feeling—one unconscious and two conscious, one universal and two particular—are seen together by the all-powerful infinite subject. Poetic experience is spiritual but includes the psychic. It is supra-mental but has mental activities as its subordinate parts. Incipient imaginal action

4. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 111.

5. *Vibhāvānu bhāva.vyabhicāri-saṁyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ.* NS, I, 272.

without the esemplastic force of the pure infinite self-consciousness to hold it in its total grasp would degenerate a man into what the *Bhagavad-Gītā* calls *mithyācāra*. Pining for a thing mentally can never be equated with understanding it. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* very aptly contrasts the perfect activity of a *karmayogī* with the hypocritical behaviour of a *mithyācāra*.⁶ Abhinava would agree with Richards when he says that "sensory and motor systems are not independent, they work together; every perception probably includes a response in the form of incipient action".⁷ Abhinava's analysis of the divine pentad, his explanation of activity as extension of knowledge,⁸ explains this truth more naturally. But he would not equate intelligence and mental refinement with the capacity to make the required responses in an imaginal or incipient way. That would equate intelligence with mental indulgence. Intelligence is a detached activity. Mental indulgence is a false show of detachment.

The poet has to be very cautious in his method. He should always remember the aims of human life. The highest aim of life is *Mokṣa*, which means complete dissociation from the objective world, not only human but also divine,⁹ but the lower aims are not to be ignored. The highest aim is very rarely achieved and it is after constant effort of several lives that a man is able to secure the divine grace which liberates him totally from the spatio-temporal associations.¹⁰ But even this liberation does not necessarily mean extinction of worldly existence. In that case it may be confused with death. It only means that the liberated soul sees everything in the world as a manifestation of the infinite eternal subject, that alone exists, call it pure Existence, pure self, pure I, pure

6. See BG, III, 6 and 7.

7. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 107.

8. See Book II, ch. IV, fn. 4.

9. *Mokṣa* is to attain the position of Śiva, not of Sadāśiva.

10. *Bahūnām janmanā mante jñānavān mām prapadyate.*

self-consciousness, eternal I AM, pure Joy, I AM I, *Parama Śiva*, *Parā Vāk*, or by any other name. With this absolute reality the liberated soul completely identifies himself. This makes him a god in this very human life, a *jīvanmukta*, and after death he is no more born. Because of such a realization he has no more desire for any kind of physical or mental satisfaction, for no more does he equate himself with any limitation of the eternal infinite self—body, mind or life (*deha*, *buddhi* or *prāṇa*). Such a state is a very rare achievement.

The lower aims of life become proper aims only when they do not run counter to this highest aim of life. That is one of the reasons why *Śānta Rasa* is the primary *Rasa* and other *Rasas* are secondary, derivations from the primary *Śānta Rasa*.¹¹ The realization that everything in this world is a manifestation of the eternal self, that multiplies itself in all these manifold forms by its own freedom of self-limitation, naturally makes man realise that he has to change his whole attitude towards the spatio-temporal world and the pleasures derived from it. He has to be unselfish and dutiful.

It is not necessary to dilate upon this rather extraneous matter for us at present. It will, however, be necessary to note that the Indian aesthetics does not consider that values in poetry run counter to those in other branches of learning or in life as a whole.

A similar view has been expressed by T.S. Eliot. "Literary criticism" he says, "should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint. In so far as in any age there is common agreement on ethical and theological matters, so far can literary criticism be substantive....The greatness of literature cannot be solely determined by literary standards, though we must remember that whether it is

11. Svam svam nimittam āsādyā śāntād bhāvaḥ pravartate ;
Punar nimittāpāye tu śānta eva praliyate.
Iti yādinaś rāsāntaraprakṛtitvam upasamhṛtam.

literature or not can be determined only by literary standards."¹²

Thus crops up the concept of Propriety in poetic experience. Morality is introduced in Indian poetics under this concept. The basic feelings are our primary limitations as they are our primary impurities. They are purified when they have proper objects. Devotees who lead their life solely to achieve salvation (*Mokṣa*) would thus consider love for any object other than God improper. Thus for example the Vaiṣṇava devotees of Śrīkrṣṇa, the most perfect incarnation of God according to Hindus, considered love for any object other than Śrīkrṣṇa as semblance of *Rasa* (*Rasābhāsa*),¹³ not *Rasa*. But as poetry is meant for all and especially for the weak, who are not able to take recourse to the difficult ways of getting salvation,¹⁴ propriety in poetry would also have a lower reference. Thus the description of Rāma's love for Sītā would be proper, but that of Rāvaṇa's love for her would be improper. This is so in life and it remains so in poetry, even though the poetic world is not the world of facts. The semblance of *Rasa* is called *Rasābhāsa*. This denigration is due to an improper objective correlative.¹⁵ This definition of *Rasābhāsa* is according to such critics as hold that impropriety of the object should be decided by the general social behaviour of a people and who thus make 'improper' an epithet of the *object* of feeling. Others say that it does not cover the whole range of impropriety and

12. *Selected Prose*, p. 32.

13. See *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal*, p. 150.

14. *AB* on *NS*, Adhyāya I, verse 12, especially the following :
Sukumārāṇām vyutpattidāyī.

15. *Yadā tu vibhāvābhāsād ratyābhāsodayaḥ tadā vibhāvānubhāsāt carvaṇābhāsa iti rasābhāsasya viśayaḥ, yathā Rāvaṇa-kāvya-karṇane śṛṅgārābhāsaḥ.*

Locana, pp. 177-8.

Jagannātha also defines *Rasābhāsa* as
anucitavibhāvā-lambanatvam rasābhāsatvam.

See his commentary on this.

R.G., pp. 188-9.

therefore 'impropriety' should qualify the basic feeling itself. Thus a basic feeling improperly developed should also be taken as an example of *Rasābhāsa*. Thus the love of animals or birds, or one-sided love, unreciprocated by the other side, is a case of *Rasābhāsa*, for even though true it restricts the scope of the full development of love. Again the love of a coquette or a courtesan for many lovers or of a debauch for many women is only apparent, not true. Thus the description of Rāvaṇa who went on showing overtures of love to Sītā without being sure whether she would love him or reject him would produce only a 'semblance of *Rasa*' (*Rasābhāsa*) and not *Rasa*. He falsely equated sexual passion with love as one often does an oyster with a piece of silver. True love cannot but be a permanent tendency of the heart, which Rāvaṇa did not possess.¹⁶

The spectator's realization of Sītā's laughing at the folly of such attempts of Rāvaṇa will be a different experience altogether having mirth as its basic feeling and not love, false or true.¹⁷ Shakespeare's comedies offer a number of instances of *śṛṅgārābhāsa* turning into *hāsyā*. He would often expose the hollowness of the loud assertions of pseudo-lovers and laugh at them.

The impropriety may not only be marked in the objective correlatives of the feeling and in the feeling itself but also be seen in the action depicted. There may be improper action of even proper persons, improper display of even proper feelings. So impropriety is a wide concept of poetics covering

16. *AB*, p. 295 :

Vibhāvābhāsād anubhāvābhāsād vyabhicāryābhāsād ratyābhāse pratite carvaṇābhāsasāraḥ śṛṅgārābhāsaḥ kāmanā. Abhilāṣamātrarūpā hi ratiratra vyabhicāri-bhāvaḥ, na sthāyī. Tasya sa tu sthāyikalpatvena ābhāti. Tadvāśād vibhāvādyābhāsatā ; ataśca sthāyīyābhāsatvaṁ rateḥ. Yato Rāvaṇasya Sītā dviṣṭā mayyapekṣikā veti hṛdayam naiva sprṣati iti. Tatsparśe hi abhimāno'sya vilīyata eva. Mayi iyam anuraktā iti tu niścayo hi anupayogī, kāmaja-mohasāratvāt, śuktau rūpyābhāsavat.

A similar analysis is made in *Locana*, pp. 177-178.

17. *Locana*, p. 178.

many facets — right from the use of words to the creation of the poetic experience.¹⁸

Kshemendra, a notable Kashmirian poet-critic, makes Propriety (*Aucitya*) a central concept in poetics. He calls it the soul of poetry,¹⁹ the essence of *Rasa*.²⁰ *Dhvanikārikās* emphasize the importance of propriety in every part of the plot of a poem.²¹ Ānandavardhana sums up the discussion on Propriety by quoting a couplet (*śloka*)²² which means that all the defects of poetry, that become hurdles in the poetic experience, may be summed up in one word, *impropriety*, and the delineation of the supreme poetic experience lies in describing everything *properly*. Coleridge's concept of Good Sense comes very near the concept of *Propriety* in Sanskrit poetics.

The question has been raised if *Rasa* and *Rasābhāsa* should be accepted as experiences of the same level. Some critics say that they cannot be accepted on equal footing, just as a false or improper cause (*hetvābhāsa*) cannot be equated with a true or proper cause (*hetu*). Others accept their parity on the ground that both are equally spiritual experiences of their respective descriptions, just as a man with a weak or improperly developed intelligence is also a man, though his essential nature as man, his rationality, is defec-

18. Tacca anaucityaṁ sarva-rasānāṁ vibhāvānubhāvādaṁ sambhāvyaṁ.

AB, I, 296.

See *AVC*, a small but very helpful book of Sanskrit poetics consisting of 39 *kārikās* only with illustrations and commentary, where Kshemendra shows the necessity of propriety in every aspect of poetry, word, meaning, figure of speech, merit (*Guṇa*) and *Rasa*.

19. Aucityaṁ rasa-siddhasya sthiraṁ kāvyasya jīvitam. *AVC*, v. 5.

20. Aucityasya...

Rasajīvitabhūṭasya...

AVC, v. 3.

21. *DK*, III, 10, p. 329.

22. Anaucityād ṛte nānyad rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam ;
Prasiddhaucityabandhastu rasasyopaniṣat parā.

DA, III, p. 330.

tive. The defect does not destroy the nature of the thing in either case.²³

There are more reasons in favour of the second view. According to Bharata, drama was created for the benefit of men of different tastes. It was to lead all sorts of men to a pure universal experience, a liberation from the impure objective world.²⁴ Truly speaking, all worldly objects are improper, for all of them are impure, limitations of the universal spirit. Coming to worldly standards, we see that they are not the same in every society. Thus the loving of a Brahmin girl by a boy of a lower caste is highly improper in the orthodox Hindu society and was one of the fears of Duṣyanta when he fell in love with Śakuntalā at first sight.²⁵ But such restrictions do not exist in other societies. In the orthodox Hindu society love is allowed to develop only after marriage, while courtship is a social custom in Western countries. It is the impropriety of a *brahmacāri*'s falling in love that gives weight to Kapiṇjala's exhortations to Puṇḍarīka against his love for Mahāśvetā in Bāṇa's immortal work, *Kādambarī*. No Western writer could possibly have utilized a similar occasion in the way Bāṇa did, for he would not have found fault with such an innocent love affair. Indeed literature cannot be free from its social origins. What is important to note is that it is not the objective origin of the feeling but its dissociation from all objects that is poetry. There is one demand of poetry from its readers that they must be able to remove the spatio-temporal tags of their feelings with the help of the book or the stage. It is only after the removal of these spatio-temporal tags that the universal spiritual subject has poetic experience on the background of its own duplicated

23. Tatra rasādyābhāsatvaṁ rasatvādinā na samānādhikaraṇam, nirmala-syaiva rasāditvāt, hetvābhāsatvamiva hetutvena ityeke. Na hyanucitatvena ātmahāniḥ, api tu sadoṣatvād ābhāsa-vyavahāraḥ, aśvābhāsā-divyavahāravat ityapare.

RG, pp. 118-9.

24. NS, Adhyāya I, verses 12, 14, 112, 113, 114 and AB on them.

25. AS, I, v. 30.

self. The great task that literature performs is that it lures us by a portrayal of our biases—feeling is really a bias that unbalances man's behaviour—and as the affections gently lead us on, we attain that blessed mood in which the breath of this corporeal frame almost suspended, we totally rise above the limits of time and place and experience the calm and harmony of our own eternal spirit. As soon as we rise above the limitations of feeling and knowing by concentrating on an object, we enter into the world of universal infinite self-consciousness. All secondary *Rasas* are experiences on the background of the primary *Rasa* experience,²⁶ and thus the nature of the experience is the calm of the eternal spirit that truly rests on nothing but its own nature (*svabhāva*). Objects as objects are impure and unpleasant; and even if pleasant they soon become stale and insignificant.²⁷ *Rasa* is an experience where the mind is so over-whelmed with the delight of the free universal spirit that objects appear in a fresh light as if they got a new life.²⁸ It is due to their purification by idealization or universalization, which means removing the spatio-temporal tags.²⁹

Even if *Rasa* and *Rsaābhāsa* be accepted as experiences of the same level, they are not of the same kind. They show

26. Sarveṣāṃ rasānāṃ śāntaprāya eva āsvādo viṣayebhyo viparivṛtṭyā...
kevalaṃ vāsanāntaropahita ityasya sarvaprakṛtītvābhīdhānāya
pūrvam abhīdhānam. AB, I, 339.

27. Sā rasanāsvādadaśā loke bhavantyapi na cīram avatiṣṭhate.
AB, I, 300.

In the *Ode to A Nightingale* Keats describes the world as a place
Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes,
Or new Love pine at them beyond tomorrow.

Shelley speaks of the 'sad satiety' of love.

28. Jagad grāvaprakhyāṃ nijarasabharāt sārāyati ca. Locana, v. I.

Cp. S. T. C., *Dejection*: An Ode; lines 67-9:

Joy, Lady, is the spirit and the power
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
A new Earth and a new Heaven.

29. Mark the phrase "viṣayebhyo viparivṛtṭyā" in the fn. 26 above.
AB reading with a negative 'na' before it as wrong.

differences on the objective level. One of the aims of poetry is to better life, to show what to do and what not to do, to help men to achieve the four aims of life not by command or persuasion but by change in the very attitude of mind.³⁰ And thus literature becomes a means of moral culture, giving proper guidance to the individual and the society at a particular moment of their life-history. It depends upon the character of the reader which of the two suits him as a starting point for spiritual education. That *Rasa*, and not *Rasābhāsa*, is the pure experience should not be forgotten.

The concept of *puruṣārtha* in Sanskrit literature is, in its essence, a concept of the proper development of personality, which leads to the full blossoming of all that is fine in a human being without inhibiting any of his natural tendencies. The concept of Propriety is important, because it prunes efforts that are either wasteful or do not allow a harmonious growth of all the natural tendencies of man. Instead of curbing a tendency it develops it through a proper channel. It is true that the sense of propriety differs from time to time and from place to place, but that cannot efface the concept itself. We cannot think of a man totally exempt from a social condition. Even Robinson Crusoe had a society of his own making and that is the case with everybody. Man creates his own society. Though he is born and developed in a particular society and thus is influenced by the customs and patterns of behaviour of that society, yet his freedom as an individual even in that society cannot be ignored. But it is important to note that social differences can manifest themselves on the basis of universal humanity only.

Hindu philosophy as propounded by the Trika and like-minded philosophers teaches us that man's self-conscious

30. Rāmādivad vartitavyam, na Rāvaṇādivat.

KP, p. 7.

Tat kācīdeva pumarthopayoginī ityupadeśyā.

AB, I, 283.

Nanu kiṁ guruvad upadeśam karoti? Netyāha; Kintu buddhim vivardhayati; sva-pratibhāmeva tādṛśīm vitarati ityarthah. Na ca sā duṣṭā pratibhā...hitapratibhājanakatvāt.

AB, I, 41.

nature, which is the basis of all his experiences, in the ultimate analysis, is spiritual, eternal and infinite, capable of innumerable manifestations, and yet is of the nature of perfect peace and joy that requires nothing other than itself for its fullest realization. Hindu philosophers planned their whole individual life and built their whole social structure for the attainment of this fullest development of personality. It is their highest aim. Whatever helps in the fulfilment of this aim is called *Dharma* or duty in this worldly life. All the little details of their code of behaviour are, in the ultimate analysis, regulated by this highest aim. Whatever is a hindrance in achieving this goal is called *adharma* or sin.

Man as a worldly being does not live as a spirit only. He has a body too with a mind that thinks and feels, likes something and dislikes another, feels pleasure in contact with some objects and pain in contact with others. So he must have mental satisfaction also. Hence *Kāma*, the enjoyment of worldly objects, the most delightful form of which is the sexual union of lovers, and *Artha*, its means of procurement, also become the proper aims of human life. But in order that the body may not lead the man astray from his essential spiritual nature and thus keep him ignorant of himself and hinder his full development, the lower aims are to be subordinated to the spiritual means of *Dharma*. For such a harmonious development of human personality the concept of Propriety is essential. Life has to be beautified by literature as by *dharmaśāstra*. If, on the one hand, the poet must necessarily start from the level of the individual in order to lead him to the heights he is capable of reaching, it is necessary, on the other hand, that the poet should realize his task as a social reformer for which knowledge of the absolute standard is a necessity.

Abhinava speaks of the importance of four out of the nine basic dispositions on the basis of their being directly helpful in achieving the four aims of life. The feelings of love, courage and resentment together with the ground of all feelings,

the feeling of calm, are the four important basic feelings according to Abhinava.³¹ But the other five basic dispositions may also be made conducive to the fulfilment of these aims of life, as Abhinava has himself said³² Indeed the main task of the poet is to rouse them in a proper way through proper objective correlatives.

The division of feelings into 'important' and 'unimportant' made by Abhinava is not very convincing. Thus, for example, sorrow, which he places in the list of 'unimportant' feelings, is the basic feeling of the first and the greatest epic of Sanskrit literature, the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmiki. Anger, which he calls 'important', is not the basic feeling of any important form of drama. It is one of the six feelings that may be chosen by the author of *Dima* and *Vyāyoga*, the two minor dramatic forms in Sanskrit.

According to Bharata the four primary feelings are love, anger, courage and aversion, for he considers their corresponding *Rasas* as primary.³³ It has to be noted that Bharata's division of four original *Rasas* and four derivative ones is made to show their genesis. He does not consider any *Rasa* to be unimportant.

The only form of drama in which *Rasābhāsa* has been permitted for portrayal is *Īhāmrga*, which describes rape. In all other varieties it is some *Rasa* that is to be portrayed. This binding rule of propriety has certainly narrowed the scope of Sanskrit literature in the portrayal of the varied human feelings of different types of men and women. But it speaks

31. Tatra puruṣārthanīṣṭhaḥ kāścid saṁhīda iti (eva) pradhānam. Tad yathā ratiḥ kāmāḥ tadanuṣaṅgi-dharmārthanīṣṭhā. Krodhas tatpradhāneṣu arthanīṣṭhaḥ. Kāmadharma-paryavasito 'pyutsāhaḥ samastadharmādi-paryavasitaḥ. [Tattvajñānajanita-nirvedaprāyo] vibhāvo mokṣopāya iti tāvadeṣāṁ prādhānyam.

AB, I, 282.

32. AB, I, 341. Evam to navaiva rasāḥ, pumarthopayogitvena rañjanādhikeya vā iyatāmeva upadeśyatvāt.

33. NS, Adhyāya VI, verse 39.

volumes for the high character of the Hindus, who utilized literature as means for achieving the great ends of life.³⁴ Similarly their acceptance of *Rasābhāsa* as a form of poetry in spite of their high regard for Propriety (*Aucitya*) shows their large-heartedness and intelligence to accept the standards prevalent in other societies also. The great task of literature is to purify feelings, that are, truly speaking, biases, impurities, limitations of self-consciousness turned into appetencies, which being felt are called feelings. They do not allow the infinite self-consciousness, active within us behind our finite self-consciousness or mind, to know its free nature. Our most important duty is to know our own true nature, which is free and joyful. But we are bound by our limitations. These limitations or appetencies cannot be fully satisfied with the objects of the phenomenal world because these latter are all finite. They are passive, incapable of crossing their limits. Between a limited subject and a limited object there can never be a perfect union. The most perfect union is that between the infinite subject and its own nature as object, that is when the object is not limited but is the infinite subject's own passive duplicate, existing because of the subject's freedom to appear as such. That union is the primary *Śānta Rasa*, the most fundamental *Rasa*. On its basis alone we can have the experiences of the secondary *Rasas*, where the object is again a universal, a basic feeling, which ordinarily remains in the unconscious region and is never known but through an agitation caused in it by physical objects or their contemplation. The transitory emotions floating on the surface of the undercurrent of the feeling and their concrete psycho-physical expressions in the action and on the body of the person feeling it are all unified in the super-psychic experience of *Rasa*. Most people live a life of transitory

34. Bharata speaks of the didactic ends of literature :

Dharmyaṁ yaśasyaṁ āyusyaṁ hitaṁ buddhi-vivardhanaṁ
Lokopadeśajananaṁ nāṭyametaḍ bhaviṣyati.

NS, verse 115 of Adhyāya 1.

emotions only. They have no capacity to have a character at all. A long-drawn-out feeling of love or courage, for example, and that too for a proper object is a rare qualification. But the poetic experience with a long-drawn-out basic feeling as object is still more rare. Owing to the fact that the subject experiencing is infinite and eternal and the object a universalized feeling, that is, free from the shackles of time and place, this experience of the secondary *Rasa* is also of the same *kind* as that of primary *Rasa*, for the feelings are not felt as limitations in the *Rasa* experience and do not bind the subject. Thus the experience of the secondary *Rasas*, that is, of the basic impurities, or the basic feelings universalized and purified with the help of poetic works and dramatic arts embraced by the infinite spirit has a value in the total scheme of education of man. Once a man learns the art of feeling and knowing in an infinite universal manner, he learns the secret of his total progress—of spirit, mind and behaviour.

CHAPTER IV

OBSTACLES TO THE POETIC EXPERIENCE

Sarvathā rasanātmaka-vītavighnapratītigrahya bhāva eva rasaḥ.

Tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāva-prabhṛtayaḥ. Tathā hi loke sakala-vighna-vinirmukta-samvittireva camatkāranirveśa-rasanās vādana-bhoga-samāpatti-laya-viśrāntyādi-śabdair abhidhiyate.

AB, I, 280.

The great Artist does what Nature would do, if only the disturbing Forces were abstracted.

Letter 983, C.L., IV, 607.

One thing only perhaps is certain, what happens is the exact opposite to a deadlock, for compared to the experience of great poetry every other state of mind is one of bafflement.

I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 252.

that blessed mood,
In which the burthen of the mystery,
In which the heavy and weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened...

Wordsworth : *Tintern Abbey*, lines 37-41, *Poems*, p. 206.

ABHINAVA calls *Rasa* or poetic experience an experience free from hindrances. Various types of obstacles are there to what may be called a total experience. Common experiences of the world are not total experiences. In a common experience the subject is finite ; in the total experience it is infinite. The infinite subject is so powerful that it holds any abstract universal object with all its concrete or finite manifested forms in its grasp. It experiences the thing in itself as well as all its variants manifested at a particular moment. The 'moment' is that which gives one unified experience. It is an experience of simultaneousness in continuity.

unity in multeity. Without such a definition of 'moment' it is impossible to explain any thing or thought.¹

It is significant that I. A. Richards, a materialist, holding a totally different philosophical standpoint, also says the same thing about great poetry. "One thing only perhaps is certain: what happens is opposite to a deadlock, for compared to the experience of great poetry every other state of mind is one of bafflement."²

Abhinava enumerates seven obstacles³ to such a total experience. They do not allow the spectator in the theatre or the reader in his study to have the climax of poetic experience that *Rasa* is.

The first obstacle is improbability of the action described.⁴ If descriptions transgress probability, readers can hardly take any interest in them. Aristotle and Coleridge support Abhinava in making probability of description the first law that poets must observe. Aristotle said: "Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages."^{4a}

Coleridge spoke of "the plan of the *Lyrical Ballads* in which it was agreed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic;

1. See Book IV, chapter III.

2. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 252.

3. Vighnāś cāsyām 1. pratipattau ayogyatā sambhāvanāviraho nāma ; 2. svagatatva-paragatatva-niyamena deśakālaviśeṣāveśaḥ ; 3. nijasukhādivivaśībhāvaḥ ; 4. pratityupāyavaikalyam ; 5. sphuṭatvābhāvaḥ ; 6. apradhānatā ; 7. saṁśaya-yogaśca. *AB*, I, 280. All these seven obstacles are explained by Abhinava in *AB*, I, 280-2.

4. ...Tathā hi saṁvedyam asaṁbhāvayamānaḥ saṁvedye saṁvidam viniveśayitum eva na śaknoti, kā tatra viśrāntir iti prathamō vighnaḥ.

4a. *Poetics*, Butcher, p. 35.

AB, I, 280.

yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith".^{4b}

Ānandavardhana and Abhinava advise poets to take recourse to famous stories or histories in describing supernatural actions so that any doubt regarding them may not arise in the mind of the audience.^{4c}

Inability to extricate the feeling from the limits of space and time is the second in the list of obstacles. It has been explained that *Rasa* is an impersonal, universal experience. If the spectator accepts the feeling and emotions portrayed to be those of the actor, character or himself exclusively or of all by turns, he can never enter into the world of poetry. The most important thing in a drama or a poem is *Rasa*. *Rasa* covers the whole plot and is therefore more important than the hero and other characters that are its objective correlatives. *Rasa* is an experience of a feeling not belonging to any particular individual, and thinking of the person rather than the action displayed and the feeling portrayed would lead the spectator astray. If the experience be pleasant, he would try to have it for a period longer than that taken by the dramatist's portrayal of it and his interest in the subsequent action of the drama would not be parallel to its display for sometime at least. If the experience be unpleasant, he would try to skip away from it and thus would miss what the poet wished to say. In any case he would have his attention diverted from the action displayed and would find this diversion an obstacle to the poetic experience.

Aristotle is like Bharata on this point. He says, "The Plot, then, is the first principle, and as it were, the soul of a tragedy: Character holds the second place."⁵ T. S. Eliot rightly condemned such critics as changed the emphasis from

4b. *B.L.*, II, 5-6.

4c. *Dhvanyāloka* with *Locana*, pp. 330-1.

5. *Poetics*, Butcher, pp. 28-9.

the plot to the character in critical appreciation. He says regarding critics' appreciation of *Hamlet* : "Few critics have ever admitted that *Hamlet* the play is the primary problem, and *Hamlet* the character only secondary."⁶

Keeping this obstacle in view Bharata says that the drama should not begin with too much of dance or music ⁷ They are used for the purpose of attracting the attention of the audience to the dramatic action, but too much of dance and music would have the opposite effect. The audience would enjoy the dance and music and not the dramatic action. The costumes and make-up of the actors to resemble the characters whose parts they play remove this obstacle. They assist the spectator in dissociating the feeling from the actor. No intelligent spectator, on the other hand, would take the actor for the character himself. Thus is the feeling universalized.

Indulgence in one's own pleasant or unpleasant feelings is the third obstacle. A spectator who goes to the theatre morose or gay, with his mind pre-occupied with his own personal feelings, incapacitates himself to enjoy the feelings portrayed on the stage. The spectator must not enter the theatre preoccupied. He should go there with a virgin mind eager to receive what the dramatist has to give. The aids of music and dance and acting help the spectator in forgetting his personal world and in entering into the world of drama.⁸

The fourth and fifth obstacles are defects of means. If the drama is presented in an uninteresting style or if it is merely read in the study and not seen on the stage, the spectator's interest in the plot begins to wane and he becomes inattentive and thus the unity of his poetic experience is broken.

6. *Selected Prose*, p. 104.

7. *NS*, Adhyāya V, verse 158, vol. I, p. 246.

8. *Yena ahṛdayo'pi hṛdaya-vaimalyaprāptyā sahrdayikriyate. Uktam hi : "dṛśyam śravyaṁ ca"* (*NS*, Adhyāya I, verse 11) iti.

For removing both these obstacles Bharata prescribes various *Vṛttis* and *Pravṛttis*.⁹ *Vṛttis* are manners of presentation—the various bodily poses (*Ārabhaṭī*), mental moods or gestures (*Sātvatī*) and verbal turns of speech (*Bhāratī*)—all befitting the four aims of life. The *Vṛtti* that beautifies all these manners of presentation is common to all, and is known as *Kaiśikī* on the analogy of hairs (*keśa*), that have no utility except beautifying the face. The predominance of the type of presentation in beautifying expression in acting is the basis of this division : physical, mental and verbal.¹⁰ *Kaiśikī* is that excellence of manner which makes a presentation so beautiful that it attracts the hearts of the audience at once. A mastery of this *Kaiśikī* manner shows that the dramatist actually had the *Rasa* experience, that the actor also felt it in his heart and so was able to give the unique expression to it, and it is this that holds the attention of the audience to the action and the passion depicted. Bharata says that only actresses can have the *kaiśikī* manner of presentation. It is almost beyond the reach of actors.¹¹

Pravṛttis are indicative of the various dialects, modes of dress, speech and behaviour.¹²

The sixth obstacle is related to the nature of the feeling displayed. The peculiarity of intelligence is that it does not rest without finding the basis, the final cause, the most important among the objects to be known. A knowledge of the unimportant only cannot satisfy intelligence. Hence the intelligent spectator is not satisfied unless he enjoys the basic feeling, which is the most important thing in the drama, for it alone covers the whole plot and gives it unity.¹³ Characters,

9. Tasmāt tadubhaya-vighnavighāte abhinayā lokadharmi-vṛttipravṛtṭy-upaskṛtāḥ samabhiṣicyante. AP, I, 281.

10. AB, I, 20.

11. NS and AB, I, 22.

12. AB, II, 205-6.

13. Bahūnām samavetānām rūpaṁ yasya bhaved bahu
Sa mantavyo rasaḥ sthāyī śeṣāḥ sañcāriṇo matāḥ.

NS, I, 379.

their physical actions or transient emotions are not important. It is the undercurrent of the predominant feeling that gives unity to the plot and is the mainspring of all dramatic action. Objects that rouse this feeling in the hearts of the audience are, after all, merely objects, be they persons or things, and have only secondary importance. So are the floating emotions that are parasitic in their nature and owe their existence to a basic feeling. Neither the objective correlatives, that rouse emotions in us, nor the floating emotions can be raised to the highest level of experience known as *Rasa*. They cannot be fit objects for the infinite subject. *Rasa* is of the nature of self-contentment. Who will be contented with unimportant things ?¹⁴

Thus whenever this important factor of the basic feeling is neglected either by the spectator or by the dramatist, there is an obstacle to the realization of *Rasa*.

The distinction between a basic feeling and a transient emotion is of fundamental importance in understanding the poetic process, Abhinava points out.

King Bhoja, the author of *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*,¹⁵ is of the opinion that a fixed division between thirtynine transient emotions and eight basic feelings is not proper. There is no doubt that a feeling must be stabilized for being experienced as the highest type of poetic experience (*Rasa*), but every one of the eight basic feelings, thirty-three transient emotions and the eight psycho-physical expressions is capable of being stabilized. Thus every one of them can be basic or transient according to circumstances. Thus this three-fold division of feeling is not correct. That a particular feeling or emotion or

14. Apradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṁvid viśrāmyati. Tasyaiva pratayasya pradhānāntaram pratyānudhāvataḥ svātmanyaviśrāntatvāt. Ato'pradhānatvaṁ jñāte vibhāvānubhāvavarge vyabhicārinicaye ca saṁvidātmake'pi niyamena anyamukhasamprekṣiṇi sambhavati iti tadatiriktaḥ sthāyyeva tathā carvaṇāpātram. AB, I, 281.

15. For Bhoja's concept of *Rasa*, see *SP*, vol. I, pp. 1-3, vol. II, pp. 42-44, 352-57, of the Madras ms. of the text, quoted by Dr. V. Raghavan in his thesis on Bhoja's *SP*, vol. I, part II, pp. 513-518.

psycho-physical expression becomes predominant at a time means that it is stabilized at that moment.

Bhoja accepts, in a way, only one *Rasa* which he calls *Abhimāna*, *Ahaṅkāra* or *Śṛṅgāra*. The subject's experience of any one of the forty-nine states of psyche is *Rasa*, provided they are free from impurities.

When Bhoja equates *Rasa* with I AM, it appears as if he is echoing Abhinavagupta. But the fact is otherwise. Abhinava very clearly states that the subject of the poetic experience is infinite, eternal self-consciousness, and not the finite self-consciousness which is commonly called *buddhi* or *citta* or *ahaṅkāra* or *manas* in Sanskrit, and intellect or mind in English, and which Coleridge calls Understanding. Bhoja's subject is not infinite self-consciousness (*parāhantā*) but the limited self-consciousness, *abhimāna*, *prakṛti-vikāra*. The only qualification of the subject in a poetic experience is freedom from impurities. Bhoja's weakness is that he does not explain how this freedom from impurities can be a qualification of the finite mind. It is Abhinava who has clearly shown that this is a qualification of the eternal, infinite self-consciousness only.

Bhoja's concept of purity seems to be based on love. We love all types of experience conveyed through poetic words. Hence he accepts love (*prema*) as the nature of poetic experience irrespective of the nature of the psychic object experienced.

This view which Bhoja propounds in a very inspired language is really very attractive. It also throws light on many important aspects of poetic experience and it may easily have popular support, but it will be against truth.¹⁶ Bharata,¹⁷ Aristotle and Abhinava have all differentiated the three states of a feeling, and some of the modern critics like

16. For Dr. V. Raghavan's criticism of Bhoja's view of *Rasa* see *SP*, Vol. II, pp. 491-501.

17. *Evam Rasāśca bhāvāśca tryavasthā nāṭake smṛtāḥ*.

Last verse of *Adhyāya*, VII, *NS*, I, 380.

George Whalley have noted the importance of a distinction between a basic feeling and a transient emotion.¹⁸

Bhoja's opinion of abolishing a permanent distinction among the three states of feeling did not find favour with later critics like Mammaṣa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha.

Thus the eight basic tendencies alone can be elevated to the state of *Rasa*, for they alone are capable of being kept before our view for long. That cannot be said about the transitory emotions or their psycho-physical expressions.

The dramatist's or the poet's main task is to depict basic feelings and such basic feelings as help in realizing the four-fold aim of life. He should not run after petty things. Otherwise he would fail to attract good and intelligent persons.

The seventh and the last obstacle is called 'doubt' and is explained thus. Accessory or floating emotions (*sañcāri-bhāvas*), psycho-physical expressions (*anubhāvas*), and the hero and the circumstances that rouse the basic feeling (*vibhāvas*) are not fixed separately for each basic feeling. Thus one may be anxious for his safety from a tiger or for his victory against his enemy or for being accepted by the beloved. Tears may indicate sorrow or joy or may be a mere disease of the eye. A tiger may rouse fear or courage according to the nature of the person and circumstances. A lonely place may rouse the basic feeling of love or calm. The fall of evening rouses different feelings in the heart of a student, a lover and an ascetic. So the dramatist should present his materials in such a combination that the spectator may not have any doubt about the feeling intended to be roused. Thus, for example, when the dramatist shows a lover weeping for his dead beloved, we can hardly doubt that the nature of the basic feeling is sorrow.

Rasa, the acme of poetic experience, is free from these seven obstacles. The whole structure of the drama is to help the spectator in removing these obstacles to a pure poetic experience so that he may be able to have a taste of the

18. *The Poetic Process*, pp. 66-67.

universal experience, where he is the subject not as a finite person but as infinite universal self (*aparimita-pramātā*) and the object is not the finite object of the world but the universal feeling of mankind developed with accessories and expressions that make it unique. The spectator experiences it not as something belonging to *all*. He experiences his *own* deep-seated feeling with all the emotional complexes in such a way that there is total freedom from limitations, subjective as well as objective.

In the words of Coleridge we may say that "each man does at the moment so far legislate for all men, as to believe of necessity that . if it be right for him, it is universally right". Each subject at such a moment of appreciation becomes representative of all.¹⁹

19. "Fragment of an Essay on Taste". *B.L.*, II, 249.

CHAPTER V

THE SATELLITES OF RASA

Alaṅkārya-vyatiriktaś ca alaṅkāro' bhyupagantavyaḥ, loke tathā
siddhatvāt, yathā guṇi-vyatirikto guṇaḥ. Guṇālaṅkāra-vyavahāraś ca
guṇini alaṅkārye ca sati yuktaḥ. Locana, p. 204.

Tamartham-avalambante ye'ṅginam te guṇāḥ smṛtāḥ,
Aṅgāścritās tvalaṅkāra mantavyāḥ kaṣakādivat.

DK, II, 6, p. 204.

Ucitasthānavinyāsād alaṅkṛtir-alaṅkṛtiḥ

Aucityād acyutā nityam bhavantiyeva guṇā guṇāḥ.

AVC, v. 6, p. 1.

Atha bhāvaḥ : sādharmaṇīkaraṇa-vyāpāra-balāt svāntaḥkaraṇavṛttya-
bhedena sāmājikair āsvādyamāno Rāmāder antaḥkaraṇavṛttir bhāvaḥ.
Rasas tu tathāvidho bhāvaḥ paripoṣāpanna ucyate. Paripoṣas tu rater
ālambanaratyupabhr̥mhaṇam, hāsasya ālambanagata-kaitavam autkaṇṭhyā-
dyupabhr̥mhaṇam. Karuṇe tu ālambanasya rati-vibhāvatvaparakarṣa ityādi
praṇidheyam. Te ca bhāvāḥ paripoṣam anāpannā ratyādayo'stau,
nirvedādayas trayastriṃśat, sāttvikāḥ svedādayo'stau ityūnapañcāśat.
Ratyādis tu samucitālambanakāḥ, taṣasthālambanakāḥ, anucitālambanaka
iti trividhaḥ. Ādyo rasaḥ, dvitiyo bhāvaḥ. trtiyo rasābhāsa iti viveka iti
dik. KPV, pp. 170-1.

"In my opinion every phrase, every metaphor, every personification,
should have it's justifying cause in some *passion* either of the Poet's
mind or of the Characters described by the poet—But *metre itself* implies
a *passion*, i.e., a state of excitement, both in the Poet's mind, & is
expected in that of the Reader—and tho' I stated this to Wordsworth, &
he has in some sort stated it in his preface, yet he has (not) done justice
to it, nor has he in my opinion sufficiently answered it. In my opinion
Poetry justifies, as *Poetry* independent of any other *Passion*, some new
combinations of Language, & *commands* the omission of many others
allowable in other compositions." Letter 444, *O. L.*, II, 812.

1. BHĀVA

It has been said that *Rasa* is an experience above the limits
of time and place. It only means that in the poetic experience

we lose consciousness of time and place. It cannot be said that time is not taken in creating conditions leading to this experience. To rouse the appetency from its latent unconscious state, to make it consciously felt does take time. To display the action does require space. When the preparation is complete, the intelligent spectator enjoys *Rasa*, which indeed is the apex of the delightful experience and free from the spatio-temporal tags.

Sometimes, however, it so happens that instead of the basic feeling, the floating emotion itself attracts the spectators' heart on account of its predominant beauty at a particular moment. In such a case the experience is technically called *Bhāva*, not *Rasa*. It is an experience not of the basic feeling underlying the whole poem but of a particular wave of it only. Sometimes even a basic feeling is not developed in a full-fledged manner or is replaced or obscured by some other feeling. In such cases a basic feeling becomes a floating emotion. A basic feeling may appear in a transient form, but the transient emotion can never become basic.¹ *Rasa* is an experience of the whole, *Bhāva* is that of a part, but of a part as subsisting in a whole.² *Rasa* is the experience of a basic

1. Sthāyino hi vyabhicāritā bhavati, na tu vyabhicāriṇām sthāyitā.

AB, I, 345.

2. Tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛtti-sūtrasyūtā eva ami vyabhicāriṇaḥ svātmānam udayāstamayavaicitryaśata-sahasradharmāṇam pratilabhamānā rakta-nīlādisūtrasyūta-viralabhāvopalambhanasambhāvita-bhaṅgi-sahasragarbha-sphaṭika-kāca-bhramaka-padmarāga-marakata-mahānīlādimaya-golakavat tasmīn sūtre sva-saṁskāravaicitryam aniveśayanto'pi tatsūtrakṛtam upakārasandarbhām vibhrataḥ svayam ca vicitrārthasthāyisūtram ca vicitrayanto'ntarāntarā śuddhamapi sthāyisūtram pratibhāsāvakāśam upanayanto'pi purvāpara-vyabhicāri-ratnacchāyāśābalimānam avaśyam ānayantaḥ pratibhāsanta iti vyabhicāriṇa ucyante.

AB, I, 283.

Evam rasadhvanerevāmi bhāvadhvaniprabhṛtayo niṣyandā āsvāde pradhānam prayojakam evam aṁśam vibhajya pṛthag vyavasthāpyate.

Locana, p. 179.

feeling ; *Bhāva* that of a transient emotion. The difference between a basic feeling and a transient emotion is often explained with the example of the garland and a particular bead in it, or of the ocean and its particular wave. A transient emotion is like a flash of lightning and does not exist for long.³

Like other ephemeral things a transient emotion has a beginning, a middle and an end. Poetic experience of a transient emotion may be an experience of any of these three states or of a meeting point of two transient emotions. The difference in experience is the *raison d'être* of all these varieties.⁴

Like *Rasa* and *Rasābhāsa*, the 'true' and the 'apparent' varieties of these experiences of transient emotions may be noted according as the objective correlative is 'proper' or 'improper', or the emotion is properly or improperly portrayed.

The objects of poetic experience are psychic only and they are no other than the basic feelings and the transient emotions in their impersonal form. Their objective correlatives, the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* simply suggest them ; they are not themselves objects of the poetic experience, because *vibhāvas* are physical things, and *anubhāvas* psycho-physical, not psychic.⁵

3. Viśeṣād ābhimukhyena caranto vyabhicāriṇaḥ

Sthāyinyunmagna-nirmagnāḥ kallolā iva vāridhau.

DR, IV, 7.

Ete ca vyabhicāriṇo vidyudunmeṣa-nimeṣayuktyaiva sthāyisūtramadhye prakāṣyantaḥ tirodadhataśca tadvaicitryam āvahanti.

Na tu vyabhicārī kṣaṇamapi avatiṣṭhate.

AB, I, 308.

4. Vyabhicāriṇaḥ udayasthityapāya-tridharmakāḥ.

Locana, p. 175.

5. Nanvevaṁ vibhāvānubhāvamukhenāpi adhikaścamatkāro dṛśyate iti vibhāvadhvanir-anubhāvadhvaniśca vaktavyaḥ. Maivaṁ, vibhāvānubhāvau tāvat svaśabdavācyaeva. Taccarvaṇāpi cittavṛttiṣveva paryavasyati iti rasabhāvebhyo nādhikaṁ carvaṇīyam. Yadā tu vibhāvānubhāvau api vyaṅgyau bhavatas tadā vastudhvanirapi kiṁ na sahyate.

Locana, p. 177.

Cp. Coleridge : 'Poetry also is purely human, for all its materials are from the mind, and all its products are for the mind.'

'On Poesy or Art', *B.L.*, II, 254.

2. *GUṆA*, *DOṢA* and *ALĀṆKĀRA*.

Concepts of merits (*Guṇa*) and demerits (*Doṣa*) of poetry as well as of the figures of speech and figures of thought (*Alāṅkāra*) are all based on the concept of *Rasa*.⁶ Even *Bhāva*, as we have just seen, cannot have any existence without *Rasa*, as a transient emotion cannot be thought of without a basic feeling. I have, therefore, called all these concepts satellites of *Rasa*. Thus a 'demerit' is defined as that which hinders poetic experience (*Rasa*)⁷, and 'merit' as the quality conducive to it.⁸ Figures of speech and those of thought are called 'ornaments' (*Alāṅkāras*) of words and their meanings, that form the body of the poem, only secondarily. Primarily they adorn the poetic experience, which is its soul. We never speak of adorning a dead body. Similarly 'merits' and 'demerits' primarily belong to *Rasa*, the soul, and secondarily to words and meanings, the body of poetry.

The difference between an 'ornament' (*Alāṅkāra*) and a 'merit' (*Guṇa*) is that of a variable and an invariable concomitant of the poetic experience. It is impossible to think of the poetic experience (*Rasa*) without its inherent excellence (*Guṇa*) and similarly the latter being a quality cannot exist without its substance, the essential content, the poetic experience (*Rasa*).⁹ But that cannot be said of a 'figure'

6. Guṇālaṅkāravvyavahāraśca guṇini alāṅkārye ca sati yuktaḥ, sa ca asmat-pakṣe evopapannaḥ. *Locana*, p. 204.

7. Mukhyārthahatir doṣaḥ, rasaśca mukhyas tadāśrayādvācyaḥ.

KP, VII, v. 49, p. 244.

Rasāpakarṣakā doṣaḥ.

SD, VII, v. 1, p. 380.

8. Samarpakatvam kāvyasya yat tu sarvarasān prati

Sa prasādo guṇo jñeyaḥ sarvasādhāraṇakriyaḥ.

DK, II, v. 10.

'Samarpakatvam' is explained by Abhinava as 'hṛdayasaṁvādena pratipatṛn prati svātmāveśena vyāpāraakatvaṁ jhaṭiti śuṣkakāṣṭhāgnidṛṣṭāntena ; akaluṣodakadṛṣṭāntena ca tadakāluṣyam prasannatvaṁ nāma sarvarasānām guṇaḥ.

Locana, pp. 212-3.

9. Rasam vinā ye nāvatiṣṭhante, avatiṣṭhamānāśca avaśyaṁ rasam upakurvanti.

KPP, p. 383.

(*Alaṅkāra*) either of speech or of thought. It is neither always present nor always beautifies the poetic content even when it is present.¹⁰

Dhvanikāra, Ānandavardhana and Abhinava do not accept such figures as do not enhance the charm of the poetic experience. They plead for the acceptance of only such figures as are structural. Those that require a separate effort are no ornaments of the poem, for they only divert the attention from the poetic experience and so become an obstacle to its realization and its communication. They thus become 'defects' instead of 'ornaments'. Even great poets are often guilty of introducing figures in such a way. But their defective practice should not sanction such a usage. Figurative expression comes naturally to a man of genius who has an aesthetic experience. As he wishes to communicate this infinite experience, he often inevitably uses figures, for otherwise he cannot communicate his experience successfully. In the very effort to communicate his experience he picks them up. If, on the other hand, the poet makes a separate or extra effort for them they divert his attention from the communication of his experience, which is his main purpose. For the same reason they disturb the reader also.¹¹

Coleridge says very similar things in the following passages of the *Biographia* :

"The philosophic critics of all ages coincide with the ultimate judgement of all countries, in equally denying the praises of a just poem, on the one hand, to a series of striking lines or distiches, each of which, absorbing the whole

10. Eṣa eva ca guṇālaṅkārapravibhāgaḥ, Evaṁ ca samavāyavṛtṭyā śaur-yādayaḥ, saṁyogavṛtṭyā tu hārādaya ityastu guṇālaṅkāraṇām bhedaḥ.

KP, p. 389.

11. Rasa-samavadhānena vibhāvādighaṭanāmeva kurvan tannāntariyakatayā yam āśādayati sa evātra alaṅkāro rasamārga, nānyaḥ.

Locana, pp. 219-20 on DK, II, 16 :

Rasākṣiptatayā yasya bandhaḥ śakyakriyo bhavet,
Apṛthagyatnanirvartyaḥ so'laṅkāro dhvanau mataḥ.

attention of the reader to itself, disjoins it from its context, and makes it a separate whole, instead of an harmonising part ; and on the other hand, to an unsustained composition from which the reader rapidly collects the general result unattracted by the component parts. The reader should be carried forward, not merely or chiefly by the mechanical impulse of curiosity, or by a restless desire to arrive at the final solution but by the pleasurable activity of mind excited be the attractions of the journey itself."

"It has been before observed that images however beautiful, though faithfully copied from nature, and as accurately represented in words, do not of themselves characterize the poet. They become proofs of original genius only as far as they are modified by a predominant passion, or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion ; or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity or succession to an instant ; or lastly, when a human and intellectual life is transferred to them from the poet's own spirit."¹²

'Excellence' (*Guṇa*) of a poetic experience means freedom from such impurities as create a deadlock and do not allow the reader to enjoy the experience quickly. When the poet uses the most appropriate words and arranges them in the best order, he makes his meaning as transparent as pure water. This quality of the words and their arrangement is thus *their* 'excellence' too. The 'excellence' of the poem is thus the quality that helps the reader's quick understanding of its essential meaning. Just as fire devours dry fuel or pure water melts sugar quickly, so does the 'excellence' of the poet's style enable the reader to understand the meaning of his poem in no time.¹³

12. *B.L.*, II, 10-11, 16. See also the quotation from Letter 444 on p. 387.

13. See fn. 8 and *DA* and *Locana*, p. 213.

See Coleridge's quotation of the poem of Sir John Davies to illustrate the working of Imagination, where similar ideas are expressed. The following lines may be especially noted for comparison :

As fire converts to fire the thing it burns,
As we our food into our nature change.

B.L., II, 12.

The soft suffusion of the spirit, its overwhelming the finite mind, the latter's quick inscape into the world of impersonal universal feeling is technically called *Guṇa*, 'excellence' or 'merit'. As a quality of the poetic experience, which is its primary sense, it is of the nature of freedom or purity. As a quality of the poetic composition, the words and their arrangement, it is of the nature of lucidity, by virtue of which the reader comprehends the poet's intended meaning as soon as he hears the poem. Thus for appreciation it is the excellence of the poet's style and for creation it is the excellence of the poet's experience.

Milton's epithet, 'simple' regarding poetry has this very significance. The ease of understanding difficult things in a simple way as well as the ease of communicating it in a similarly simple way is the hall-mark of genius. Milton's dictum that poetry should be simple, sensuous and passionate is a nebulous statement of what Indian critics analyse elaborately in their concepts of *Guṇa*, *Alaṅkāra* and *Rasa*. We miss the elaborate analysis of these concepts in Western poetics.

'Excellence' of poetry is experienced in either of two forms. The mind appears to be melting or blazing up. In both cases the mind outgrows its limitations, that are its basic impurities, and is overwhelmed with universal spirit. Just as fuel is not distinguished from the fire consuming it, or sugar from the water dissolving it, so the mind (or *citta* or Coleridge's Understanding) is not distinguished from the spirit or the infinite self-consciousness overpowering it at the time of the poetic experience. There is an extension of self-consciousness, an expansion of the psyche; the barriers are crossed and the experience is like that of an empirical forgetting and a spiritual awakening. This explains the joyful nature of the poetic experience, for all grief is due to bafflement caused by limitation.

Coleridge had no clear-cut concept of poetic excellence, but it cannot be said that he did not realize it as a fact of

experience. His concept of *Motion* which he calls the Life of poetry¹⁴ is very near the concept of *Guṇa*. Abhinava says that the 'excellence' of poetry is best seen in the order in which words are arranged in poetry.¹⁵

Coleridge speaks of "the balance, the perfect reconciliation, effected between these two conflicting principles of the *FREE LIFE* and of the confining *FORM*. How entirely is the stiffness that would have resulted from the obvious regularity of the latter, *fused* and (if I may hazard so bold a metaphor) almost *volatilized* by the inter-penetration and electric flashes of the former."¹⁶ Coleridge like Aristotle did not clearly differentiate between the Imaginative experience and its cathartic effect. In Sanskrit poetics a clear distinction is made between the highest super-psychic *Rasa* experience and its 'purifying excellent quality' or *Guṇa*. The former is the cause of the latter.¹⁷ Even Richards, who does not believe in the infinite spiritual subject of the poetic experience, speaks of the poetic experience that it is free from bafflement.¹⁸

The nature of the basic feeling determines whether the poetic experience would be of the melting or the blazing type. Thus the aesthetic experience of anger, courage and wonder is of the blazing type, that of love and sorrow is of the melting variety. Mirth, fear, hatred and the peace of soul cause experiences of both types one after another.¹⁹

Thus, for instance, in the case of mirth sometimes it becomes difficult to decide whether the poet laughs at us or with us. Great humorists refuse to be onesided. They cut

14. *B.L.*, II, 13.

15. *Locana*, p. 16.

16. 'On the Principles of Genial Criticism,' *B.L.*, II, 235.

17. See the present author's article on "The Concepts of *Katharsis* and *Guṇa*."

18. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 252.

19. *Locana*, p. 212.

jokes with sympathy.²⁰ In the case of 'fear', which naturally has a melting tendency, the cause of fear is a fierce object, that sets the heart ablaze before it makes the heart sink. In the case of the *Sānta Rasa* it depends on the nature of the objective correlatives (*vibhāva and anubhāva*) whether the poetic experience would take a blazing or a melting form. Viśvanātha and Maṃmaṭa, two important critics say that it is of the melting type only.²¹ Indeed, in the case of perfect disillusionment regarding worldly pleasures, one gets a tendency of renunciation which is a complete negation of one's selfish interests and thus the poetic experience is of the melting type. But, as Abhinava points out, there is hardly any state of life which can be said to be completely effortless for it would be a lifeless state. It would be absurd to say that the experience of spiritual peace, which, as has been shown before, is the very Life-principle itself, is a totally effortless and hence a lifeless state. Indeed, the only difference between a degenerate person and a regenerate one is that while the former is lured by the worldly objects, the latter is not, for he knows the essential spiritual nature of reality and the ultimate falsity of phenomena. All his efforts are therefore an outcome of his compassion for others. He does not do anything for himself.²² A regenerate man may sometimes be

20. Goldsmith's famous description of the villagers' appreciation of the village school master in *The Deserted Village* may be cited as an instance :

And still they gazed and still the wonder grew
That one small head could carry all he knew.

21. Āhlādatvam mādhyam śrīgāre drutikāraṇam.
Karṇe vipralambhe tacchānte cātisāyānvitam.

KP, kārīkās 68-9.

See also SD, VIII, 2.

22. Svātmani ca kṛtākṛtyasya parārthaghaṭanāyām eva udyama ityutsāho' sya paropakāra viṣayecchā-prayatnarūpo dayāparaparyāyo' bhyadhiko' ntarāṅgaḥ. Ata eva kecid dayāvīratvena vyapadiśanti, anye dharmavīratvena ... Paropakārakarṇe hi utsāhasyaiva prakarṣo lakṣyate. Na tu utsāhaśūnyā kācidapi avasthā, icchāprayatna-vyatirekeṇa pāṣāṇatāpatteḥ.

AB, I, 337-8.

lost in meditation, caring ■ fig for the worldly achievements ; at other times he may be engaged in a brave fight for a noble cause. It depends on the nature of the description of his action at a particular moment, therefore, whether the poetic experience of spiritual peace would take a blazing or a melting form.²³

3. THE TWO STYLES.

Poetry is essentially dramatic.²⁴ There are two styles of presentation²⁵ in drama. When things are presented in accordance with the behaviour of people, the style is called *lokadharmī*. When the dramatist introduces some newness of his own which, though not found in the world, does not transgress the laws of probability and thus compels the spectator for tis acceptance, it is called *nāṭyadharmī*. In poetry these two styles are called *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti* respectively.

The two styles of writing poetry have been noted by various critics. Plain and figurative, pure and ornate, direct and oblique, truthful and fallacious, natural and supernatural, what is and what may be—these are some of the terms used to show the distinction between the two styles.²⁶ The emphasis has always been on the second of these pairs of terms. Thus Aristotle pointed out that “it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen, what is possible according to the law of probabi-

23. Śānte tu vibhāva-vaicitryāt kadācid ojaḥ prakṛṣṭam, kadācin mādhyamam, *Locana*, p. 212.

24. Kāvyaṁ tāvan mukhyato daśarūpātmakameva. *AB*, I, 291.

25. *NS*, vol. II, adhyāya 13, vv. 70-86 and *AB* thereon, pp. 214-19. Kāvya-nāṭyayor hi lokānusāritvaṁ vaicitryayogitvaṁ vā dharmam.

AB, II, 215.

26. For a detailed discussion of the two styles and their counterparts in Western criticism see the present author's article on The “Two Styles of writing Poetry”.

lity or necessity",²⁷ though he accepted that "even if he chances to take an historical subject, he is none the less a poet; for there is no reason why some events that have actually happened should not conform to the law of probable and possible..."²⁸ Coleridge noted that "willing suspension of disbelief for the moment...constitutes poetic faith."²⁹ He, however, says that Imagination is the characteristic merit of both the styles of writing.³⁰

The clearest statement in this regard, however, has been made by Abhinava, who states that the essence of poetry lies not in any of the two styles, *svabhāvokti* or *vakrokti*, but in the essential poetic content which is nothing other than *Rasa*.³¹ In the natural (*svabhāvokti*) style the nature of letters of the words used and the order in which they are arranged,³² and their extraordinary charming movement³³ suggest *Rasa*. In the figurative (*vakrokti*) style the figures of speech suggest *Rasa*.³⁴ The real poetic charm lies not in the imagery or rhythm but in their suggestiveness of the poetic content

27. *Poetics*, Butcher, p. 35.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

29. *B. L.*, II, 6.

30. *Ibid.*, II, 5.

31. Kāvye'pi ca loka-nāṭya-dharmisthānīyena svabhāvokti-vakrokti-prakāradva yena alaukika-prasanna-madhuraujasvi-śabda-samarpyamāṇa-vibhāvādi-yogād iyameva rasavārtā.

Locana, p. 186.

32. *Locana*, p. 16.

33. Parām dhārām āśritaḥ.

Locana, p. 212.

34. Etad uktam bhavati—upamayā yadyapi vācya'rtho'laṅkriyate, tathāpi tasya tadeva alaṅkaraṇam yad vyaṅgyārthābhivyañjana-sāmarthyādhānam iti vastuto dhvanyātmaiva alaṅkāryaḥ. Kaṭaka-keyūrādibhirapi hi śarīra-samavāyibhiḥ cetana ātmaiva tat-tat-cittavṛttiviśeṣaucitya-sūcanātmatayā alaṅkriyate.

Locana, p. 197.

(*Rasa*)^{34a} The beauty of an image³⁵ or rhythm³⁶ consists in this suggestiveness of the ideal movement of *Rasa*.

Bhoja makes a three-fold division as *vakrokti*, *svabhāvokti* and *rasokti* based on the predominance of *Alaṅkāra*, *Guṇa* and *Rasa* respectively. But *Rasa* should not be made a principle of division, for it is the poetic essence, that can never be directly expressed and is necessarily present in every poem, howsoever faintly. Abhinava's division accords with that of Coleridge, who speaks of the two styles, natural and super-natural in the *Biographia* (II, 5).

34a. Richards holds a similar view ; see *P.L.O.*, pp. 114-33.

35. Tathā hi śavaśarīram kuṇḍalādyupetaṁ api na bhāti, alaṅkāryasya abhāvāt ; yati-śarīraṁ kaṭakādi-yuktaṁ hāsyāvaham bhavati, alaṅkāryasya anaucityāt. Na hi dehasya kiñcid anaucityam iti vastuta ātmaiva alaṅkāryaḥ, aham alaṅkṛta ityabhimānāt.

Locana, p. 198.

36. Api tu ātma-bhūtasya rasasyaiva paramārthato guṇā mādhyādayaḥ, upacāreṇa tu śabdārthayoḥ...

Locana, p. 208.

Rītirhi guṇeṣveva paryavasitā, yadāha viśeṣo guṇātmā, guṇāśca rasa-paryavasāyinaḥ.

Ibid., p. 517.

Cp. Coleridge's remarks on music, *I.S.*, item 178 quoted in Book I, p. 162.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF POETRY

Na bhāvahīno' sti raso, na bhāvo rasa-varjitah
Parasparakṛtā siddhis taylorabhinaye bhavet.
Vyañjanaśadhi-saṁyogo yathāhnam svādutām nayet
Evam bhāvā rasās caiva bhāvayanti parasparam.

NS, Adhyāya VI, vv. 36-7, vol. I, p. 293.

Etaduktam bhavati—Ekatraikadā kriyāyām anyonyāśrayatvaṁ doṣo
na tu kriyābhede. Yathā vyañjanādisaṁyogena annasya āhlādirasa-
vattā kriyate ; annena ca āśrayarūpeṇa satā vyañjanasukha-yogyatā
kriyate ; evam bhāvai rasyamānatā, rasaiś ca vibhāvādivyapadeśyatā
kāraṇādīnām. Yathā paṭāpekṣayā tantavaḥ paṭa-kāraṇam iti vyapa-
deśyaḥ ; tantvapekṣayā pataḥ kāryaḥ ; na ca itaretarāśrayatvam ; tathā
prakṛte' pi.

AB, I, 293-4.

Kecid punar la kṣaṇa-kāraṇa-śālīna-buddhayo dhvanes tattvam girām
agocaram saḥdaya-hṛdaya-saṁvedyam eva samākhyātavantah. Tena...
saḥdaya-maṇaḥ-prīṭaye tat-svarūpam brūmaḥ.

Tasya hi dhvaneḥ svarūpam sakala-satkavi-kāvyaopaniṣadbhūtam
atīramāṇīyam aṇīyasībhīrapī cīrantana kāvya-lakṣaṇa-vidhāyinām buddhi-
bhir anumilitapūrvam.

DA, pp. 33-5

"...a scientific or completely analytic definition of poetry has never
been achieved."

W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Cleanth Brooks, *Literary Criticism :
A Short History*, p. 25.

RASA is the poetic experience at its apex, an experience
of worldly materials so transformed that one gets an un-
worldly joy, a joy that neither ever was nor would ever be
on sea or land, for in such an experience the finite mind
(*citta*) becomes one with the infinite self-consciousness,
which is the inexhaustible storehouse of joy, nay, the Joy

itself in its universal, total, absolute form. The experience exists as long as the mind is attentive to the poem.¹

The listener of the poem or the spectator of the drama is so enchanted by what he hears or sees that he forgets the spatio-temporal limits of the feeling portrayed and quickly enters into his own infinite unconsciousness and makes the whole of it conscious for the time being. The beauty of presentation generates infinite passion. The value of descriptions lies in their being able to remove all obstacles to the listener's experience of infinite passion,² in their being conducive to his quick entry into the depth of his own personality, so that in a mood of unhampered taste of the under-current of his basic feeling roused by the poet's descriptions of its objective correlatives from the latent unconscious state and made conscious for the time being, the reader's infinite self-consciousness overcomes the limitations both of his finite mind and the transient objects. He can enjoy the infinite passion only after subduing his finite self. Sometimes he feels as if his mind is melting away; at others it appears to be consumed in a flare-up. While the descriptions give a uniqueness to his taste,³ like the constituents of a drink to its taste, the joy born of the peace of the infinite self-consciousness is the same in every case.⁴ It is a unique joyful experience of unity in variety (*Rasa*) or variety in unity (*Bhāva*), of the whole holding the parts (*Rasa*) or a part subsisting in the whole (*Bhāva*).

It may be repeated that the real subject everywhere is infinite self-consciousness. The finite self-consciousness, so far as it is finite, is an object and hence impure. Unless objective associations are completely subdued it is impossible to have a manifestation of the unity of the infinite

1. Vibhāvādijivitāvadhiḥ. *KP*, p. 99.

2. Tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhṛtayaḥ. *AB*, I, 280.

3. Pānaka-rasa-nyāyena. *KP*, p. 99.

4. Sarva-rasānām śāntaprāya evāsvādo viṣayebhyo viparivṛttyā.

self-consciousness. The peculiarity of a poetic experience lies in the fact that here the objects themselves are used for removing the objective associations of the subject. When the removal is complete, the *esemplastic* infinite self-consciousness tastes a basic feeling as it is in itself.⁵ Its objective correlatives and subjective associates give it a unique form.⁶ They present it by focussing light on it from different angles and there is no end to the variety of the ways of such focussing. The ultimate base is the self or will, a duplicate of the infinite subject or spirit, an objective nothing and a subjective all. On this base alone all the objective manifestations are perceptible.⁷ But even lower bases are accepted. Such lower bases are the basic feelings. They are called basic, because human beings are guided by them. They guide the birth and life of every man. His whole life is a development of their peculiar combination in him. For all practical purposes they are therefore called permanent and basic.⁸

Poetic experience is the experience of a continuity. It is a continuous process.⁹ It is at the climax of the experience that one perceives the unification of one's infinite self with one's basic feeling, the feeling as it is in itself, that is, without its objective associations being obtrusive. Like a lightning flash the experience lasts only for a moment, but it so purifies the finite mind that the latter is never the same again. I. A. Richards values the after-effects of this moment but belittles the quality of the momentary consciousness which the arts occasion.¹⁰ It is in that unique moment that transformation

5. *Hṛda' asaṁvāda āsvādaḥ.*

AB, I, 323.

6. *Vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are objective correlatives of the *sthāyibhāva* and *sañcārībhāvas* respectively. The *sañcārībhāvas* are the subjective associates of the *sthāyibhāva*. They have been explained before.

7. *Svaṁ svaṁ nimittamādāya śāntād bhāvaḥ pravartate ;*

Punar nimittāpāye tu śānta eva praliyate.

AB I, 340.

8. *Lokāpekṣayā ye sthāyino bhāvāḥ,*

AB, I, 288.

9. *Sādī ānātibhūtā santānavṛtter ekasyā eva vā saṁvido gocarabhūtā ratih śṛṅgāraḥ.*

AB, I, 285-6.

10. *P.L.C.*, p. 132.

is brought about by poetry And that is its real value as a means of education.

Though truly speaking, it is the moment of light, the manifestation of the infinite self-consciousness, that deserves the name of *Rasa*, yet the whole process of preparation for this experience from the first moment to the last moment of the flash of light is called *Rasa*.¹¹ Very few persons are really successful in going to the end of the journey, but the journey is started by everyone who enters the theatre or opens a book of poetry. The poet puts him on the right track, but it depends on the reader's capacity to have full sympathy or rather empathy with the soul of the description. It depends on his efforts whether he receives the light or misses it. There are obstacles that put him off the track. They again may be due to the defects of the poet's composition or of the reader's own understanding^{11a}.

The poetic experience is a bilateral business. The poet is as much responsible for it as the listener. It is the moment of light that gives significance to the whole preparation. The source of genuine poetic creation and enjoyment is no other than this moment of light, when we rise above our narrow selfish emotions and find our basic nature purified by the embrace of the infinite self, which is as much our own as of everyone else. When the experience is over, the charm haunts the listener's finite self, and he realizes that his finite self has been purified in this universal, experience. Without the joyful experience of a universal all talk about poetic creation and poetic taste is meaningless. It is the poet who first has this unique experience. The experience is so overwhelming that he cannot but express it, even if in a soliloquy. It is like flood water that seeks its own outlet. It may take any shape—drama, epic, lyric, novel or essay. It may move in measured verse or unmeasured

11. *Rasāṅ pratiyante iti odanam paoṣṭi itivād vyavahārah*. *Locana*, p. 187.

11a. See Ch 4, BK III.

prose. The form depends on the poet's inclination, choice and facility. The reader perceives this product of the poet's experience, listens to it in his study or sees it on the stage. The charming nature of the expression helps him in having an experience similar to the poet's. The reader's success in this depends on his capacity of attentiveness to the poetic expression, which, though a natural ability, is perfected by continued contact with fine expressions of such experiences.¹² In the development of this capacity to enjoy such a universal experience the histrionic aids make the drama superior to other forms of expression.

The poet's experience is the seed of poetry ; the poem he composes, the tree ; and the reader's experience, the fruit. Acting is compared to the blossoming of the tree of poetry. It is *Rasa* itself that appears in all these forms.¹³

A question naturally arises. How can the causal relation be established here ? Would it be proper to say that the poetic experience precedes the poem or *viceversa* ? In both cases absurdity is apparent. So, it may be explained on the analogy of the seed and the tree. To prove the tree, the seed has to be accepted as cause ;¹⁴ and to prove the seed, the tree has to be accepted as cause.

The point raised here is of some importance and needs clarification. Is it possible to give a scientific definition of poetry ? Commenting on Aristotle's sentence, "not to know

12. See in 22. Ch. I, Bk III.

13. Kavigata-sādhāraṇībhūta-saṃvinmūlaśca kāvyapurassaro naṭavyāpāraḥ. Saiva ca saṃvit paramārthato rasaḥ. Sāmājikatasya ca tatpratītyā vaśīkṛtasya paścād apoddhārabuddhyā vibhāvādi-pratītir iti prayojane, nāṭye, kāvyē, sāmājikaadhiyi ca. Tadevam nūlaṃ bijas-thāniyaḥ kavigato rasaḥ. Kavir hi sāmājikatulya eva...Tato vṛkśas-thāniyaṃ kāvyam. Tatra puṣpasthāniyo'-bhinayādi-naṭavyāpāraḥ. Tatra phalasthāniyaḥ sāmājika-raśvādaḥ. Tena rasamayameva viśvam. AB. I, 294.

14. A similar riddle regarding the explanation of Creation from the Uncreated One has been similarly explained in the "Alāta-sānti-prakaraṇa" of *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*. See DU, pp. 231-34, verses 18-23.

that a hind has no horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically", Mr W. K. Wimsatt remarks :

"With the word *inartistically* Aristotle may be thought to have begged the question, and in a sense no doubt he has. In somewhat the same sense all the other poetic theory which we are to consider in this book will do the same—in the sense, that is, that a certain nuclear area of the indefinable will never be reduced by the theory ; a scientific or completely analytic definition of poetry has never been achieved."¹⁵

The difficulty of a scientific definition of poetry cannot be minimized. I. A. Richards tried to give a scientific basis to criticism and offered a psychological theory of value. In his opinion all "attempts to fit Beauty into a neat pigeon hole with Feeling have led to calamitous distortions" and "the phantom aesthetic state" does not exist. He points out "the fallacy of 'projecting the effect and making it a quality of its cause'. He explains that aesthetic experiences "differ chiefly in the connections between their constituents and that they are only a further development, a finer organization of ordinary experiences and not in the least a new and different kind of thing"¹⁶ Indian critics would agree with Richards to a great extent but still would not accept his conclusion. Richards denies the artistic experience a qualitative difference, a difference in kind, from the ordinary experience. Here he differs not only from Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, and their followers but from Aristotle and Coleridge also

Abhinava says that *Rasa*, the artistic experience, transforms the nature of the ordinary emotions as they are felt in life.¹⁷ In ordinary experiences, for example, of a young woman rousing a young man's feeling of love, the sight of the woman is the cause of love in the young man. In an artistic

15. *Literary Criticism, A Short History*. p. 25.

16. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 12, 11, 21, 16.

17. *Rasaiśca vibhāvādivyapadeśyatā kāraṇādīnām*.

AB, 1, 293.

experience the cause, the sight of the young woman, and the effect, the erotic emotion in the young man's heart, are both unified together in a universal feeling of love of which the woman and her lover are the two poles of manifestation as objective correlatives. It is this universal feeling of love, free from the spatio-temporal tags of this woman and that man, that is the object of a poetic experience.¹⁸ Thus in a poetic experience, the cause, the object of the poetic experience, does depend on the effect, namely the poetic experience itself. And this fallacy is obvious.

But credit goes to Abhinava, who, remaining true to the idealistic tradition, succeeded in removing the fallacy. He says that, in truth, mutual inter-dependence of cause and effect becomes fallacious in one action, not in two actions. In the present case there are two actions involved. Thus the poetic experience (*Rasa*) makes the *ordinary* emotions (that are of the nature of effects of perceptions, the causes) poetic, that is, universal. *Rasa*, the poetic experience, *transforms ordinary emotions*. This universalization of ordinary emotions is one action. These ordinary emotions so universalized with all their causes and effects, the perceptions and emotions, submerged in it, *become the object of a poetic experience*. This 'becoming the object of a poetic experience' is another action. Thus there is no fallacy¹⁹ involved in accepting an artistic universal feeling being the object of an artistic or poetic experience, though an artistic universal feeling does not exist as a separate, phenomenal entity apart from its being felt in an artistic experience.²⁰ It cannot be shown as we can

18. Lokasya sarvasya sādharāṇatayā svatvena bhāvyamāṇaḥ carvyamāṇo'rtho nāṭyam. Lokikā ye sukhaṁ hṛkhātmano bhāvāḥ tat-saṁkāraubiddho nāṭya-lakṣaṇo'rthaḥ samudāyarūpaḥ. AB, I, 43-44.

19. Etaduktam bhavati : Ekatra ekadā kriyāyām anyo'nyāśrayatvam doṣo, na tu kriyābhede. AB, I, 293.

20. Na tu siddha-svabhāvaḥ, tātkālika eva, na tu carvaṇātirikta-kālāvalambī sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa eva rasaḥ. AB, I, 284.

show a man emotionally affected, for its differentia of universality can hardly be distinctly marked in any external signs of this experience. But that does not disprove its existence, for whatever is experienced cannot be negated.

Ordinarily, emotions as they are felt in life afford little scope for an artistic experience,²¹ which is an experience of unmixed joy²² on account of its object being a universal, free from all obstacles due to the limits of place and time. That is not the case with the ordinary experience of emotions. Ordinarily a feeling remains in the unconscious latent state as an appetency. Emotions experienced by the common man are fickle responses and are prejudiced by the associations of the objects that cause them. They may be of both pleasant and unpleasant types. But the artistic feeling is not bound by any limitation of time or place. It is impersonal and purely delightful because it is a repetition of the very principle of universality and joy, the infinite I AM.

It needs repeated emphasis that the differentia of the poetic feeling is impersonality and unmixed delightfulness, and not being produced by poetic words.²³ If a person be so uncultured that he pines for the beauties on the stage or in the poem instead of enjoying the action displayed or described, he can never have the poetic experience. Again, for experiencing a feeling universally or impersonally poetry or fine arts is not the exclusive medium. If it were so, it would be difficult to explain the faith of poets like Wordsworth who

21. Nāṭya eva rasāḥ, na loke. Na hi loke vibhāvānubhāvādayaḥ kecana bhavanti, hetu-kāryamātravāt loke teṣām. AB, I, 292.

22. Paraprītimayameva nāṭyam. AB, I, 16.

23. This may be considered as an apt refutation of the charge levelled by Richards against idealists. He says: "The myth of a 'transmutation' or 'poetisation' of experience and that other myth of the 'contemplative' or 'aesthetic' attitude, are in part due to talking about Poetry and the 'poetic' instead of thinking about the concrete experiences which are poems". P.L.C., p. 79.

claimed to have learnt direct from Nature. Moreover, it would lead to an absurd conclusion that in order to be a poet the poetic experience is necessary, which latter is possible only through poetry. It would be a difficult task to explain the fact of the first poet in any language on the basis of such a theory, even if all other objections are answered. Vālmiki's *Rasa* experience at the sight of the curlew crying for her spouse shot dead by the hunter at the time of their mating, the expression of which is supposed to begin the new era of classical Sanskrit poetry, would vindicate the point stressed here. The famous verse runs as follows ;—

Mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhām tvam agamaḥ śāśvatīḥ samāḥ
 Yat krouñca-mithunādekam avadhīḥ kāma-mohitam.
 (May thou not gain prestige
 For all years to come,
 Oh hunter ! that thou hast
 killed the impassioned one
 Of the pair of curlews.)

Here Vālmiki did not experience sorrow, explains Abhinava. To say that he did would amount to denying him the title of a sage, who cannot be said to be suffering from grief.²⁴ It is the bird that suffered from grief. Vālmiki had an inscape into his own 'unconscious' and had a taste of the universal feeling of sorrow belonging not to any particular being but to all including himself and the suffering bird he saw.²⁵ The plenitude of the *Rasa* experience found expression in a spontaneous overflow in a simple *śloka* full of deep poetic passion of sorrow. The poet was himself surprised at his uncontrollable creative activity. Repeatedly he wondered at his verse and repeatedly it came out of his

24. Na tu munēḥ śoka iti mantavyam Evaṁ hi sati tad-duḥkheṇa so'pi duḥkhita iti kṛtvā rasasya ātmatā iti niravakāśam bhavet Na ca duḥkhasantaptasya eṣa daśeti. *Locana*, p. 86.

25. Yastu aloukikacamatkāratmā ra-ā-vādaḥ...[tat] na tāsthyena pratipadyate api tu hrdayasaṁvālaparapa-ryāya-sahridayatva-paravaśikṛtatayā, ...taumayibhavanocitacarvaṇāprāṇatayā. *Locana*, pp. 155-6.

mouth. Pleased with Vālmiki's capacity of inscape into the universal feeling, Brahmā, the divine creator, requested him to describe the story of Rāma and Sītā, a story of immense love and sorrow. Such is the genesis of the first and the best poem in classical Sanskrit.²⁶

It is crystal clear that Vālmiki did not have the *Rasa* experience through poetic words. It came direct from his observation of a worldly event. It would be absurd to suggest that his *Rasa* experience was the effect of his own poem. His *Rasa* experience must naturally have preceded his poetic creation. Thus the theory that the artistic experience is not extra-ordinary is as untenable as that which holds that the artistic experience can only be produced through the medium of poesy or fine arts.

We have to start with the *Rasa* experience, which must precede all poetic creation. The differentia of a *Rasa* experience is that the subject as well as the object of this experience is a Universal. If this is understood, it would be easy to arrive at a scientific definition of poetry. Indeed the word 'poetry' has two meanings. First, it means poetic experience. To have that experience is to understand and enjoy what is its second meaning, the poem. The experience in a concrete shape is the poem, which helps others to have that experience which brought the poem into existence. Thus we have a poetic circuit.

So the poetic experience may be easily defined as the experience of a universal feeling with all its particular parts (causes and effects) subdued and submerged in it. The subject of such an experience cannot be a finite mind. It is the infinite spirit, for it alone can grasp an infinite universal. The poetic composition may be defined as the words and meanings that suggest the presence of such an experience. In Sanskrit the two words that express these two meanings are *Rasa* and *Dhvani*. Poetry in its essence is *Rasa-dhvani*.

26. *Rāmāyaṇa*, 'Bālakāṇḍa', canto 2.

CHAPTER VII

POETRY AS DHVANI, OR SUGGESTION

Kāvyaśyātmā dhvaniḥ...

DK, I, 1. p. 9.

Pratīyamānam punaranyadeva vastvasti vāṇiṣu mahākavinām
Yat tat prasiddhāvayavātiriktaṁ vibhāti lāvaṇyamivāṅganāsu.

DK, I, 4. p. 49.

Tatra pratīyamānasya tāvad dvan bhedaḥ - laukikaḥ, kāvyavyā-
pāraikagocaraśceti. Laukiko yaḥ svaśabdavācyatām kadācid adhiśate. Sa
ca vidhi-niṣedhādyanokaprakāro vastu-śabdenocyate. So'pi dvidvidhaḥ :
yaḥ pūrvaṁ kvāpi vākyārthe alaṅkārabhāvam upamādirūpatayā anvabhūt,
idāni tu analaṅkārarūpa eva anyatra guṇibhāvābhāvāt, sa pūrva-
pratyabhijñānabalād alaṅkāradhvanir iti vyapadiśyate brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa-
nyāyena. Tadrūpatābhāvena tu upalakṣitaṁ vastumātram ucyate... Yas tu
svapne'pi na sva-śabdavācyo, na laukika-vyavahāra-patitaḥ, kintu śabda-
samarpyamāna-hṛdayasañivāda-sundara-vibhāvanubhāva-samucita-prāg-vin-
iviviṣṭa-ratyādīvāsanānurūgasukumāra- svasaṁvidānanda- carvaṇā-vyāpāra-
rasaniya-rūpo rasaḥ sa kāvyavyāpāraikagocaro rasadhvanir: iti, sa ca
dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyatayā ātmeti.

Locana, pp. 50-2.

Urdhvo'rdhvamāruhya yadarthatattvaṁ
Dhīḥ paśyati śrāntimavedayanti
Alan-tadāśyaḥ parikalpitānām
Viveka-sopānaparamparāṇām.

AB, I, 278.

WORD and meaning are a unity. Meaning or idea, a
universal and not the particular object referred to by the idea,
is the soul, and word or expression is its body. That is
everywhere the case. Language would be a blind guide without
this unity. But ordinarily nobody perceives this unity. An
experience of this unity would be experiencing a universal. It
would be perceiving the reality as it is, pure existence, the
thing in itself, as distinguished from knowing a thing through
a word as an accepted conventional dead symbol. Sentences

and paragraphs, essays and novels, dramas and poems are all extensions of words that are still unified with their soul, the meaning, the unified impression of the whole. The whole theory of *Rasa-dhvani* is based on the unity of word and meaning, *vimarśa* and *prakāśa*, discussed earlier in Book II. Ānandavardhana and Abhinava expressly mention their debts to grammarians. Abhinava especially names Bhartṛhari, referred to in the previous chapters.¹

Man's behaviour is guided by his innate tendencies, his various appetencies. They shape his character and mould his speeches and actions and give them a unity. When attending to any object or action, physical or mental, man becomes so attentive as to forget all the spatio-temporal limits, he himself is transformed. His finite mind is subdued and his infinite spirit perceives without its aid. He experiences a universal basic feeling, where parts submerge their separate entities. The experience is overwhelmingly joyful and so overflows in sentences, and such sentences are the constituents of a poem.

The question is : what differentiates a poem from an ordinary group of sentences ? The answer given by the Indian critic is that the words and meanings conveying poetic experience are suggestive,² and the order in which they come out facilitates a flight to the universal state of the poet's experience. They become the suggestive signs trying to express the inexpressible unified state of the universal subject and universal object.³ As a consequence the ordinary literal meanings and words expressing them become sub-

1. See *DA* and *Locana*, pp. 192-35.

It is why the grammarians say : *Ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyag jñāto'suṣṭhu prayuktaḥ loke vede ca kāmādhug bhavati.*

2. *Kāvyaśāstrī dhvaniḥ.*

DK, I. 1, p. 9.

3. *Ritirhi guṇeṣveva paryavasitā...guṇāśca rasaparyavasāyina eva...*

Locana, p. 517.

Prasādaśtu svacchātā śabdārthayoḥ. Sa ca sarva-rasa-sādhāraṇo guṇaḥ sarvaracana-ādhāraṇaśca vyaṅgyārthāpekṣayaiva mukhyatayā vyavasthito mantavyaḥ.

DA, p. 213.

ordinate and less significant than those that help in the suggestion of this extra-ordinary esemplastic experience.⁴ *Dhvanikārikās* first of all revealed this truth about the new relation of Suggestion between word and meaning in poetry.⁵ Ānandavardhana, who wrote his commentary, *Dhvanyāloka*, on the *Dhvani-kārikās*, written by himself or somebody else, gives many illustrations to show the difference between the suggested meaning and the literal meaning. Abhinava's commentary on them makes the finest analysis of the relations between words and meanings in poetry.

The word and its meaning are a unity like *Ardhanārīśvara*.⁶ But that is so when word is pure consciousness (*vimarśa*), consciousness of nothing other than its pure self or meaning (*prakāśa*). That is the state of the absolute self-consciousness. In the phenomenal sphere, word and meaning are two separate entities. Sanskrit grammarians accept meaning to be an idea and not the object we see.⁷ There are three types of relations commonly found between words and their meaning. They are called the powers of the word or the syntax to have meaning. They are known as *Abhidhā*, *Tātparya* and *Lakṣaṇā*. *Abhidhā* is the power of Denotation, that gives the literal meaning, the commonly accepted meaning of the word, as 'rose' means 'the flower of that name'. *Abhidhā* similarly denotes the literal meaning of a sentence also, as the meaning of a sentence is the total meaning of its constituent words. 'The sun has set' means that it is no longer visible in our part of the sky. Some scholars, however, say that the meaning of a sentence is something over and above the meanings of its constituent

4. *Yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛta-svārthau*

Vyañktaḥ kāvya-viśeṣaḥ sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ.

DK, I, 13, p. 103. See also pp. 50-84.

5. *Tasya hi dhvaneḥ svarūpaṁ sakala-satkavi-kāvyaopaniṣadbhūtaṁ*
atiramaṇīyam aṇīya-ibhirapi cirantana-kāvya lakṣaṇa-vidhāyinām
buddhibhir anumīlitapūrvam. *DA*, p. 35.

6. *Raghuvamśa*, I, 1.

7. *Śaṅketitas caturbhedo jātyādir jātireva vā.* *MB* quoted in *KP*, p. 30.

words and the power expressing the meaning of the sentence is different from that which expresses the meanings of its words. They call it *Tātparya*, or Import, the Power of Syntax. The third relation is *Lakṣaṇā*, or Indication, which indicates a meaning allied with the literal meaning of a word, resolving a contradiction in the relation between the literal meanings of two words.⁸ The phrase 'blind mouths' in Milton's *Lycidas* may be taken as an illustration. Mouths cannot be blind. So mouths would mean 'persons having mouths' in order to remove the contradiction. This is a figure of speech known in English as synecdoche. According to Sanskrit critics it is a relation existing between a word and its meaning, not a figure of speech. The three relations noted above are not poetic. 'Mouths' meaning 'persons having mouths' would be a mechanical semantic relation, unless we think of Milton's purpose in using such a phrase as 'blind mouths'. The purpose, Abhinava, emphatically says, shows a fourth relation, different from all the previous three.⁹ It is the poetic relation and is known as *Dhvani*, or Suggestion. Milton's purpose was to suggest the *ignorant and greedy nature* of the clergymen and the compact phrase is an expression of the purified passion of anger (*Roudra-rasa*) raging in his heart of hearts against all ignorant and greedy clergymen. The phrase suggests Milton's attitude to such clergymen. These suggested meanings of the phrase can never be learnt from the dictionary or in any other mechanical way. A connoisseur of art, a man with a sensitive heart (*sahṛdaya*), at once perceives this fourth relation and knows the poet's whole attitude to his subject-matter, his whole intention. The literal meaning is not completely

8. *Siṃho mānavaka ityatra dvitīyakakṣyāniviṣṭa-tātparyasakti-samarpitān-va-ya-bā thakollāsānantaram abhidhā-tātparya-śaktidvaya vyatiriktā tāvnt tṛcīyaiva śaktis tadbādhaka.vidhurikarāṇa-nipunā lakṣaṇābhidhānā samullasati.* *Locana*, pp. 58-9.

9. *Caturthyāṁ tu kakṣyāyāṁ dhvananavyāpārah.* *Locana* p. 59.
See the quotation from *Abhinava-Bhāratī* in the beginning of this chapter.

effaced but is submerged in the more important suggested meaning, which alone attracts the connoisseur.¹⁰

Poetry is *Dhvani*. The word, *dhvani*, has five meanings according to the various ways of grammatical formation. They are the suggestive word, the suggestive meaning, the relation of suggestion, the suggested meaning, and the poem with such words and meanings. As meaningless words cannot suggest,¹¹ the word and its literal and indicative meanings may be taken together as one category of the suggestive. The word may be suggestive through its literal meaning or its indicative meaning. The relation existing between the suggestive and the suggested is called suggestion.

Thus *dhvani* with all these four or five meanings is called the soul of poetry, that is to be found 'everywhere, and in each', like the Coleridgean Imagination, "and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole".¹² It is like beauty that is found in every particular part but cannot be identified with one particular part only and pervades all over the body. It beautifies the poem as a whole.¹³

There is no end to the varieties of the suggested meaning, but the three most important and broad divisions are known as *Vastu-dhvani*, *Alaṅkāra-dhvani* and *Rasa-dhvani*. The suggestion of some fact or thought is called *Vastu-dhvani*.

10. Tadvat sacetasāṁ so'rtho vāyārthavimukhātmanām

Buddhau tattvārthadarśinyāṁ jhaṭṭityevāvabhāṣate. *DK*, I, 12, p. 102.

Tenātra vibhaktatayā na bhāṭo, na tu vācyasya sarvathaiva anavabbhāṣa. *Locana*, p. 102.

11. Word and meaning are equally important in poetry. Hence it is called *sāhitya*. See also *Locana*, p. 189: Na ca kāvyaśabdānām kevalānām bhāvakaṁ nam, arthāparijñāne ta'abbāvāt. Na ca kevalānām arthānām, śabdāntareṇa arpyamānatve tadayogāt. Dvayostu bhāvakaṁ tvam asmābbhiraiva uktam 'yatrārthaḥ śabdaḥ vā tamartham...vyañktaḥ' ityatra.

12. *B L.*, II, 13.

13. Pratiyamānam punaranyadeva vastvasti vāṇiṣu mahākaviṇām.

Yat tat prasiddhāvayavātiriktaṁ vibhāti lāvaṇyamivāṅganāsu.

DK, I, 4, pp. 48-9.

Ānandavardhana cites the example of a verse where a courtesan requests a pious man to go to the bowers on the bank of the Godāvarī, where he used to go probably for plucking flowers for worship, while her intention in such a request is that he should not go there. The place served her as a rendezvous and she was disturbed by this man's movements there. This is how she makes the request :

Bhama dhammia vīsattho so suṇao ajja mārio deṇa
 Golāṇaikaccha-kuḍaṅgavāsīnā dariya-sīheṇa.
 (Move there with confidence, O pious man,
 That dog has been killed today by the lion
 Of the bower on the bank of the Godāvarī.)

The sensitive listener would at once pick up that the true meaning of the poem is just the opposite of its apparent meaning and that the woman's request is her subtle device to get rid of the obstacle to her amours in the romantic surroundings.

Abhinava has elaborately discussed¹⁴ the process of arriving at this meaning intended by the speaker. He has shown that the Denotation and Import fail to bring out the true intention of the speaker, who gave an unsolicited advice to the pious man. 'Move freely because the obstacle has been removed' is quite an intelligible meaning and does not involve any contradiction and so Indication has no scope here. It is only through Suggestion that the real intention of the woman becomes known. A plain request to the man not to disturb her would have been against feminine nature and would not have worked either.

Though there is an infinite variety of *Vastu-dhvani*, one more example may be sufficient to explain the nature of this variety of Suggestion.

Snigdha śyāmala-kāntilīptaviyato velladbalākā ghanā,
 Vātāḥ śikarīṇaḥ, payodasuhṛdām ānandakekāḥ kalāḥ,

14. Abhinava's explanation of the verse "Bhama dhammia" in *Locana*, pp. 52-70.

Kāmañ santu dṛḍham kaṭhorahṛdayo Rāmo'smi
 sarvañ sahe
 Vaidehī tu katham bhaviṣyati hahā hā devi dhīrā
 bhava.

(The sky is dark with watery clouds.

And cranes enjoy their buoyant flight :

The wind is wet with water-drops,

And friends of clouds are cooing gay.

O let them be. I'm Rama the hard-hearted,

I bear all. But alas ! how would Vaidehī

Be ? Gather strength, oh my lustrous darling !)

Ordinarily a proper noun has no connotation. But here Rāma does not mean simply Rāma, the son of Daśaratha or the husband of Vaidehī, but qualified with various epithets like one who was promised the throne but was banished to the forest, where among other hardships he had to suffer the demon's stealing away his beloved wife ; who as a king had to pay the heavy price of the banishment of his innocent pregnant wife for pleasing his subjects, and so on. All these meanings are simultaneously suggested. This unity in multiplicity is the secret of the charm of Suggestion, for no other relation displays a number of meanings simultaneously.¹⁵

The second category of the suggested meaning is called the suggestion of a figurative idea (*Alaṅkāra-dhvani*). Figures are analysed in two categories in Sanskrit poetics. They are verbal and ideal, ornament of speech and ornament of thought. Thus alliteration is an ornament of speech, as the

15. Vyāṅgyaṁ dharmāntaram prayojanarūpam rājya-nirvāsanādyasaṅkhye-
 yam. Tacca asaṅkhyatvāt abhidhā-vyāpāreṇa aśakyasamarpaṇam.
 Krameṇa arpyamāṇamapi ekadhiviṣṭyābhāvāt na citracarvaṇāpādam
 iti na cārutvātiśayakṛt. Pratiyamāṇaṁ tu tadasaṅkhyam anudbhī na vi-
 śeṣatvenaiva kiṁ kiṁ rūpam na sabhate iti citrapānakara-āpūpa-
 guḍamodakassthāniya-vicitracarvaṇāpādam bhavati. Yathoktam 'Ukt-
 yantaropāśakyam yat' iti. Eṣa eva sarvatra prayojanasya pratiyamā-
 natvena utkarṣahetur mantavyaḥ.

Locana, pp. 169-70.

charm there is purely verbal. Simile and metaphor are ornaments of thought, as their charm depends on comparison of ideas or meanings. Some figures like pun are of dual nature, because word and meaning both contribute to their charm. Again an ornament of thought may be explicit, expressed (*vācya*) or implicit, suggested (*vyāṅgya*). The poet expresses a 'doubt' in the following example :

Tasyāḥ pāṇirayaṁ nu māruta-calat-patrāṅguliḥ pallavaḥ ?
(Is this her hand ?
Or a twig with finger-like leaves
Tossed by the breeze ?)

The suggested figure showing the comparison between the lady's hand and the twig is the source of the charm of the 'doubt' here. The figure of simile or metaphor is the suggested meaning, while the express meaning is a figure known as 'doubt'.

Here is another example of a figure suggesting another :—

Yā sthaviramiva hasantī kavivadanāmburuhataddha-
viniveśā.

Darśayati bhuvanamaṇḍalam anyadiva jayati sā Vāṇī.
(Glorious is the Goddess of Speech, who,
Seated on the lotus-mouth of poets,
Laughing as it were at the old Creator shows
His universe different from what it is)

The poetic charm of this verse is due to the figure called *vyatireka* or 'difference', which is suggested by the figure of *utprekṣā* or 'fancy', which is expressed in the phrase 'laughing as it were'. The Goddess of Speech is superior to the old Creator, Brahmā, because she has a seat in the mouth of poets, which is a living lotus, while Brahmā's lotus-seat is inanimate. Again her creative faculty surpasses the Creator's, for she shows his creation in a fresh and charming way.

There are innumerable varieties of this type also. Often a bare thought suggests a figurative one. It is not possible to illustrate them all here.

While the two varieties of the suggested meaning known as *Vastu-dhvani* and *Alaṅkāra-dhvani* may be found even in ordinary conversation, what always remains on the poetic plane is its third variety, *Rasa-dhvani*, which is the soul of poetry. Even *Vastu-dhvani* and *Alaṅkāra-dhvani* imply *Rasa-dhvani* but it is not predominantly felt in them. The principle of classification in poetry can be no other than the predominant cause of charm.¹⁶ Just as the Suggested meaning is more charming than the Expressed or Indicated, similarly among the different varieties of the Suggested meaning it is *Rasa-dhvani*, the suggestion of poetic passion, that is most delightful, for that is the very essence, the soul, of poetry.¹⁷

Here is an example of *Rasa-dhvani* :

Vācam na miśrayati yadyapi madvacobhiḥ,
 Karṇam dadātyabhimukhaṁ mayi bhāṣamāṇe,
 Kāmaṁ na tiṣṭhati madānanasammukhiyam
 Bhūyiṣṭhamanyaviṣayā na tu dṛṣṭirasyāḥ.
 (She does not join me in talk indeed, but
 Lends her ears closely to what I say ;
 She does not stand before me face to face,
 Though mostly she doesn't look elsewhere either.)

This description of the bashful actions of the love-laden Śakuntalā by her lover Duṣyanta in the famous drama of Kālidāsa suggests the erotic passion (*Śṛṅgāra-Rasa*). The ultimate meaning of the lines is the experience of the basic feeling of love in a universal form. The meanings of different parts—Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā, the lover and the beloved,

16. 'Cārutvotkarṣa-nibandharā hi vācya-vyaṅgyayoḥ prādhānya-vivakṣā.

DA. p. 114.

Cp. Coleridge : "According to the faculty or source from which the pleasure given by any poem or passage was derived, I estimated the merit of such poem or passage." *B. L.*, I, 14. If the word 'faculty' be removed from the passage, Abhinava would totally agree with Coleridge.

17. *Locana*, pp. 50-52 ; see also pp. 85, 90, 174-5, 197 ; *DA*. p. 363 : Rasabandha eva kaveḥ prādhānyena pravṛtti-nibandhanam yuktam.

the *vibhāvas*, her physical movements and his close watch, the *anubhāvas*, that suggest the various transient emotions (*sañcāribhāvas*) like her shyness in talking to a stranger but pleasure in listening to what he says and his happiness at all these—are all submerged in this ultimate meaning, which is thus an experience of unity in multitude.

Browning's "Meeting at Night" similarly suggests the passion of love ; and Tennyson's "Break, break, break", that of sorrow.

This charming ultimate poetic meaning, *Rasa*, may be suggested by the description of either of the objective correlatives, the *vibhāvas* or *anubhāvas*. In the verse from Kālidāsa cited above Śakuntalā's actions (*anubhāvas*) are pre-dominantly the suggestive factors. In the following it is her person (*the ālambana vibhāva*).

Anāghrātam puṣpam, kisalayamalūnam kararuhair,
Anāviddham ratnam, madhu navamanāsvāditarasam
Akhaṇḍam puṇyānām phalamiva ca tadrūpamanagham.
Na jāne bhoktāram kamiha samupasthāsyati Vidhiḥ.

(A flower unsmelt, a leaf untorn by nails,
A gem unperforated, fresh honey
Never tasted before ; the unshared prize
For pious deeds—such is her spotless beauty ;
Upon whom, I know not, will Fortune bestow it ?)

Sometimes the surroundings (*uddīpana vibhāvas*) suggest

Rasa, as in the following :—

Kāryā saikatalīnahamsamithunā srotovahā Mālīnī ;
Pādāstāmbhito niṣaṇṇaharīṇā Gouriguroḥ pāvanāḥ ;
Śakhāmbitavalkalasya ca taror nirmātumicchāmyadhaḥ
Śṛṅge kṛṣṇamrgasya vāmanayanam kaṇḍūyamānām mṛgīm.
(The river Mālīnī, with pairs of swans
Hidden in its sandy banks, and at its back
The holy foot-hills of the father of
Gourī, with deer sitting all round, and under
A tree, with bark-garments hanging from its
Branches, a doe softly rubbing her left

Eye on a black buck's horn—it is such a
Picture that I wish to draw.)

Duṣyanta's love for the peaceful atmosphere of Kaṇva's
āśrama is due to his first meeting his beloved there.

Bhāva is suggested by the same objective correlatives
as *Rasa*. *Anubhāvas* suggest *Bhāva* in the following descri-
ption of a shy maiden :

Nakhaṁ nakhāgreṇa vighaṭṭayantī vivartayantī valayaṁ
vilolaṁ
Āmandramāśiṅjitanūpureṇa pādena mandam bhuvamā-
likhaṁtī.

(Rubbing a nail with a nail-end,
Moving the bracelet round and round,
With her foot resonant with the tinkling anklet
She was softly scratching the ground.)

Rasa, however, is better portrayed in a long poem, best in
a drama enacted on the stage. Abhinava is not a protagonist
of the small poem like Edgar Allan Poe.¹⁸ It is only the
expert *litterateur* whom even a small lyric or a detached
stanza can give the joy of what has been called a total
experience of poetry. Ordinarily men get it in long poems,
most in dramas in the theatre, provided they attend to the
dramatic action displayed and do not suffer from any distrac-
tion like music, song or the beautiful actress. Even the best
critic cannot but find this total display of the total poetic
experience more satisfactory than its small or long reports in
other forms.¹⁹

The Stages of Poetic Experience

Though the man of literary taste knows the poet's ultimate
meaning, his whole intention, immediately after reading his

18. See his essay, "The Poetic Principle," in *American Critical Essays*
XIXth and XXth Centuries, ed. by Norman Forester, (World's
Classics)

19. Kintu samaprādhānya eva rasāśvādasya utkarṣaḥ. Taoca prabandha
eva bhavati; vastutastu daśarupaka eva.
AB, I, 287.

poem, yet there are steps in the process, which should be noted for understanding the process as well as the reader's poetic development.

Abhinava noted that the process contained many steps,²⁰ but it was Gokulanātha Upādhyāya,²¹ who noted these steps in detail. It would not be out of place to note these stages here in short.

At the first moment the words are attended to in an order conducive to rendering the literal meaning of the sentences. At the second, their meanings, the objects, that is, characters and their actions, are remembered. At the third, the characters doing this or that action become the objects of experience. At the fourth, there is remembrance of the fleeting emotions suggested by the words denoting actions. At the fifth, the meaning of the sentences along with these suggestions is understood. It is the moment when the literal meaning is enriched by the suggested meaning for the first time and both are perceived together. It is the stage of entrance into the poetic mood. At this moment the main characters, the hero and the heroine, the objective correlatives of the basic feeling, and their actions along with the transient emotions suggested by them, are the objects of experience. At the sixth moment, the Figures, verbal and ideal, as well as the Poetic Merits are perceived. These beauties help in removing the hardness of the heart, its selfish, narrow, finite, stiff nature. Though the delight of the universality of the poetic experience begins to be felt at the fifth moment, when there is take-off to the poetic experience on account of the suggestions of the floating emotions, yet at the sixth moment it is all the more intensified. At the seventh, the characters, their actions, and the floating emotions are totally extricated from their

20. See footnotes 9 and 17 of this chapter. See also *MVV*, I, 1030-33.

21. A poet-critic and a versatile genius of Mithilā of the nineteenth century. He wrote many excellent works on poetry and grammar and other subjects. One such is his commentary on *Kāvya-prakāśa*, which unfortunately is not available in full.

spatio-temporal tags. First there is remembrance of these in a universal way, and then at the eighth moment, there is perception or experience of all these universalized. It is the stage of the delightful experience of the universalized floating emotions. Or, joy being the nature of the infinite spirit superior to consciousness, the delight of such a perception may be said to be experienced at the ninth moment. At the tenth, the basic feeling is remembered, and at the eleventh, its unification with its suggestive factors is experienced. It is the moment of the experience of the basic feeling. At this moment the universal basic undercurrent of feeling, the back-ground on which all the particulars are displayed, is experienced. At this very moment or next, the joy of the infinite spirit is unified with the basic feeling. At the thirteenth moment, the basic feeling along with the factors that develop and suggest it, the universal with all its particulars subdued in it, is experienced. At this or the next fourteenth moment, the delight of the infinite spirit is unified with the universal basic feeling made unique by all its particular constituents that suggest it. This last is the apex of the poetic experience and this apex is known as *Rasa*.²²

At another place Gokulanātha reduces the poetic process to ten moments only.²³ The merit of his analysis lies in distinctly marking the stages in the centripetal movement of the reader's mind towards the central self-consciousness. It is the ultimate centre of poetic creation and appreciation. Genuine poetic creation starts from that centre, that apex of the poet's experience. And so does genuine poetic appreciation. That centre is the experience of *Rasa*, the unity of the infinite consciousness with its own self and its offshoots. On this infinite ground alone all other lower manifestations, creative or appreciative, are possible, if one is keen to make poetics scientific. Only a few poets and a few critics reach there. But the relative merits

22. *KPV*, p. 141.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-3.

of poetic creation and poetic appreciation are measured from this very absolute standard in Sanskrit poetics. That is the secret of the emphasis on, and priority of treatment given to, *Rasa* in Sanskrit poetics by Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, and their followers.

The Soul Of Poetry

It cannot be too many times repeated that *Rasa* is an experience of unity in multeity like the taste of a drink composed of various ingredients ; that the take-off to the transcendental poetic experience is quick and sudden in the case of the men of taste. But that does not negate either the multeity or the stages of the poetic experience. And the reader's attention may be arrested somewhere on the way. Thus he may stop at the very sonorous beauty of the words, the alliterations and the puns or at some figurative thought. Or he may be interested in the mere story or plot-structure. Or he may go a step further and have flight to the purely psychic region and may be occupied with emotions that appear in their ever-changing forms. It requires patience to enter the world of the basic feeling, that flows only as an under-current in the unconscious region and is beyond our grasp, for it is universal, which is cognizable only through its particular manifestations, the concrete transient emotions. The basic feeling can never be an object of ordinary experience. It can only be inferred.²⁴ But poetic experience is not inferential. It is perceptive, intuitive.²⁵ Universals can be perceived only intuitively. In the dualistic empirical stage they can only be inferred. A materialistic explanation of poetry will have to make poetic experience inferential, not perceptual. Once a universal is perceived it is easy to see the

24. *Sthāyātma-para-eittavṛttyanumānābhyāsapāṭavāt.*

AB, I, 284.

25. *Sākṣātkāra-kalpaḥ kāvyārthaḥ sphurati.*

AB, I, 287.

Pratitireva viśiṣṭā rasanā. Sā ca nāṭye lūkikānumānapratīter vilakṣaṇā.

Locana, p. 187.

multeity of particulars in it, for particulars are only its developed forms. To have a taste of the universal along with its particulars subdued in it thus is the apex of experience, for nothing remains to be known regarding the particulars after that.

What Ānandavardhana and Abhinava emphasize is that poetry in its essence is this apex of experience and even the lowest stage of enjoying a figure of speech cannot be possible without the suggestion of the essence. Just as a body bereft of its soul cannot be made attractive by ornaments, so a poem bereft of *Rasa* cannot be beautified by a figure of speech, for it is no poem. *Rasa* or *Īhvani* should not be made a principle of division of poetry, for a poem without the sweetness of the esemplastic *Rasa* experience is no poem.

CHAPTER VIII

CLASSIFICATION OF POETRY

Pradhānaguṇabhāvābhyām vyaṅgyasyaivaṁ vyavasthite
Kāvye ubhe tato'nyad yat tat citram abhidhīyate. DK, III, 98.

Kāvyē'pi ca loka-nāṭyadharmasthānīyena svabhāvokti-vakrokti-
prakāradvayena... Locana, p. 186.

Avivakṣitavācya vivakṣitānyaparavācya iti dvau mūlabhedau.
Ibid., p. 281.

THE classification of the different types of poetry is based on the predominantly charming factor of the poem.¹ The charm may be purely verbal or due to a thought, simple or figurative, or a fleeting emotion or a basic feeling. The latter two can only be 'suggested'. Thus the words 'anxiety' and 'love' do not move anybody, but when suggested by a description of their objective correlatives they move every sensitive heart. A thought, whether simple (*svabhāvokti*) or figurative (*vakrokti*), may be 'expressed' or 'suggested'. When a simple idea is charmingly expressed, the charm is due to the *Rasa* or *Bhāva* suggested by it. The simple direct expression cannot be charming otherwise. Without such a suggestion it degenerates into mere informative statement, *Vārtā*, as *Bhāmaha* said.² Suggestion may often help the expression to become more charming. Thus there are both *vyāṅgya* and *guṇībhūtavyāṅgya* varieties of *svabhāvokti*. Because of the possibility of this latter variety, *svabhāvokti* is often treated as

1. See fn. 16 of chapter VII, Bk. III.

2. *Kāvyaśaṅkārā*, II, 85. Cp. *DA*, p. 336: Na hi kaver itivṛttamātra-nirvahanena kiñcit prayojanam, itihāsādeva tat-siddheḥ.

a figure of thought. For the real charm of a figure lies in its being helped by a suggested thought. Just as *vyāṅgya*, the suggested idea, is the essence of the poetic experience, and *dhvani*, or suggestion, the essence of the poetic expression, *guṇibhūtavyāṅgya*, where the suggested idea enlightens the expression from the back-ground, is the essence of all poetic figures or imagery³. Suggestion (*Dhvani*) must be there in poetry either in the forefront or in the background.⁴ When it is in the forefront, poetry is *vyāṅgya*; when it is in the background, poetry is *guṇibhūtavyāṅgya*.

When a simple thought is suggested, it becomes charming and an example of *Vastu-dhvani*. A figurative thought may be charming either expressly or suggestively. In the first case, it is an Ornament (*Alaṅkāra*) of poetry. In the second, it is a Suggestion of Ornament, *Alaṅkāra-dhvani*.

Vastu-dhvani and *Alaṅkāra-dhvani* have already been explained and illustrated in the previous chapter. The illustration of *Rasa-dhvani* given there describing Śakuntalā's bashful nature may be taken as an example of *svabhāvokti*, for it describes the behaviour of a love-laden girl most naturally. That illustrates the *vyāṅgya* variety of *svabhāvokti*, as the suggested feeling of love is more charming than the physical actions described. The *guṇibhūtavyāṅgya* variety of *svabhāvokti* may be illustrated by the child's description of the horse in *Uttara-Rama-carita*. The children of Vālmiki's hermitage saw a horse for the first time. This is how Lava, Rāma's son, describes it :

Pāścāt pucchaṁ vahati vipulam, tacca dhūnotyajasram,
Dīrghagrivaḥ sa bhavati, khurās tasya catvāra eva,
śaṣpānyatti, pragirati śakṛt-piṇḍakān āmramātrān,

3. Guṇibhūtavyāṅgyataiva atra alaṅkāratāyām marma-bhūtā laksitāḥ.

Locana, p. 478.

4. Sarvathā nāstyeva sahrdaya-hṛdyahārīṇaḥ kāvyasya sa prakāro yatra na pratiyamānārtha-saṁsparśena saubhāgyam. Tadidaṁ kāvyarahasyam param iti sūribhir bhāvanīyam.

D.A. pp. 474-5.

Kiñ vyākhyātair, vrajati sa punar dūramehyehi yāmaḥ.⁵
 (He bears a long tail at his back
 And moves it again and again ;
 With neck prolonged and hoofs only four
 Goes on grazing the grass and throwing
 Mango-sized balls of stool all round.
 Won't further describe him ; come on,
 He is going away, we go.)

Here the suggestion of the poetic passion of wonder has beautified the child's expression of it. Acceptance of these two varieties of *svabhāvokti* ultimately rests on the impression of the connoisseurs of literary art.

As a matter of fact, all examples of figurative expression are examples of *guṇibhūtavyaṅgya*. They only show that sometimes the suggested meaning beautifies the expression so much that the former becomes subordinate to the latter. One more example may suffice here.

Anurāgavatī Sandhyā Divasas tatpurassarah ;
 Aho daivagatiḥ kiṁ tathāpi na samāgamah.
 (The Day goes gliding,
 The blushing Eve following ;
 But oh ill luck that they can't meet.)

Love between Day and Eve is suggested by the different genders in *Divasah* and *Sandhyā* that personify them as man and woman respectively, and by the pun in the words, *anurāgavatī*, which means both 'red' and 'love-laden', and *purassarah*, meaning both 'that which moves before' and 'that which moves in front'. This suggestion of love between Day and Eve has made the expression itself more charming.

The measure of the relative importance and value of a poem is the relation of suggestion. The suggestive word and meaning and the suggested meaning are superior to the expressive word and the expressed meaning, for the essence

of poetry (*Rasa*) can only be suggested, never expressed.⁶ Of all the various types of the suggested meaning, it is *Rasa*, the experience of a universal basic feeling along with all its particular ingredients, that holds the highest position.⁷ It is superior to *Bhāva*, the experience of a transient particular aspect of *Rasa*. Among the different types of *Rasa*, the primary *Śānta Rasa*, the supreme experience of the peaceful nature of the infinite spirit, is the most valuable. It is the achievement of salvation (*Mokṣa*) through poetry. It is the highest purpose of human life and is a very rare achievement.⁸

Sometimes more than the suggested meaning—*Rasa* or *Bhāva* or *Vastu-dhvani* or *Alaṅkāra-dhvani*—the expression itself is charming. In such cases suggestion makes itself subordinate to expression, which latter as helped by the former becomes thus the predominant cause of delight. It is like taking the baby on one's shoulders and making it taller. *Vastu*, *Alaṅkāra* and *Rasa* including *Bhāva* are the divisions of poetry when idea or meaning is taken as the principle of division. Taking expression or word as the principle of division, poetry may be divided as *Vyaṅgya* and *Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya*. What is suggested is the principle in the former division. What is the *position* of the suggested is the principle in the latter. The predominant source of charm is the guiding factor in accepting all these varieties.

As a matter of fact these two, *Vyaṅgya* and *Guṇibhūta*-

6. Yathoktam—'Uktyantarapāsakyaṁ yat' iti. Eṣa eva sarvatra prayojanasya pratiyamānatvena utkarṣaḥ. *Locana*, pp. 169-70.

7. Vyaṅgyasya ca cārutvaṁ rasābhivyaktiyogyatātmakam. Rasādivyativirikṭasya hi vyaṅgyasya rasāṅgabhāva-yogitvam eva prādhānyam, nānyat kiñcit... *Locana*, pp. 473. 484-5.

8. Mokṣaphalatvena cāyam parama-puruṣārtha-niṣṭhatvāt sarva-rasebhyah pradhānatamaḥ. *Locana*, p. 394.
Yadi nāma sarvajanānubhavgocaratā tasya nāsti, naitāvatā asau alokasāmānyamahānubhāva-cittavṛttiviśeṣaḥ pratikṣeptuṁ śakyaḥ.

DA, p. 393.

vyāṅgya, are the only varieties of poetry.⁹ There can be no poetry without a suggested meaning. It may be predominantly charming as in the first variety or it may help the expression and be itself subordinate as in the second. Even those who say that poetry moves by a 'fine excess' (*atiśaya*) or 'ambiguity' (*kāku*) mean nothing other than this.¹⁰ The 'fine excess' is hardly different from suggestion. Ambiguity, if it means anything different from suggestion, is a defect.¹¹

There is, however, a third variety noted by Ānandavardhana and Abhinava. They do not accept it as true poetry. It is rather an exercise in rhetoric, which in the beginning no doubt helps poets showing them different ways of expression, but it does not lead them to the goal either of the poetic experience or the poetic communication. This third variety is called *Citra* or Pictorial. It can easily be equated with Coleridge's Fancy. It is merely a copy of true poetry. It is lifeless like a person in a picture (*citra*). As the speaker's intention alone is the guide in determining the meaning of words,¹² this variety is defined as that where the poet does not intend to suggest anything but is satisfied with mere figurative turns of speech and thought. In the absence of the poet's intention if the reader still finds a suggested meaning it cannot be denied, but it remains there in such a feeble position that its presence becomes insignificant.¹³

A MISUNDERSTANDING REMOVED

The criticism that Sanskrit poetics neglects the creative aspect of poetry seems to be baseless, for while the theory of *Rasa* deals with the appreciative aspect of poetry, that of *Dhvani* definitely deals with the creative aspect too. That ultimately *Rasa* and *Dhvani* are the same shows the essential

9. See *DA*, p. 495.

10. *Locana*, pp. 467-9, 477-9.

11. *KP*, VII, *kārikā* 51, p. 247.

12. *Vivakṣopārūḍha eva hi kāvyē śabdānāmārthaḥ*.

DA, p. 496.

13. *DA*, pp. 495-500.

unity of the two attitudes noted by Abhinava in the very first verse of his commentary on *Dhvanyāloka*. Any reader of *Dhvanikārikās* would mark the author's emphasis on the creative aspect.¹⁴ The commentaries naturally follow him. It is the suggestive word and the suggested meaning that a poet desirous of fame and true greatness should try to know and use.¹⁵ It is they that beautify the poem.¹⁶ They can never be learnt by enriching the vocabulary in the ordinary ways,¹⁷ Abhinava says that the aesthetic experience alone makes one a poet.¹⁸ The *Dhvanikāra* points out that the main task of the poet is to have the sense of propriety in the use of words and meanings so that *Rasa* may be properly suggested.¹⁹ He should know the relations among different poetic passions (*Rasas*) so that he may be able to avoid the juxtaposition of such of them as contradict each other.²⁰ Those that are friendly to each other should be similarly known. Poets improve human nature. That is their great task.²¹ They cannot do so without knowing these relations.

14. See e.g. I, 8, 9; II, 16; III, 17, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 45; IV 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17.

15. Ityuktalakṣaṇo yo dhvanir vivecyah prayatnataḥ sadbhīḥ.
Satkāvyaṁ kartum vā jñātum vā samyagabbhiyuktaiḥ.

DA, III, 45, p. 516.

So'rthas tad-vyakṛti-sāmarthyayogī śabdaś ca kaścana
Yatnataḥ pratyabbhiñneyau; tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ.

DA, I, 8, p. 97.

16. Pratiyaṁānam punaranyadeva vastvasti vāṇiṣu mahākaviṇām
Yat tat-prasiddhāvayavātirikṭaṁ vibhāti lāvanyamivāṅganāṣu.

DA, I, 4, pp. 48-9.

17. Śabdārtha-śāsanajñānamātrenaiva na vedyate
Vedyate sa tu kāvyārtha-tattvajñāireva kevalam.

DA, I, 7, p. 93.

18. See fn. 18 of chapter VI, Bk III and *Locana*, p. 92:
Pratibhā apūrvā-vastu-nirmāṇakṣamā prajñā; tasya viśeṣo rasāveśa-
vaisādyasaundaryam kāvyanirmāṇakṣamatvam.

19. Vācyānām vācakānām ca yadaucṭtyena yojanam
Rā-ādiviṣayapāitāt karma mukhyaṁ mahākaveḥ.

DA, III, 32, p. 400

20. Vijñāyetkhaṁ rasādīnām avirodha-virodhaḥ oḥ
Viśayaṁ sukaviḥ kāvyam kurvan muhyati na kvacit.

DA, III, 31, p. 400.

21. Sadācāropadeśarūpā . hi nāṭakādigoṣṭhi, vineyajanahitārthameva
munibhir avatāritā.

DA, p. p. 398-9.

See also *Locana* on it.

Ānandavardhana emphasises the importance of the erotic passion in this context, for love is the most predominant feeling of mankind.²² Another predominant feeling is sorrow as noted by Bhavabhūti.²³ Most of the Indian philosophers would agree with Keats that the world is a place

'Where but to think is to be full of sorrow
And laden-eyed despairs'.

As a matter of fact, there cannot be a fixed gradation of feelings. Circumstances, personal idiosyncrasies, racial characteristics, the spirit of the age—all have a say in the matter. Abhinava decided their relative importance on the basis of the four aims of life.²⁴ The poet, who is an intelligent man *par excellence*, ought to understand what would serve his purpose at a particular moment.

There is no possibility of there ever being a dearth of poetic subjects, for though the poet's work is confined chiefly to the suggestion of basic feelings, which are numbered, there is no end to the variety of the ways in which they can be displayed. He should not search for new emotions or feelings on the ground that old ones have been displayed by other poets. True poetry is new and old at the same time.²⁵ He would never suffer for want of subject matter if only he has creative imagination (*pratibhā*).²⁶ For Imagination indeed is the very goddess of Poesy.

22. *DA*, p. 399.

23. Kko rasaḥ karuṇa eva nimittabhedād
Bhinnaḥ prthak prthagivāśrayate vivartān
Āvarta-budbuda-taraṅga-mayān vikārān
Ambho yathā salilameva tu tat samagram.

URC, Act III, v. 47.

24. *AB*, I, 282.

25. Purāṇa-ramaṇiyacchāyānugṛhitam hi vastu śarīravat parām śobhām
puṣyati. Na tu punaruktatvena avabhāsat, tanvyāḥ śaśicchāyami-
vānanam.

DA on *DK*, IV, 15, p. 548.

Coleridge held the same view. See his defence of Scott against the charge of plagiarism and the quotation from his letter 845 given before. T. S. Eliot also had the same view. See his essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent." He says that "art never improves, but... the material of art is never quite the same." *Selected Prose*, p. 25.

26. Na kāvyārthavirāmo'sti yadi syāt pratibhāguṇaḥ. *DK*, IV, 6, p. 537.

CHAPTER IX

A RÉSUMÉ

Asmanmate tu sañvedanameva ānandaghanam āśvādyate.....kevalam tasyaiva citratākarane rati-śokādi-vyāpāraḥ ; tadudbodhane ca abhinayā-divyāpāraḥ. AB, I, 292.

...Anuprāsopamādayo vācya-vācaka-rūpāṅgopaskāra-dvārā aṅgibhūta-rasam upaskurvāṇā eva śāstre alaṅkāratayā vyavahriyante iti rasādināṁ sākṣād upakāraikatvena vācya-vācakāṅga-dvāropaskāraikatvābhāvena teṣāṁ alaṅkāra-vyavahāro niryuktika eveti. Tippaṇī on Locana, p. 195.

Kāraṇānyatha kāryāṇi sahakāriṇi yāni ca
Ratyādeḥ sthāyino loka tāni cen nāṭya-kāvyaayoḥ
Vibhāvā anubhāvāś ca kathyante vyabhicāriṇaḥ
Vyaktaḥ sa tatr vibhāvādyaiḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.

KP IV, 27-28, pp. 83-90.

Rasa-bhāva-tadābhāsa-tatpraśāntyādir-akramaḥ
Dhvaner-ātmāṅgibhāvena bhāsamāno vyavasthitaḥ.
Vācya-vācaka-cārutva-hetūnāṁ vividhātmanāṁ
Rasādiraparatā yatra sa dhvaner viśayo mataḥ.
Pradhāne' nyatra vākyārthe yatrāṅgaṁ tu rasādayaḥ
Kāvyo tasminn-alaṅkāro rasādiriti me matiḥ.

DK, II, 3-5, pp. 175-191.

To sum up, the theories of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* are complementary to each other : *Rasa* is Meaning and *Dhvani* is the Power of Word. Both are a unity and that is the significance of the Sanskrit word for literature—*Sāhitya*. *Rasa* is the intuitive poetic experience ; *Dhvani*, the suggestive expression of that experience. *Rasa* is the poetic content ; *Dhvani*, the poetic expression. Both are ultimately one like the *Trika* concept of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*. The word *Dhvani* in all its five meanings is however a more comprehensive concept than *Rasa*. Moreover, just as word is more tangible than

meaning, so is *Dhvani* more tangible than *Rasa*, But the more valuable thing is the poetic content, the ineffable experience of poetic joy. And that makes *Rasa* the superior concept. Both these concepts together are an exhaustive treatment of poetry.

The value of a poem is decided by the source of its delight. *Rasa* is the soul of a poem, the source of its birth and organic growth. It is an intuitive perception and should not be confused with any type of worldly knowledge.¹ It is an esemplastic experience of the unity in multitude and can only be imaginatively created with the help of its objective correlatives. It does not exist anywhere as an entity and hence cannot be had by any means except by strenuous personal efforts in attentiveness to it. Total attention alone makes this experience possible,² just as total surrender makes one fit for receiving the divine grace. Total attention to the object of description (*varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyata*) has already been referred to as the essential characteristic of the man of artistic taste.

Bhāva differs from *Rasa* only so far as it is the transient or particular aspect of the whole that *Rasa* is. The suggestion of a transient emotion is *Bhāva*: that of a basic feeling with all its particulars is *Rasa*. The relation between the two is like that between the ocean and the wave. There is no qualitative difference but a difference of depth and magnitude. Waves cannot exist without the ocean, though the ocean may sometimes be calm and waves may not be seen. Transient emotions like waves of the ocean-like feeling may rise or fall or meet another wave or be variegated by mixing with one another. Thus we have *bhāvodya*, *bhāvasānti*, *bhāvasandhi* and *bhāvaśabalatā*, respectively as varieties of *Bhāva*.

1. Lokavārtāpatita-bodhāvasthātyāgenonmīlanti.

Locana, p. 508.

2. Yāvannijahṛdayarasavilasadvikasvaranirvāra-camatkāra-pavitratā nā jātā Bhagavata iva tāvat śikṣāsatairapi vaicitryamanābhāryam.

AB, I, 22.

Again all these may be suggested through proper or improper objective correlatives and we may have the true and the apparent varieties of each. Like *Rasa* and *Rasābhāsa*, there may be *Bhāva* and *Bhāvābhāsa* and so on. Among all these *Rasa*, and among *Rasas* the primary *Śānta-Rasa*, is important.

All these belong to the category of the essence, or the soul, of poetry. They give a significant meaning to the poem.

Whenever there is a suggestion of the esemplastic essence, *Rasa*, we have a poem of the first class, though even here there is difference of magnitude and it is a long poem that offers the scope for full-fledged growth of this seed of poetry. The drama is better than other forms on account of the arresting nature of the audio-visual aids, that compel the spectator to listen to the poet and be moved and improved.

Abhinava would agree with Aristotle's statement that "Epic poetry is addressed to a cultivated audience, who do not need gesture", but he would not denigrate Tragedy on account of its unrefined audience, because the extra audio-visual aid only improves the capacity of the dramatist to move the audience. Even Aristotle considers Tragedy superior to Epic on account of vivid impression and concentrated effect. In smaller poems also the superiority is decided in the same way.

There are two other varieties of the suggested meaning known as *Vastu-dhvani* and *Alaṅkāra-dhvani*, that is the suggestion of a simple or a figurative thought. Though there is hardly any idea that cannot be said to suggest a human feeling and thus suggest some *Rasa*, these two varieties are enumerated only on the principle that the meaning of any sentence or sentences is decided by the speaker's intention.

Sometimes the suggested meaning, which is more important, becomes subordinate to the expressed. The predominance in all such cases is decided by the source of charm. That meaning, suggested or expressed, which is more charming is more important. Thus on this principle poetry is of two

types. *Vyaṅgya* is the type where the suggested meaning is more charming, and *Guṇibhūtavyaṅgya* is that where the expressed meaning is more charming than the suggested.

A simple idea without any suggestion is merely an informative statement and has no place in literature. A figurative word or meaning is rhetoric and can be poetic only when it beautifies *Rasa* or *Bhāva* or the like. In itself it is a mechanical lifeless exercise that may become the poet's strength later on when he is able to instil life into it by suggesting some human feeling or emotion.

INTERCHAPTER IV

Book III presents the main structure of Sanskrit poetics in a nutshell. Comprehensive and exact analysis is the common characteristic of Sanskrit learning. Sanskrit poetics is no exception to the rule. Hindu critics make a thorough analysis of the poetic content and the poetic expression. They say that poetic content is never knowledge; it is always feeling. Science or *Sāstra* deals with knowledge. They make two broad divisions of all learning, *śāstra* and *kāvya*,¹ science and art. They do not make the incorrect juxtaposition of head and heart in poetry as Coleridge does. They point out that feeling is not contradictory to knowing. Instead, feeling is intimate knowing. When knowing is affective, it is feeling. Knowing and feeling, head and heart are not the opposites to be reconciled in poetry. The opposites are the subject and the object. The finite has to be brought to the infinite and unified with it. But unification is possible only between similar things. Opposites cannot be reconciled, as both Abhinava and Pythagoras pointed out. One of the two factors in the opposites must therefore change its nature. As the subject everywhere is the eternal infinite self-consciousness, it cannot be said to change its nature. Naturally the lower unit has to change its nature. The finite object has to lose its finiteness. The object has to be made ideal, universal, subjective. Then alone is a union with the eternal infinite subject possible. This is the significance of Bharata's remark in *Nāṭyaśāstra* that the basic feeling is turned into *Rasa*. The actions displayed or described suggest concrete emotions and concrete emotions must submerge themselves in their universal form, the basic feeling, of which they are the off-shoots, before they can be unified with the infinite universal subject. No Western critic has pointed out this fundamental point of the poetic process. Aristotle mentioned

1. Iha hi vānmayam ubhayathā-śāstraṁ kāvyam ca.

the three states of feeling—*ēthē*, *pathē*, and *praxeis*—but did not show the process of idealization.

Aristotle said that poetry describes things as they may be, and this is what he meant by describing them in a universal way as different from the historical way, which describes things as they are or were. But things as they are or were are also forms of what they may be, and Aristotle felt some difficulty in explaining probability or inner necessity as the fundamental law of poetic description. He recurs to it again and again but does not quite succeed in clarifying his point and winds up his argument by a statement that begs the question: 'not to know that a hind has no horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically'. This led W. K. Wimsatt to remark that a nuclear something in poetry still remains a mystery. [Aristotle's pragmatic way of explanation has its own merits, but certainly it gave speculation a blind spot and the analysis of the poetic experience on the lines suggested by his own distinction of the three states of feeling, *ēthē*, *pathē*, and *praxeis*—a distinction, by the way, more Indian than Greek—did not develop in the West. Critics in India right from Bharata analysed the centripetal nature of the poetic description that leads *praxeis* to *pathē* and *pathē* to the central *ēthos*, which, with all the offshoots merged in it, becomes the object of the infinite eternal subject, the pure self-consciousness, or spirit, in a poetic experience.

Coleridge spoke of the importance of the under-current of feeling but was not clear about its being the *object* of poetic experience. He spoke of the re-conciliation of opposites, unity in multitude, unity of the universal and particulars in the poetic experience. [The Indian critics speak of the poetic experience as the unity of two universals, objective and subjective. It is a more correct view on the basis of the Pythagorean principle that likes alone can meet, a principle on which Coleridge based his own theory. Particulars lose their particularity, become submerged in their universal before they become the object of poetic experience.

The whole process happens very quickly, almost like a flash of lightning, but none the less the process cannot be denied.

In ordinary experience subject and object are never completely unified. There is never a perfect reconciliation of these opposites. The subject knows the object as something separate from itself. Though there is an attempt to reconcile them, yet reconciliation is only partial, never total. Worldly knowledge is always dualistic : subject and object are always felt as different entities. Worldly feeling is no better. It is also dualistic having spatio-temporal tags.

The whole gamut of human feelings and their offshoots, the concrete emotions and their psycho-physical effects are the matter of poetry. Nothing is excluded from the scope of poetry. Beauty is not a key concept of Sanskrit poetics. It is Joy, *Rasa*, that creates beauty, and makes things valuable.²

There are three states—universal potential feelings, concrete emotions, and their psycho-physical expressions, and they make a psycho-physical circuit, which is the story of life in every form. Actions are a development of emotions, and emotions, of feelings. But feelings are nothing other than psychic potentials, appetencies, that are the results of the individual's past actions. Thus actions lead to feelings and feelings lead to actions. The relation between them is like one between the seed and the tree. Freedom from this vicious causal chain is possible only in the human form of life. In every other respect man is no better than animal or is even worse, because he often turns his freedom into licence.

How to be free from this vicious causal circuit is the greatest problem of man's life. Education in the true sense of the term must solve this fundamental problem of freedom from causal bondage. *Mokṣa* or salvation means nothing other than this freedom.

Bondage is possible of finite things only. Infinity cannot be bound. So the Hindu thinkers tried to find out the secret

2. *Locana*, v. 1 : *DU*, p. 302.

of crossing the realm of finites. Their analysis shows that what appears as finite is, in every case, a developed form of its infinite potential form, and that infinity in the ultimate eternal form is subjective. The true self is wider than the sky. Thus the secret of salvation or freedom (*Mokṣa*) lies in being the true eternal infinite self. But being differs from nothingness only so far as it can be observed and observation requires objectification, howsoever 'inly' it may be. Thus *Cit*, or infinite consciousness is found to be the nature of self; *Ānanda*, or ineffable joy, a realization of the plenitude of *Cit* by union with *Cit*; and *Rasa*, an overflow and taste of *Ānanda* as a result of that union.

Total attention to any object is found to be the secret key to freedom from the causal fetters. The attractive art of drama was created only with this purpose in view. Its attractive features easily free the spectator's mind from distractions and make him attend to the plot. And when the spectator becomes totally attentive, all the objective correlatives get submerged in their subjective counterparts, the concrete emotions, which have a quick inscape into their universal form of the basic feeling. As the spatio-temporal tags of the action or the object portrayed are loosened, the concrete emotions suggested by them become impersonal and they become submerged in their basic universal form and thus there is no obstacle to the union of the infinite subject and the universalized object. This unification is the real poetic experience, its climax. The whole poetic process is a process of idealization of physical objects and universalization of their conceptual subjective counterparts.

The experience of a basic feeling as it is in itself is possible only by an infinite self-consciousness, which is higher, deeper, and larger than the vast unconscious region of the basic feeling. Abhinava is most probably the first writer in the world to point out that the subject of the poetic experience is the infinite knower (*Para-pramātā*) and the poetic experience is *esemplastic*.

In this highest experience of the union of universals, which lasts, at best as long as the drama is displayed or the poem is read, the finite mind gets volatilized and purified. Purification as a result of the poetic experience becomes an Excellence (*Guṇa*) of the mind, which is its moral and spiritual development, and the expressions of such a mind show this. The concept of *Guṇa* in Sanskrit poetics explains the value of poetry and the process of purification more clearly and convincingly than the Greek concept of *Katharsis*. *Rasa* is higher than a cathartic experience. *Guṇa*, or poetic catharsis, is an effect of the *Rasa* experience. The imaginative simplicity of expression, the natural spontaneity of rhythm in the arrangement of words is a result of the purification of the mind due to the *Rasa* experience. When a reader reads a poem, he is helped by such a spontaneous rhythmic expression in the realization of the higher delight of the poetic experience (*Rasa*).

There is a circuit in poetry as in life. The poetic experience creates poetry and poetry creates poetic experience. This, however, involves no fallacy. Like the seed and the tree they are inter-dependent. The interdependence of cause and effect becomes fallacious in one action, not in two actions, Abhinava points out. There is no fallacy in accepting the poet's experience as the cause of the poem and the poem as cause of the reader's poetic experience.

In the case of the poet who had no poetry to read or one who learnt direct from nature, the aesthetic or the poetic experience is due to the timeless and spaceless apprehension of natural phenomena. The only difference between a poetic experience and an aesthetic experience is that in the former the objects are the artificial actions and emotions, artificial because they are verbally created, and in the latter they are natural, actual. Both have the common characteristic of being a timeless and spaceless apprehension of objective phenomena. Both are the result of a total attention to the objects of experience. In the case of the first aesthetic or poetic experience the fallacy of interdependence of cause and effect

is thus resolved. The aesthetic experience *transforms* ordinary emotions making them universal by removing all spatial and temporal contacts. Such universalized emotions *become the object* of the aesthetic experience.

Moreover, that facts should be explained, not tortured to suit a theory, is a fundamental postulate of science. Poetry deals with a relation higher than the causal. It is a work of the freedom of self-consciousness (*Para-pramātā Citi, Aham*, the eternal infinite I AM) and naturally it becomes difficult for the empirical mind (*citta, ahankāra*) to hold the poetic experience within its grasp. Mind can have only dualistic experience; it can hardly have a taste of the intuitive esemplastic poetic experience without a total self-surrender to the infinite self-consciousness.

A theory of poetry from the standpoint of empirical psychology cannot be perceptual, for poetic perception is esemplastic, not dualistic. A universal can only be assumed by the mind; it can never be actually experienced by it. Such an experience is therefore always out of the scope of common consciousness. A materialistic, empirical, scientific theory of poetry will have to explain poetic experience as inferential, not perceptual, if facts are not denied and self-consistency is maintained in explaining them.

It is precisely here that the Richardsian principles of criticism fail. Richards is inconsistent. To base a psychological theory of value on the unfelt appetencies and to call unconsciousness a fiction is self-contradictory.³ To accept a standard poetic experience common to the poet and the reader and to declare 'universals' as 'bogus entities'⁴ is to be inconsistent, for a universal by definition means unity in multitude. To say that "the critical theories can be obtained from the psychology without initial complication with the philosophical matter"⁵ and declare Coleridge's transcenden-

3. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 47, 82.

4. *Ibid.*, chs. XXX and VI.

5. *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 11.

tal Imagination as "the essential characteristic of poetic as of all valuable experience" is defection from the materialistic opposition to the idealistic treasury bench. It is to declare the failure of a purely psychological theory of poetry.

It is indeed strange that Richards did not see philosophy relevant to poetics and thought that psychology was sufficient to give principles of literary criticism. A modern Western authority on psychiatry finds philosophy relevant even to medicine and psychotherapy for curing mental diseases and restoring mental health. Thus writes Medard Boss in his book, *A Psychiatrist Discovers India*, (pp 57-8) :

"Never in fact, has there been a physical medicine, let alone a psychotherapy, nor will such scientific disciplines ever be possible in the future, without a pre-given specific philosophical first premiss concerning the actual nature of man, his world and the inherent relationship between man and his world. Whether doctors are aware of their philosophical approach, and its limits, or not, its adequacy in regard to the particular way of man's existence will always be of first importance for their practical therapeutic actions as well."

Indian authorities on medical science, Caraka and Suśruta, make the knowledge of philosophy essential for physicians.

In India poetry has been studied from the empirical materialistic standpoint also. Rājānaka Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyakti-viveka* is such a study. He criticized the theory of Poetry as Suggestion (*Dhvani*) and tried to show that poetic experience was a kind of inferential knowledge.

The greater critics like Ānandavardhana and Abhinava chose a different standpoint, and certainly a better one, for, after all, inferential knowledge can never have the surety and conviction of perceptive knowledge. Inference is useful as a means of knowledge only in case where perception is not possible. Those who are content with the inferential knowledge of the Poetic Muse can never have the extra-ordinary total satisfaction of perceiving her ideal beauty and can never have the purification of the mind which follows as its result.

These greater critics followed the grammarian philosophers who knew the higher stages of Word and Meaning. Abhinava's own *Trika* philosophy is a philosophy of universal grammar. He was himself a master of semantics and explained poetry on the basis of metaphysics and idealistic semantics.

Just as word or sentence is ultimately equated by the grammarians with consciousness and meaning with its self and both are unified in self-consciousness and thus is knowledge possible in every case, so is *Dhvani* the ultimate power of word or sentence or still larger units of expression till the whole poem becomes one unit, capable of being unified with its meaning, which ultimately is the infinite human feeling experienced by the infinite pure self in the form of a self-conversation (*hrdaya-samvāda*).

The experience of a basic feeling is not, however, the last word in poetic experience. Every branch of Sanskrit learning has a peculiarity of offering a total education. That is more so in poetry which is supposed to be the verbal icon of the Absolute.⁶ The concept of the primary *Śānta Rasa*, where the infinite subject has for its object no appetency, no limitation of the subject but its purest self is ultimately the goal to be achieved through poetry. To have such an experience is the highest achievement in life. What is achieved by Vedānta is attained by Poetry also. Nay, *Rasāsvāda* in this ultimate *Śānta* form is even a higher realization than *Brahmāsvāda*. For *Brahmāsvāda* so negates predicates that it is difficult to say anything about that experience. In *Śānta Rasa* the joy of the absolute self-consciousness itself becomes the object of taste and so it is a deeper realization of *Brahma* itself. It is an experience of I AM I. It is to be

6. Kāvyaṁ hi Paramātmāśvarūpāyā Bhāratyā
ānandamayāśvarūpābhivyañjakatayā vīgraha iti vyapdiśyate :

Kāvya-lāpāśca ye kecid gītakānyakhilāni ca

Śabda-mūrti-dharaścaite Viṣṇorāmśā mahātmanah.

KPV, p. 4.

nothing and everything and higher than both, all simultaneously. It is an experience that excludes nothing.

The theory of *Rasa* thus does not teach *sanyāsa* but *karmayoga*. After the realization of *Śānta Rasa* man conquers his finite nature totally. He becomes totally unselfish, totally pure. Such men live only for doing good to others, for bettering life. They are the best citizens of an ideal society.

BOOK IV

Matir abhyeti viśvāsam parīkṣāpakṣaśālinām.

Mālinī-Vijaya-Vārtikam, I. 797.

Great injury has resulted from the supposed incompatibility of one talent with another, judgement with imagination and taste, good sense with strong feeling &c. If it be false, as assuredly it is, the opinion has deprived us of a test which every man might apply. *Anima Poetae*, p. 24.

A great authority may be a poor proof, but it is an excellent presumption, and few things give a wise man a truer delight than to reconcile two great authorities, that had been commonly but falsely held to be dissonant.

Stapylton quoted by Coleridge in *The Friend*,
Section 2, Essay IX, P. 323.

CHAPTER I

PURE PERCEPTION AND THE PRIME PERCEIVER

Ekaiṣa cānusandhānāt sā proktā sarva-saṁvidāṁ

Sva-saṁvedana-paryāya-mātr-tattvam-anādi tat.

Śeṣvarī Parāśaktiḥ samastānāṁ vicchinna-nīlādi-saṁvidāṁ saṁyojana-vijojanādaṁ kārye pūrvāparādikoṭaṁ aikyānusandhānam āśritya tadādhārabbhūtānavacchedinī ekaiva. Tadeva svasaṁvedana-paryāyam mātur anādi tattvam ucyate.

APS, v. 25 and com., p. 11.

Sarvāṇyeva ca saṁvedanāni vastuto'ham iti paramārthāni vimarśamayāṇyeva.

PT, p. 200.

THE foregone Books clearly show that Abhinava and Coleridge agree in fundamentals. They have the same philosophical outlook. They both accept absolute self-consciousness as the ground of all existence and knowledge, as the unity of subject and object, where being is knowing and knowing is being.¹ They both note the difference between Reason and Understanding. In Abhinava's terms the opposites are *Vidyā* and *Māyā*, *Citi* and *Citta*.² Both noted the intermediate position of the poetic experience between the conceptual worldly and the intuitive divine.³

1. See Book I and II. See *B.L.*, I, 182-3; Letter 1077, *C.I.*, IV, 768:

"...we must be it in order to know it"; *T.4*, II, pp. 198-99:

Ekameva paraṁ rūpam Bhairavasyāhamātmakam;
Visarga-śaktir yā Śambhoḥ settham sarvatra vartate.
Tata eva samastoyam ānandarasavibhramah.

2. See Book II.

3. *Satyāsatyādi-vilakṣaṇatvāt*. *AB*, I, 48.

See also the summary of Abhinava's view in *KP*, pp. 101-102:

Tad-grāhakaṁ ca pramāṇam na nirvikalpakam, vibhāvādi-parāmarśa-pradhānatvāt; nāpi savikalpakam, carvyamāṇasya alaukikānandamayasya tasya svasaṁvedana-siddhatvāt.

And see Book I, chapter V.

But there is difference in their analysis. Coleridge thinks of a separate faculty of the mind in between Reason and Understanding that joins the conceptual and the intuitive, the particular and the universal, the passive and the active, in an experience. This he holds to be the prime agent of all human perception, of which a superior⁴ exercise is the poetic experience. The Primary Imagination is defined by him as "a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM". The infinite I AM he calls Reason. If the Primary Imagination were a repetition of the total activity of Reason, how would it differ from Reason itself? If the finite mind, where the activity manifests itself, be a limiting factor, how would it differ from Understanding, which also borrows its activity from Reason but is considered stagnant and passive? In either case Imagination loses its differentia. It will have to be accepted that Coleridge's definition of the intermediate faculty of Imagination is not well-worded. Again it is self-contradictory to define Understanding as 'the faculty of judging according to sense' and to call it stagnant and passive.

Abhinava's analysis is self-consistent and so is more easy and clear. He does not suffer from self-contradiction. He says that the absolute self-consciousness, or *Citi*, is a unity of total activity with total passivity. That is why it is existence and consciousness, subject and object, at the same time. If the absolute were either only active or only passive, it would lose its all-powerful and all-inclusive nature.⁵ There is nothing which does not show its presence. If the unconscious void or sky or stone does not show any activity, it only means that they by themselves do not possess freedom to cross the limitations which ensnare them. The absolute self-consciousness, which alone is totally free, can manifest activity even there. The difference between the absolute self-consciousness and its creation is a difference between freedom

4. *B. L.*, I, 86.

5. *TA*, II, 108, quoted in fn. 9 of Book II, chapter II.

and limitation. The absolute alone is really free; all its evolutes are slaves of Limitation. Mere quantitative difference in the manifestation of limitation is responsible for the qualitative differences in the manifold diversity of creation. That is why the Trika philosopher does not make any logical division between a human being, an animal, and a stone, and often refers to them promiscuously. The absolute self-consciousness is formless and omniform, transcendental and immanent, simultaneously, always I AM I, never 'me'. Whatever exists has the absolute in the background as its immanent ideal potential. Hence is a thing real. The test of reality is not objectivity but perceptibility. That a thing exists means that it may be perceived at some time at some place by somebody. Perception is the basis of conception. Whatever can be conceived cannot be denied objective existence, though whatever exists objectively can have only an apparent or imaginary reality (*ābhāsa*).⁶

As the absolute is free, it can choose to appear as it is, that is truly. But as limitation is an aspect of freedom, it may choose to appear limited, distorted, that is, as it is not. The former is the divine, pure appearance (*śuddha vikalpa*); the latter is worldly, impure appearance (*aśuddha vikalpa*). The former noumenal form is ideal creation (*bhāva-sṛṣṭi*); the latter phenomenal form is material creation (*bhūta-sṛṣṭi*).

The noumenal world is ideal but the converse of it is not always true. Idea is really a word with two meanings. There are empirical and non-empirical, psychic and super-psychic, ideas. The former are empirical impressions, Lockean ideas; the latter noumenal essences, Platonic ideas. An impression

6. Cp. "A simple Idea, as a simple Idea, cannot refer to any external Substance, representatively: for as Pythagoras said, nothing *exists* but in complexity. A simple Idea can be adequate therefore only in reference to itself; and this is merely affirming that this particular Idea is this same particular Idea, that is, if A be A, then A is A."

382, C. L., II, 691 Letter.

or an abstract of many impressions cannot be a universal idea. The former is an empirical synthesis ; the latter, a noumenal essence. That a thing differs from another in kind means that it differs in its universal ideal noumenal essence. That shows that things are essentially universal in nature. Empirical ideas, impressions, their associations or abstracts always suffer from the limitations of the mind, which being a product of the principle of limitation or materiality (*Māyā*) is a material limited passive instrument of knowledge and can never let us know a thing as it is, howsoever comprehensive its synthesis may be. It can give us only abstractions and generalizations, which can never be wholly comprehensive of all its possible forms. Induction or inference is always a leap into the unknown and can never have the certainty of immediate perceptive knowledge. On the other hand, a universal generally remains an object of indirect knowledge, a presumption, a matter of inference for the mind, which cannot directly perceive it. But if true observation be the proper means of knowledge and the basis of science, it is impossible to ignore the perception of the universal ideal true form, which lends reality to its particular manifested forms. The universal form of a thing can be perceived only by subduing the mind. True perception requires total attention. Attention can be total only when the limitation caused by the presence of the mind is removed. As soon as the limited instrument of mind, that can know things only in their particular forms, is subdued, the form of knowing changes from 'I know this' to 'I am this'. Knowing turns into infinite feeling, and the object is perceived as an aspect or form of the subject itself.

This great change in the form of knowledge is the difference between the divine and the mundane, the total and the limited, the completely satisfactory and the partially satisfactory, natures of the two kinds of experiences. The difference between the empirical knowing and feeling and the noumenal knowing and feeling has to be carefully noted.⁷

7. See *IPVV*, II, pp. 239-40.

The former two are limited activities on account of their manifestations through the limited inner organ of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Empirical knowing or knowing anything in its particular form is as much a half-truth as feeling for a particular thing is partially satisfactory. Validity of the knowledge or satisfactoriness of the feeling so acquired cannot be total.⁸ On the other hand, knowing a thing in its universal form reveals that it is distinct but not different from one's own self. This unity of the subject with the object makes the knowledge of the object self-evident. Knowledge so gained is immediately felt as true. Feeling here is a help, not a hurdle in knowing as it is in the empirical stage. It is the very form of knowing. In an ordinary empirical experience all the three parts of 'I know this' or 'I love my son', the subject, object and their relation are separately felt, and the knowledge so gained has always a mixture of doubt and the feeling a mixture of pain.⁹ In the noumenal experience all the three become united and hence the form becomes 'I am this'. Knowledge thus gained requires no further proof of its authenticity; feeling so acquired is totally satisfactory.¹⁰ It is the perception of unity behind diversity, of the underlying sameness between the knowing subject and the object known. Without such a perception knowledge can never be self-evident. The ignorance of the people regarding the true nature of the knowing subject and the process of creation of the manifold forms of nature is the cause of their not accepting a supramental perception of the universal form of things. But if the nature of truth be accepted as self-evident, such a perception cannot be denied; it follows as a corollary.

8. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 177-178.

9. *Sāṃsārikaśca sarvo'sya ānando 'lābhe bhāvi-viyoga-bhīru...' iti. Viśayo viśayāntārāthitām janayan vā janayet katham sukham?*

IPVV, II, 178.

10. *Svarūpaśya svātmanah paripūrṇanijaśvabhāva-prakāśanameva parāmarśamayatām dadhat ānanda iti ucyate.*

IPVV, II, 177.

It is not the mind that knows. The ignorance of this most important truth is the root-cause of all confusion and evil. Mind is merely an inner instrument, *antaḥkaraṇa*, and that too a limited one. The limited forms of things, as they appear in our phenomenal world of particulars, require a limited instrument of knowledge. That is the use and value of mind. In knowing the reality of a thing, its essential universal form, mind is more a hurdle to be crossed than a help to be sought. The real knower is the absolute self-consciousness. It knows things through its limited and unlimited instruments. The limited instrument is the mind, which distorts the true picture of things. The unlimited instrument, which shows a thing as it truly is, is nothing other than the equivalence of the absolute self-consciousness with its duplicate, the universal 'this', a repetition of its unification with its self-projection. It is called *Sad-Vidyā* in the Trika philosophy. As everything in its essence is a duplicate of the absolute self-consciousness, to know a thing in its essential universal form is to have a divine perception, to repeat the equivalence of the subject with the object. The particular forms separate; the universal ones unite. Behind the manifold forms of nature there is their essential sameness with their creator and through Him amongst themselves. Things in their ideal universal forms are distinct, not different, from one another. Ordinary empirical observations including those of the scientists suffer from the limitation of the mental instrument, howsoever aided they may be by powerful magnifiers. Mechanical instruments magnify the power of the sense-organs only. They cannot help the mind to transgress the limitation to which it owes its existence. They cannot overcome its natural bias. An unbiased mind is an absurdity as Coleridge said.¹¹ It is a pity that he did not mark its contradiction; with his concept of the Primary Imagination as an intermediate mental faculty that mixed the unbiased Reason with the biased Understanding.

11. N. 59.

Coleridge's definition of Imagination as repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM is quite all right. It can be easily equated with *Sad-Vidyā* of the Trika philosophy. It is actually the prime agent of all human perception. But Coleridge did not explain what happened to the finite mind when this activity is repeated in it. Hence his concept of Primary Imagination became that of an intermediate mental faculty between Reason and Understanding. Actually it is a spiritual activity. Coleridge's concepts of the one universal mind and the biased mind contradict each other. Observation has to give place to meditation and meditation to total attention if we plan a methodically progressive education.

Perception of the universal cannot be ignored for other reasons also. Everybody has to accept it as the basis of every kind of experience. When, for example, we say that 'it is a table', what is it that we perceive? It is certainly not the word or the concept of the table that we see, but a something, a mere 'it', to which we transfer this concept of our own mind learnt by copying our teachers. This mere 'it' is the ideal essence, the universal idea of a table.¹² It never falls within the ken of ordinary perception. None the less, it has to be accepted like the geometrical point which has no dimensions and hence can never be truly drawn. The meaning of the word 'table' cannot be a particular table but the universal idea behind all particular tables, past, present and future. To say that we see a table is possible only on the basis of this universal. It is not perceived ordinarily, but without presuming it worldly perception cannot be explained.¹³

12. Vācakaḥ śabdāḥ śrotra-grāhya-svalakṣaṇa-rūpatā-tyāgena buddhi-nirgrāhyaṁ sphoṭa-rūpaṁ sāmānya-rūpaṁ va śabdaṁ darśayati. 'Vācyaṁ' iti pratyakṣatocitāṁ sva-lakṣaṇatām śabdācca vācakaḥ prthagbhāvamasya nirasyan buddhigrāhyameva nirāmāṇaṁ sphoṭātmanāṁ sāmānya-lakṣaṇam tadvan-mātram vā rūpaṁ nirūpayati.

IPVV, II, 244.

13. Dṛaṣṭuṣa samvidrūpasya iyameva dṛaṣṭṛtā yad idantā-vimarśe bhittisthānatayā pratiṣṭhā-padatvena aham-vimarśamayatvam iti stimitatā api vimarśamayī eva.

IPVV, II, 229.

If the word or concept or mental image of the table be accepted as the cause of the knowledge of the table, we cannot discard the view that all objects have an imaginary conceptual nature,¹⁴ a view not accepted by the materialist or the physical scientist. To say that the particular table seen outside is the cause of its knowledge and there is no necessity of accepting a universal would make the knowledge of all the furniture belonging to the class of 'table' difficult to be explained by the preception of one or even many tables. Abstraction or generalization cannot take any account of the possible varieties not seen unless it transgresses the bounds of observation and thus becomes unauthentic. Hence it is not possible not to accept the universal essence of a table as the primary object, of which a particular form is seen in ordinary perception, which thus may be called secondary perception. Even empirical psychology has to accept sensation as a stage prior to perception, though sensation always eludes the grasp of the perceptive organs. In the secondary perception, which alone is ordinarily possible, word or concept always intervenes and offers its help.¹⁵ As soon as we see a table, we know it, which means a repetition or recollection of the word or the concept of the table. Similarly, hearing or recollecting the word 'table', the mind has the image of the table before it. Thus perception at the secondary stage is a misnomer. The secondary perception, which passes by the name of perception, is a mixed perception. It is mixed with concept. Truly speaking, it is so overpowered with conception that it would be more correct to say that the table we see has conceptual and not a perceptual existence.¹⁶ That is the unreality, the imaginariness of all outward existence. Śaṅkarācārya called it untrue, *adhyāsa*; Abhinava called it imaginary, *ābhāsa*. There is no vital difference between Trika

14. Yathoktam — 'Vikalpā hi pratyakṣāyante.'

IP'V, II, 228.

15. Śabda-saṅketa-smṛter-āyatto vikalpa iti smṛtaḥ, sa smṛtyābhāve katham bhavet.

IP'V, II, 231.

16. See fn. 14 above.

and Vedānta as is generally supposed. Thus all particulars have conceptual imaginary existence only. True perception, true observation, direct immediate knowledge can only mean knowing a thing as it is, that is, in its universal form. In this form knowing is a repetition of the equivalence of the subject with the object and that is possible only when the subject and the object are both universal.

Knowing in every form is the activity of the absolute self-consciousness. The word and the image, the name and the form (*nāma* and *rūpa*), only modify this activity, and so far as they modify it they distort it also. True perception is unmodified equivalence of the universal subject with the universal ideal form of an object.

True perception is called *mantra*, where 'word' changes its limited conceptive form and shows the object totally equivalent to the subject. There 'word' is not the word as we understand it. 'Word' at that stage is consciousness as focus¹⁷. It directly perceives its self, its meaning¹⁸. *Sadvidyā*, which is the universal of all *mantras*, which are its smaller universals¹⁹, is defined as equivalence of the perceiver with the conceptual object²⁰. This equivalence makes it divine. Words or concepts are unable to reach this divine perceptive state of equivalence unless they change their nature and become pure consciousness²¹. But none can debar the divine perceiver if he likes to come down to them. That

17. *Parāmarśamayī vimarśana-lakṣaṇaiva yā kartṛtā saiva mantrānām utpatti-sthiti-laya-sthānatvena samāpyāyanopabrūhaṇādi-kāritvena ca māntri mahāmantra-tanośca Bhagavataḥ sambandhini śabdānarūpā, na tu pāśa-varga-madhya-patitā karmendriya-viśeṣa-rūpā tat-kārya-śabda-rūpā vā vāk.* *IPVV*, II, 187.

18. *Svarūpādabhinnam vācyam paśyantyām.* *Ibid.*, II, 190
Vimarśānubhavaṇaiṣa yathā vāk prathamam sthitā.

Ibid., II, 196.

19. See Book II, chapter 4. p. 312.

20. *Sāmānādhikaranyam ca sad-vidyāhamidan-dhiyoḥ.* *PK*, III, 3, 60.

21. *Nāma-rūpātireki ca adhyavśāyaḥ prakāśate ahamityātmeva.*

IPVV, II, 242.

descent of the divine perceiver in the verbal form is the secret of revelation. *Mantras* are such revealed words. Truly speaking, they are not the letters uttered but pure self-consciousness focussed by those letters. They do not present it in any distorted manner.

Modification of the activity of the absolute means bringing it into a particular focus in order to manifest its light in a particular way. A word is able to express its meaning only with the help of the activity of the eternal infinite I AM. The heard word is as much an object as the image of the object or the object itself²² and there can be no unity established among them without the unifying power of the absolute²³, which can be possible only in a universal way, for the limited particular form is always an obstacle to the object's unification with the subject. Primary perception or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is the true perception of a thing, perception of its universal essence.²⁴ Behind its particular physical form and mental concept, which are spatio-temporal limitations, everything is similar to the absolute self-consciousness. 'This' has, in ultimate analysis, the same essence as 'I'.²⁵

As a matter of fact, from every nook and corner of this universe, from inside every created form, both divine and mundane, the absolute self-consciousness declares 'I am this'. The whole creation is a choral echo of the absolute self-consciousness, which alone exists and knows itself in all its manifold forms. Both Coleridge and Abhinava said so. Man's ignorance cannot change the nature of the reality. It only vitiates his own knowledge, makes it a half-truth and hence

22. Ye punarami māyiyā varṇaḥ śabdātmanāḥ te ghaṭādi-sthānīyāḥ.

IPVV, II, 196. See also p. 241.

23. Sarvo vimarśaḥ pramātaryeva viśrāntim āśrayate. IPVV, II, 180.

24. Saṁvṛtā hi śabda-bhāvanā prasāritāṁ śabda-bhāvanāṁ vividhakaḥkalpanā. rūpām apekṣya tathābhūta-vaividhya-kalpanā-vaikalyāt nirvikalpeti ucyate. IPVV, II, 240.

25. Ghaṭo' yamityadhyavasā nāmarūpātirekiṇī.

Paraśa-śaktir-ātmeva bhāṣate na tvīdantayā.

PK, I. 51.

dangerous. True realism can only be explained by idealism. They are two aspects of the same truth.

True perception is thus the primary perception, perception of the universal essence of a thing. The universal essence, the mere 'this' of a thing, however, excludes universals of other things. The thus excluded 'this' is the essential meaning, the ideal essence of that thing. It is called *apoha*. For human beings to see this universal essence of a thing is itself a great achievement, for it is an entrance into the true world. Man enters the divine world, the world of true perception, as soon as he leaves the limitations of perception, the subjective concept and the objective form of the empirical secondary perception, which make both the object and its concept distorted and impure half-truths (*aśuddha vikalpa*). To overcome these two is to have an "inlook" into the universal perceptive reality. Though it is an uphill journey yet man may sometimes cross the limitations of his mind and perceive the universal essence, the life, of things. It may be either by divine grace or by constant efforts in improving his power of attending to an object to the extent of being lost in it. The two ways—divine grace and human efforts, *śāktopāya* and *āṇavopāya*—have a relation like the seed and the tree on account of the impartiality and universality of the absolute self-consciousness. In Coleridge's beautiful expression, the divine "dwells in us only as far as we dwell in it."

To have the perception of the universal 'this' is a divine perception. Both Abhinava and Coleridge say this²⁶. They further agree in believing a higher state of 'I am this', where 'this' stands for the universal essence of all things, a state of Indistinction from which all distinctions came out. The highest state is 'I AM I'²⁷. But Coleridge does not give a detailed and clear analysis of these. Abhinava clearly distinguishes these states as *paśyantī*, *mahā-paśyantī* and

26. *The Friend*, pp. 340-341 ; *IPV*, II, 202-3.

27. See Letters 1077 and 1096 and *The Friend*, pp. 340-3 ; See Book II.

parama-mahā-paśyanti. The first is the regenerate soul's spiritual perception of a universal ; the second is God's perception of His own will, which is His creative power. God creates by His will or perception. The third is His most intimate perception of His very self. It is thus the most primary perception and hence is called *parā*. That is the absolute's highest freedom, power or joy²⁸.

It is this last, the absolute I AM I, which is the perceiver everywhere, Abhinava says, because it needs no imaginary conceptive aid (*vikalpa*, which is a product of *kalpanā*). Truly speaking, it is *nirvikalpa*. The two states of 'I am this' are states of pure conception, for the universal 'this' in these states does not falsify the subject. The subject and the object are equivalent. Though 'this' is an externalization, and to that extent a product of imagination, yet it is a pure projection of self, a duplication of itself. Hence these two states are called states of pure conception (*śuddha vikalpa*).

In spite of these subtle differences, all these belong to the one category of divine or true perception, for all these are perceptions of universals. The common word, *paśyanti*, in the three designations shows this. From the worldly point of view, therefore, all these perceptions are called *nirvikalpaka* and the worldly conceptual perception is called *savikalpaka*²⁹. But it has to be remembered that *nirvikalpaka* may further be analysed into pure conception and pure perception.

And both may have individual and universal forms. Individual pure conception is *mantra* ; individual pure perception is *Śāmbhava* or *Śaktija*. Universals of these respectively are *Śadvidyā*, *Śiva* and *Śakti*. There are higher states of *mantra* : *mantrēśvara* and *mantra-maheśvara* with their higher universals, *Īśvara* and *Sadāśiva* respectively. All these universal states are unities of subject and object. *Parama*

28. *IPVV*, II, 195-7.

29. / ...avikalpa-savikalpa-rūpam paśyanti-madhyamātmakam jñānam...
IPVV, II, 196.

...madhyamaiva vikalpabhūmir ucyate.

Ibid., II, 192.

Śiva is the highest universal, the innermost centre of every object and above all objects, both immanent and transcendental at the same time.

All the forms of *nirvikalpaka* perception would be, according to Coleridge's view, equated with the work of Reason; and *savikalpaka* would be equated with the work of Understanding. While Coleridge made a great contribution by explaining the process of perception as the subject's resembling the object of perception, he made a confusion by separating this faculty of Imagination, or secondary perception or perception of a worldly object, that is, of a limited particular, from the faculty of Understanding, which is really the faculty of perceiving a particular, of "judging according to sense".

In every act of perception the subject resembles the object. The Indian philosophers call this resemblance of the mind with the object *vytti*. As the mind is limited, its *vytti* also is limited. Knowledge gained through the *vytti* of the limited mind is knowledge gained through an impure instrument of knowledge, *asuddha vidyā* of Trika, Understanding of Coleridge. Coleridge differentiates the knowledge gained through Imagination from that gained through Understanding. Imaginative knowledge is *esemplastic*. It is togetherness of apprehension. Its form is 'I am this' instead of 'I know this'. Ordinary consciousness is of the latter type. To be conscious in the former way is beyond its scope. Consciousness of mere 'it' is divine perception, Coleridge himself said³⁰. It would therefore be the work of Reason, not of Imagination. Such a superior consciousness Abhinava called *mantra*, which is a super-psychic self-conscious perceptive ideal reality or true perception or true knowledge. Poetic experience is something lower than *mantra*, as will be shown later. Coleridge made the Secondary Imagination superior to the Primary Imagination. It is, therefore, not possible to equate the Primary

30. *The Friend*, pp. 340-1.

Imagination with the *mantra*. We cannot say that Imagination is the faculty of perceiving Platonic ideas and Understanding is the faculty of perceiving Lockean ideas and worldly objects. Platonic ideas have Reason, not Imagination, as their constituent.

There may be some justification for the Secondary Imagination for explaining the intermediate position of the poetic experience, but there seems to be none for an intermediate faculty for common perception. Perception is either divine or worldly. Man either perceives a universal or a particular. In one case he uses the faculty of Reason or *Sad-vidyā*; in another that of Understanding or *asad-vidyā*. This, however, does not mean that both are mutually exclusive. Indeed the universal is the very life of a particular. A particular can exist only on the basis of a universal. It only means that the experience may be total or limited. In the case of total experience the absolute subject, *Aham*, I AM I, uses its own equivalence with the predicate, *Sad-vidyā*, 'I am this', as the infinite instrument of knowledge. In the case of limited experience it uses the limited material instrument of *antaḥkaraṇā*, or mind, and the form of knowing and feeling changes from 'I am this' to 'I know this' and 'I feel so'. Total experience is perceptive; limited experience is conceptive.

The whole confusion is due to Coleridge's unequal emphasis on the passive and active aspects of the absolute self-consciousness. In the absolute, self is the passive and consciousness the active aspect. The total unity of both is self-consciousness. This total unity is possible only in the spiritual universal form of the subject and the object. Worldly perception is dualistic. Here the mind and its object appear separate. Though Coleridge's absolute is also a unity of subject and object, he emphasized its active aspect and neglected the passive one. He did not think of a passive universal state of the divine as Trika philosophers thought of in their concept of *Śiva* as dis-

tinguished from the active state of *Śakti*, the absolute being their total unity. Naturally he thought of an intermediate faculty of Imagination to combine the passive object with the active consciousness as essential to all knowing. And here he nods. If it be said that the Trika philosopher also thinks of a state between the absolute I AM I and the worldly 'I know this' or 'I feel so' in the form 'I am this', it should be noted that he considers that intermediate state also as a state of divine perception, because it is infinite and universal. Even 'this' there is not a particular but a universal, says Abhinava.³¹ That is the difference between a divine concept and a worldly concept. The latter limits, the former does not. When the divine activity is repeated, the finite mind is subdued. Coleridge's 'Primary Imagination' may be accepted as an unconscious repetition of this supramental activity. But even then the way in which it is defined—an active-passive faculty between the totally active Reason and the totally passive Understanding—is not quite correct. For Reason is equated with self-consciousness and there also we have a unity between the active consciousness and the passive self. And Understanding also is not totally passive. Judging even according to sense is an activity, even though a limited one. Abhinava's superior knowledge of the nature of word and meaning and their relation at various stages is the reason for his clearer and more consistent exposition.

31. Viśeṣo'pi hi tatra avamṛśyamānaḥ paramārthataḥ sāmānyātmaiva sampadyate. *IPVV*, II, 242.

CHAPTER II

MIND : A MATERIAL INSTRUMENT OF KNOWLEDGE

Uktam mita-prakāśatvaṁ jaḍasya kila lakṣaṇam ;
Jaḍād vilakṣaṇo bodho yato na parimiyate.
Vibhutve mānasasya syād yugapad sarvavedanam ;
Nitye ca manasi jñānaṁ sarvasiḥ bhavet tataḥ.
Kathaṁ cābhautikaṁ sūkṣmam grhṇīyat parvatādikam ?
Abhivyaktiḥ samānasya samānena vidhiyate.
Bhedāvedi hi yanmānaṁ tadeva grahaṇam bhidaḥ ;
Jñānaṁ hi viśayākāra-prakāśa-pariniṣṭhitam.
Sa eva bhedaḥbhāsitaṁ māyati paribhāṣyate ;
Māyaiva ca paśūnāṁ syān mānam mayācidātmakam.

MVV, I, 372, 469, 481, 579, 584, 788.

Citireva cetana-padād avarūḍhā cetyasaṅkocinī cittam.

PH, sutra 5, p. 11.

There is one Mind, one omnipresent Mind

Omnific.

Religious Musings, lines 105-6, Poems, p. 118.

Unbiased mind—an absurdity.

N. 59.

COLERIDGE's concept of mind is clumsy when compared to that of Abhinava. The unnecessary concept of the Primary Imagination was partly due to his lack of a clear concept of the mind. Both Abhinava and Coleridge say that "intelligence is a self-development, not a quality supervening to a substance".¹ Viewed from the side of the unconscious it would appear a self-development ; from that of the absolute self-consciousness it would appear a self-limitation. Self-consciousness is self-expression. The central principle is pure self-consciousness or total self-expression, which holds the key to all possible circles of knowledge and existence. This fact makes the universe a cosmos, a divine symphony.

1. B. L., I, 188 ; TA, VI, 67, quoted in Book II, chapter II, fn. 5.

Coleridge thinks of a series of mental faculties, but he nowhere explains how they are derived from the central principle of intelligence, the absolute self-consciousness. In the essay *The Prometheus of Aeschylus*, he speaks of the story of the self-developing intellectual principle from the Product to the Understanding in the ascending order: Product, Property, Faculty, Function and Understanding. From his discussion of the subject at various places it appears that the human faculties stand in this ascending order: Sense, Understanding, Imagination, Reason. It is very difficult to place Fancy in this hierarchy. He makes the difference between the faculties of Reason and Understanding fundamental for his philosophy, and that between Imagination and Fancy for his literary theory. His enumeration of mental faculties involves duplication. Basil Willey's remarks in this connection may be cited in support of our contention. Willey refers to D. H. Lawrence's statement that "the two ways of knowing, for man, are knowing in terms of apartness, which is mental, rational, scientific, and knowing in terms of togetherness, which is religious and poetic.... Lawrence's 'two ways of knowing' appear in Coleridge under the designations of Reason and Understanding, a distinction as central in his religious and ethical thought as that of Imagination and Fancy in his literary theory. Indeed it is the same distinction transposed into another key, Reason being to Understanding what Imagination is to Fancy".²

As has already been pointed out, Coleridge says: "...to support, to kindle, to project, to make the Reason spread light over our Feelings, to make our Feelings diffuse vital Warmth thro' our Reason—these are my Objects & these my Subjects."³ But it is not Reason but Imagination that he makes the poetic faculty. It has been shown in the previous

2. *Coleridge on Imagination and Fancy*, Warton Lecture on English Poetry, pp. 9-10.

3. *N.* 1628.

chapter that there are only two types of experience, the experience of a universal and that of a particular. *Nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* are the most telling Sanskrit terms for them for they contain the explanation of such experiences. The way in which Coleridge defines Imagination equates it either with Reason or with Understanding, as has been shown before. Indeed Coleridge's interpreters have treated the Primary Imagination as the faculty of common experience, and the Secondary Imagination as the faculty of poetic experience. The effect of this has been almost like equating the Primary Imagination with Understanding and the Secondary Imagination with Reason. But Coleridge himself said that the Primary and the Secondary varieties of Imagination did not differ in kind but only in the mode of their operation, while the difference between Reason and Understanding was a difference of kind. The wide difference of views among some of the ablest interpreters of Coleridge like Lascelles Abercrombie, Livingston Lowes and I. A. Richards about Imagination and Fancy may also be attributed to Coleridge's own mistake of making Imagination instead of Reason the prime perceiver. If it be said that Reason is the faculty of perceiving the divine and Imagination that of perceiving things human or worldly, it may be noted that the common man is not conscious of the repetition of the spiritual activity in ordinary perception. His perception is "unirradiated by the reason and the spirit" and as such the faculty he uses does not differ from Understanding.⁴

As already shown, Abhinava makes the eternal infinite I AM I⁵ the prime agent everywhere, both in the divine and the worldly stage. The two-fold classification of perception is most simple and is accepted not only by all Indian

4. See Book I, chapter IV.

5. Some of the terms used by Abhinava for the absolute self-consciousness are *Parā Devī*, *Parama Śiva*, *Parā Vāk*, *Parama-mahā-paśyanti*, *Pūrṇāhantā*.

philosophers but also by modern psychologists in their concepts of 'sensation' and 'perception'. Modern psychology, however, does not bother about sensation, which is really the experience of a universal. If it be said that man uses the faculty of Imagination unconsciously, then there may be no harm in accepting his use of Reason itself, for ultimately it is Reason that is the source of life and activity of the Coleridgean Imagination. Abhinava's analysis does not materially differ from the account of perception in Vedānta.⁶

A detailed exposition of Abhinava's concept of mind has already been given in Book II. We repeat here for emphasis that Abhinava's concept of mind is not that of a knower or a subject but that of a material instrument, a totally passive thing though very transparent, which can reflect in it things perceived as well as conceived. Mind is the universal of all the sensory and motor organs. It is their inner essence. This inner organ, *antaḥkaraṇa*, focuses the light of the absolute self-conscious spirit in three ways and gets three names of *manas*, *ahankāra* and *buddhi*. The mind has folds. *Manas*, *ahankāra* and *buddhi* are the gradually inner folds and show the process of their creation by the self-limiting power of the absolute self-consciousness. *Manas* came out of *ahankāra* and the latter from *buddhi*. But all the three are mere folds, the mere mechanism of the frame of the torch. The light passing through it comes from the eternal I AM I, *Aham*. The light appearing through *manas* is thinking or desiring; through *ahankāra* it is feeling, through *buddhi* it is ascertaining, judging or discriminating. All knowing being recollective⁷, as everything is contained in the absolute self-consciousness, the mind is also called *citta* or memory. "We receive but what we give" as Coleridge said.

6. For the Vedāntic explanation of perception see *VP*, *pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*.

7. Sarvo vikalpaḥ smṛti-svabhāva eva.

IPVV, II, 231.

Knowing is the primary activity⁸ and belongs not to the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa* or *citta*) or to its universal, life (*prāṇa*), or to the still prior unconscious void (*śūnya*). All these are forms of matter, products of the power of limitation (*Māyā*). Knowing is a repetition of the divine activity (*Sadvidyā*). But when this divine activity is expressed through the products of the Material Principle (*Māyā*), it suffers from the limitations of these material products.⁹ The Material Principle is essentially the principle of separation of the subject from the object. Hence it is not possible to have total knowledge or complete satisfaction until this material principle is overcome. To overcome it is to enter into a divine experience. The secret of overcoming it lies in total attention, in crossing the limitations of *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind and *prāṇa* or breath, that confines life within the body.

Coleridge talked of one universal mind.¹⁰ His main attack on Locke was that Locke considered the mind passive.¹¹ Coleridge traced the etymology of the word 'mind' and proved that mind was active.¹² At the same time he also said that an unbiased mind was an absurdity.¹³ and that consciousness or knowledge was a sort of limitation.¹⁴ These inconsistencies

8. Cp. "To know is in its very essence a verb active." *B. L.*, I, 180.

9. *TA*, II, pp. 11-12, śloka 10 and its commentary.

10. "Mind, therefore, may be regarded as a distinct genus, in the scale ascending above brutes, and including the whole of intellectual existences; advancing from *thought*, (that mysterious thing!) in its lowest form, through all the gradations of sentient and rational beings, till it arrives at a Bacon, a Newton, and then, when unincumbered by matter, extending its illimitable sway through Seraph and Archangel, till we are lost in the GREAT INFINITE."

"And if there be but ONE directing MIND, that Mind is God."

[Letter 922, *C. L.*, IV, 483 and 486.]

11. Letter 388.

12. Letter 388, *C. L.*, II, 696-7.

13. *N.* 59.

14. *I. S.*, item 29.

are not found in Abhinava's analysis. Abhinava accepts the eternal infinite self-consciousness as the subject everywhere that knows both through its unlimited instrument, the *Śuddha* or *Sad-Vidyā* and the limited instrument, the *aśuddha* or *asad-vidyā*, which is no other than *Sad-Vidyā* itself expressed through the passive material instrument of *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind. The absolute *Aham* or I AM I is always the knower and never an instrument or predicate of knowledge. The latter two are the manifestations, *ābhāsas*, of the absolute, not the absolute itself.

CHAPTER III

POTENTIAL UNIVERSALS AND MANIFESTED PARTICULARS.

Nara-Śakti-Śivāveśi viśvametat sadā sthitaṁ
Vyavahāre kramiṇāṁ ca sarvajñānāṁ ca sarvaśaḥ.

Śrī Tantrasamuccaya quoted in PT, p. 80.

Tad etat Śiva-Śaktyātmaiva sāmānya-viśeṣarūpam ekātmakam api
Parameśvareṇaiva upadeśopāyapraveśāya prthak-kṛtya nirūpyamāṇaṁ
vastutaḥ punar ekameva svatantra-cinmayam ahamityaiśvaryaśaktisāram
anuttaram. PT, p. 86.

Evam-paramārthamayatvāt Parameśvarasya cit-tattvasya yadeva
avibhāgena antar-vastu sphuritam, tadeva paśyantibhuvi varṇa-pada-
vivibhājaiṣayā parāmṛṣtam, madhyamāpade ca bhedena sthitaṁ vastu-
pūrvakaṁ sampannaṁ yāvat vaikharyantam...bhinna-māyīya-varṇa-pada-
vākya-racanāntam. Etadeva tad anupalakṣyam Bhairava-vaktram sṛṣṭi-
parāmarśātmakam.... PT, p. 13.

Parasyāḥ saṁvitter miti-viśaya-mātr-vyatikaraḥ
Vikāso yaḥ seyam jagati vividhā kalpanakalā.
Kadācid vācakāṁśas tu svarūpa-grastavācyakah
Nirbhāsate kadācit tu sāmānyollāsavācakah.
Jātucin nikaṭānanta-viśeṣeṇa-viśeṣitaḥ
Sphuṭa-svarūpa-vācyāṁśa-samudrekeṇa bhāsate.

MVV, I, 606.

MV V, I, 422-3.

BOTH Abhinava and Coleridge believed that the noumenal world held the key to the phenomenal. They both spoke of two types of creation. The noumenal world is a world of universal ideas and is real; the phenomenal world is a world of particulars and has only apparent reality. Abhinava calls the one pure and the other impure as has already been explained.

It is significant that Abhinava speaks of both types of creation as *vikalpa*, that is, a product of imagination, (*kalpanā*). The only difference between the divine and the

mundane form of creation is that the former reflects the light of the absolute reality without any distortion and the latter reflects it in a distorted manner, limiting it both by mental concept and physical form. But both are projections of the absolute self-consciousness. The divine is a perceptive existence (*paśyantī daśā*) ; the worldly is a conceptive one or even worse, a state of disintegration (*vaikhari daśā*), which has existence and significance only because the disintegrated units are held together by a conceptive unity (*madhyamā daśā*).¹ Concepts as empirical syntheses are worldly and owe their value and validity to perceptions.² The perceptive divine universal forms alone are self-evident and true. The mistake of the materialist, physical scientist and logical positivist lies in not understanding the true form of perception, which is not 'I know this' but 'I am this', which necessitates that 'this' should be the same as 'I', that is, though distinct yet not essentially different from 'I'. That is possible only when the particular 'this' is in its essential universal form. The absolute I AM I alone is self-evident and requires no verification because it is self-verified.

Coleridge did not analyse the difference between the divine and the mundane in terms of perceptive and conceptive realities as clearly as Abhinava did, though he had similar ideas and called the former substantial and the latter negative.

The fundamental agreement of Coleridge with the Trika theory of 'manifestation', *ābhāsa*, gets a fine expression in the following passage :

"The groundwork, therefore, of all true philosophy is the full apprehension of the difference between the contemplation of reason, namely, that intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves, as one with the whole, which is substantial knowledge and that which presents itself when

1. Śabdanañ hi śabdaḥ, tacca madhyamaiva, vaikharyāḥ tacche-
ṣātmakatvāt ityuktam bahuśaḥ. PT. p. 264.

2. See Book II, chapter III, fn. 40.

transferring reality to the negations of reality, to the ever-varying frame-work of the uniform life, we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as object to subject, thing to thought, death to life. This is abstract knowledge, or the science of the mere understanding. By the former we know that existence is its own predicate, self-affirmation, the one attribute in which all others are contained, not as parts, but as manifestations. It is an eternal and infinite self-rejoicing, self-loving, with a joy unfathomable, with a love all-comprehensive. It is absolute, and the absolute is neither singly that which affirms, nor that which is affirmed ; but the identity and living copula of both.

“On the other hand, the abstract knowledge which belongs to us as finite beings, and which leads to a science of delusion then only when it would exist for itself instead of being the instrument of the former—instead of being, as it were, a translation of the living word into a dead language, for the purposes of memory, arrangement, and general communication—it is by this abstract knowledge that the understanding distinguishes the affirmed from the affirming. Well if it distinguishes without dividing ! Well ! if by distinction it adds clearness to fulness, and prepares for the intellectual reunion of the all in one, in that eternal reason whose fulness hath no opacity, whose transparency hath no vacuum.

“Thus we prefaced our inquiry into the science of method with a principle deeper than science, more certain than demonstration. For that the very ground, saith Aristotle, is groundless or self-grounded, is an identical proposition. From the indemonstrable flows the sap, that circulates through every branch and spray of the demonstration....”³

Analysing the divine existence he says in the same essay :

“In vain would we derive it from the organs of sense, for these supply only surfaces, undulations, phantoms ! In vain from the instruments of sensation, for these furnish only the

3. *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay 11. p. 344.

chaos, the shapeless elements of sense. And least of all may we hope to find its origin, or sufficient cause in the moulds and mechanism of the understanding, the whole purport and functions of which consist in individualization, in outlines and differencings by quantity, quality, and relation. It were wiser to seek substance in shadow, than absolute fulness in mere negation."⁴

The superiority of Abhinava lies in analysing the difference among various types of reality on the principle of identity in difference commonly held by him and Coleridge. Abhinava is able to do this mainly on account of his being a perfect semasiologist, far greater than Coleridge. Reality is verbal at every stage, says Abhinava. Changes in the nature of Word show the reality in different forms. In itself it is the same absolute self-consciousness, transcendental and immanent simultaneously, always 'I AM I', never 'me'.⁵

All creation is the manifestation (*ābhāsa*), externalization, becoming, of this Being. Like Coleridge Abhinava believed in continuity (*krāma*) and individuation (*variccheda*) as the two poles of manifestation.⁶ Another important common principle is that two heterogeneous things can never unite. There is a distinction without difference as Coleridge said, or an identity in difference (*bhedābheda*) as Abhinava called it. In the divine stage the objective forms do not belie the subjective content. There is no contradiction between existence and consciousness there. Existence in the divine form has no gross materiality. Its constituent is pure consciousness, *śuddha satva*. It is on the basis of the predominance of one of the five self-evident aspects of the total unity of existence and consciousness that Abhinava analysed the divine pentad (*brahmapañcaka*). Thus we have *Śāmbhavas*, *Śaktijas*, *mantra-maheśvaras*, *mantrēśvaras* and *mantras*, all universals

4. *Ibid.*, p. 340.

5. See Book II, chapter III.

6. See Letter 1077, *C. L.*, IV, 769.

within their higher universals, *Śiva*, *Śakti*, *Sadāśiva*, *Īvara* and *Sadvidyā*, as consciousness, joy, will, knowledge and activity become predominant respectively. There is an order and hierarchy even in the divine pentad. Consciousness and joy are the superior, most internal, states, the states of 'I' and 'I am I'. Will is the first duplicate, first external sign-situation of the centrifugal tendency of the absolute, but it is still internal and subjective, and does not in any way misrepresent the subject. The same Will becoming more concrete becomes true Knowledge. True Knowledge is true concept, and concept in the ultimate form is the same as percept. Will is self-duplication as well as self-unification. It is both Will and Percept. Will or Percept in the divine state is the same as Knowledge or Concept. 'I am this' is a total esemplastic experience of a unity. The difference lies in the factor emphasised in the experience. If the emphasis is on the subject, it is Will or Percept; if it is on the predicate, it is Knowledge or Concept. Activity is only a further externalization of knowledge. It holds the balanced relation of equality between knowledge and will. Prior to Will there are two states of Joy and Consciousness. They also can be distinguished only as a distinction of emphasis. Consciousness shows the predominance of the subject—Joy the union with the very Self of the subject. Joy always requires a second. It is the very feeling of plenitude, a feeling of complete self-satisfaction arising out of the total fulness or freedom of self. But it is a feeling of union with such a self, while consciousness is the very self of self.⁷ Existence and consciousness mean the same there. These five states thus may be called the divine manifestations of continuity and individuation in and from *Aham*. The five states may be

7. Cp. Coleridge: "I was hardly used from infancy to Boyhood; & from Boyhood to Youth most, MOST cruelly/yet 'the Joy within me', which is indeed my own Life and my very Self, was creating me anew to the first purpose of Nature..." Letter 550, C. L., II, 1053.

In *Dejection*: *An Ode* Joy is called

"This beautiful and beauty-making power."

distinguished as *I*, *I am I*, *I am This*, *This am I*, and *This I am*, with the changed emphasis on the italicised words. These divine states do not misrepresent the Reality or the true nature of Existence in any way and are therefore called pure. Total purity is a synonym of divinity. They are Pure Expressions of the Intuitive Reality. The first two states of 'I' and 'I am I', Consciousness and Joy, are the innermost expressions and show no externalization whatsoever. Will onwards, the three forms are external expressions. Howsoever pure they may be, they are not, truly speaking, eternal. The absolute self-consciousness is not bound to express itself so. Therefore the latter three are called pure expressions but still imaginary (*śuddha vikalpa*). The former two are not at all imaginary (*nirvikalpa*). The concept of salvation therefore is nothing lower than achieving a seat in the state of *Śiva* or *Śivā* according as one worships God as father or mother. That is, however, the utmost limit man can reach. He can never be the Absolute in toto. He becomes a wave in the ocean of the Absolute. To make such a distinction the Trika philosopher calls the Absolute by the name of *Parama Śiva*, who is all-inclusive and much more.

Exhaustive analysis is Abhinava's forte. Coleridge does not analyse the divine world so clearly. Abhinava surpasses Coleridge even in explaining the phenomenal world as a limitation of the divine. Coleridge's promise in this regard remained unfulfilled.

How the divine unity of the subject, object, and their relation split up into three separate units on account of the absolute's power of self-limitation has already been discussed.⁸ What is to be repeated here for refreshing our memory is that man can never out-grow his animality without overcoming the limitations imposed on him by his body, breath and mind, (*deha*, *prāṇa*, and *antaḥkaraṇa*), which are all material limitations according to the Trika philosopher. *Prāṇa* or the vital

8. See Book II, chapter IV.

air is the first tangible manifestation of the divine conceptive activity (*Īśvara*) and holds a mid-position between body (*deha*), with every part of which it identifies itself, and mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Mind is only a developed form of the vital air (*prāṇa*),⁹ just as the divine percept or will (*Sadāśiva*) is only a higher, less concrete, state of the divine concept (*Īśvara*). Just as the vital air (*prāṇa*) is a limitation of the divine concept (*Īśvara*), intellect (*buddhi*), the essence of mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), is a limitation of the divine percept (*Sadāśiva*). The relation of equality of concept and percept in the divine stage (*Sadviyā*) is lost in the phenomenal stage. Knowing or feeling in the divine stage is a total activity. The phenomenal knower knows by limited concepts and develops attachment (*rāga*) to limited objects, limits his own *Aham* into *ahaṅkāra*, and thus circumscribes his own freedom. To regain it is possible only by total attention to a concept, by a total belief in it, an experience of which is like the stopping of breathing (*prāṇa*) and conceiving (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Fickleness is the very essence of *antaḥkaraṇa*, mind, and *prāṇa*, the vital air in the body. As soon as they are fixed they merge in their divine universal forms. To conquer time or continuity is not to be passive but to enter into Time as eternal divine activity, which is the same as the divine concept (*Īśvara*). Total attention is the secret of intelligence, of which the divine universal form is pure perception (*Sadāśiva*).¹⁰ And it is only by total attention that man rises above time, the inner principle of continuity (*krama*), of which breath (*prāṇa*) is the primary and mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) the secondary form. He enters into a pure divine state by conquering time. The

9. Book II, chapter IV, fn. 16.

10. Tata eva uktāneka-dharma-parāmarśakatve'pi ekatvalakṣaṇāt hetero vyoma-vyāpi-rūpaḥ śuddha-vidyātmā vikalpas tat-tad-aneka-hṛdādisaktyāmarśakatve'pi ekatvāt pāryantika-phala-rūpām Śivatām eva dadāti iti pūrvam eva asmābhīr uktam.

TAV on TA, vol. IV, Abn. 7, p. 29.

unity of impression generated by a work of art and the willing suspension of disbelief as an act of poetic faith are the ways to gain this very secret of the conquest of time.

Knowledge in the phenomenal stage also is a relation between subject and object. But this relation is always unbalanced because of the internal impurities (*malas*) and folds (*kañcukas*) of the mind. They act as barriers to the equivalence of the subject with the object, which exists in the divine stage. Even *buddhi*, the highest form of mind gives us only a conceptive synthesis, not a perceptive confirmation. Our percepts are limited by concepts as concepts are by names (*nāma*) and forms (*rūpa*) of the objects we perceive or conceive. This fallacy is inherent in all empirical perception and conception, which the empirical sciences ignore. Causal relation can never be the ultimate principle of knowledge. The ultimate principle can be no other than the self-evident principle of self-development. It is the most natural explanation of development of all types of nature, not only human.

In the divine form concept is equivalent to percept and every concept is truly verified because it is seen as a self-development or a self-projection. In the phenomenal stage such a verification is impossible. It is the self or the subject, not the object, which is the true referent in verification. The mistake of the empirical sciences lies in giving the object this venerable post.¹¹ Without a perceptive verification, conceptive knowledge can give us notions only, not true knowledge.

11. Na ca aprakāśarūpasya prakāśa-rūpatām, svabhāvasya anyatvam Vidhirapi vidhātum prabhavati.

Na ca parasya para-niṣṭhatvam ucitam iti uktam asakṛt. Anubhavādeva anātmā prakāśate iti viparītam ucyate. Anubhavo hi prakāśa eva. Sa ca na bhinnasyeti upapādītam. Na tu sva-hetuparamparayaiva bodho grāhakātmā, nīlādis tu grāhyātmā. Eka-sāmagryadhinatā kevalam idam asyaiva grāhakam iti grāhaka-grāhya-bhāvasya niyame vyāpriyate, na tu tayā asau utthāpyate cakṣurāder agrāhya-grāhaka-svabhāvatvād iti.

The secret of overcoming limitation, not only of space and time (*kāla*) but also of cause and effect (*niyati*), of limited feeling, knowledge and activity (*rāga*, *vidyā* and *kalā*), and the secret of purification of inner impurities (*malas*) lie in total attention to a concept, that is, attention to it without suffering from distractions. What appears to be a concept is an association of many units, a stream of conscious moments. We accept a moment but never perceive it. Coleridge very well asks: "Who ever felt a single sensation? Is not every one at the same moment conscious that there co-exist a thousand others in a darker shade and less light?"¹² We accept an impression but never hold it in its purity. It passes away so quickly. But speaking of association of ideas or impressions we cannot deny the unit of an idea or impression. Similarly, the moment exists, but it can be defined only ideally like a geometrical point. The secret of arresting a moment or conquering time lies in total attention to an idea or impression. This one impression can, however, be objectified only ideally, that is, as feeling in its universal form, which can only be 'suggested' and never 'expressed' by its particular forms, its objective correlatives. That close attention to a thing makes the period of attention appear less to the attentive person than to the inattentive is a matter of common experience. In such a moment the particulars have a cohesive tendency and appear merging into a form which is ideal and universal. The experience of such an ideal universal moment appears like a moment of life and death at the same time. Actually it is passing into the divine experience, which requires the subduing of continuous particulars and is felt as a new awakening. It is simultaneously felt as a forgetting and a recollection, a death and a new birth.

Let us understand it in another way. To overcome the barriers of space and time, form and concept, we have to

overcome their common principle of conceptual succession or succession of impressions. Space and time, shape of the object outside and inside the mind (*rūpa*) and its differentiation from other objects by naming it (*nāma*) are the two-fold limitation of the conceptual activity of the mind. The essence of both the limitations is continuity or succession. We have a sense of time in marking continuity in action and that of space in marking it in extension or form. The first manifestation of this continuity in the phenomenal world is the movement of breath or the beating of heart and the second is the shifting of the mind's attention from one object to another. The essential nature of the mind is its fickleness. It is to be carefully noted that the manifoldness of the objects of perception or imagination does not make the percept or the concept manifold. Attention is the measure of a percept or a concept. A shift of attention changes them and we become conscious of another percept or concept. Spatio-temporal limitations are manifestations of one limitation of continuity, which is temporal and subjective. The subjective limitation of time, the conceptual activity manifested in the stream of conscious moments, does not allow us to find a static position. Moments pass on ; we cannot stop them. Ordinarily we cannot. Time cannot be bribed but it can be conquered. The primary unit, the one moment, can be measured. The measure can be no other than the sameness of impression. No other definition of moment is possible.¹³ As long as one impression continues, one and the same moment exists. The change of the moment depends on the change of the impression or thought, which latter depends on the separation of consciousness from the

13. Na kāla-bheda-janito jñānabhedah prakalpate.
 Saṁvedya-bhedān-na jñānam bhinnam, śikharivṛttavat.
 Kālas tu bhedakas tasya, sa tu sūkṣmaḥ kṣaṇo mataḥ.
 Saukṣmyasya cāvadhīr jñānaṁ yāvat tiṣṭhati sa kṣaṇaḥ.
 Anyathā na sa nirvaktum nipuṇairapi pāryate
 Jñānaṁ kiyad bhavet tāvat tadabhāvo na bhāsat.

T 4, vol. IV, Ahu, 7, vv. 24-26, pp. 15-18.

object of perception or conception.¹⁴ The change of impression is due to a change in feeling and still further to a change in willing. The moment that thus synchronizes with one impression cannot be differentiated as long or short. A man totally attentive is not conscious of its length as others are. It is by total attention to an object that time is conquered, its continuity stopped. That is the secret of conquering death. That is an ideal present. At such an ideal moment the infinite eternal self-consciousness gets completely unified with the universal ideal essence of a thing and that is true perception, a perfect unity of subject and object in an experience which is in the form 'I am this'.¹⁵

Those who do not agree with this analysis of time and its conquest can hardly explain any percept or concept. For example, while hearing a word we do not hear all its constituent letters simultaneously. There is a sense of continuity in hearing the letters. But the impression of the word is one, and not as many as its constituent letters. If it were not so, it would be impossible to form a concept of a thing on hearing a word.¹⁶ Similarly when we hear a sentence, its meaning is

14. Jñānasya ca tāvad abhāvo na jāyate yāvad indriyāṇām arthasya pramātur vā saṁyoga-vibhāgau na syātām.
TAV on TA vol. IV, Ahn. 7, p. 19.

15. Na cāsau vastuto dīrghā kāla-bheda-vyapohanāt.
Vastuto hyata eveyaṁ kālam saṁvin na saṁsprśet.
Ata ekaiva saṁvittir nānā-rūpe tathā tathā
Vindānā nirvikalpāpi vikalpo bhāva-gocare.
Spandāntaram na yāvat tad uditam tāvadeva saḥ ;
Tāvān eko vikalpaḥ syāt vividhaṁ vastu kalpayan.
Ye tvitthaṁ na vidus teṣāṁ vikalpo nopapadyate.
TA, vol. IV, Ahn. 7, vv. 29-32, pp. 22-25.

16. Sa hyeko na bhavet kaścit trijagatyapi jātucit ;
Śībdārūṣaṇayā jñānaṁ vikalpaḥ kila kathyate.
Sā ca syāt kramikaivettthaṁ kiṁ kathaṁ ko vikalpayet ;
Ghaṭa ityapi neyān syād vikalpaḥ kā kathā sthitau.
Na vikalpaśa ko'pyasti yo mātrā-mātra-niṣṭhitaḥ ;
Na ca jñāna-samūho'sti teṣāṁ ayugapat-sthiteḥ.
Ibid., vv. 33-35, pp. 25-27.

understood as one single impression. Similar is the case of a poem, drama or novel. The method of conquering time and thus of all phenomena is this unbroken continuity of the same consciousness (*sajātīya-vṛttipravāha*). It is the fickleness of the mind rather than the manifoldness of the phenomena which is the root of all evil. To conquer this is to experience the absolute truth of total self-consciousness. A work of art has its valuable place in a scheme of total education because it creates a unity of impression. The ultimate wisdom is to be one with the eternal I AM I, that is, to have always one and the same impression, namely, of the total self-sufficiency of self-consciousness. The value of poetry lies in its being an exercise towards that end. In *Śānta Rāsa* we get the final achievement of life as well as the apex of poetry.

Speaking of the men of genius Coleridge says that instead of their living in time, time lives in them. Wordsworth speaks of the suspension of breath and lying asleep in the body in order to become a living soul while attending to the beauteous forms of Nature. Rossetti speaks of an experience of death while listening to music.¹⁷ And there are innumerable other persons who have recorded similar experiences of psychic sleep and spiritual awakening. But the secret of such an experience was explained by Abhinava. He analysed time as continuity and the latter as shifting of consciousness from one object to another. Without total attention nobody can ever enter into the supreme poetic experience. Coleridge did not fully explain his own phrase "all Shakespeare and nothing Shakespeare". It would be wrong to interpret it as a mixing of the limited consciousness, or what is called by Coleridge 'natural consciousness' and is commonly called simply 'consciousness', with unconsciousness. They contradict each other. "Nothing Shakespeare" can become "all Shakespeare" only by a higher principle that includes both, of which

17. See Book III, p. 333.

unconsciousness is as good a limitation as the limited consciousness. This principle is the total equivalence of self and consciousness or *Sadvidyā*. It is a transcendental consciousness, a living in the universal, a perceptive experience of the type 'I am this' and not the conceptive 'I know this'. It is only such an esemplastic experience that makes the feeling free from limited associations. There is nothing wrong with feeling as such. Indeed Coleridge's great importance in the history of Western thought lies in his discovery that all perceptions have a coadunating form, 'I am this', instead of a co-ordinating form, 'I know this'. The knot of knowing or feeling caused by its spatio-temporal ties makes it limited, selfish, impure, and worthless. As soon as the object of the empirical feeling, the form of which is either 'I like this' or 'I hate this', is totally unified with the subject, the forms of both types of experiences change to 'I am this'. It is a true perceptive experience and gives total satisfaction. Attachment to one object and hatred of another, the fear of losing the darling or getting the loathsome are all due to seeing things separate and different from our self.

Abhinava gives a fine analysis of the three types of experience. In the ordinary experience the form of the object, which is really conceptual, is the separating factor between 'I' and 'this'. In the poetic experience this separating factor loses its particularity but remains as a universal feeling. In the divine experience the separating factor totally vanishes and 'I' and 'this' are totally united.¹⁸

The intermediate nature of the poetic experience will be explained later. But it is to be noted that the particulars of a feeling, the concrete emotions and their psychophysical expressions, have to take a universal form, which Indian

18. Madhurādi-rasāsvāde tu viśaya-sparśa-vyavadhānam. Tato'pi kāvyā-nātyādan tad-vyavadhāna-śūnyatā, tadvyadhāna-saṁskārānuvedhastu. Tatrāpi tu tathodita-vyavadhānāṁśa-tiraskriyā-sāvadhānahṛdayā labhanta eva paramnānam.

critics call the basic feeling, before the true poetic experience can be had. The secret of the totally satisfactory nature of the poetic experience, of poetic delight, however, does not lie in this universal feeling but in the union of the universal subject with the basic feeling, of the universal 'I' with the universal 'this'. The basic feelings are really the basic inner impurities (*malas*). They are of the nature of appetencies. The stream of total consciousness of total self-sufficiency is coloured, modified,^{18a} variegated, by this inner impurity, but in this very stream of joy the inner impurity of the mind gets purified also.¹⁹

The experience of such a unity may exist for a second or for a very long period. It exists till we attend to a poem on a drama. It depends on the attentive capacity of the person. But such a moment of living in the universal, in the ideal present, cannot be denied. In that pure moment mind undergoes a catharsis, an apotheosis. Man learns the secret art of crossing limitations, of dissociating himself from the outward form and the mental concept, which distort truth and limit satisfaction, and of associating himself with the stream of total consciousness, Truth and Joy, that "beautiful and beauty-making power". This is how art teaches morality and improves character.²⁰ Man learns the art of unselfish work (*niṣkāma karma*), of impersonal feeling, of living in the world as lotus-leaves live in water without being wet.²¹ This is how the opposites—detachment and feeling, total activity and perfect peace, unselfishness and total activity of self—truly meet.

Abhinava's vast comprehensiveness and clear analysis are wonderful. He shows, broadly, the four limited forms of the

18a. Cp. A.P., p. 155.

19. *IPVV*, II, 177-80.

20. Nānu kiṁ guruvad upadeśam karoti? Netyāha, kintu buddhiṁ vivardhayati; sva-pratibhāmeva tādrśim vitarati ityarthah. Na ca sādūṣṭā pratibhā ityāha-'hitam'. hita-pratibhājanakatvāt. Atra hetum āha-yato dharmād anapetam. AB, I, 11.

21. Padma-patramivāmbhasā, *BG*, V, 10.

absolute self-consciousness as the vast unconscious void and the various types of undeveloped and developed bodies according to the predominance of the physical, vital and mental aspects.²² In every limited form the absolute remains immanent. While the most primary limited form, the unconscious void or sky shows the ultimate insubstantial nature of all later manifestations, it also shows its vastness necessary for containing the lower manifestations. But the unconscious is neither the last word in the analysis of the knowing faculty nor void the last word in that of existence. The unconscious and the void are limitations of the absolute self-consciousness. It is Abhinava's clear exposition of the process of creation which resolves the paradox underlying Coleridge's phrase "all Shakespeare; and nothing Shakespeare",²³ or his statement that "unconscious activity" is "the genius in the man of genius".²⁴ The unconscious in itself cannot hold the key to genius. Richards is more true to himself when he says that an unconscious mind is a fiction than Coleridge is to himself in making the unconscious active. The phrase 'unconscious activity' like the sentence 'it is nothing' is self-contradictory. Coleridge marked the self-contradiction in the latter²⁵ but not in the former. At best, the phrase 'unconscious activity' may be explained as a case of transferred epithet. The limited mind is unconscious, not the activity, for activity is nothing but a developed form of consciousness,²⁶ its self-expression. It is not the unconscious that really explains the secret of genius but the divine activity that manifests itself through it. In an ascent to the divine experience one has necessarily to pass through that stage of unconscious void which means complete negation of particulars. Subjective plenitude

22. See Book II, chapter iv.

23. *Shak. Crit.*, II, fn. on p. 85.

24. 'On Poesy or Art', *B. L.*, II, 258.

25. *The Friend*, p. 340.

26. Bk. II. Ch. 4. fn. 4.

requires objective nothingness.²⁷ The secret of genius lies not in the unconscious but in the total consciousness, in the removal of obstacles to a complete unification of the subject with the object.²⁸

Coleridge speaks of the folios of the human mind, but he never explains them. He speaks of the fall of man in space and time.²⁹ He notes that Kant for the first time—in the West, we should add—pointed out that they were “the pure *a priori* forms of the intuitive faculty”. Coleridge says that they are “the Acts of the perceptive Power, of which all particular acts of perception are modifications, directions &C”.³⁰ He also remarks that cause and effect “like the two poles of the magnet manifest the being and unity of the one power by relative opposites”. “It is Eternity revealing itself in the phenomena of time”.³¹ He describes the invisible subject.³² He notes the limitations of human consciousness.³³ But he does not explain these as the folds of the human mind.

Abhinava's treatment of the three internal impurities (*malas*) and the six folds (*kañcukas*) of the limited individual (*aṇu*) as *a priori* forms of the absolute's power of self-limitation, and his concept of the evolution of life from *śūnya-mātā* to *prāṇa-mātā* and *dehamātā* and from *prāṇa-mātā* to *buddhimātā* make the whole process of creation of phenomenal existence and empirical sensory and motor activities a clear and consistent derivation from the divine unity of existence and knowledge, a task which Coleridge set out to perform but did not complete.

A reconstruction of the Coleridgean philosophy is beset with difficulties, for the scattered notes and letters in which it

27. Neti-neti-vimarśena yoginām sā parā daśā. T4, IV, p. 9, v. 10.

28. Sarvathā vīta-vighna-pratitigrāhyo bhāva eva rasah. 4B, I, 280.

29. See the essay, *The Prometheus of Aeschylus*.

30. Letter 1126, C.L., IV, 852.

31. B, L., II, 207.

32. See the quotation from *Aids to Reflection*, Book I, p. 104.

33. I. S., item 29.

mainly exists are often inconsistent. It is buried in a heap of extraneous material, and it cannot be safely said what would have been rejected or accepted by Coleridge in his final draft. Many of his ideas are embryonic and require development. His concept of word as a focal point of consciousness, as an active tool, is one such.³⁴ Many useful ideas are unsystematized. Thus he spoke of one universal mind³⁵ and also of the absurdity of an unbiased mind.³⁶ He spoke of the unity of head and heart in poetry but did not fully explain it. It is difficult to presume what shape his philosophy would have finally taken. Coleridge tried to reconstruct and develop Plato's doctrine of ideas and explain Christianity as well as poetry through such a reconstruction.³⁷ Too much indulgence in opium made him incapable of such a heavy task. Abhinava's personality was far greater. He led a celibate life. He did not suffer from any sense of frustration or sorrow. He converted his worldly losses into spiritual gains.³⁸ He had the good fortune, even better than Coleridge, of coming into contact with great philosophers, scholars, and

34. *I. S.*, items 73 and 74. Coleridge's semasiology has not been reconstructed. Many pregnant ideas are scattered in letters and manuscript notes. It is impossible to refer to all of them. Some of the important references are Letters 383, 384, 684, 1031, 1145, 1152, *I. S.* items 70, 73, 74, 108.

35. *Religious Musings*, ll. 105-6, *Poems*, p. 113.

36. *N.* 59.

37. "To the cause of Religion I solemnly devote all my best faculties and if I wish to acquire knowledge as a philosopher and fame as a poet, I pray for grace that I may continue to feel what I now feel, that my greatest reason for wishing the one & the other, is that I may be enabled by my knowledge to defend Religion only, and by my reputation to draw attention to the defence of it."

Letter 221, *C. L.*, I, 372.

See also *I. S.*, item 111.

38. Thus he writes on the death of his mother, who died in his childhood :
Mātā param bandhur-iti pravādaḥ sneho'tigādhī-kurute hi pāśān,
Tan-mūlabandhe galite kilāśya manye sthitā jīvata eva muktiḥ.

TA, XII, 413, verse 57.

saints.³⁹ He was confident of his mastery of grammar, logic, and poetics. His love for poetry and devotion was intense and deep.⁴⁰

That the divine held the key to the secrets of the mundane was known to Plato but he kept it a secret.⁴¹ None of his disciples developed it in a full-fledged philosophy. Kant was more interested in explaining the limits of human knowledge. Coleridge had to leave his guidance in his search for the divine learning. An unprejudiced attitude to the Sanskrit learning and a study of the *Śaiva-Śākta* philosophy, of which Abhinavagupta is the best interpreter, would be of great help in a reconstruction of the Platonic-Coleridgean philosophy.

39. See *TA*, XII, verses 60-63.

40. Abhinava writes of himself :

Pitrā sa śabda-gaṇe kṛta-sampraveśaḥ
Tarkārṇavormipṛṣatāmālapūtacittaḥ
Sāhitya-sāndra-rasabhogaparo Maheśa-
Bhaktiā svayam-graṇa-durmadayā gṛhitaḥ.

TA, XII, pp. 413-14, v. 58.

Pūrṇa-vyākaraṇāvagāhana-śuciḥ sattarka-mūlonmiśat
Prajñā-kalpalatā-viveka-kusumair abhyarcya hṛd-devatām
Piyūṣāsava-sāra-sundara-mahā-sāhitya-saṁhitya-bhāg
Viśrāmyāmyaham Īśvarādṛṣyakathā-kāntā-sakṭaḥ sāmpratam.

IPVV, I, v. 5, p. 2.

41. Coleridge says to this effect in *The Friend* (p. 306). He says that Aristotle in his *Ethics* stated "that Plato had discussed the problem, whether in order to scientific ends we must set out from principles, or ascend towards them : in other words, whether the synthetic or analytic be the right method. But as no such question is directly discussed in the published works of the great master, Aristotle must either have received it orally from Plato himself, or have found it in the...private text-books or manuals constructed by his select disciples, and intelligible to those only who like themselves had been entrusted with the esoteric (interior or unveiled) doctrines of Platonism."

CHAPTER IV

REALITY IS VERBAL AT EVERY STAGE

Na ca vācyam prthag jātu vācakād vyavatiṣṭhate.

MV'. I, 421.

.....para-mahāmantra-vīrya-vierṣṭirūpāyā ārabhya vaikharīpra-
sṛtabhāvabhedaprakāśaparyantaṁ yat iyaṁ sva-camatkṛtimayī svātmanyeva
prakāśanamaye viśramya sphurati, tadevam sphuritam avicchinnatā-
paramārtham aham iti...antahkṛtānantaviśvedantācamatkṛtipuṇāvṛttiḥ.

17', pp. 5-6.

Thought and reality are, as it were, two distinct corresponding sounds,
of which no man can say positively which is the voice and which the echo.

A. P., p. 143.

A bodily substance, an unborrowed Self-God in God immanent ! The
Eternal Word ! That goes forth yet ! remains ! Crescent and full and
Wane, yet ever entire and one, it dawns, and sets, and crowns the height
of heaven. At the same time, the dawning and setting sun, at the same
time, the zodiac—while each, in its own hour, boasts and beholds the
exclusive Presence, a peculiar Orb, each the great Traveller's inn, yet still
the unmoving Sun—

Great genial Agent in all finite souls :

And by that action puts on finiteness,

Absolute Infinite, whose dazzling robe

Flows in rich folds, and plays in shooting hues

Of infinite finiteness.

A. P., p. 162.

COLERIDGE thinks of self-consciousness as focus and
mirror.¹ He says that word is a focal point of conscious-
ness.² Naturally, self-consciousness as mirror reflects mean-
ing. The unity of word and meaning is self-consciousness.
But Coleridge does not develop the doctrine.

In India the philosophy of grammar was developed in
ancient times. Bhartṛhari developed it most in his

1. "On Poesy or Art", *B. L.*, II, 259.

2. *I. S.*, item 73.

Vākyapadīya. Abhinava was well-versed in grammar and was proud of this qualification. He made his own contribution to the philosophy of grammar, especially in *Parātrimśikā*, and *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti vimarśinī*.

Reality is verbal at every stage. The theory, in short, is that there are four states of Word known as *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*. The first two are divine states. The first is the absolute unity of word and meaning, the absolute self-consciousness, I am I. The second is a perceptive unity of the two, a state of 'I am this'. The third is the state of concept and has both divine and mundane forms. It becomes divine when its equivalence with the percept is observed, and mundane when it is only assumed. All these are universal states of Word. The last is the totally mundane state. It is the state of word as letter-sounds separate from its meaning, of particulars all falling apart. These particulars have any significance or meaning only because in the higher state of concept letter-sounds and the image of the object they refer to are brought together. Concept is a universal that is assumed but not perceived ordinarily. The Indian seers say that concept can be perceived and its perception brings a tremendous change in the experience. It makes the word creative. It is the state of word as the divine Will. In the highest state word is the absolute consciousness completely unified with its meaning or self.

Abhinava spoke of the universal language of consciousness with infinite modalities at the various stages of manifestations.³ His analysis of self-consciousness, or *Aham*, as a unity of the whole Sanskrit alphabet from *a* to *ha*, where every letter represents an aspect of Creation shows not only the perfection of the Sanskrit alphabet but also of the scholar explaining it. Coleridge who made an attempt to show the whole alphabet included in 'I' could not succeed because of

3. Vayam ekām tāvad ananta-citratā-garbhinīm tām saṁvidātmikāṁ girāṁ saṅgirāmahe.

PT, p. 149.

the unscientific nature of the Roman alphabet. Abhinava's concept of the letter as the primary word or the primary focal point of consciousness is an improvement on Coleridge's concept of word. It is impossible to accept word as a focal point of consciousness without first accepting each of its constituent letters to be of the same nature. That the conceptive knowledge can have a perceptive verification only at an ideal stage is a statement of great significance for the perfection of a truly scientific epistemology. The theory supports the idealistic theory of perception presented by Vedānta and Trika and the Platonic philosophy of Coleridge. It proves that there is a true ideal world above the material. That bold statement of Abhinava that what may be conceived of as having an entity separate from the subject exists outside as surely as the jar one sees⁴ not only shows Abhinava's firm conviction about the verbal nature of reality but also puts the nail in the heart of logical positivism that accepts tautology as the only form of true statement even in the phenomenal sphere and thus makes knowledge impossible or hypothetical. Knowledge becomes tautologous only in the universal state, when to know is to be. That is the state of perfection of knowledge. Perceptive verification is the only test of truth. But what is the verifying touchstone? There lies the mistake of the empirical psychology and logical positivism based on that. Logical positivists like empirical scientists think that object is the touchstone. That is their referent of verification. Vedānta and Trika say that object is not a self-evident reality. It itself requires a proof of its existence. It owes its existence to the mental conception. The only self-evident reality is self-consciousness, I AM. Everyone feels that he is the subject and everything else is an object. It is this 'I AM' which is the true touchstone of perceptive verification. Lack of objective material verification should be no bar against metaphysical knowledge. Not

4. *Yad bhāti kila saṅkalpe tad asti ghaṭavad bahiḥ.*

TA, VI, p. 123, v. 159.

accepting metaphysics on this ground betrays an ignorance of the true nature of perception as well as of the conceptual nature of phenomenal percepts.

Abhinava would agree with Coleridge in his criticism of Kant who says that the thing-in-itself cannot be known. Coleridge very aptly says that human nature cannot cheat us so. Our very desire to know is ample proof that true knowledge of everything is within our range.

Abhinava very well shows that external existence and non-existence of a thing conceived have any meaning only in terms of time and space. That a thing exists externally means that it exists at a particular place and time. That it does not exist means only that it does not exist at a particular place and time; it may exist at another place and time. Total negation of its objective existence can only mean that it is inconceivable. Absolute self-consciousness cannot have external existence because it is not conceptual but perceptive intuitive being, where becoming rests in its true self.

This solves the problem of poetic truth. Poetic truth is a true percept, that is, a percept of the universal germinal potential form of a thing. It is thus higher than the phenomenal historical factual truth, which can never attain the height of a true percept. As the only language intelligible in the phenomenal world is the language of conceptual self-consistency, poets have to be conceptually self-consistent in communicating their vision. Spirits alone commune in silence as Coleridge said, not human beings. Poetry gives the news of a true perception in a conceptual language. That explains its intermediate position, between science and religion as Coleridge said,⁵ and between *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* perceptions as Abhinava said.⁶ Only an inconsistently developed idea can be rejected as false. Everything conceptually consistent is valid. That the world exists appears so because all of us

5. See Book I, chapter V.

6. See fn.16 Bk, III, ch. 1.

dream alike, says Coleridge.⁷ According to Abhinava, in this world, where particulars alone are seen and their ideal universal essence remains behind them, man is both blind and lame on account of the limitations imposed on his knowledge and action.⁸ He perceives things as in a dream. All external existence has a dreamy imaginary nature. Yet the world is accepted because of its conceptual validity. Its insubstantial nature becomes clear only to the man who enters into the divine perceptive world. This world of ours is a physical disintegrated manifestation (*vaikhari*) of the absolute's perceptive creative power of Joy.⁹ The world has only a conceptual validity.

Similarly a poem is an assemblage of words and sentences expressing self-consistent concepts, suggesting the poet's pure perceptive experience. Poetic creation remains verbal and does not attain the material reality of nature, owing to the tinge of internal impurity, or the *malas*, which do not totally vanish away in the poetic experience. Again, there is a difference of degree in the perceptive powers of the Absolute and the seer, as already discussed. This is why the poetic experience is below the purely spiritual experience, though it is above the common experience. The phenomenal particulars lose their obtrusiveness of the common experience but their universal conceptual form still persists as a recollection, and does not allow the percept to be totally free from the conceptual tinge.¹⁰ The imaginative therefore is still imaginary.

7. *Lay Sermons*, p. 19. *IPVV*, II, 228 : *Vikalpā hi pratyakṣāyante*.

8. *TA*, VI, p. 136, verse 175.

9. *Ānando brahmeti vyajānāt. Ānandādhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante. Ānandena jātāni jivanti.*

Taittirīyopaniṣad, *DU*, p. 315.

10. See Bk. IV, ch. 3, fn. 18,

CHAPTER V

RASA IS FEELING IMPREGNATED WITH REASON

Saṁsāra-nāṭya-janana-dhātṛ-bīja-latā-juṣṭīm
Jalamūrtim Śivām Patyuh sarasām paryupāsmahe. AB, I, 47.

Sthāyi prabuddha-hṛdaye vyabhicāribhūtaḥ
Kāmākulāsu janatāsu mahānubhāvaḥ
Antar-vibhāva-viṣayo rasa-mātra-mūrtiḥ
Śrīman prasannahṛdayo'stu mama Trinetraḥ. AB, I, 342.

...bhagnāvaraṇa-cid-viśiṣṭo ratyādiḥ sthayibhāvo rasaḥ... RG, p. 27.

Hṛdaye yaḥ sthito granthir adha-ūrdhvaṁ-niyāmakah.

Mālinīsāra quoted in *IPVV*, III, 293.

...to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings, with their vital warmth, actualise our reason :—these are my objects, these are my subjects...

The Friend, p. 65.

How to overcome limitation, remove the conceptual cobweb, figments of imagination, and perceive truth as it is is the greatest task before man. Truth is the most important value. Knowledge is valuable because it is true. But truth is not an objective fact ; it is an esemplastic feeling of spiritual self-sufficiency. Poesy or art is the most attractive means of achieving this end, and that is its value. Physical sciences with all their mechanical aid cannot attain that ideal height. That is their inferiority to poetry. Both Abhinava¹ and Coleridge² declare the intermediate position of poetic experience between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Credit goes to Abhinava for giving us the most convincing account of the nature and the process of the poetic experience.

1. See Book IV, chapter III, ln. 18.

2. See Book I, chapter V.

How feeling receives the light of Reason has not been successfully shown by Coleridge, though he declared it to be the main object of his philosophy.³ Coleridge brought in an intermediate faculty of Imagination to relate feeling with Reason and that itself became the barrier between the two. Though, according to him, "the poet, described in *ideal* perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity",⁴ Coleridge makes the power that so brings it half-passive and half-active and thus incapable of total activity. Reason alone is totally active, he himself says.

The Indian theory of *Rasa* is exactly a theory of shedding the light of Reason over feelings. It is a concept that explains the purification of one's conscious and unconscious regions of the mind by removing the limitations of one's emotions (*rāga*), the spatio-temporal tags of which make them what they are. Such limitations alone make all worldly pleasures unsatisfactory. Physical possessions only flatter-blind the so-called rich and successful people. The so-called masters become slaves of their possessions. By gradually satisfying the readers with the attractive figments of his own imagination the poet weans them away from the slavery of the senses and trains them to discover their own spiritual power of self-sufficiency and self-satisfaction (*Sadvidyā*). He makes them realize that the secret of truth and satisfaction lies inside their own hearts, which they can find only by overcoming the spatio-temporal limitations of their own feelings, their likes and dislikes. The poet plays on the varied strings of human emotions and makes us perceive their common universal form in a blessed ideal moment. The poetic experience is a bilateral affair. The poet's efforts to make the readers attentive succeed only so far as the readers are attentive to his

3. See Book I, chapter VII.

4. *B. L.*, II, 12.

poem. The audio-visual aids of the theatre are a great help to the reader in his attention to the poet's plot. If somehow the spectator becomes totally attentive to the work of a true poet, whose poem is a product of such a total attention on his own part, the result is a catharsis, a purification of the spectator's heart. His mind undergoes a conspicuous change on account of the touch of the infinite spirit. That poetry is an alchemy of life is a fact noted by many critics—Aristotle, Abhinava, Coleridge, I. A. Richards and T. S. Eliot, to quote only a few names.⁵ But Abhinava surpasses everyone else in his compre-

5. Jagad grāvaprakhyam nijarasabharāt sārayatī ca. *Locana*, v. 1.

"Thus, as 'the lunatic, the lover, and the poet' suggest each other to Shakespeare's Theseus, as soon as his thoughts present him the one form, of which they are but varieties; so water and flame, the diamond, the charcoal, and the mantling champagne, with its ebullient sparkles, are convoked and fraternized by the theory of the chemist.... It is the sense of a principle of connection given by the mind, and sanctioned by the correspondency of nature. Hence the strong hold which in all ages chemistry has had on the imagination. If in Shakespeare we find nature idealized in poetry, through the creative power of a profound yet observant meditation, so through the meditative observation of a Davy, a Woollaston, or a Hatchett,—

—By some connatural force,
Powerful at greatest distance to unite
With secret amity things of like kind,

we find poetry, as it were, substantiated and realized in nature; yea, nature itself disclosed to us...as at once the poet and the poem."

The Friend, pp. 312-13.

T. S. Eliot's explaining the poetic process of depersonalization with the help of an experiment of chemistry—that of placing a finely filiated platinum in a chamber containing oxygen and sulphur dioxide, which become mixed together and produce sulphurous acid only when the platinum is present, but without either any trace of platinum in the compound or the platinum being itself affected; and comparing the mind of the poet during creation to the shred of platinum and showing the impersonal nature of the poet's feelings, the difference between the man who suffers and the man who creates—has now become a popular text of critical theory. (See "Tradition and The Individual Talent" *Selected Prose*, pp. 26-7).

Aristotle's theory of universalization or idealization are similarly well known.

I. A. Richards says that poetic experience effects mental health.

hensive and convincing analysis of the process of this transmutation.

Coleridge has his own concepts of the poetic Passion and the poetic Imagination. But the former is not developed and the latter is unable to explain the shedding of the light of Reason over feeling. Coleridge does not succeed in explaining how Imagination, which repeats the activity of Reason in the mind, differs from Understanding, which also receives its light from Reason. If Understanding differ from Imagination as concept differs from percept or 'I know this' from 'I am this', it still remains to be explained how a reconciliation of the opposites, 'I' and 'this', is possible. To accept that the difference is merely 'ideal', a distinction without difference, would equate Imagination with Reason; to accept the difference as a fact would equate Imagination with Understanding. Coleridge did not mark that loophole while defining Imagination. It is not the subject's resemblance with the object but their unity that is perception. In Vedānta and Trika, perception, or *pratyakṣa*, is defined as the unity between the mental mould and the object. Vedāntins say, exactly like Coleridge, that the mind goes out and envelopes the object and this enveloping is perception. But this is called *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, where the mental conceptual mould and the objective form limit perception. The prime perceiver, Reason or *caitanya* and the prime object, the universal 'this' are beyond the scope of this ordinary mixed (*savikalpaka*) perception. This mixed perception can, however, be possible only on the basis of the pure perception, unity of Reason or *caitanya* with its duplicate, universal 'this', which is called *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*.⁶ Coleridge's primary perception is equal to *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, ordinary perception. It hardly differs from Understanding, which judges according to sense. If it be equated with *nirvikalpaka*

6. See *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* Pariccheda I, paras 15-18 and 2; *PT*, pp. 107-8 quoted in fn. 40, ch. 3, Bk II.

pratyakṣa or true perception, Imagination would be the same as Reason. If it be said that Abhinava also accepts a difference between the experiences of 'I am I' and 'I am this', *nirvikalpa* and *śuddha vikalpa*, and we may accept an intermediate faculty common to all perception, then in that case that faculty would be something superior to both the Primary and the Secondary Imagination. It would be something divine, *paśyanti* or *mantra*, as Abhinava called it.

Coleridge's mistake lies in making Imagination instead of Reason the prime agent of perception; in differentiating conception from imagination,⁷ in not recognizing the absolute's self-limitation as separation of the object from the subject; in analysing mind's faculties instead of its folds caused by the self-limiting power of the absolute. It made his analysis of mind confusing and did not allow him to understand clearly that unconsciousness was its primary fold.

To all this may be added his inability to analyse the predicate of the poetic experience clearly. In an idealistic philosophy like that of Abhinava and Coleridge, where everything is an aspect of the eternal I AM, difference of one thing from another will have to be explained as a difference of the predicate, the limiting factor. To know a thing truly is to know the predicate truly. He did not care to analyse the three different states of feeling in spite of the hint given by Aristotle in the terms *ēthē*, *pathē* and *praxeis*. He did not find out that *praxeis* and *pathē* must be submerged in *ēthos* before this central *ēthos* became the predicate of the poetic experience.

It cannot be said that Coleridge was ignorant of a universal state of feeling. He said that a man of genius lived in the universal.⁸ He showed the importance in poetry of "a continuous under-current of feeling" which is "everywhere present, but seldom anywhere as a separate excitement".⁹ He

7. See *I. S.*, item 29 quoted in fn. 40, ch 3, Bk. II.

8. *P. L.*, p. 179.

9. *B. L.*, I, 15.

spoke of "reducing multitude into unity of effect and modifying a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling".¹⁰ But in spite of these statements it cannot be said that he clearly visualized the three states of feeling and made the universal undercurrent of feeling, with all its concrete manifestations subdued in it, the *object* or *predicate* of poetic perception.

Abhinava is more clear in analysing the subject and the object as well as the instrument of the poetic perception. He makes the absolute self-conscious spirit, *Aham* or I AM I, *parā* or *parama-mahā-paśyanti*, the prime perceiver everywhere. Thus the only thing common between the poetic experience and the ordinary experience is the subject, the eternal I AM. The instrument of knowing in the poetic experience is *sad-vidyā* or the divine equivalence of the subject with the object, the object *per se*, that is, in its universal essence, the thing in itself, while in the ordinary experience it is the finite mind, *antaḥkaraṇa*. That is why the poetic experience is esemplastic, of the nature of 'I am this, which is different from ordinary knowing or feeling, which is in the form 'I feel this' or 'I know this'. The extra-ordinariness of the poetic experience is due to its super-psycho nature. The object, or the predicate, of the poetic experience is the undercurrent of feeling with all the concrete emotions and their psycho-physical expressions subdued in it, their universal form. The object of ordinary feeling or knowing is always a particular person or thing, never a universal.

Abhinava points out that objective existence either in the noumenal ideal universal potential form or in the phenomenal material particular form has imagination (*vikalpa*, *kalpanā*) as its constituent.¹¹ The very essence of imagination is

10. *B. L.*, II, 14.

11. *Atra tu darśane viśayasyāpi vimarśamayatvāt abhilāpamayatvameva vastutaḥ.* *IPV*, I, 227. See also pp. 204-5.

self-expression, self-duplication. The primary unity of subject and object, which has no externality, alone is true in the sense that it cannot in any way at any time be obliterated and made non-existent. This most pure identity of existence and consciousness is the subject and always remains the subject everywhere, in the noumenal as well as the phenomenal form. It is that which imagines or perceives. The perceiver can never be imaginary. The noumenal objective existence is imaginative, true, as the phenomenal objective existence is not, because in the noumenal form the absolute subject duplicates itself *as it is*. There 'this' of 'I am this' is equated with 'I'. The predicate is totally equivalent to the subject. This total equivalence alone makes the noumenal world totally true and above time and space. Total union of will with knowledge or of percept with concept makes the noumenal world a world of true ideas. It is the world of distinctions, not of differences. Is is the world of 'pure imagination' (*Śuddha vikalpa*). There is no limitation to knowledge or activity as yet and the joy of such a freedom of will is yet untinged by any grief. It is the world of truth, of true existence, of true knowledge, of true feeling. (*Sad-or śuddha-vidyā*).

This unity gets split up in the phenomenal world. 'This' which was the ideal universal essence of a thing now becomes plural in the particular limited way. 'Man' is no longer universal humanity. The term means individuals expressing the quality of humanity, which lies hidden in every one of the species. The universal 'this' or 'idea' of a thing gets many external material bodies and the knower, perceiver, takes the help of letter-sounds, which are as much objective as the object of perception. Knowledge or perception is by nature synthetic, esemplastic.¹² But in the phenomenal world and the

12. Ye punar ami māyiyā varṇāḥ śabdātmanāḥ te ghaṭādi-sthānīyāḥ. Tadutthāpakam ca avikalpa-savikalpa-rūpakam paśyanti-madhyamātmakam jñānam jñānāntara-sthānīyam. *IP* IV, II, 196.

empirical experience synthesis is never completely achieved. Word and meaning, subject and object, never totally meet in the phenomenal stage, though knowledge is impossible without their union. As soon as we attempt to know anything, there is a beginning of a synthetical process, which ends mid-way. The letter-sounds of a word suggest an ideal concept. Similarly the object turns into an ideal image. We never consciously outgrow the limitation of the concept and the image. We may even say the conceptual image, for the conceptual activity takes the form of the image. Mind itself takes the form of the thing. Coleridge called it mind's 'resembling' the object. Sanskrit writers call it *vr̥tti*. Coleridge called this activity of mind primary imagination, the prime agent that perceives. Abhinava says that this conceptual image has as much externality as the outward object. The only difference is that one is psychic, the other physical. Whatever can be known cannot be the subject. 'Me' or 'mine' can never take the position of 'I'. This is why the form of knowledge or feeling or perception in the phenomenal stage is 'I know this', 'I feel this', not 'I am this'. Concept is temporal limitation as image is spatial. One limits activity; the other limits extension. Worldly perception always suffers from these two limitations.

Poetic experience is the experience just above the empirical because here spatio-temporal limitation is overcome. The subject is no longer the conceiving finite I, but the perceiving infinite I. Or in other words, the instrument of knowing is not the finite mind but the infinite equivalence of subject and object (*Sad-vidyā*). The object is a universal feeling and not its concrete forms or objective correlatives that suggest it. The experience is of the type 'I am this' instead of 'I know this' as has been repeatedly pointed out. The poetic experience (*Rasa*) is therefore primarily spiritual. But the memory of the phenomenal particulars is not lost. They colour the spiritual experience as ingredients modify the taste of a drink. *Rasa* or poetic experience at its apex is the tranquillity of a

total experience where the memory of emotions and feeling modifies the joy of the concentrated experience of peace.

The ordinary relation between word and meaning undergoes a change in poetry. It is not now one word meaning one idea. This fixity is removed. Not only the words but even the quality of their sounds, the order in which they are placed, the character of the person who speaks and that of him who hears, the 'literal' and 'indicative' meanings, the speaker's intonation—all these or even more contribute to magnify the power of the words¹³ and they suggest the meaning which is wide in its scope for its ties with any one fixed meaning is loosened. Word in its particular tangible form is always different from its meaning. In order to unite with meaning it has to make itself universal. There is a finesse in calling poetry *Dhvani* or 'Vibration'.¹⁴ With all its meanings of the suggestive, suggested, and suggestion, again, it shows the unity of the poetic experience. Words and all their aides-de-camp focus the consciousness to attend to its own self. Word is not the combination of letters but *spṛṣṭa*, consciousness as focus, say the Hindu grammarians. *Dhvani* as the suggestive is consciousness as focus, in which many factors count as we have noted above.¹⁵

That poetic experience is below the pure divine experience (*śuddha vikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*) and above the impure mundane experience (*aśuddha vikalpa* or *savikalpa*) is due to the presence of the memory of the phenomenal particulars. The pure experience has no such memory. One of the reasons why the primary *Śānta Rāsa* is accepted as poetic experience is that even here the unselfish acts and talks of divine wisdom and grace are remembered. The pure spiritual joy

13. *Vakṛt-boddhavya-kākūnām vākya-vācyānya-sannidheḥ
Prastāva-deśa-kālāder vaiśiṣṭyād pratibhā-juṣām
Yo'rthasyānyārtha-dhī-hetur vyāpāro vyaktireva sā.*

K P, vv. 21-2, p. 71.

14. *Locana*, pp. 133-4.

15. See also *D A* and *Locana*, p. 301.

may be experienced by very able persons who are very attentive to that part of a poetic experience. But generally speaking, it may be said that it is a mixed experience where the phenomenal particulars are experienced in their universal form. The only thing to be noted is that the particulars are not remembered in their particular forms.¹⁶ There lies the intermediate nature of the poetic experience, which is neither wholly spiritual nor wholly empirical but partakes of both. Here we may realize the importance of the Trika concept of the internal folds of mind, the impurities (*malas*), the appetencies lying in the potential unconscious state, which persist even if the outward folds (the *kañcukas*) are removed. These appetencies colour the spiritual poetic experience and hence poetry is not purely spiritual. But it is not purely psychical either, because the experience has the infinite spirit above the limitation of mind as its subject, that is, the instrument of knowledge used is not the finite mind but the infinite esemplastic subject-object equivalence (*Sad-vidyā*).

It is the same thing whether we say that the infinite eternal I AM, *Aham*, has the poetic experience with *Sad-vidyā*, the subject-object-equivalence, as the instrument of perception, or we say that the subject knows without the limitation of the mind, or that the subject is the infinite knower in a poetic experience. For the Trika philosopher explains everything as a subject-object or intuition-expression continuum, and while the subject is the same universal I AM I everywhere, the objective colouring of the experience is its differentia in each case. Poetic experience is thus the experience of *malas*, one's own basic impurities, basic universal potential characteristics, of which all psychic emotions and psycho-physical expressions and physical actions are only developed forms. As the outer folds, the *kañcukas*, are absent from the poetic experience, the experience loses the dualistic separatist nature, and the object, one of the basic impurities, or appetencies

16. See fn. 18, ch III, Bk. IV.

hidden in the unconscious, comes in close touch with the subject. This touch of the infinite pure subject purifies the internal impurities. This is the secret of catharsis or purification of the mind in a poetic experience. Thus poetic experience purifies the mind. Particulars imprison the knower. Their evaporation in a poetic experience makes the mind unobtrusive and makes it easy for the knower to unite with the ideal universal object, the essence of a thing, the thing as it really is. None the less, the memory of mental experiences remains present even though unobtrusively. The appetency, the knot of the heart, melts or is burnt as the subject unites with it. The mind's purification means the removal of its knotty nature, its spatio-temporal tagging, which is totally removed in a poetic experience.

As truth alone is pure, catharsis or purification of the mind for the Indian means making it more akin to the truth of things, and that is possible only by universalizing it, by removal of selfishness. Poetry gives a sound principle to the mind to regulate its likes and dislikes. That sound principle is the principle of unselfishness. Poetry does it in the practical way by making the reader or the spectator totally attentive to the plot, the body of poetry, which is living only because a universal undercurrent of feeling holds all its particulars together, runs through it. Poetic experience at its apex is attention to this undercurrent of feeling and not to the objective correlatives that suggest it. This raising the mind above the objects, its dissociation from the objective correlatives, is done by a deep attention to the poem. While Aristotle calls plot the soul of tragedy, Abhinava calls it the body of *nāṭya* or drama,¹⁷ and *Rasa* the soul. That shows their difference, and Coleridge's view that Imagination or Passion is the soul of poetry is the same as the Indian view if we make a few corrections as we have suggested in these chapters.

Poetry gives a training in detached selfless living by the

17. *Locana*, p. 402.

opposite method of deep attachment to a thing. The poet finds people attached to the worldly objects and utilizes that very human weakness for removing it. Abhinava and Plato and Aristotle hold the same view. Plato and Aristotle explained catharsis in almost a similar way by the example of rocking the cradle and singing lullaby in order to induce the baby to sleep. An external agitation is employed to calm and counteract an internal.¹⁸

Mind is conquered by total attention to one of its basic moulds or feelings. While the reader is attentive to a universal, he learns the importance of universal, its superiority to particulars, and the art of impersonal knowing and feeling. This is crossing the barriers, the particulars that limit and hamper a union with the infinite. To have an idea of one's self-sufficiency, of total nothingness of outward phenomenal objects and hence a feeling of complete detachment from phenomenal objects and their empirical impressions is a very difficult task and a very rare achievement. Only Yogis are capable of that.¹⁹ So a lower universal, an appetency, a basic feeling is made the object of attraction by the poet. People relish mental indulgence in descriptions of things they like or dislike. They like to hate things they dislike as much as they like to love things they like. The poet utilizes both these types of feelings in poetry. He uses all the attractions of figurative and rhythmic expression to make the reader's mind attentive to the universal basic feeling. If once the reader is able to live in the universal, he learns the art of dissociating feeling from worldly objects and their impure mental images and prepares the ground for the higher

18. See Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

19. Ketaki-kusumasaurabhe bhṛṣam bhṛṅga eva rasiko na makṣikā :
Bhāṭṭaraviya-paramādvayārcane ko'pi rajyati, na bheda-mohitaḥ.

MV, Kāṇḍa II, v. 151, p. 118.

experience. He would ultimately realize that his spirit is above all appetencies and that essentially he is a wave of the infinite eternal ocean of an all-pervasive, all-inclusive spirit.

In the Trika language the idea may be expressed thus. In the poetic experience the *kañcukas*, the outer folds of mind, are overcome, but the *malas*, the inner folds, remain. They are the basic character-traits of human beings, the seeds of their animality, which limit their essential reality, which is totally spiritual or rational. But in the esemplastic poetic experience these *malas*, or impurities in their universal potential basic forms, the *karma-vāsanās*, or *karma-saṁskāras*, the residues of all our past acts in this life and the previous ones, which become the seeds of all our actions, get purified in the sense that they do not tend to hanker after particulars after once receiving the joy of experiencing a universal. Their hankering after the particular objects is thus subdued.²⁰ But till the seeds are not completely destroyed, nobody can take the guarantee that they will not sprout up again. Thus it is the experience of *Śānta Rasa* alone that brings salvation. The Secondary *Rasas* also better life because they are experienced only on the background of the *Śānta Rasa*, or the purely spiritual experience, where the subject is the infinite 'I' and the object is its pure duplicate, the pure will or soul. After the poetic experience, therefore it cannot be said with definiteness that the reader will never behave in the narrow selfish manner, will never hanker after worldly pleasures. But it is certain that once he has tasted the joy of the spiritual poetic experience and the evaporation of his mind, his selfishness will gradually vanish away. Animality in its essence is appetency (*lolikā*), hankering of the subject. But, as a matter of fact, the subject

20. As Govardhanācārya so well says :

Satkavirasanaśūrpi-niṣṭaṣṭataraśabdaśālīpākena

Trpto dayitādharamapi nādrīyate kā sudhā dāsi.

Āryā-Saptaśatī, v. 46, p. 15.

is self-sufficient. This hankering is due to the separation of the subject from the object. The hankering subsides, the impurity gets washed away or burnt up, in a poetic experience. As it is a very hard knotty stuff, it requires continuous washing or burning. When by repeated washing or burning it becomes totally pure, that is, when the mind realizes that the ultimate substantiality lies only in the spiritual infinite subject and all objectivity is a product of imagination, that the most primary objective form of all phenomenal particulars is the unconscious void,²¹ then it becomes totally liberated, gets the highest peace. Thus salvation, *Mokṣa*, the highest goal of life, is achieved through poetry in this very life.

One thing has to be repeated again and again that the reader enjoys only that description which he likes, and his education will have to be started according to his choice. The most important advance he will make is by stabilizing his feeling. Unless a feeling is stabilized, made constant (*sthāyī*), it is impossible to be experienced as *Rasa*. Poetic experience, it has been said, is bilateral. To stabilize a feeling is as much the reader's job as the poet's. It is therefore said that a debauch can never experience *Rasa*. At best, he can experience *Bhāvābhāsa* or *Rasābhāsa*. His education will have to be started from that point. The stability of feeling, be it liking or disliking, is essential for the *Rasa* experience. Fickle-mindedness is the worst human trait, though it is also true that all of us suffer from it in various proportions. Constancy of behaviour is likewise one of the best human traits. If only we constantly hate bad things and constantly love good things, all the problems of life would be easily solved.

Here comes the importance of sexual passion for poets. They see that the attraction for the opposite sex is constantly

21. *Saṁvinmātraṁ hi yac-chuddham prakāśa-paramārthakam*
Tan meyam ātmanah projhya viviktam bhāsate nabhaḥ.

T4, IV, p. 7, v. 9.

the most powerful human feeling. Therefore they utilize the feeling of love most for the education of human beings. Many religious teachers of India, Vaiṣṇava saints of Bengal, for example, following the example set by Vyāsa in *Bhāgavata*, made *Kṛṣṇa-rati*, love for Kṛṣṇa, the highest incarnation of God, the perfect means for the regeneration of the human soul.

Bhavabhūti follows the line of Vālmiki, whose *Rāmāyaṇa* depicts the perfect man (*Puruṣottama*), and considers the feeling of sorrow the most fundamental human feeling, and *Karuṇā-Rasa*, or the poetic passion of sorrow, most important. There are enough reasons to make sorrow the most important human feeling. Man's fall from the spiritual height in this mortal world is a permanent source of grief. There may be other schemes with some other basic feeling as predominant. The importance of historical and social factors and racial characteristics in such schemes cannot be minimized.

Abhinava, however, develops the theory of *Rasa* in the most philosophical way, basing it on the metaphysical ideal truth of spiritual existence, and makes *Śānta Rasa* the most primary *Rasa*. When man knows his true spiritual nature, the self-sufficiency of his pure spirit, he enjoys the pure experience of 'I am this', where the predicate is his own pure will. That is a liberating experience. Still higher, he reaches the final goal and enjoys the purest experience of 'I am I'. Everything, phenomenal or noumenal, appears to him as an aspect of his own self. He realizes that nothing else exists, that he alone exists in manifold forms. Man realizes his self-sufficiency and all his hankering is stopped. But in order to experience this self-sufficiency he should have a faith in his spiritual self-sufficiency. This faith alone can generate the actual experience of spiritual self-sufficiency. Cause and effect are two poles of manifestation of one truth. That is the case everywhere. We study in order to improve our intelli-

gence, but without innate intelligence it is impossible to study. Similarly without a constant feeling or faith in our spiritual self-sufficiency we cannot experience it. An experience of this sort strengthens such a faith.

This highest experience is achieved through poetry, provided the reader has faith. Faith, willing suspension of disbelief, is important for all types of poetic experience (*Rasa*). The predominant character-trait (*sthāyibhāva*) of the reader is only a help in generating this faith in him. A successful lover, for example, cannot have faith in meaninglessness of sexual love and he cannot have an experience of *Śānta Rasa* while reading *Mahābhārata*. Similarly a Yogī can hardly concentrate on a poem where love for a prostitute (*Rasābhāsa*) is depicted. The racial characteristic, the time-spirit, and the basic character-trait of the individual are important factors in the development of poetic taste. To identify oneself with every type of basic feeling is a sign of intelligence in a poet as well as a reader. The dramatist who identifies himself with all types of characters is the most important poet. The highest proof of intelligence is to realize the self-sufficiency of spirit and insubstantiality of all objective reality, to realize that

The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded
Leave not a rack behind.²²

But this realization does not make the liberated soul pessimistic. He realizes his subjective plenitude, and while he has no selfish motive in any action, he works most selflessly for the good of others. He learns the art of detached action, of living like the lotus-leaf in water, immanently and yet transcendently, inside the world and yet unaffected by it.²³

22. *The Tempest*, IV, I.

23. Coleridge says that "the artist must first elogn himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect" B. L., II. 258.

The value of the highest spiritual experience for this life is shown by the greatest poets like Vyāsa, the essence of whose teaching in the most simple words is that one should do good to others for that is the best way of doing good to oneself.²⁴ The regenerate soul does not stop work; he only does every thing for the good of humanity at large.

Rasa is thus feeling (*ahankāra*) made pure by the touch of the infinite eternal spiritual self (*Aham*). It gives infinite dimensions to the finite self. In between the infinite subject and its pure projection, which get unified in the esemplastic poetic experience, the appetency, the hankering, the innermost impurity lying in the unconscious in the universal potential form, is crushed and it colours the poetic experience. The uniqueness of the poetic experience (*Rasa*) depends on the whole gamut of the universal feeling and its particular emotions, the appetency and its manifestations, its peculiar development, but its common characteristic is peace and joy born out of the experience of the self-sufficiency of the infinite eternal subject in an embrace of its own self.

24. Nāyaṁ loko' styayajñasya kuto'nyaḥ kurusattama.

BG, IV, 31

Aṣṭādaśa-purāṇeṣu Vyāsasya vacanadvayam :
Paropakāraḥ puṇyāya, pāpāya para-piḍanam.

CHAPTER VI

VALUES IN POETRY

Ürmireṣā vibodhābdher nistarāṅgasya kīrtitā.

Spanda-kārikā quoted in *IPVV*, II, 199.

Apūrvaṁ yad vastu prathayati vinā kāraṇa-kalām
Jagad-grāva-prakhyāṁ nija-rasa-bharāt sārāyati ca,
Kramāt prakhyopākhyā-prasara-subhagam bhāsayti tat

Sarasvatyās tattvaṁ kavi-sahṛdayākhyāṁ vijayate. *Locana*, v. 1, p. 1.

Madhurādi-rasāsvāde tu viśaya-sparśa-vyavadhānam. Tato'pi kāvya-nāṭyādaṁ tad-vyavadhāna-śūnyatā, tadvyavadhāna-saṁskārānuvedhastu. Tatrāpi tathodita-vyavadhānāṁśa-tiraskriyā-sāvadhāna-hṛdayā labhanta eva paramānandam. *IPVV*, II, 179.

Apradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṁvit viśrāmyati, tasyaiva pratyayasya pradhānāntaram pratyānuddhāvataḥ, svātmanyaviśrāntatvāt. Ato'pradhānatvaṁ jaḍe vibhāvānubhāvavarge vyabhicāri-nicāye ca saṁvidātmake'pi niyamena anya-mukha-samprekṣiṇi sambhavati iti tadatiriktāḥ sthāyyeva tathā carvaṇāpātram.

Tatra puruṣārthanaiṣṭbāḥ kāścid saṁvida iti pradhānam. *AB*, I, 281-2.

Yadyapi sthāyyapi na sthiraḥ, tathāpi saṁskāra-rūpatayā dhārāvāhi-sajātiya-pravāha-rūpatayā ca sthira eva. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

Tattvajñānajaś ca nirvedaḥ sthāyyantaropamardakaḥ, bhāvavaicitrya-sahiṣṇubhyo ratyādibhyo yaḥ paramasthāyīśiḥ sa eva sthāyyantarāṇām upamardakaḥ. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

WHATEVER may be the points in favour of art for art's sake and against art as criticism of life, the relation of art with life cannot be denied. Poetry would be useless if it did not better life. Bacon's theory of removing mental defects by different types of studies is really a sound doctrine. The theories of catharsis, divinization and mental health propounded by Aristotle, Coleridge and Richards respectively point out the important use of poetry for improving life. The theory of *Rasa* shows perfectly, as no other theory does, how poetry

transforms life. Coleridge's essay on passions is undeveloped. His Imagination is an obstacle to Reason's embrace of feeling. Aristotle talks of universalization but does not fully explain it. How poetry effects catharsis is suggested by Aristotle's interpreters on the basis of metaphor and analogy from medical science. T.S. Eliot explains his theory of impersonalization on the basis of analogy from the science of chemistry. Analogy is not an undisputed means of knowledge. Richards makes universal a bogus entity and does not convincingly explain the mental health brought about by poetry. It is Abhinava who exhaustively explains both the psychic and super-psychic aspects of the poetic experience. Abhinava would readily support Richards' statement that values in poetry are the same as in life. Indeed, Abhinava determined the value of the eight types of *Rasa* experience on the basis of their fulfilment of the four aims of life. He agreed with Bharata who stated that poetry led to the same goal as the Vedas.¹ Abhinava's concept of the poetic experience, or *Rasa*, is very much akin to Richards' account of it as an experience free from deadlock or bafflement.² But why it is so is explained by Abhinava better than Richards. Abhinava's superiority lies not only in furnishing a more detailed account of feelings and emotions that are the stuff of poetry, or in showing that appetencies are satisfied in poetic experience but also in presenting the most convincing account of how and why they are so satisfied. He shows the equation of the highest poetic experience, namely *Śānta Rasa*, with the pure truth and the absolute joy, the salvation of both the poet who creates and the reader who enjoys

Coleridge says that poetic emotions are artificial,³ different from naturally, commonly felt emotions. Richards says that there is no fundamental difference between ordinary emotions

1. See Book III.

2. *AB*, I, p. 280; *Principles of Lit. Crit.*, p. 252.

3. *N*, 87.

and those felt in a poetic experience.⁴ Abhinava would partially agree with both Coleridge and Richards. He would say that the stuff of poetic emotions certainly belongs to the same stock of basic feelings and transient emotions and the psycho-physical expressions to which ordinary feelings and emotions belong. But so far as they undergo a purification in the *esemplastic* experience of the poet, and so far as these purified feelings and emotions are the stuff of poetry, Coleridge is justified in calling them artificial. In Sanskrit poetics, the affection of the infinite perceiver that brings this change in the nature of the poetic feeling, its emotions and expressions as well as in that of their objective correlatives, is indicated by giving even the objective correlatives, a subjective name (*vibhāva*) and explaining the two meanings of the word *bhāva*, meaning feeling. The ordinary feeling is 'becoming'; the poetic feeling is 'diffusion', 'pervasion', 'spreading over'. The derivation of the word *bhāva* in the former case is *bhavanti iti bhāvāḥ*; in the latter, *bhāvayanti iti bhāvāḥ*.⁵ The difference in the two experiences is due to the different instruments of knowledge used. In the case of ordinary feeling it is the finite *antaḥkaraṇa*, mind; in the case of poetic feeling it is *Sad-vidyā*, or the infinite activity of the infinite perceiver. Thus there is a qualitative difference between artistic feeling and emotion and ordinary feeling and emotion.

If poetry is an "art of telling lies skilfully" and "the secret of it lies in a fallacy",⁶ how is it valuable? Is falsehood valuable? Aristotle, Coleridge and Abhinava give the same answer, namely, that poetry deals with a universal or ideal truth which is presupposed in each of its particulars and hence

4. *Principles of Lit. Crit.*, pp. 16-17.

5. *NS*, I, 342-5. Cp. Coleridge's description of the Secondary Imagination :
 "It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify."
B. L., I, 202.

6. *Poetics*, Butcher, p. 95.

higher than the factual truth of particulars. "What may be" is as much true as "what is", if not more. It is wrong to accept only what has been or what is as true. What might have been or what may be is equally true. To visualize ideal truth holds the secret of controlling facts, of bettering humanity, of making what ought to be a fact.

Aristotle merely stated it. Coleridge analysed it but was not free from mistakes; Abhinava brought the analysis to perfection and he did it long before anybody did it in the West.

It would not be out of place here to refer to Aravindo's view of poetry. He claims for the poet "the role of a seer of Truth"⁷ and equates poetry with *mantra*. He says, "The poetic vision of life is not a critical or intellectual or philosophic view of it, but a soul-view, a seizing by the inner sense; and the *mantra* is not in its substance or form poetic enunciation of a philosophic truth, but the rhythmic revelation or intuition arising out of the soul's sight of God and Nature and the world and the inner truth—occult to the outward eye—of all that peoples it, the secrets of their life and being".⁸ His view does not essentially differ from the traditional Indian view of poetry as represented by Bharata, Ānandavardhana or Abhinava. The view of poetry as *Rasa* is really that of a 'soul-view' for the true creator as well as the true hearer is the soul,⁹ the infinite knower (*aparimita-pramātā*), and not the finite mind. As Aravindo says, "it is the soul which sees and the eye, sense, heart and thought-mind become the passive instruments of the soul", sunk into the soul and steeped and fused,¹⁰ or, as Coleridge puts it, volatilized. That is the significance of Abhinava's comparison of the poetic experience with the taste of a drink (*pānakarasa*)

7. *The Future Poetry*, p. 42.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

modified by its particular ingredients. The *Rasa* theory maintains that the object of poetry can never be merely a particular but a universal behind a particular, a basic feeling flowing as an under-current behind the floating emotions without any spatio-temporal tags. Even the poetry of the category of *Bhāva* is poetry because of the basis of *Rasa*. The difference is due to the predominant source of the charm, which in the case of *Bhāva* is the particular aspect of a universal, and in the case of *Rasa* the universal with all its particulars subdued in it. Exactly the same is Coleridge's view. He says that Aristotle "required of the poet an involution of the universal in the individual". The ancient dramatists, he points out, "wished to transport the mind to a sense of its possible greatness, and to implant the germs of that greatness, during the temporary oblivion of the worthless 'thing we are' and of the peculiar state in which each man happens to be, suspending our individual recollections and lulling them to sleep amid the music of nobler thoughts".¹¹ The higher ascents of poetry are measured by the nobler thoughts, though thoughts become poetic as soon as the subject becomes the infinite spirit instead of the finite mind. Abhinava pointed out that instead of a universal basic feeling, which is after all an impurity, the pure will or soul itself, totally free from any appetency, may be the object, and the expression of the poetic experience with such a pure object is the highest pinnacle of poetry. Satisfaction of an appetency is far lower than the satisfaction arising out of a complete absence of all appetencies, said Ānandavardhana.¹² Not touching the mud is better than washing it off. So runs a Sanskrit proverb. Unfortunately man is born muddy, impure, and he has to wash his impure self constantly in order to be totally pure. That is the superiority of the secondary *Rasas* to

11. *The Friend* quoted in *B. L.*, II, 33.

12. *Yacca kāma-sukhaṁ loke yacca divyam mahat sukhaṁ*
Tr̥ṣṇā-kṣaya-sukhasyaite nār̥bataḥ śoḍaśim kalām.

the primary *Rasa* from the practical standpoint of educating the degenerate souls. Some people do not even accept the primary *Śānta Rasa*. But as Abhinava points out, it is the most important *Rasa*, the *Mahā-Rasa*.¹³

Thinking of the hard discipline required for a complete freedom from all appetencies, seekings or hankerings, the Vaiṣṇava saints thought of utilizing the most commonly predominant appetency of sexual passion for the highest achievement.¹⁴ They say that if instead of the beloved or the wife, Kṛṣṇa, the highest manifested form of the infinite eternal universal spirit,¹⁵ be made the object of the basic feeling of love, the experience in life as well as poetry would reach the highest point of nobility. According to them, therefore, the *Madhura Rasa*, where love for Kṛṣṇa is the basic feeling, is the poetic apex¹⁶ and the highest form of salvation.

While Aravindo, Coleridge and Abhinava made poetry a soul-view of God or Nature or Life, Dr. Richards frowned at it and said that "critical remarks are merely a branch of psychological remarks, and that no special ethical or metaphysical ideas need be introduced to explain value".¹⁷ Coleridge, who deplored the severance of psychology from metaphysics,¹⁸ stated that in his philosophy of poetry

13. *AB*, I, 267.

14. *Gīta-Govindā* of Jaydeva, which is a popular text of the Vaiṣṇavas, says in the very beginning :

Yadi Hari-smaraṇe sarasam mano yadi vilāsakalāsu kutūhalam
Madhura-komala-kānta-padāvalīm śṛṇu tadā Jayadeva-sarasvatīm.

15. *Uj्जvalānīlamani*, v. 1 (p. 1)

Nāmākṛṣṭa-rasajñāḥ śilenoddīpayan sadānandaḥ
Nijarūpotsavadāyī sanātānātmā Prabhur jayatī.

16. The com. of Jīva Gosvāmī on vv. 2 and 3 says :

Esā Kṛṣṇaratih sthāyībhāvo bhaktiraso bhavet (p. 5).

Sa eva Uj्jvalāparaparyāyo bhaktirasānām rājā madhurākhyo rasaḥ.

(p. 4).

17. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 23.

18. *P. L.*, p. 23.

his sole aim was to show that Reason spreading light over feelings or feelings diffusing vital warmth through Reason made the essence of poetry. His theory of Imagination and that of poetic passion were attempts to achieve this main purpose, though he did not succeed in achieving it. Abhinava with his more developed psychology and more developed metaphysics and semantics succeeded in achieving it. According to Abhinava and Bharata, in poetry as well as poetics a start has to be made not with an appetency but with a felt appetency, a basic feeling, and one not felt by the finite mind but with an infinite spirit. Even Richards accepted that an unconscious mind is a fiction.¹⁹ Is it possible or proper then to start with an unfelt appetency as he has done?²⁰ As soon as an appetency is felt by the mind it becomes a transient emotion or appears as so many emotions. It no longer remains an appetency lying hidden in the unconscious. To make poetry an affair of the unconscious would be a bad materialistic proposition, worse than the idealistic proposition to explain everything as a mysterious work of God. Realism and idealism are not such opposites as should make the people holding the one view feel allergic towards the other. Both Coleridge and Richards realize it.²¹ Both the conscious and the unconscious have a play in poetic creation and poetic experience. Coleridge says: "In every work of art there is a reconciliation of the external with the internal, the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it...He who combines the two is the man of genius and for that reason he must partake of both".²² But how can the two, the unconscious and the conscious, work together in harmony, when the two are opposites? What one is conscious of is finite, and the infinite unconscious is beyond

19. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 82.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

21. See *B. L.*, I, 178-9 and *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 83-4.

22. 'On Poesy or Art', *B. L.*, II, 258.

one's grasp. Coleridge says that the unconscious activity is really "the genius in the man of [genius]". It becomes unavoidable here to enter into the realm of ideal reality and materialists cannot avoid it. Abhinava pointed out the truth which is so self-evident as to appear a truism, but a neglect of which is the bane of materialism—that a larger vessel alone can contain a smaller one in it. That particulars are contained in their respective universals and these respective universals in a higher universal and the latter in the highest universal of the self-evident self-consciousness, the unity of total existence and total consciousness, is a very obvious truth.²³

If the unconscious, of which we are not conscious, is accepted as a reality, heavens would not fall if we accept universal as a reality. Moreover, not to accept universal would not do.

Richards calls universal a 'bogus entity', a 'premature ultimate',²⁴ But is it possible to avoid its acceptance? What is the meaning of the word 'man' for instance? Mr. X, Y. Z? If it be said that it is an abstract of many particulars observed, how would it be applied to the particular men who are not yet born or who lived in the past or whom we never saw. Inductive logic would be merely a sceptical affair on such a hypothesis. The science of Word and Meaning alone can explain it. According to Coleridge a universal is not an empirical abstract but an ideal entity which is distinct but not different from self-evident self-consciousness. But his semasiology was not developed. Once in an intuitive way he knew that word was a focal point of consciousness. He did not develop it. In India a full-fledged philosophy of Word and Meaning, or what Coleridge called universal grammar, was developed in the hoary past by such writers as Patañjali

23. Abhinava does not state it as such but he explains the higher and lower forms of creation on the basis of this principle in *TA*, VII, pp. 68-84.

24. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 40.

and Bhartṛhari, mainly by the latter, on the authority of the revelations of the Vedic Ṛsis. The absolute self-consciousness was shown to be the unity of word and meaning. The idea had become popular in the pre-Christian era and was used by Kālidāsa, the master poet of the simple style, in the first benedictory verse of his easiest poem, *Raghuvamśa*.²⁵

'Man' means 'the universal man, the ideal entity which holds all particulars in it, and similar is the case with every other word. This universal idea is a distinct unit of a higher universal, of an indistinct 'This', which is merely a duplicate creation of the Will of the eternal infinite I, which is everywhere the subject. So says Abhinava.²⁶ Letters, words, sentences, paragraphs, nay, whatever forms man's expression may take are all focal points of self-evident self-consciousness. Without such an assumption no explanation is possible either of the satisfaction we receive in communicating an idea or in understanding one communicated by others. 'I have said what I had to say' or 'I have understood your meaning' will be false statements on any other hypothesis.

Universals are, therefore, realities, not phantoms. They are ideal realities, not material concretes like bricks or jars. They exist only in 'the sky of consciousness', *cidākāśa*, which is wider than the sky we see as void.

Howsoever we may try we can never sever reality from consciousness. Even when things are said to exist outside without a man's being conscious of them, they cannot be said to exist without the possibility of somebody's being ever conscious of them. To believe otherwise will be a worse kind of belief than believing a phantom.

To revert to our main problem, to make the unconscious conscious is possible only on the basis of a universal self-

25. Vāgarthāviva sampr-ktau vāgartha-pratipattayo
Jagataḥ pitarau vande Pārvati-Paramēśvarau.

26. See Bock II, chapter III.

consciousness that is higher than the unconscious. Indeed the latter is a limitation of the former.²⁷ The unconscious is at best an inferential entity for the materialist. He accepts it not because he perceives it or is conscious of it for then it cannot retain its unconscious nature, but because he cannot do without it, for the perceived things or their empirical counterparts in the mind, the concepts, do not get fully explained without its basis. Even Richards, who says, "An unconscious mind is a fairly evident fiction", considers it useful, and starts his psychological theory of poetry²⁸ with the unconscious or unfelt appetency. But poetry is not inferential knowledge. Even Richards says that one of the two meanings of poetry is poetic experience.²⁹ To accept that the unconscious holds the secret of genius is to accept ignorance about the source of genius. It is a fact that the poet in his act of creation is not conscious of the source of his power of creation. He yields to it rather than grasps it. So far he may be said to be unconscious of it. But as consciousness alone is active, we can only say that an infinite consciousness within him writes for him and through him.³⁰

Poetry in both the meanings of poetic communication and poetic experience has super-psychic elements. Its value lies in giving the mind a higher experience than it is naturally capable of. In the poetic experience the mind gets volatilized and thus outgrows its own limitations. Abhinava states that the whole plot-structure is only to remove the obstacles that create a deadlock in the mind.³¹ Even Richards says that "compared to the experience of great poetry every other

27. In the theological language of the Trika philosophy the fact is stated thus : *Śānyamā.ā* is a limitation of *Śiva* (TA, IV, 38-40).

28. See *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 82, 47.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

30. *Parasvādānecchā-virata-manaso vastu sukaveḥ
Sarasvatyevaiṣā ghaṭayati yatheṣṭam Bhagavati.*

DK, IV, 17, p. 550.

31. *Vighnāpasārakā vibhāva-prabhṛtayaḥ.*

AB, I, 280.

state of mind is one of bafflement."³² Though in one way it is an acceptance by Richards of the universal nature of poetic experience, yet what Richards fights against is not so much a universal or impersonal effect of poetic experience, but universal as a qualifying adjective of the poetic experience, which will distinguish it from ordinary experience of empirical particulars. He says that universalization is an effect produced by the poetic communication, and experience as such cannot be qualified as universal or particular. Abhinava would not accept that. He would, however, accept that universal or impersonal experience is not like any other experience which can be had in the common empirical way.³³ It is an experience which lasts only so long as we give total attention to the objective correlatives of the poetic feeling, the action or the plot.³⁴ It lasts therefore only so long as we attend to a work of art. Richards is against what he disparagingly calls "the switchboard view of the mind".³⁵ He accepts that Coleridge's theory of Imagination as "a balance of or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities" or as "the sense of musical delight...with the power of reducing multitude into unity of effect and modifying a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling" is his greatest contribution to critical theory and that in its "many applications and elucidations scattered through the *Biographia* and the *Lectures*" he has "put his finger more nearly than any one else upon the essential characteristic of poetic as of all valuable experience".³⁶ But he would not see any justification for Coleridge's "speculations upon Imagination into the realms of Transcendentalism".³⁷ This amounts to accepting the effect and rejecting the cause.

32. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 252.

AB, I, 284.

33. Na tu siddhasvabhāvaḥ.

KP, p. 99.

34. Vibhāvādijivitāvadhiḥ

35. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 251.

36. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 242-3.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 242; Coleridge on Imagination, p. 11.

Richards does not give an alternative explanation of the reconciliation of opposites, which he also accepts as the essence of the poetic experience. The very definition of Imagination Coleridge gave in transcendental terms, "a repetition in the finite mind of the activity of the eternal infinite I AM." His eternal I AM, or Reason, is a reconciliation of the fundamental opposites, subject and object. The primary importance of Imagination lies in the repetition of the activity of Reason, which makes Imagination the prime agent of human perception according to Coleridge. The Secondary or poetic Imagination is only a superior exercise of the Primary Imagination. Richards belittles Reason and the Primary Imagination but accepts the Secondary Imagination as a unique contribution. That is unjustified.

Richards, however, could not avoid accepting a universal. Thus, for example, he called it a superstition that a poem meant the same to the reader and the writer or even to any two readers. He defined it as "a class of experiences which do not differ in any character more than a certain amount, varying for each character, from a standard experience. We may take this standard experience as the relevant experience of the poet when contemplating the completed composition."³⁸

Abhinava and Coleridge would hasten to point out that this standard experience is the experience of a universal. When any reader has that standard experience, he does at that moment "so far legislate for all men,...that if it be right for him it is universally right". More convincingly than Richards, Coleridge says, "No person of common reflection demands even in feeling, that what tastes pleasant to him ought to produce the same effect on all living beings; but man does; and must expect and demand the universal acquiescence of all intelligent beings in every conviction of his

38. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 226-7.

understanding”³⁹ Abhinava still more convincingly says that in an artistic performance, be it a dance or a drama or any other form of art, all the spectators share a universal common experience because they outgrow the limitations of their individual minds, Understandings as Coleridge called them.⁴⁰ The limitations of space and time are overcome by deep attention to the feeling portrayed. Even the subtlest psychic limitations of appetencies do not obtrude, for they melt away or are burnt up according to their constitution and the spectator enjoys a total satisfaction of being one with his innermost spirit. The only difference between a purely spiritual experience and a poetic experience is that the latter is coloured and variegated with the basic feeling and its offshoots while the former is colourless. As colourless water is purest, so is *Śānta Rasa* the purest form of spiritual experience, and hence has been called the *Primary Rasa*. But even a *Secondary Rasa* is a spiritual experience as much as it partakes of the *Primary Rasa* and thus brings about the catharsis or purification of the basic feeling.

Even Richards says that a reconciliation of opposites produces a mental balance, a catharsis—“whether Aristotle meant anything of this kind or not” and that “None of the effects of art is more transferable than this balance or equilibrium.”⁴¹ Abhinava’s exposition of the poetic experience as being primarily the *Śānta Rasa*, which is really nothing other than the most perfect mental balance, is the most exhaustive explanation known to the world so far of this valuable transferable poetic effect. It is the greatest value of poetry

39. ‘Fragment of an Essay on Taste’, B.L., II, 249.

40. Tata evocyate malla-naṭa-prekṣopadeśane

Sarva-pramāṭṛ-tādātmyam pūrṇa-rūpānubhāvakam.

Jayaratha explains: Pūrṇa-rūpeti—iyadeva hi pūrṇam rūpam yad vigalita-vedyāntaratyā tatraiva ananyākāṅkṣatvena parāmarśanaṁ nāma iti.

T.A., VII, pp. 67, 8.

See also Mammāṭa’s summary of Abhinava’s view in KP, pp. 96-102.

41. P.L.C. pp. 245-6, 248.

according to him, for it is how poetry is conducive to the highest goal of life, namely, *Mokṣa*, or salvation. Poetry has a secure place in the scheme of education mainly on this account. Coleridge gave poetry middle place in a scheme of total education, giving physical sciences a lower and religion a higher place than poetry. In the Indian scheme of education all the three types of learning, *Vedic*, *Paurāṇic* and *Sāhityika* (or poetic), lead to the same goal. The superiority of the last lies in its being common to all and in its being extremely charming in manner. A balanced view can be no other than a universal view which may satisfy all irrespective of time and place and prejudices. Its universality alone makes it valuable and capable of transfer.

Thus it is clear that poetry is not a purely psychic affair as Richards tries to show, for psyche is everybody's individuality. There is hardly a person who has no appetency, no hankering, says Abhinava. An unbiased mind is an impossibility, says Coleridge. The balanced mind only shows the universal spiritual super-psychic activity at work and the psychic activity subdued. Richards' non-acceptance of a universal thus seems to be an unnecessary quarrel. Unawares he gave ground to the idealists and accepted their entity called 'universal' by accepting a 'standard' experience.

The source of Inspiration, Imagination or Taste lies in the super-psychic region of universal self-consciousness. But it is not God's view of things. Neither Abhinava nor any other important critic would agree with Aurobindo in calling poetry *mantra*. *Mantra* is an aspect of *Brahma*. Poetry is neither knowledge nor taste of *Brahma*. The poetic experience or *Rasa* is called *Brahmāsvādasahodara*, not *Brahmāsvāda*. If at all *Rasa* is equated with the latter, it can be so done only in the case of the primary *Śānta Rasa*.⁴² But this primary variety is the most rare experience. Only those who can make freedom from all kinds of *vāsanās* or

appetencies as their permanent character-trait (*sthāyibhāva*) can have a taste of it. Though that is the highest goal to be reached through poetry also, yet to equate poetry with *mantra* will be to rob poetry of its peculiar character as a universal saviour. Indeed it is the secondary *Rasas* that help common men to have a taste of the spiritual experience of a universal. The peculiar value of poetry in a scheme of education lies in its stooping to conquer man's heart, in going down to him in order to lift him up. It deals with all his strong and weak points, his proper and improper feelings, and gradually purifies him by weaning him away from a life of sensual gratification or mental indulgence by giving him a taste of the super-psychic experience of a universal with the particulars subdued in it. To lead him to this stage the very objects that allure him are used as tools by the poets. The *mantra* is cent per cent spiritual. Poetry has the whole gamut of psychic experience in its scope. *Mantra* has nothing of the allurements of poetry, nothing of its constituent psychic element. *Mantra* is a spiritual expression of the divine, of the absolute self-consciousness. Poetry is the psycho-physical expression of the spiritual reality. Poetry is therefore differentiated from a Yogic perception or pure intuition. It is therefore said to be neither the pure perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) nor the impure perception (*sarvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) totally but partaking of both. The unique nature of the poetic experience lies in its subduing the empirical experience. Similarly poetic expression consists of words of ordinary speech though the poet impregnates them with suggestions of a super-psychic universal. The subject as well as the object of *mantra* is spirit. In poetry the subject—the reader, the spectator, the listener, the creator—is spirit, but the object described is that of the phenomenal world though in its essential universal ideal aspect. The secret of the universal attraction of poetry lies in its intermediate nature.

Richards and Aurobindo hold the extreme views. The one makes poetry purely psychic, the other purely super-psychic. As a matter of fact poetry is both psychic and spiritual. It is feeling impregnated with Reason. Coleridge and Abhinava are of the same view here, though Abhinava shows the way leading to the higher spiritual ascents also.

The problem of poetic value has been a baffling one to critics. Is poetry spiritual, or is it material? The answer suggested by such important modern critics as W. K. Wimsatt, Cleanth Brooks, George Whalley and others is that it is both. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks offer their own suggestions towards the solution of the problem of value in poetry in these terms :

"A theory of art will not be able to get along without at least two key terms—to stand in partial opposition to each other and keep the theory from collapsing into tautology or into literalism. At the same time it will hardly be a theory at all unless it tries to bring these two terms into a reconciled and necessary relation, or to see each in and through the other. The two best critical terms the most simple, inclusive and unavoidable, are perhaps *making* and *saying* (if the latter be understood to include its expressionist complement, the term *seeing*—"Always the seer is a sayer"). Or, *Creation and Discovery*, as the title of an aesthetic philosopher's recent book has it. *Making*, the Aristotelian emphasis, and *saying-seeing*, the Platonic and romantic."⁴²

Earlier in the same chapter Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks speak of "three main focuses or three most radical ideas in the history of literary criticism", and of the importance of their inter-relation and reconciliation. They are : (1) the mimetic or Aristotelian, which does justice to the world of things and real values and keeps our criticism from being merely idealistic ; (2) the emotive (as developed with most subtlety perhaps by Richards), which does justice to human responses to values

42. *Literary Criticism : A Short History*, p. 758.

and keeps criticism from talking too much about either ethics or physics; (3) the expressionistic and linguistic (*par excellence the Crocean*), which does justice to man's knowledge as reflexive and creative and keeps criticism from talking about poetry as a literal recording of either things or responses."⁴³

It speaks volumes for the Indian theory of poetry that it presents all these aspects—or even more—of poetry and poetic theory in a naturally integrated manner, with a path leading to still higher ascents. As has been shown at the relevant places, Abhinava offers a superior analysis at every point, whether it is the concept of the ideal realism; or that of feelings and emotions and actions, *ēthē*, *pathē*, and *praxeis* that correspond to *sthāyibhāvas*, *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas* respectively; or of intuition and expression, meaning and word; or of the cathartic effect brought about by the poetic experience;⁴⁴ or of the plot-structure, the objective correlatives, *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*; or of *abhinaya*. At every step Abhinava is more definite and clear than the Western critics. He presents the ontological, epistemological, psychological and expressional aspects of poetry in an integrated way as is not done by any Western critic. They do not bad him to cross purposes. For the Trika philosopher, poetry is one of the various means of spiritual regeneration. The Trika philosophy negates neither matter nor spirit. It only shows the gradually changing nature of matter and ultimately shows its pure form as the very essence of the spirit. This unity is said to be a unity of intuition and expression. The whole universe, noumenal as well as phenomenal, is manifestation (*ābhāsa*) of the Divine Intuition. Intuition and expression never separate even when they appear to do so. Only the form and

43. *Literary Criticism: A Short History*, p. 750.

44. For the concept of *Guṇa* and its superiority to the concept of *Katharsis* see the present author's article, "The Concepts of *Katharsis* and *Guṇa*."

consequently the value of expression change. Comprehensiveness is the very essence of the system, for, as Abhinava says, salvation or *Mokṣa*, the highest goal of life, cannot be achieved without knowing everything clearly.⁴⁵ There is no beating about the bush in the Indian theory. Abhinava comes straight to the poetic problem, to every aspect of it and offers a convincing solution. Thus he shows the process of idealization which was not done convincingly by Aristotle or by any other critic who tried to explain it. Abhinava offers a psychology of feelings, emotions and psycho-physical expressions, which three states were not clearly distinguished by any interpreter of Aristotle and were left where they were in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Richards supplanted it by his own theory of impulses. He did not renovate it with his new knowledge. Abhinava's delineation of reality as the various states of intuition-expression—*parama-mahāpaśyantī*, *mahāpaśyanti*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā*, both noumenal-ideal and empirical-psychic, and *vaikharī*—are an improvement even upon Bhartṛhari, the great philosopher of universal grammar. There is certainly nothing like it in Croce. It is a perfect semantics, the science of sciences. The theory of *Dhvani* as a theory of poetic expression, and the theory of *Rasa* as a theory of poetic content, both based on the ideal unity of intuition and expression, self and consciousness, meaning and word, are the last words in a theory of poetic composition and appreciation. Indeed the Indian theory of Poetry as *Rasa-Dhvani* reconciles the Platonic, the Aristotelian the Crocean and the Richardsian views, which Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks consider essential for finding out the secret of poetry. It may be safely said that it is not only a reconciliation but also an improvement.

45. *Mokṣaḥ sarva-prakāśanāt.*

Tā, VI (Āhnika VI, v. 58).

CHAPTER VII

TRAGEDY AND RASA

Tatra nāṭyam nāma nāṭa-gatābhinaya-prabhāva-sākṣātkārāya-
māṇaikaghana-mānasa-niṣcalādhyavaseyaḥ samasta-nāṭakādyanyatama-
kāvyā-viśeṣāc-ca dyotaniyo'rthaḥ. Sa ca yadyapi ananta-vibhāvādyātmā,
tathāpi narveṣāṁ jaḍānāṁ sainvidi, tasyās ca bhoktari bhoktr-vargasya ca
pradhāne bhoktari paryavasānān nāyakābhidhānabhoktrviśeṣa-sthāyi-
cittavṛtti-svabhāvaḥ.

Tena rasa eva nāṭyam.

AB, I, 266, 267

Suppressions and sublimations alike are devices by which we endeavour to avoid issues which might bewilder us. The essence of Tragedy is that it forces us to live for a moment without them. When we succeed we find, as usual, that there is no difficulty; the difficulty came from the suppressions and sublimations.

P. L. C., p. 246.

"TRAGEDY is perhaps the most general, all-accepting, all-ordering experience known", said I.A. Richards.¹ "Pity, the impulse to approach, and Terror, the impulse to retreat, are brought in Tragedy to a reconciliation which they find nowhere else and with them who knows what other allied groups of equally discordant impulses. Their union in an ordered single response is the *catharsis* by which Tragedy is recognised, whether Aristotle meant anything of this kind or not. This is the explanation of that sense of release, of repose in the midst of stress, of balance and composure, given by Tragedy, for there is no other way in which impulses, once awakened, can be set at rest without suppression.

"It is essential to recognise that in the full tragic experience there is no suppression. The mind does not shy away from anything, it does not protect itself with any illusion, it stands uncomforted, unintimidated, alone and self-reliant. The test of its success is whether it can face what is before it and respond to it without any of the innumerable subterfuges

1. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 247.

by which it ordinarily dodges the full development of experience. Suppressions and sublimations alike are devices by which we endeavour to avoid issues which might bewilder us. The essence of Tragedy is that it forces us to live for a moment without them. When we succeed we find, as usual, that there is no difficulty; the difficulty came from the suppressions and sublimations. The joy which is so strangely the heart of the experience is not an indication that 'all's right with the world' or that somewhere 'somehow, there is Justice'; it is an indication that all is right here and now in the nervous system. Because Tragedy is the experience which most invites these subterfuges, it is the greatest and the rarest thing in literature, for the vast majority of works which pass by that name are of a different order. Tragedy is only possible to a mind which is for the moment agnostic or Manichean. The least touch of any theology which has a compensating Heaven to offer the tragic hero is fatal. That is why *Romeo and Juliet* is not a Tragedy in the sense in which *King Lear* is.

"...It is the relation between the two sets of impulses, Pity and Terror, which gives its specific character to Tragedy, and from that relation the peculiar poise of the Tragic experience springs."²

All this has been said by Richards to show that Tragedy best illustrates the "balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities" which Coleridge considered a characteristic of Imagination, the soul of poetry.³ Richards thus uses the Coleridgean Imagination to suit his thesis of free and unmitigated experience, that is very much akin to Freud's worked-off inhibitions, for restoring mental health. Coleridge who thought of education as God's teaching Himself through various shapes of Nature⁴; who said

2. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 245-7.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

4. *Frost at Midnight*, lines 59-64, *Poems*, p. 242.

For what is Freedom, but the unfettered use of all the powers which God for use had given ?

But chiefly this, him First, him last to view
Through meaner powers and secondary things,
Effulgent, as through clouds that veil his blaze ;⁵

whose concept of God or Truth was that of an eternal stream of life,⁶ which he found in the phenomenal life of limitations in a war-embrace with death ;⁷ whose advice was —

Ignore thyself, and strive to know thy God,⁸
must have shuddered at such an agnostic and Manichean use of his optimistic spiritual philosophy.

Coleridge's own application of his theory may be seen in his explanation of Shakespeare's genius in the fifteenth chapter of the *Biographia*. He speaks of the opposites to be reconciled in poetry variously as "depth and energy of thought", "the creative power and the intellectual energy" ; the predominant passion and the images or associated thoughts ; unity and multitude ; instant or simultaneousness and succession ; human or intellectual life and nature. Coleridge found Shakespeare's characteristic poetic genius in his very first work, *Venus and Adonis*. The tragedies were only repetitions of the same activity for "the deeper passions". About *Venus and Adonis*, Coleridge says : "Shakespeare has here represented the animal impulse itself, so as to preclude all sympathy with it, by dissipating the reader's notice among the thousand outward images, and now beautiful, now fanciful circumstances, which form its dresses and its scenery ; or by diverting our attention from the main subject by those frequent witty or profound reflections which the poet's ever-active mind has deduced from, or connected with, the imagery and the incidents. The reader is forced into too

5. *The Destiny of Nations, Poems*, p. 192.

6. *The Friend*, p. 313 ; N. 119.

7. *What is Life ? Poems*, p. 394.

8. *Self-knowledge, Poems*, p. 487.

much action to sympathise with the merely passive of our nature. As little can a mind thus roused and awakened be brooded on by mean and indistinct emotion, as the low, lazy mist can creep upon the surface of a lake, while a strong gale is driving it onward in waves and billows." Or again, "In Shakespeare's *poem* the creative power and the intellectual energy wrestle as in a war-embrace. Each in its excess of strength seems to threaten the extinction of the other. At length in the DRAMA they were reconciled, and fought each with its shield before the breast of the other. Or like two rapid streams, that, at their first meeting within narrow and rocky banks mutually strive to repel each other and intermix reluctantly and in tumult; but soon finding a wider channel and more yielding shores blend, and dilate, and flow on in one current and with one voice"⁸

The essence of Tragedy according to Richards is to live fully without suppressions or sublimations. But one common lesson that all tragedies teach us is that living fully without any suppression and suffering at the same time from a tragic weakness brings a colossal loss to the tragic hero himself and the persons in contact with him. That such a brave and imaginative general as Macbeth, 'Valour's minion', 'worthy gentleman', could not be of any use to himself, his country or his king simply because he was not able to control his ambition is the essential tragic fact. It rouses pity in us when we realise that we have something of the hero's tragic weakness that not only destroys his good antagonist but also renders the good in himself useless. This act of destruction strikes terror in our heart. The tragic hero, as a matter of fact, is incapable of full development because he obeys the evil rather than the good in himself. His inner weakness is an obstacle to his development and is therefore tragic. The hero realises his error only after it has performed its work of destruction. Tragedy, however, does not end

with the note of destruction or the triumph of Evil. It ends with the restoration of the natural moral order. That the natural order is restored only after the destruction caused by the evil is complete is the sum and substance of Tragedy. A distinction, however, has to be made between the tragic fact and the valuable effect conveyed by Tragedy. This valuable transferable effect is the note of peace by the restoration of the natural order. That Nature's law or *dharma* cannot tolerate its violation at any time or place is what Tragedy teaches us. That is the source of the great satisfaction it produces. The centre of Tragedy is always the tragic hero. Good elements for the time being become passive or subordinate, and the evil ones active or predominant. The development of the plot-structure of a tragedy is really the development of the hero's tragic weakness and the conflict it leads to. That is the essential technique of Tragedy. The hero realises his mistake only in the end when it is too late; but he does realise it. He cannot escape the remorseless working of destiny. The plot is wound up only after that. After having said that the writer has his meaning exhausted and has nothing more to say. The disturbance caused by his fatal mistake gets exposed and the natural order is restored. Richards went too far when he made the agnostic or the Manichean attitude essential and the theological harmful for the tragic experience. 'All is right here and now in the nervous system' of the reader or the spectator only by a realisation that all was not right in the nervous system of the tragic hero, that his action showed a serious lack of wisdom in him; and that he realised it only when so many good lives including his own had been destroyed.

Both Coleridge and Abhinava equated God with self-evident self-consciousness present everywhere at every moment being above time and space as the central essence of everything. The whole universe is the choral echo of the infinite eternal I AM. Tragedy does not prove the absence of a divine

order. The tragic weakness is the evil that explodes the good in the tragic hero, and others around him are also damagingly affected. But that does not make Evil the ruling power of the universe. It only shows that the totally good alone can develop fully. Even a little of impurity in the person goes against his full development. That the 'good' in the ambit of the evil of tragic weakness is destroyed only shows the temporary triumph of evil, which is nullified by the destruction of the tragic hero and the restoration of the natural moral order. The ordinary man's life is a life of suppressions and compromises; the tragic hero's life is not so. But in the process of development his weakness outstrips the good in him and renders his full development a self-defeating game.

The point I wish to stress is that it is not the unmitigated, unsuppressed nature of the experience that makes Tragedy valuable, as Richards contends. In that case freedom would be equated with mental indulgence (*mithyācāra*). Just as billingsgate is not Satire, mental indulgence is not Tragedy. The valuable effect of Tragedy lies in its disciplining our emotions and not in letting them loose even though only mentally in a theatre. What we learn from *Macbeth* is not to abandon ourselves to an unmitigated ambition but to be away from it and to be always on the watch so that our dormant ambition may not stir up and overtake us unawares, and overpower our goodness in a weak moment. Discipline always requires tagging to a stable post. It is obeying a stable principle, which, as both Abhinava and Coleridge pointed out, is no other than conscience or the infinite eternal self-consciousness behind our psyche. Morality is nothing other than following this essential infinite nature of ours in thought, feeling, and action. Duty is the "stern daughter of the voice of God", as Wordsworth said. The value of poetry lies in persuading the reader to listen to this inner voice. The poet makes him listen to it in so subtle and sweet a manner that the reader

is lured. He offers himself to be educated. Tragedy performs this task in a negative way by rousing terror in our heart at the violation by the tragic hero of the natural moral law, which does not differ from the voice of total self-consciousness or total intelligence. It rouses pity in us only to make us realise this terror. Unless we sympathise with the tragic hero, we cannot realise the terrible nature of the tragic weakness. The reader or the spectator finds his animality, folly, or ignorance depicted only to be exposed. He finds all his selfish, indulgent deeds described only to realise their unwise nature, their terrible potentiality. He understands that a life of attachment is beset with snares, that it is foolishly limiting one's true self, stealing from one's own nature all one's natural self. As George Meredith says

In tragic life, God wot,
No villain need be ! Passions spin the plot ;
We are betrayed by what is false within.^{8b}

A. N. Whitehead still more explicitly says in his essay, *Science and the Modern World*, "Let me here remind you that the essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things. This inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama." Tragedy shows the rigorous, remorseless working of Nature's nemesis when Nature's Law, or *Dharma*, is consciously or unconsciously violated, irrespective of the greatness or goodness of the hero.

The emphasis on this natural self, the *svabhāva*, is an emphasis on a positive, stable, universal, infinite, eternal

8b. Quoted by A. C. Ward, Introduction to *Caesar and Cleopatra* of G. B. Shaw, The Orient Edition, p. 167.

nature of human beings that both Coleridge and Abhinava emphasised in life as well as in literature. The Shakespearian Tragedy is perhaps the supreme poetic expression of the importance of the cosmic Law of Nature and the infinite, eternal nature of man in the *negative* way. But that is not the last word in poetic expression. Shakespeare left Tragedy for Romance in his last days, and their importance is now duly appreciated. If Tragedy shows the consequences of doing what ought not to be done, there is also a positive way of poetic expression of what ought to be done. What moralists and religious teachers, saints and prophets do is done by poets also. To preach the sameness of value in poetry and life and to separate ethics and religion from poetry would be either a self-contradiction or a misunderstanding of true religion and ethics. If the poet is a teacher of mankind, he should not only show where man errs, as is done in a tragedy, but also point out the right way of living. There is no agnosticism, no pessimism, no scepticism in life, provided we understand the right way of living, the substantial unity behind life's manifold variety, the truth of the universal behind the falsity of particulars, the self-sufficiency of our true self, and the futility of hankerings; if, in one word, we know the proper way of living. That shows mental balance, mental health, positively. Poetry as *Rasa* is poetry of this good living.

What I emphasize here is that it would be wrong to suppose that Tragedy and *Rasa* represent two different world-views and different types of morality. The ultimate truth of life and nature cannot be but one and the same for all, though it may be expressed and analysed in different ways according to the genius of an individual or a race.

Every country and every race develops its poetry according to its own characteristic genius. The story of *Rāmāyaṇa* might have been written in the West in a tragic way with

Rāvaṇa as hero. Vālmīki, however, chose Rāma, the superman, *Puruṣottama*, his hero. Unlike a tragic hero, Rāma succeeds in solving the crisis created by Kaikeyī by non-grudging obedience to his father. This is due to the perfection of his character, which shows his perfect intelligence in realising his self-sufficiency. He was neither eager to have the crown nor reluctant to go to the forest. There was no suppression of sorrow or anger or hatred or fear, for they had not been felt by Rāma. If at all Rāma was sorry, he was sorry for his truthful father, who, he knew, had been cheated by his beloved wife, Kaikeyī, and could not say 'no' to her request, remembering his promises to her. Rāma's mind was completely unprejudiced and never allowed any misunderstanding to grow between him and Bharata, for whom his mother had played the foul game that brought misery to the royal family as well as the people. Both Bharata and Rāma met at Pañcavaṭī as prisoners of a situation for which neither of them was responsible. They were caught in a snare of circumstances created by an ignorant, narrow-minded, ambitious mother in a family of large-hearted persons. Kaikeyī's mistake had tragic potentialities but it was not allowed to develop in a tragic way. The rift in the family was avoided by the self-sacrifice not only of Daśaratha, Rāma and Bharata, but also of everyone in the family other than Kaikeyī. Here lies the difference between Tragedy and the *Rasa* genre of poetry. The tragic character behaves in a critical moment as he should not, and realizes his fault when it is too late; the behaviour of the hero in the *Rasa* genre sets an ideal for others. The tragic hero fails to solve the problem by his improper response to a difficult situation; the *dhīrodātta* hero of a poem of the *Rasa* genre solves the most difficult problem of life easily because he is a model of propriety and knows self-sufficiency to be his true nature. He has no hankerings. If he has, they are guided by a sense of propriety. He is indeed a superman and

because of his unselfishness and intelligence knows the art of solving difficult problems easily.⁹

Rāma is misunderstood as a lover. Bhavabhūti's play, *Utāra-Rāma carita*, the best love-drama in Sanskrit and perhaps in any language, most probably owes its conception to such a realisation. His banishing of Sitā after the Conquest is generally misunderstood. As a matter of fact, that was Rāma's greatest sacrifice in his life full of sacrifices. It was banishing himself, sacrificing his joy, a greater sacrifice than renouncing the crown or accepting a banished life in the forest. Rāma's life is all along a life of sorrow and sacrifice, yet he never murmured and never shirked from duty. All this was possible for Rāma because of his clear understanding that the essence of good living is to live for others. Rāma made life sublime. He set the highest standard of good living. It is significant that Vālmiki's *Rāmāyaṇa* is not only the best poem in Indian literature but also one of the most important books of Hindu religion. Hindu critics say that poetry teaches us to live and act like Rāma, the paragon of virtues, and not to live like Rāvaṇa, the king who with "a forest of wives" stole away one more and that most unwittingly of the brave Rāma and thus brought himself and his relatives and his kingdom to ruin. He was suffering not only from lust but also from folly in underestimating Rāma's strength and Sitā's love for her husband.

Hamlet is a 'problem' play of Shakespeare. In spite of its being called an artistic failure it is accepted to be a great drama. It is tempting to analyse it from the Indian standpoint. The whole plot has a centripetal tendency. The hero is the centre, the objective correlative of the central *ēthos* of the play, as Abhinavagupta would say. As has been shown

9. It is significant that one of the common epithets of Rāma is *akliṣṭakarmā* or one who does his work without any trouble, that is, easily.

by A. C. Bradley, the play will lose all its meaning and charm if we are unable to appreciate the hero's character, his innermost feeling. That central feeling which moves as an under-current in the play is Hamlet's disillusionment, his sense of despair or emptiness of life (*nirveda* or *śūnya-cittatā*) caused by his mother's hasty remarriage after the mysterious death of her noble husband. Hamlet was all the more dumb-founded when he remembered how she had doted on him :

Must I remember ? why, she would hang on him,
As if increase of appetite had grown
By what it fed on ; and yet, within a month,
Let me not think on't : Frailty, thy name is woman !

Hamlet lost all the zest for life and in the very first soliloquy thought of committing suicide :

O that this too too solid flesh would melt.

He developed a distaste for love and life when he found that everything in this life only 'seems'. He was a man who knew not 'seems'. He meant what he said or did. He had a deep love for Ophelia as is clear from his out-burst in the graveyard scene. But he advised Ophelia to go to a nunnery and be no breeder of sinners. He became enamoured of Horatio, because he was different from the common run of mankind, was not 'passion's slave', and took 'the buffets and rewards of fortune with equal thanks'. This shows Hamlet's disillusionment. It is this feeling of indifference to life that explains his delay in avenging his father's death. *Hamlet* is the only tragedy of Shakespeare where the hero suffers from a guilt not his own. The greater his suffering, the nobler his character.

But in spite of all this stress on the central under-current of Hamlet's predominant feeling, *Hamlet* remains a tragedy and is not a drama of the *Rasa* genre. I do not agree with Dr. Sen Gupta's analysis of the play in his essay, 'Hamlet in the light of Indian Poetics' in his book, *Aspects of Shakespearian tragedy*.

Rasa is the innermost essence of the highest type of poetry, and that essence makes it a genre also, for in its purest form it is not found everywhere. Now, to become a drama of the *Rasa* genre the first and foremost requisite is that the central feeling of the hero should stabilize. It should not be replaced by any other feeling. Here it is to be noted that disillusionment does not make Hamlet a Buddha. He does not renounce the world. The death of Ophelia and 'the bravery of her brother's grief' rouses his deep-seated love for his beloved and puts him in a fit of 'towering passion'. He fights a duel. It is this return to the common world of love and hatred that makes Hamlet a tragic hero. He is ensnared by the plot of Claudius. The guilty persons like Claudius and the Queen die, but not without the loss of innocent lives of Hamlet and Laertes. Hamlet is tossed between two contradictory feelings as other tragic heroes are. There is very much in Hamlet to sympathise with and to appreciate, but there is very little to imitate.

In Tragedy the hero is a noble person no doubt, but he suffers from a fault that leads him to his ruin. What Agrippa said of Antony may be said of all tragic heroes :

A rarer spirit never

Did steer humanity ; but you, gods, will give us

Some faults to make us men.

From one stand-point it may be said that Hamlet suffered on account of too much of reflection. From another stand-point Hamlet's life was tragic owing to his inconsistent behaviour. He was neither reflective enough nor practical enough. On the other hand, the hero in the *Rasa* genre of poetry or drama is a noble person without a fault. To rise to the occasion is his forte. He is *akliṣṭakarmā*. He is *punyaśloka*. To think about him is to ennoble oneself. To emulate him is the very aim of reading or writing poetry. Here lies the essential difference between the two genres of Tragedy and *Rasa*. Again, in the ladder of poetic experience

Tragedy would belong to the class of *Bhāva*, not *Rasa*, on account of the conflict of emotions and want of a stable central *ēthos* in the hero.

The positive presentation of an ideal way of living, of how men ought to behave, is the height of poetry according to Hindu critics. Man should live to attain the four aims of life. This is their concept of full development of life. It is based on a constant recollection that life is infinite eternal self-consciousness; that all concrete manifestations are its limitations, which do not last for ever and are bound to perish; that the secret of perfect living lies in self-sacrifice¹⁰ and detachment; that one should live in the world as the lotus-leaf lives in water, as the *Gītā* so well puts it, remaining inside water and yet not wet at all. This is imitating the Divine, who is immanent and transcendent simultaneously. Sanskrit poetry at its best depicts this ideal living. To make the ideal real is its eternal message. It is salvation in this very life that Sanskrit poetry ultimately aims at. Liberation in this life means that one's activities are guided by one's infinite self and not by one's finite mind. Liberation does not induce passivity. Instead, it is living for the good of others. Even on a lower plane, *Rasa* is poetry of life guided by a sense of propriety or *dharma*.

There is a close parallel between the ideals in life and those in poetry. The reader enjoys the poem he deserves according to the nature and development of his mind. If he is a debauch, he will at best enjoy *Rasābhāsa* only; if he is a true lover, he will enjoy *Śṛṅgāra Rasa*. A warrior or a patriot will enjoy *Vīra Rasa*; a devotee, *Bhakti Rasa*, and so on. If all his hankerings have subsided, he can enjoy *Śānta Rasa*.

While these are the heights he may rise to, poetry even from the lower state of *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, where the attraction

10. Nāyaṁ loko'styaya jñāsyā; kuto'nyaḥ kuruṣattama.

BG, IV, 31

of the expression is superior to that of the poetic content, performs the task of educating its reader by weaning him away from the life of sensual gratification and prepares him for a satisfaction born of imaginative self-sufficiency and selfless activities.

Whatever improves man's intelligence, character, and behaviour is valuable. Poetry is valuable because it betters life. The purpose of life is to know one's true self. Coleridge calls it wisdom. Indian critics call it *tattvajñāna* or knowing the truth. Their expositions vindicate Lord Kṛṣṇa's statement in the *Gītā* that after knowing that nothing remains to be known.¹¹ The reason is that the true self is absolute, all-pervasive and all-inclusive. Everything that has been and may be is its own becoming.

Abhinava points out that life does not become useless after this supreme experience. It only becomes unselfish. Poetry makes man unselfish and sympathetic to all forms of life, and thus makes him fit to enjoy the divine life of perfect peace (*Śānta Rasa*). Poetry as *Rasa-dhvani* does it in the *positive* way with all the force of the beloved's persuasion.

Here one doubt regarding the relation between life and poetry may be cleared. We have said that the reader enjoys the poetry he deserves. But the reader's capacity to deserve better things is constantly improved by the poets. They stabilise the reader's feeling by their attractive descriptions of things he likes to love and hate, and thus enable him to purify it by the touch of the infinite eternal subject in an eternal present moment. The repetition of such exercises gradually makes him learn the secret of detached living and makes him a regenerate soul (*jīvanmukta*).

11. Yaj-jñātvā neha bhūyo'nyaj jñātavyam avaśiṣyate.

BG, VII, 2.

12. AB, I, 388.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MEASURE AND SUBDIVISIONS OF POETRY

Trailokye'pyatra yo yāvān ānandaḥ kaścid iksyate
Sa bindur yasya taṁ vande Devam-ānandasāgaram.

Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa quoted in *PT*, p. 69.

Cārutvotkarṣa-nibandhanā vācya-vyaṅgyayoḥ prādhānya-vivakṣā.

DA, p. 280.

Avivakṣitavācya vivakṣitānyaparavācya iti dvau mūlabhedau. Ādyasya dvau bhedaḥ—atyantatiraskṛtavācya' rthāntarasāṅkramitavācyaś ca. Dvitiyasya dvau bhedaḥ—alakṣyakramo' nuraṇanarūpaś ca. Prathamō nantabhedāḥ; dvitīyo dvividhaḥ—śabdaśaktimūlo' rthaśaktimūlaśca. Paśoimas trividhaḥ—kavipraṇḍhoktikṛtaśarīraḥ, kavinibaddha-vakṛt-praṇḍhoktikṛtaśarīraḥ svataḥ-sambhavī ca. Te ca pratyekam vyaṅgya-vyañjakayor uktabhedā-nayena caturdheti dvādaśavidho' rthaśaktimūlaḥ. Ādyāś catvāro bhedaḥ iti śoḍaśa mukhyabhedāḥ. Te ca pada-vākya-prakāśatvena pratyekaṁ dvividhā vakṣyante. Alakṣyakramasya tu varṇa-pada-vākya-saṅghaṭanā-prabandha-prakāśyatvena pañca-triṁśad bhedaḥ. Tadābhāsebhyo dhvanyābhāsebhyo viveko vibhāgaḥ.

Locana, p. 281.

COLERIDGE thought of measuring the merit of poetry "according to the faculty or source from which the pleasure given by any poem or passage was derived."¹ He made the broad divisions of poetry as imaginative and fanciful. The difference is between the living poetry and the dead, the poetry of organic growth and that of mechanical assemblage, a difference of reality and appearance, of an egg and an egg-shell. Broadly speaking, it agrees with the division made by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta between *Vyaṅgya*, or *Dhvani*, and *Citra*². But Coleridge did not make any

1. *B. L.*, I, 14.

2. *DA*, pp. 494-500.

further classification of imaginative or true poetry. Hindu critics make two broad divisions of true poetry according to the source of its predominant charm. Wherever the suggested meaning is predominant, it is poetry of the first class. In the first class there are three broad subdivisions as the suggested meaning is the poetic passion (*Rasa* or *Bhāva*), the figurative meaning (*Alaṅkāra*) or any meaning other than the preceding two (*Vastu*). The first variety again has various subdivisions like *Rasa* and *Rasābhāsa*, *Bhāva* and *Bhāvābhāsa*, as the object rousing the feeling or emotion or the development of a feeling or emotion is proper and improper. *Rasa* again is of eight varieties according to the eight basic feelings while primarily it is one, the union with one's own spiritual self or pure will (*Sānta Rasa*). *Bhāva*, again, is of four varieties as it is depicted in its rising, falling, united and variegated states, known as *Bhāvodaya*, *Bhāvaśānti*, *Bhāvasandhi* and *Bhāvaśabalatā* respectively. The poetic experience of any of the transient emotions or the ordinary man's love of gods and goddesses, that is, all such emotions as do not become stable, are classed under *Bhāva*. These divisions are from the point of view of the poetic content or meaning.

Taking word or expression as the principle of division, *Vyaṅgya*, or *Dhvani*, or the first class of poetry has, again, two broad varieties. In one case the suggested meaning is based on the secondary or indicated meaning (*lakṣaṇā*); in another, it is based on the primary, or literal, meaning (*abhidhā*). They are respectively called *avivakṣitavācya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, as in the first case the literal meaning of the suggestive word is totally out of the poet's intention, and in the second case it is the basis of the suggested meaning. Both these two again are of two broad varieties. In the first variety of *avivakṣitavācya* the suggestive word rejects the literal meaning either partly or wholly and so is called *arthāntarasankramitavācya* and

atyantatiraskṛtavācya respectively. In the second variety of *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, the suggested meaning is either simultaneously apprehended along with the literal meaning and the succession in the two apprehensions of the literal and the suggested meanings is not marked, or the two meanings are apprehended one after the other and their succession is well marked. They are respectively known, therefore, as *asamlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* and *samlakṣyakramavyaṅgya*. The latter again has fifteen subdivisions. What is to be noted is that while this latter variety has the two varieties of poetic content, *Vastudhvani* and *Alaṅkāradhvani*, the former has *Rasa*, *Bhāva* and their varieties as its content. The two varieties of *avivakṣitavācya* have only *Vastudhvani* as their poetic content.

A rigorous stylistic analysis makes the varieties of *Dhvani* innumerable. In all these the soul is *Rasa*, for ultimately it is that which is suggested and makes the expression significant.

The second class of poetry is not bereft of suggestion, but here the direct expression itself is more charming. Just as sometimes the master makes his own servant more important, the suggested meaning becomes subordinate to the expression, which becomes more charming. It is therefore called *Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*. All the varieties of figurative expression come under this head. So far as figurative expressions are concerned, the analysis in Sanskrit poetics is very elaborate and even then the critics say that they cannot be exhaustive as new ways of figurative expression are still found out by poets. Their essence lies in the skill shown by the poet in the obliquity of expression, *Vakrokti*.

The third variety of fanciful (*Citra*) poetry can be poetry only by a touch of the suggested meaning but it is so faint and remote that this variety may either be called a beginner's exercise in poetry or the lowest class of poetry. Total absence of suggestion would only mean that the poem is not living.

Thus Sanskrit poetics, of which Abhinava is the greatest exponent, is a fully developed branch of learning with a fully developed theory of *Rasa-dhvani* as the poetic unity of word and meaning, based on the unity of self-evident self-consciousness, of which the whole world is the choral echo at different levels. It is an improvement on the works of Aristotle, Longinus, Croce, Coleridge, and Richards inasmuch as it is more comprehensive and satisfactory in its explanations of the various problems of poetry.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Vikalpa-nirhrāsa-vaśena yāti vikalpa-bandhyā paramārtha-satyā
Saṁvit-svarūpa-prakaṣatvamittham tatrāvadhāne yatatām subuddhiḥ.
MVV, I 990.

ESEMPLASTIC imaginative experience is the soul of poetry, good sense its body, and fancy its drapery. So said Coleridge. As all these are forms of meaning according to Coleridge's own explanation of the terms, Coleridge's concept of the true poetic expression does not become sufficiently clear. After all, the tangible thing in poetry is word and a start has to be made with it, though it has to be accepted that meaningful words alone form expression. Antithesis of body and soul in poetry cannot be expressed as word and meaning. The proper thing to say would be that word and meaning are the body and the experience conveyed by them is the soul of poetry. But it has been seen that the experience, the soul, is only a higher state of the unity of word and meaning. Thus the soul and the body of poetry are only higher and lower states of the unity of word and meaning.

Coleridge made Imagination and Passion the soul of poetry by turns. His concept of poetic passion is feeling impregnated with Reason, though in his fragmentary essay on Passion he defined it as "a state of emotion, having its immediate cause not in things, but in our thoughts of the Things". As a matter of fact, his theory of poetic passion was just in the making. His main thesis was "to make the Reason spread light over our Feelings, to make our

Feelings diffuse vital warmth thro' our Reason." But he did not revise his theory of Imagination in the light of this fundamental thesis. It would have meant the replacement of Imagination by Reason.

Rasa is exactly feeling impregnated with Reason, as has already been shown. Ordinarily we experience feeling through what Coleridge calls Understanding and Abhinava calls *citta*, or *antahkaraṇa*, the limited mind. The subject of poetic feeling is infinite Reason and not the finite mind, says Abhinava. Mind is subdued in a poetic experience; it melts or burns according to the nature of the basic feeling. This melting or burning of the mind is its purification, its *kathārsis*, its *prasāda*, the first effect produced by poetry. The real cause of our misery in the world is the acceptance of the finite mind as our guide. Being a limited instrument, the mind never allows us to have a total experience, and naturally therefore our sincerest laughter is mixed with some pain. The joy of a gain is mixed with the fear of its possible loss. Once Reason becomes our guide, the experience gets new contours and infinite dimensions. This is possible only by subduing the mind to the spirit. This subduing of the mind is an experience of its volatilization, to use Coleridge's expression. Indian writers mark two distinct forms of this experience. The mind being a limitation suffers from likes and dislikes, *rāga* and *dveṣa*. All its basic feelings fall under these two broad divisions. *Rāga* means attachment, and *dveṣa* means its opposite, aversion. According to the nature of the feeling described, the experience of the mind's extinction appears as melting (*druti*) or burning (*dīpti*). This disappearance of the mental limitation quickly prepares the ground for the spiritual experience of peace. The basic feeling merely colours this spiritual experience. It is because of this colouring by the worldly feeling that poetic experience is said to be inferior to the pure spiritual experience, *Brahmās-vāda* or *Śānta Rasa* or *Bhakti Rasa* or divine love. Both

Coleridge and Abhinava gave poetic experience a place lower than that of divine experience. Indeed Coleridge's own justification of Imagination as an intermediate faculty, higher than Understanding and lower than Reason, lies here. Abhinava showed this difference to be purely objective and was more correct, for a subjective difference—as the hypothesis of the faculty of Imagination amounts to—would not be able to explain catharsis of the mind in a poetic experience. For nothing other than Reason is pure and nothing but the pure can purify.

Catharsis or purification brought about by poetry is not explained by Aristotle or his interpreters so clearly as Abhinava has done it. The concept of *Guṇa* as explained by Ānandavardhana and Abhinava and accepted by all later critics like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and others is really the concept of purification of mind in a poetic experience. Even Coleridge did not satisfactorily explain how a poetic experience brings about catharsis. He did not distinguish it from the poetic experience itself. And no one else did it. In Sanskrit poetics the two are clearly distinguished Indian critics fully analyse the nature and the process of purification of the finite mind in a poetic experience. They say that in contact with the infinite spirit mind gets subdued, and the subduing is experienced either as melting (*druti*) or as burning (*dipti*) or sometimes as both, one after the other, according to the nature of the basic feeling involved. They, again, explain this purification of mind, called *prasāda*, as extension of consciousness, clarity of vision, removal of impurity, giving up of its hard, knotty, unsympathetic, narrow, selfish nature¹. But they distinguish this catharsis, this quality of purification, from the poetic experience as the effect from its cause. *Guṇa* is the effect of *Rasa*. True poetry has an ease of expression, a harmony of rhythm, a musical delight owing to this *Guṇa*.

1. *DA* with *Locana*, pp. 204-13 ; *KP* with *Pradīpa*, pp. 383-94.

In Western poetics there is hardly any distinction made between the higher ascents of the poetic experience after it reaches the stage of *Guṇa*. Indian critics very clearly distinguish every stage of the poetic process or experience. Thus they clearly point out that *Rasa* is a stage of poetic experience higher than that of *Guṇa*. And even in *Rasa* experience the experience of the primary *Śānta Rasa* is the apex. Again, just as they measure these immeasurable heights so finely, they best explain the descent of the divine Muse in the tangible forms of word and meaning. *Guṇa* is the connecting link between the spiritual intuition (*Rasa*) and the material conception (*Rīti*) in the poet's experience and between *Dhvani* and *Alaṅkāra* in the poet's expression.

Here it would be profitable to take up the allied topic of the union of head and heart in a poetic experience, which is a total experience. Here also the superiority of the Indian critic is obvious. While Coleridge spoke of the union of head and heart in poetry, he meant by it a union of thinking and feeling. His analysis of this union did not go further than this. His reader is baffled when he calls the poet heartless and the poetic emotion artificial.

Perfect expression is the only proof of correct thinking and that requires that words should be very carefully handled. Though Coleridge loved de-synonymizing words for the sake of exact thinking, and must be praised for that, yet it cannot be said that his efforts in this connexion were sufficient. It is evident in his use of the words, 'heart' and 'mind'. His ambiguous or rather self-contradictory use of the word 'mind', both as biased and universal, has already been pointed out. His concept of heart is not so definite and clear as that of Abhinava.

Abhinava's concept of 'heart' is that of the infinite self. Heart is really the microcosmic sky, an objective void but a

subjective plenitude^{1a}. A connoisseur, a man of taste, is called in Sanskrit *sahṛdaya*, 'a man with heart'. Abhinava's definition of the word makes his concept of the 'heart' clear^{1a}. The essential qualification of a *sahṛdaya* is the capacity to unite his self with the object, which is further clarified as conversation with one's own heart.² This self-conversation or intuition is the very nature of infinite self-consciousness.³ All intercourse between finites is full of insurmountable hurdles. Even Coleridge said, "We know nothing even of others, till we know ourselves as nothing." Spirits alone can have a totally free conversation, free from all obstacles. Spiritual tete-a-tete has a tautologous form, I am I, at its apex, as we have seen. So it is between 'I' and 'this' when 'this' is not different from 'I'. On the lower plane we may say that as soon as we leave the world of finites, the limited conceptual concretes, and enter into the world of the unconscious, the world of universal appetencies, our dialogues take the form of self-conversation. Thus as soon as we leave the world of finite concretes we enter into the region of 'heart'. The *hṛdākāśa* itself turns into *cidākāśa* if we are able to grasp the region of the unconscious. That is how we become *sahṛdaya*, connoisseur of art.

Ordinarily the difference between heart and head is supposed to be a difference between feeling and knowing. The difference between these two is so much emphasised that their mutual relation is often misunderstood. We forget that

1a. Yatrāntar akhilam bhāti yacca sarvatra bhāsate
Sphurattaiva hi sā hyekā hṛdayam paramam budhāḥ. PT p. 270.
See also MVV, II, 22, 24.

2. Sarvato hi acamatkāre jaḍataiva : adhika-camatkāraśā : eva
viryakṣobhātmā sahṛdayatā ucyate. Yasyaiva etad-bhogāsaṅgābhyāsa-
niveśitānanta-vṛṁhaka-vīrya-vṛṁhitaṁ hṛdayaṁ tasyaiva uśīśaya-
camatkriyā. PT, p. 49.
See also *Locana*, pp. 38-9.

3. IPV, I, pp. 203-13.

feeling is also a type of knowing. The difference is only a difference between attachment and detachment. Detached apprehension is knowing; that with attachment is feeling. Abhinava aptly says that often we know through feeling and feel through knowing.⁴ Knowing is the working of *buddhi*, and feeling that of *ahankāra* and the two differ like their respective divine counterparts, *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara*, which differ only as subjective and objective emphases of the same proposition, or detached and attached varieties of the same experience.

Ordinary knowing is impure, because it is modified by the object of knowledge, which has only an imaginary existence. Feeling likewise is impure, because it is attachment to an imaginary object. Spiritual knowing and spiritual feeling, *Brahmajñāna* and *Śānta Rasa*, are both pure, for neither of the two experiences has imaginary object. If *Brahmajñāna* is a realisation of the mere subject, mere 'I', *Śānta Rasa* has no object other than I, for the experience has a tautologous form, 'I AM I'. The experience where nothing other than the pure subject or pure 'I' remains is totally detached; that where the pure 'I' becomes the predicate is an experience of deep attachment.

Brahma is neuter, and creation does not start from that subjective pole. It starts from a union of Male and Female, *Ardhanārīśvara*, *Śiva*. The predicate I or Joy is the very heart, *vimarśa*, of the eternal subject or self.⁵ The union of the eternal consciousness with its own passive self is *Rasa* in the ultimate analysis. This is the concept of the Absolute as *Rasa*. *Rasa* is the impregnation of the passive *Prakāśa* with the active *Vimarśa*, of the passive Self with the active Consciousness. It is the secretion as a result of the

4. *TA*, VI, verse 218, p. 175.

5. *IPV*, I, pp. 204-13.

pure intercourse of the Pure Self with Pure Consciousness, and the whole creation came out of this Spiritual Secretion,^{5a} or the experience of the Absolute as Joy.

On the poetic plane the union is between the pure self and the universal form of emotions, the basic feeling. It is significant to note that the form of experience changes with a change in the copula, which shows the relation between the subject and the object. When the copula becomes coadunative instead of an ordinary co-ordinating one, in short, when the copula is 'am', the predicate becomes a complement instead of an object, and that also a universal rather than a particular. As a total union is impossible between particulars, both the subject and the predicate become universal. There is a world of difference between the experiences expressed by the sentences, 'I love you' and 'I am you'. The latter is the divine experience and so is not spoken of in common parlance.

While the Indian critic shows more maturity in conceiving of the soul of poetry as *Rasa*, he shows similar maturity in thinking of its body as the suggestive word and the suggestive meaning. Here again, it has to be accepted that Coleridge had a clear idea of the poetic word as 'the living word'. "It is among the miseries of the present age", he says, "that it recognises no *medium* between literal and metaphorical. Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its name and honours usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols with allegories."⁶ The word or expression as symbol is poetic. He says that "a symbol is characterised by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general, above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal".

5a. Cp. Kaviraj Gopinath, *Śākta Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 417.

6. *Lay Sermons*, pp. 32-3.

He thinks that the symbolic word is intuitive,⁷ a focal point of consciousness⁸.

In the fifth lecture on Shakespeare and Milton, Coleridge discusses the poetic word more clearly. Speaking of the origin of the figurative language, he says that "all language arose out of passion"; that "Passion was the true parent of every word in existence in every language"; that language was in its origin figurative, punning. The figures gradually wore out and became old and lost their original emotional touch. Language merely informative or representative of external objects is an impossibility. "...Words are the living products of the living mind and could not be a due medium between the thing and the mind unless they partook of both. The word was not to convey merely what a certain thing is but the very passion and all the circumstances which were conceived as constituting the perception of the thing by the person who used the word." The very cultivation of style is a proof of the correspondence of words and their movement with the thoughts and emotions, and "words themselves are a part of the emotion".⁹

Such was Coleridge's concept of the living word, which showed that the poem was living. Coleridge's audience laughed at his calling the living word "punning", but a modern scholar, William Empson, has elaborated the concept in his *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. It is immaterial whether he was inspired by Coleridge or others. Empson, however, has none of the Coleridgean philosophy of self-consciousness as unity of word and meaning, and in the absence of such a philosophy his concept of ambiguity does not possess that self-evident nature which makes a theory inevitably accepted. Consequently he ends his excellent analysis with an apologetic

7. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

8. *J. S.*, item 73.

9. *Shak. Crit.*, II, 73-4.

tone. "An ambiguity, then, is not satisfying in itself nor is it, considered as a device on its own, a thing to be attempted, it must in each case arise from, and be justified by, the peculiar requirements of the situation."¹⁰ Coleridge would call an author "a man of words", if the term were used in all the force and sublimity it naturally contained".

The propounder of poetry as *Dhvani* had a very strong conviction about the correctness of his theory, as may be seen by the forceful statement in the very first verse of *Dhvanyāloka*¹¹. *Dhvani* almost superseded *Rasa* inasmuch as *Dhvani* was a more comprehensive concept and included *Rasa*. In its various senses it means the suggestive word, the suggestive meaning, the suggested meaning, the relation of suggestion existing between the two, and lastly, the poem with such words and meanings. The theory was based on the grammarian's theory of word as *sphoṭa* or self-consciousness as focus and the unity of word and meaning. Following Ānandavardhana, Abhinava pointed out that *Rasa* could only be *Dhvani*, a suggested meaning, and thus *Rasa-dhvani* was the soul of poetry.

Indian semasiology is a discovery of grammarians but it is further developed by literary critics. There is nothing like it still outside Sanskrit. Abhinava's explanation of the new poetic relation of suggestion propounded in the *Dhvanikārikās* is only to show that suggestion is altogether a new relation which makes the word capable of rendering the meaning poetic as other relations cannot make. The theory of poetry as *Dhvani* exemplifies a unique esemplastic relation between the poetic word and the poetic meaning. It shows that style can never be a mere dressing, that poetic words are coloured by poetic emotions.

10. *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, p. 235.

11. *Kāvyaśyāmā dhvani!* etc. DK, *kārikā* 1, p. 9.

have an organic growth from the poetic experience and are no jewel-setting. All after-dressings are defects of style. The great poet does not make an extra effort to beautify his expression¹². The relation between the suggestive word and meaning on the one hand and the suggested meaning on the other is that between body and soul. The body of poetry is not merely word but meaning also, for both words and meanings suggest emotions and feelings. In this function of suggestion many factors become contributory, as Mammata pointed out: the speaker, the listener, the manner of expression, the literal meaning, the context, the presence of others, the time, the place, and the like.

The theory of *Dhvani* was so successful that it was made the basis of classification of the various kinds of poetry. Expression is more tangible than intuition or experience and is the only proof of the existence of the latter. It is a far better criterion of judging the merit of a poem than Coleridge chose. The theory of poetic expression was so well developed in India by the pioneers like Ānandavardhana and Abhinava that it can hardly admit of any further improvement.

Abhinava convincingly shows that other theories of poetic expression are less satisfactory than the theory of suggestion, which has all their good points and none of their drawbacks. His criticism of other critics affords matter enough for a number of full-fledged theses. We shall deal with the subject here in the bare outline and that also only partially.

Coleridge's concept of the poetic word as 'punning' or Empson's concept of 'ambiguity' does not fit in with Coleridge's statement that "works of imagination should be written in very plain language; the more purely imaginative they are the more necessary it is to be plain".¹³ This contradiction in Coleridge can be resolved only by the Indian theory of the

12. *Locana*, p 219.

13. *I. S.*, item 199.

two styles of writing, the plain and the figurative, *svabhāv-vakti* and *vakrokti*. The *svabhāv-vakti* directly suggests *Rasa*. In this style it is the arrangement of words, their order and rhythm that count most. And the words themselves partake of the emotions, as Coleridge said, and thus become living.¹⁴ But even here the soul is *Rasa*, which is suggested. Thus Abhinava refutes those critics who make *Rīti*, the order of placing words, the soul of poetry^{14a}. Poetry is no doubt the best words in the best order, but that does not make the order its soul.

Another school of criticism led by Bhāmaha. Dandī and Kuntaka makes *Vakrokti* the soul of poetry. Bhāmaha says that the essence of poetic statement is 'fine excess', *atiśaya*,¹⁵ which makes it different from the ordinary statement of the common people, which is merely informative (*vārtā*).¹⁶ This fine excess is achieved not by stating a thing as it is or was, but by presenting it in a strange or oblique or extra-ordinary manner (*vakrokti*). The term *vakrokti* is variously explained. While Bhāmaha explains it by opposing it to *vārtā*, or informative statement. Dandī thinks that 'punning' (*śleṣa*) is its essence. Kuntaka explains it almost like Bhāmaha.¹⁷

While Abhinava also says that the soul of poetry, *Rasa*, is realised only by rejecting the merely informative part of the meaning of the poem,¹⁸ that the poetic meaning is the

14. For examples see Book III. 14a. *Locana* pp. 517-8

15. *Kāvya-lāṅkāra*, II, 81.

16. *Ibid.*, II, 87.

17. Kuntaka defines *vakrokti* as *vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇitī* and explains it thus : *Vakroktiḥ prasiddhābhidhāna-vyatirekiṇī vicitraiva abhidhā. Kīḍṣī vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇitī ? Vaidagdhyaṃ vidagdha-bhāvaḥ kavikarmakauśalam, tasya bhaṅgī vicchitī, tayā bhaṇitī vicitraiva abhidhā vakroktir ityucyate.* VJ, p. 22.

18. *Lokavārtāpatitabodhāvasthātāyāgena unmilanti*, *Locana*, p. 508.

unusual, uncommon meaning,¹⁹ he explains the nature of the extra-ordinariness as suggestiveness. He argues that obliquity of expression is its extra-ordinariness, and extra-ordinariness is fine excess. This, he says, is common to all figurative expression. Even old meanings get a new significance by the presence of this fine excess. Now, if fine excess be accepted as the only figure of speech, the poet's endeavour to adorn his expression by different figures of speech like simile, metaphor and the like cannot be explained. If, on the other hand, it be said that it is the very life of poetic expression, it may be pointed out that there are cases of improper uses of this fine excess. If it may be replied that fine excess guided by a sense of propriety is meant to be the soul of poetry, then, in that case, Abhinava points out, propriety will certainly refer to the poetic passions, which, as has been shown before, can never be directly expressed but can only be indirectly suggested.²⁰

Thus Suggestion alone deserves the honour of being the essential poetic expression, as *Rasa* has the honour of being the essential poetic content. *Rasa-dhvani* thus becomes the most comprehensive concept of poetics, a concept vying with that of self-consciousness itself, of which it is but an artistic form. Though of Vedic origin, the concept of *Rasa* as the key concept of aesthetics is a gift of sage Bharata. Similarly *Dhvani*, a concept of Sanskrit grammarians and based on the Vedas, was developed as the essential poetic expression by the author of the *Dhvanikārikās*.²¹ But it was Abhinava who gave the most elaborate and clear interpretation of both these concepts and for the last one thousand years or so

19. *Aloukika, lolūtikrānta, Locana*, pp. 499, 48-4, and 51 : Yastu svapne'pi na sva-śabda-vācya, na loukikavyavahārapatitaḥ.....Kāvya-vyāpārāi-kagocaraḥ.

20. *Locana*, pp. 467-9.

21. We are not concerned here whether Ānandavardhana or some one else wrote them. The different opinions held by Dr. S. K. De and

nobody has challenged the validity of Abhinava's interpretation successfully.

Comparing the French critic, Joubert, with Coleridge, Matthew Arnold says : "But that in which the essence of their likeness consisted is this,—that they both had from nature an ardent impulse for seeking the genuine truth on all matters they thought about, and an organ for finding it and recognising it when it was found. To have the impulse for seeking this truth is much rarer than most people think ; to have the organ for finding it is, we need not say, very rare indeed. By this they have a spiritual relationship of the closest kind with one another, and they become, each of them, a source of stimulus and progress for all of us"²² This statement of Arnold is applicable to Coleridge and Abhinavagupta as well.

While comparing Coleridge with Abhinavagupta we should remember one thing which is common to all branches of Indological learning. Hindu scholars have a great sense of cooperation in developing a particular branch of learning. A great sage begins it on the authority of the Vedas or Āgamas and it is subsequently developed by men of learning and genius. Consequently there is little chance of mistake anywhere. Thus when Abhinava speaks, he speaks not only with his clear vision and wide learning but with the authoritative support of a whole host of philosophers in the *Trika* philosophy and of Bharata and Ānandavardhana in poetics.

That is not the case with the Western learning. English people at least are afraid of systems. Every thinker starts afresh. While this may show the individual genius perhaps

Dr. S. Mukherji are still inconclusive. See "A Dissertation on the Identity of the Author of the *Dhvanyāloka*" by Dr. S. Mukherji, B. O. Law Commemoration vol. Pt-I and "Some Concepts of Indian Aesthetics" by Dr. S. K. De.

22. Matthew Arnold : "Joubert, or a French Coleridge",

Essays Literary and Critical. (Everyman), p. 152.

in a better way, giving it a wider and freer scope of display, it suffers from a serious drawback. The branch of learning itself does not develop in a systematic way. It has greater chances of having mistakes in it. Fortunately Coleridge was not afraid of system. Moreover, he tried to utilise the work done by philosophers and thinkers of the past. He had the good fortune of being the student of Kant. He acknowledges his debts to Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Aristotle, the mystics, Kant, Schlegel, Schelling, Fichte and others. For that he has been unjustly charged of plagiarism by Rene Wellek. Total originality is a fiction. To systematise knowledge is the real work of a scholar. Coleridge tried to present the whole truth while others, he said, had erred on account of having stated half-truths. He would not have been able to systematise knowledge for explaining poetry, had he had no originality of thought or deep understanding of the subject. A comparison of Abhinavagupta with Coleridge is not to answer the question, who is more original, but who is more correct in thinking and comprehensive in offering a satisfactory solution of all the problems of poetics. There I may say with all humility, yet with the most conscientious sense of veracity, that not only Coleridge but all other critics of the world shall have to yield the palm to the great critic, poet, philosopher, and saint of India, Abhinavagupta.

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INDEX

- Abercrombie, L., 181, 462.
- Ābhāsavāda*, 271-89, 452-3, 465-522 ; in terms of word and meaning, 290-309 ;
 and *advaitavāda*, 270-3, and Coleridge, 466-9.
- Abhinavagupta, 1, 4, 266-7, 533 ; on the Absolute as many types of unities, 310-11 ; on the Absolute as word and meaning, 290-309 ; on *Aham*, 294-8 ; on *Alaṅkāra*, 391 ; on *Brahmapañcaka*, 277, 312-3 ; on Creation, 273-80, 311-24 ; on feeling, 430, 435-8, 547 ; on *Guṇa*, 394-6, 544 ; on heart, 545-6 ; on mind, 289, 317-8, 321-3, 326, 332, 460-5, 500-1 ; on obstacles to *Rasa*, 373-86 ; on perception, 127, 287-9, 302-5, 324, 327, 445-59, 492-6 ; on poetry as *Dhvani*, 410-9, 550-1 ; on poetry as *Rasa*, 264, 266-7, 331-46, 365-6, 399-408, 410, 422-3, 435-43, 489-505, 543, 550, 552-3 ; on poetic truth, 487-8 ; on *prakāśa-vimarśa*, 273-7, 286-7, 290 ; on Primary *Rasa*, 347-61 ; on Secondary *Rasas*, 362-77 ; on the satellites of *Rasa*, 387-98 ; on the scientific definition of poetry, 399-408 ; on *Trika*, 275-6, 286-7 ; on the two styles, 397 ; on Universal and Particular, 466-83 ; on values in poetry, 506-23 ; on the verbal nature of Reality, 484-8 ; on *Vidyā* and *Māyā*, 275, 282-6, 289, 291, 314 ; and Aristotle, 435-6, 508-11, 523, 541, 544, 555 ; and Aurobindo, 509, 511, 521 ; and Bhartṛhari, 19-20, 292-3 ; and Coleridge, 4, 10, 12-4, 19-22, 27-36, 59, 76, 82, 102-3, 111-2, 117, 119, 122, 127, 139, 170, 177-8, 197-200, 225, 234, 255, 268-9, 289, 436, 445-65, 528, 530-1, 541-3, 546, 554-5 ; and Croce, 541 ; and Longinus, 541 ; and Mahimabhaṭṭa, 441 ; and Pythagoras, 435 ; and Richards, 506-8, 511-23, 541 ; and Śaṅkarācārya, 270-1, 284.
- Abstract Knowledge, 77, 467-9.
- Acit*, 314.
- Addison, Joseph, on Imagination, 46, 232.
- Adhṛā*, 103, 111.
- Āgama*, 14.
- Aham*, 458 ; as the Absolute, 20-1 ; as form of perception, 287 ; as *āda*, 301 ; as noumenal triangle, 295-6 ; as prime perceiver, 287, 465, 495 ; as self-consciousness, 294-8, 470 ; as *sphoṭa*, 307 ; as unity and totality of the alphabet, 297, 485 ; and *alaṅkāra*, 326-7 ; and Coleridge's I AM, 20 ; and poetic experience, 498.
- Alaṅkāra*, See *Antaḥkaraṇa*.
- Alaṅkāra*, and Fancy, 189 ; and *Rasa* and *Guṇa*, 197, 265, 390-1.
- Ammerbach, 47.
- Ānandavardhana, 234, 410, 422-3, 429-30, 441, 510, 538, 544, 550-1 ;
- Dhvanyāloka*, 266, 411, 429.

- Ananta*, and *Śiva*. 321.
Āyavopāya, 455.
Antahkarana, off-shoot of *prāya*, universal of sensory and motor organs and its threefold nature, 317-8, 326, 468 ; a passive finite, material instrument 320, 449-50, 458, 465, 471-2, 494, 508 ; fickle, 472 ; as *citta*, 317-8, 463 ; and Coleridge's mind, 332 ; conquest of, 550-2 : *vṛiti* of, 117, 457.
buddhi, 289, 317-8, 321, 326, 332, 472 ; and *vidyā*, 321-2.
ahankāra, 317-8, 322-3, 326 ; and *Āham*, 326, 472.
manas, 318, 322-3, 326.
Amūhāva, 338, 343, 353, 365, 389, 418-9, 522.
Appetency, material cause of Creation. 285-6 ; and *ānanda*. 314 ; and *mala*, 319.
Ariosto, 40.
Aristotle, 541, 555 ; on art as imitation, 34, 140, 230-2, 264 ; on the Law of Association, 47-9 ; on epic and tragedy, 433 ; on mind, 113 ; and Abhinava and Coleridge on : the poetic process, 435-6, 510 ; the poetic truth and the value of poetry, 508-9 ; probability as poetic law, 379-80, the soul of poetry, 499, the two styles, 396-8.
Wimsatt on, 403-4.
Arnold, Matthew, on Good Sense, 217 ; on passion, 34, 167-8 ; on Joubert and Coleridge, 554.
Artha, 265.
Association, the Law of, Aristotle on, 47-9 , Coleridge on, 45-58.
Atiśaya, 552.
Attention, 327, 474-6, 500.
Aurobindo, poetry as *mantra*, 509 ; criticism of, 519-21.
Ayer, Alfred Jules, on logical positivism, 23-6.
Bacon, Francis, and Coleridge, 13, 114 ; and Plato, 13, 85 , and Law, 13, 85, 87.
Beaumont and Fletcher, 40.
Beauty, synonym of Good Sense and Propriety, 218 ; its perception, 238 ; and the agreeable, 237 ; and the Good, 239 ; and obstacles, 240 ; and soul 239 ; and symbol, 240 ; and taste and harmony, 238 ; and Plotinus, 236 ; Coleridge and Pythagoras on, 236-7.
Berkeley, Coleridge against, 78-9, 114-5.
Bhagavad-Gītā, Coleridge's criticism of, 16, 21 ; concept of God in, 22 ; on perfect living, 536 ; on knowing Reality, 537.
Bhāmaha, 552.
Bharata, 554 ; author of *Nāṭyaśāstra*, 259-60, 266-7 ; drama created for liberation, 371, 507 ; on dance and music in drama, 381 , *Rasa-sūtra*, 264, 365 ; on *Rasa*, 263-4, 422, 435, 512, 553.
Bhartr̥hari, 36, 410, 494-5 ; *Śabda-Brahma*. 20, 292-3 , on word and meaning 19, 513-4 ; and Abhinava and Coleridge, 19-22 ; and Croce, 523.
Bhaṭṭa, Bāṇa, *Kādambarī*, 371.

- Bhaṭṭa, Mahima, *Vyaktiviveka*, 441.
- Bhaṭṭa, Mammāṭa, 265, 267, 385, 395, 544.
- Bhāva, 419, 427, 492-4, 508, 510.
- Bhavabhūti, *Uttara-Rāma-carita*, 425-6, 430, 533.
- Bhoja, 267, 383-5.
- Bindu, 301.
- Bombast, mental and verbal, 207, illustration from Wordsworth and Coleridge's criticism, 207-9; Richards' defence of Wordsworth, 209-10; Richards criticized, 210-1; Eliot's criticism of *Hamlet*, 211-2; Longinus on, 213.
- Boss, Medard, *A Psychiatrist Discovers Indā*, 441.
- Bowles, influence on Coleridge, 41.
- Bradley, A. C., on *Hamlet*, 534.
- Brahma, 292.
- Brahman, Coleridge's denigration of, 16, 58.
- Brooks, Oleanth, 521-2.
- Browning, Robert, 418.
- Calderon, 40.
- Caraka, 441.
- Cervantes, 40, *Don Quixote*, 191.
- Charles II, 41.
- Chaucer, 40.
- Cit, 314, 317.
- Citra, 200, 428, 540; and *Dhvani*, 538; and Fancy, 423.
- Coburn, Miss Kathleen, on Coleridge, 6, 8, 69; on Richards, 6.
- Colebrooke, Henry Thomas, 15.
- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, basic approach, 42: on consciousness, philosophic and common, 63-6; criticism of Associationists, 45-58; difficulty of his philosophy, 60-1; Doctrine of life, 3-4; fragmentary nature of his works 41; on plagiarism, 17; on the perspective central point, 61-2; plan of his *magnum opus*, 39-41; on Sanskrit philosophy and religion, 16-7, 21-2; his works 1; and existentialism, 9; and the Indian theory of Suggestion, 28; and Logical Positivism, 26, 35-6. and metaphysics, 36, 41-2; and Bacon, 13, 114; and Bhartṛhari, 19-22; and Bowles, 41; and Pythagoras, 13; and Wordsworth, 41, 43, 65, 159-61, 406-7, 529; D. G. James on, 7-8; Eliot on, 4-5; F.L. Lucas and Quiller-Couch on 4; Herbert Read on, 9; Kathleen Coburn on, 6, 8, 9.
- See also Abhinavagupta, Aristotle, Kant, Plato and Richards. For different concepts see the specific titles.
- Condillao, 40.
- Creation, manifestation of Power, 311; noumenal, 278, 311-3; phenomenal, 278-9, 313-24, 494-5.
- Oroce, Beneditto, 522-3, 541.

- Dandī, 552.
- Dante, 40.
- Descartes, 47-8, 55-57.
- Dharma*, 265, 373-4 ; and Tragedy, 530-1, 536.
- Dhvani*, 424-5 : its five meanings, 413 : poetic power, 412, 431, 523, 550-1 ; the soul of poetry, 122, 422-3 ; its superiority, 548-53 ; based on the unity of word and meaning, 308, 400-13 ; as true poetry, 200 ; and *Citra*, 200, 538 ; and the materialist's view, 441-2 ; and *Rasa*, 431-2 ; *Alaṅkāra*-415-6, 425, 427, 433 ; *Bhāva*-, 419 ; *Rasa*-, 417-9, 427 ; *Vastu*-, 414-5, 425, 427, 433.
- Dhvani-Kārikā*, 197, 411, 550, 553.
- Donne, John, 40.
- Deśa*, 390.
- Drama, importance of, 261-2 ; spectator's experience of, 334 ; superiority of, 341.
- Dramatic illusion, 222-8 ; French critics, Dr. Johnson and Coleridge on, 225
- Dramatic unities of time and place criticized, 222-3.
- Dryden, John, on wit, 193.
- Education, educated and uneducated, 61 ; goal of, 106, 519 ; Coleridge on methodical, 67, 103-11 ; Hindu critics on the moral purpose of, 260 ; and Reality, 35.
- Eliot, T. S., on 'bombast' in *Hamlet*, 211-2 ; on Coleridge as critic, 4-5 on comparative literary criticism, 10-1 ; on the impersonal theory of poetry, 195-6, 507 ; on the importance of plot, 380-1 ; on literary criticism and theology and ethics, 367-8 ; on poetry as alchemy of life, 491.
- Emotion, see Feeling.
- Empson, William, *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, 549.
- Ētā*, 34, 353, 522.
- Existentialism, and Coleridge, 9.
- Fancy, the aggregative and the associative power, 89, 179-200 ; and *Alaṅkāra*, 189, 197 ; and *Citra*, 200, 428 ; and Good Sense, 185, 190-1, 195 ; and Imagination, 43, 156-7, 166, 179-80, 188-91, 193-5 ; and *Kalpanā*, 200 ; and Motion, 195 ; and Understanding, 185 ; Abercrombie and Garrod on, 181 ; Basil Willey on, 461 ; Lowes on, 180-1, 186-8 ; Richards' criticism of Lowes, 181-4.
- Feeling, basic, 336-9, 342-5, 363, 401, 435 ; ordinary and poetic, 149-50 ; psycho-physical circuit, 437 ; three stages, 349-53, 493-4 ; universal (noumenal) and particular (empirical), 134-45, 150-3, 448-9, 547 ; universalization of, 385-46, 435-7 ; as impurity, 479 ; and emotion, 181-2, 166, 363, 382-5 ; and knowing, 435, 448-9, 546-7 ; and Passion, 132-45, 150-3, 165-8 ; and poetry, 158-9, 164-8, 188-9, 401-2, 479, 543 ; and Reason, 130-1, 139, 152 ; Abhinava on important feelings, 374-5 ; Bharata on primary feelings, 375 ; Bhoja on emotion and, 383-5.

Fichte, 46, 121-2, 555.

Garrick, 134.

Genius, 42-4, 141-2, 151, 161, 163, 201, 221, 477 : androgynous, 244 : the secret of, 481 ; and Good Sense, 214 ; and Imagination, 192-3 : and Judgement, 234 : and madness, 193 ; and Taste, 190, 235.

Good Sense, 201-18 : its violation, a defect, 205-8 : and Fancy, 185-9, 190-1, 195 ; and Imagination, 190-2, 195, 209, 214-7 ; and Propriety, 214-8 : and Understanding, 211-2 : Arnold on, 217 ; Richards on, 214.

Goswāmi, Jiva, 267.

Goswāmi, Rūpa, 267.

Green, J. H., 41 : on idea, 85-6.

Green, T. H., criticism of Kant, 68-9 ; on idealism, 80.

Guṇa, 390-6 : and *Alaṅkāra*, 197, 265, 390, 545 : and *Dhvani*, 545 : and *Katharsis*, 439, 543 : and Motion, 195, 394 ; and *Rasa*, 197-200, 390, 394-5, 397-8, 439, 544-5 : and *Rīti*, 265, 545 ; and *Bhoja*, 398 ; and Coleridge, 195-200, 394 : and Milton, 393.

Guṇabhīlavyaṅgya, 424-8, 434, 536-7.

Hamann, 22.

Hartley, David, the Law of Association and Coleridge's criticism of it, 47-54 : materialistic theory of knowledge, 46.

Heart, 131-2, 545-7.

Heidegger, 9.

Hobbes, 45-7, 113.

Housman, A. E., *On Reading Poetry*, 335, 365.

Hume, 45-6.

Hylozoism, 55.

I AM, as absolute intelligence, 83, 465, 467 ; or *Aham*, 294-8 ; androgynous, 152, 244 : the central principle, 145, 321 ; five divine states of, 470-1 : the form of perception, 116-22, 127, 171, 287, 303, 455-6, 494 ; pure and impure, 322 ; as the eternal (stream of Life, 83, 164 ; as God, 105, 115, 118, 126-7, 144-5, 249, 253 : as Supreme Idea, 85, 162 : as Joy, 147, 176 : as Law, 105-7 ; as *Prakāśa-Vimarśa*, 274 ; as Reason, 124, 172, 446 : as *Śānta-Rasa*, 357 ; as self-consciousness, 83, 283, 469 ; as *Śiva-Śakti*, 76, 312 ; as subject, 465, 498 : as unity of word and meaning, 122 ; and Coleridge's philosophy, 70-5, 203, 229 ; and feeling, 136-9, 145 ; and Primary Imagination, 116, 125, 129, 446 ; and Secondary Imagination, 230 ; and word, 120.

Idea, Platonic, 84-7, 140 ; Platonic and Lockean, 12, 84, 447-8, 477-8 ; Coleridge on, 113-4, 150 ; and feeling, 167 ; and image, 88, 113 ; and Law 77, 85-6, 105, 150 ; (Platonic) and *mantra*, 28 ; and music, 162 ; and Reason, 458.

Idealism, and realism and Idealistic realism, 77-80, 114-5.

Image, and idea, 113 ; and poetry and Passion, 132, 161, 163 ; and symbol, 159, 166.

- Imagination, 28, 32, 89, 139-40, 165, 203-4; *esemplastic*, 44; *imaginative experience*, 168-9; *intermediate faculty*, 104, 126-7, 145, 167, 175; *neglect*, a defect, 206; *Primary*, 112-27; *theory criticized*, 446, 451, 460-5; *Primary and Secondary*, 128-30, 148-9, 170-2; *seminal principle*, 43; and *beauty and pleasure*, 146-8; and *Dhvani*, 413; and *Fancy*, 43, 156-7, 166, 179-80, 188-91, 193-5; and *feeling*, 151-3, 167; and *Genius*, 192-3; and *Good Sense*, 190-1, 195, 214-8; and *image*, 132, 157, 159, 161, 194; and *love*, 167; and *Meditation*, 219-22; and *musical delight*, 162-3; and *Passion*, 132-3; and *Pratibhā*, 31, 430; and *Rasa*, 1, 31; and *Reason*, 110; and *Sadvidyā*, 451; and *Taste*, 190-1; and *Understanding*, 166, 170-2, 175, 184, 204, 211-3; and *Vṛtti*, 117; and *Aristotle*, 176; *Basil Willey on Fancy and*, 461; *Garrod and Abercrombie on Fancy and*, 181; *Lowes on Fancy and*, 180-1, 186-8; *Richards and George Whalley on Primary*, 125-6; *Wordsworth on*, 43-4; *criticism of Coleridge's theory of*, 445-6, 457-63; *Richards' criticism of Lowes*, 181-4.
- Imitation, *Aristotle on*, 34, 264; *Coleridge's Platonic concept of*, 140, 142-4, 146, 221-3, 229-34; and *Imagination and pānaka-rasa*, 230.
- Intuition, 290-1.
- Īśvara, 300, 316, 456, 470, 472.
- Jagannātha, *Panditarāja*, *criticized*, 267, 357-9; *against Bhoja*, 385.
- James, D. G., *criticizes Richards*, 7-8; *criticized*, 8-9; *on Coleridge*, 7-8.
- Jespers, 9.
- Jones, William, 15.
- Jonson, Ben, 40, 168.
- Joubert, and *Coleridge*, 554.
- Joy, 81; *beauty-making power*, 148, 173; *four species of*, 241-2; *as I AM*, 147, 152; *as identity of opposites*, 146, 152; *synonyms of*, 240, 367.
- Kaiā, 314-5, 318-20; *overcoming*, 474-9.
- Kāla, 315, 318-9; *overcoming*, 474-9.
- Kālidāsa, *Rtusamhāra*, 15; *Raghuvamśa*, 514; *Śākuntalam*, 371, 417-8.
- Kāma, 265, 374.
- Kāñchuka, 319, 473, 481.
- Kant, Immanuel, *on time and space*, 481; *criticized by T. H. Green*, 66-9; and *Abhinava*, 487; and *Coleridge*, 8-10, 15, 17-8, 46, 67-70, 125, 483, 487, 555; and *Logical Positivism*, 22-3; and *Plato on ideas*, 84; *Shawcross on*, 241.
- Katharsis, 264; and *Guna*, 336, 394, 499, 479, 499-500, 506-7, 518, 543-4.
- Kāvya, 435.
- Keats, John, 159.
- Kepler, 47, 87.
- Kierkegaard, 9.
- Knowing, 453, 546-7; *ordinary and spiritual*, 547; *as primary activity*, 464-5.
- Kuntaka, 552.

- Law, 77 ; and Idea, 85, 150 : the relation of, 86-9, 104-8.
- Lawrence, D. H., 461.
- Leibnitz, Coleridge on, 55.
- Lewis, Cecil Day, 157.
- Life, Coleridge on, 3-4, 81, 134. See also *Puruṣārtha*.
- Locke, John, 40 ; theory of knowledge, 45-6 ; Coleridge on, 78, 113-5, 125, 231-2, 464.
- Logical Positivism, 22-6, 35-6 : and Coleridgean and Indian theory, 121, 486 : criticized, 293, 308.
- Longinus, 250, 541.
- Lowes, Livingston, 462. See Fancy.
- Lucas, F. L., 4.
- Mackintosh, Sir James, 46-7.
- Madhyamā*, 300, 485, 523.
- Mala*, 319, 474, 479, 481.
- Mammatā*, 265, 385, 395, 544.
- Mantra*, 294, 453-4, 456-8, 469, 493, 509, 519-20.
- Manusmṛiti*, 15.
- Marcel, Gabriel, 9.
- Massinger, 40.
- Materialism, 56-7 ; Coleridge on, 63, 114-5.
- Māyā*, 275, 318-20, 446-8, 464 ; the secret of conquering, 474-6 ; and *Sad-Vidyā*, 102, 314, 326, 331-4.
- Meditation, and observation and Imagination, 219-22.
- Melanchthon, 47.
- Meredith, George, on Tragedy, 530.
- Metaphysics, Coleridge on, 36, 41-2 : and genius, 42 ; and poetry, 42.
- Method, 80-1, 103-11.
- Milton, John, 40, 60 : on the poetic language, 194, 393.
- Mind, 448, 450 : Abhinava and Coleridge on, 460-5 ; and *Sad-Vidyā*, 450-1 : and Understanding, 90, 99.
- Mokṣa*, 265-6, 321, 366-8, 437-8, 519, 523 ; through poetry, 266, 502, 518-9.
- Motion, and *Guṇa*, 195-200.
- Mithyācāra*, 363-6.
- Nāḍa*, 301.
- Nara*, 29, 275, 286-7.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, *Discovery of India*, 14-5.
- New and Old Testament*, 40.
- Newton, Sir Isaac, 47.
- Nirvikalpaka*, 454, 456-7.
- Nīyati*, 318.
- Nomos*, 88-9, 188.
- Noumena, 447-8, 466-7.

Nous, 89.

Objective correlative, of the basic feeling, 336 ; of the floating emotions, 337.

Pānakarasa, 230, 509.

Pantheism, 21-2.

Parā, 100, 300, 456.

Parama Śiva, 100, 456-7, 471.

Passion, defined, 133 ; the soul of poetry, 132, 165, 194, 542 ; and feeling, 134-9, 163-9 ; and image, 161, 166, 194 ; and Imagination, 172, 176 ; and the poetic language, 154, 174-5 ; and *Rasa*, 189.

Paśyantī, 100-1, 300-1, 314, 455-6, 523.

Patañjali, 36, 292, 513.

Pathe, 34, 353, 532.

Perception, different meanings of identity in, 116 : the essence of, 125 ; the form of, 281, 287-9, 302-4 ; perceptive nature of word, 120 ; poetic, 487 ; the prime agent of, 116 ; pure, 303, 324, 327, 455-6 ; referent in verification of, 304-5, 446-59 ; as resembling, 115-7 ; *savikalpaka* (secondary) and *nirvikalpaka* (primary), 452, 454, 456-8, 462, 492-3, 497-8 ; of universal, 448-52, 455-6 ; valid and invalid, 118 ; as *riti*, 117, 457, 496 ; and Imagination, 125 ; and *mantra*, 453 ; and reflexion, 119-20 Abhinava on, 127 ; Coleridge on, 112-27 ; agreement of Coleridge and Abhinava on, 289 ; Coleridge's view criticized, 457-9, 462 ; difference between the materialist and the idealistic realist on, 327 ; Locke, Hobbes and Aristotle on, 118 ; Logical Positivists criticized, 466-7.

Phenomena, 466-7.

Philosophy, of grammar, 42, 484-5, 513-4 ; and Method, 106 ; and Religion, 105 ; Coleridge's, 60-127 ; Coleridge's ignorance of Indian, 35.

See *Trika*, *Vedānta*, materialism, and *Pratyabhijñā*.

Plato, influence on Coleridge, 13, 60, 84-5, 98, 105, 114-5, 140, 165, 176, 236, 555 ; and Aristotle, 176 ; and Indian thought, 15, 119, 264, 500 ; Platonic philosophy, 13, 60, 105, 114-5, 140, 165, 176, 236.

Plotinus, influence on Coleridge, 60, 64, 84, 118, 236, 555.

Poetry, (Western view) : body of, 201 ; the end of, 228-9 ; has its own logic, 39 ; as imitation, 229-30 ; impersonal, 135-7, 141-7, 149-50, 153 ; language of, 154-5, 157-63, 175, 246 ; musical delight in, 162-3, 168-9, 175 ; poetic experience, 164 ; requires close attention for long, 193 ; true and false, 200 ; two styles of writing, 161, 195-6, 204-5 ; value of, 107, 123-7, 130-3 ; and beauty, 236-40 ; and chemistry, 77 ; and criticism, 190-1 ; and dreaming, 226 ; and illusion, 222-8 ; and madness, 193 , and meditation 221 ; and metre, 245-8 ; and morality, 184 , and Passion and *Rasa*, 189 ; and philosophy, 41-2 ; poetic language and history and logic, 206, 213, 215-6 ; and probability, 225 ; and propriety, 214-8 ; and religion, 243 ; and verisimilitude, 205-6 ; Coleridge's definition of, 237 ; objection by Richards and Shawcross, 240-1.

(Indian view): alchemy of life, 491; better life, 506; body and soul of, 542, 548; classification of, 538-40; creation and appreciation of, 512; as *dhvani*, 413, 497; education through, 519; essentially dramatic, 260; fallacy involved in its definition removed, 404-6, 439; feeling universalized in, 398; head and heart in, 545-7; ideally true, 508-9; identity of ideals in life and, 536; importance of, 324-5; is not mental indulgence, 285, 363-7; moral purpose of, 260, 342, 529-30; the opposites to be reconciled in, 485-6, 512-5; poetic circuit, 403, 408, 489; poetic experience: 336-46, 399-408, 491-505; a bilateral business, 340, 402-3, 502; effect of, 504-5; mind in, 543; objects of, 389; subject of, 440; value of, 328, 496-502; and aesthetic experience, 439; and ordinary experience 337, 345-6, 378, 406, 437, 494; and spiritual experience 345-6, 543-4; poetic process, 438; poetic truth, 487-8; as *Rasadhvani*, 537; relation between word and meaning in, 410-1; the same power creates and enjoys, 339; scientific definition of, 403-8, 410; stages in appreciation of, 420-2; studied from the reader's standpoint, 263; the subject and the object of, 354-5, 494-7; superiority of the Indian theory of, 522-3; a total experience, 365; true and false, 538; the two styles of writing, 198, 396-8, 553; value of, 521; Eliot criticized, 338.

Prakāśa-vimarśa, the *Trika* Absolute, 119, 273-4; as existence and consciousness, 286-7; as *Saccidānanda*, 276; as self-consciousness, 277; as several types of unity, 308-11; as word and meaning, 290-4.

Prakṛti, 320-1; evolutes of, 321-3.

Prāṇa, 316-7, 320, 326, 464, 471-2.

Prasāda, 543.

Pratibhā, 31, 189, 430; and *Rasa*, 32.

Pratyabhijñā, 13, 119.

Pravṛtti, and *vṛtti*, 382.

Procreants, 34, 353, 522.

Priestley, 49.

Propriety, 29; and *Aucitya*, 370; and feeling, 217; and Good Sense, 214-8; and Imagination, 216; and *Rasa*, 367-77.

See also *Puruṣārtha* and *Dharma*.

Puruṣārtha, four aims of life, 265, 366-8, 374; and Propriety (*Dharma*), 265, 373-4.

Pythagoras, 60, 237, 555; founder of philosophy 40, 55-6; influenced by Indian philosophy, 14, 119; influence on Coleridge, 13; and Abhinava, 435.

Quiller-Couch, Arthur, 4.

Rabelais, 40.

Raphael, 58.

Rasa, 1, 27, 331-46, 499, 523; ability to experience, 355-6; based on *Prakāśa-Vimarśa*, 410; a bilateral affair, 340, 401-3; a continuous experience, 336,

- 401-2 : creative and appreciative, 32, 389, 428-9, 431-4 : different from the divine and the worldly experience, 345-6 ; differentia of, 406-7 : distinct from *Cit* and *Ananda*, 489 ; an experience of a universal feeling, 331-44 : an experience through *Sadvidyā*, 334, 336 ; an experience without obstacles, 344-6, 378-86 ; explained, 31, 340, 408, 543 : fallacy involved and removed, 403-5 ; an improvement on Western critics, 541, 548 ; steps in the experience of, 419-23 ; the philosophical basis of 269-89 : the principle of creating and enjoying poetry, 548 : poetic circuit, 403, 408, 489 ; the semantic basis of, 35-6, 290-309, 410 ; seven obstacles to, 379-85 ; the soul of poetry, 422-3, 431-2 ; its Vedic origin, 263-4 ; as essence of poetry, 263, 397-8 ; as feeling impregnated with Reason, 489-505, 543 : as key concept of poetics, 263-4, 437 ; as poetic experience at its apex, 399-400 ; as poetry of good living, 531, 536-7 ; as reconciliation of opposites, 177-8 ; as spiritual secretion, 547-8 ; and *Alaṅkāra*, 189, 197, 390 ; and *Bhāva*, 388-9, 400 ; and *Doṣa*, 290 ; and *Dhvani*, 308, 431-2, 550, 552-3 ; and *Guṇa*, 197-200, 390, 439, 543-5 ; and Imagination, 1, 21-4 ; and mental health, 346 : and *Mithyācāra*, 368-6 ; and *Mokṣa*, 502 ; and *Pratibhā*, 31-2 ; and Propriety (*Aucitya*), 368-77 ; and *Puruṣārtha*, 265-6 ; and *Rasābhāsa*, 368-77, 372-3 ; and its satellites, 390-1 ; and *Śhāyibhāva*, 502, 505 ; and Taste, 31-3 ; and Tragedy, 530-6 ; and *Vāṇī*, 424 ; and Western critics, 379-80 ; *Madhura*, 511 ; Primary and Secondary, 363, 367, 372, 376-7, 501, 510, 518-9 ; -*dhvani*, 410, 425, 427, 523 ; -*sūtra*, 364-5 : *Śānta*, - 178, 266, 339, 347-9, 356-61, 366-7, 427, 442-3, 477, 490, 496-7, 501-5, 507, 511, 518-9, 537, 547, *Śānta-Rasa* and Brahma, 357, 442-3 ; Abhinava as interpreter of, 267-8 ; and Aurobindo's view, 509-10 ; Bhoja on, 383-5 ; Bhoja's view criticized, 383-5 ; and Coleridge's view of poetic experience, 178, 510 ; and A. E. Housman, 335.
- Rasābhāsa*, 368-73, 536.
- Rawlinson, H. G., on the Indian influence on Pythagoras, 14.
- Read, Herbert, existentialistic interpretation of Coleridge's theory, 9.
- Realism, see Idealism.
- Reason, 60, 85 : and *Citi*, 445-6 ; and Common Sense, 203 ; and feeling, 129-45, 152-3, 161-7 ; and the Indian view, 457-63, 492-4 ; and Imagination, 124-7 ; and Imagination and Understanding, 104-10, 139-40, 145, 167-75, 184, 203-4, 211-3 ; and *Sadvidyā*, 102 ; and Understanding, 89-102, 445-6 ; and Will, 202.
- Richards, I. A., against momentary aesthetic consciousness, 401 ; on Coleridge, 5-8, 18 ; on Coleridge's critics, 4-6 ; on communication, 136 ; criticized, 35, 525-30 ; defends Wordsworth against Coleridge, 209-11 ; difference from Coleridge, 26-7, 404 ; on Fancy and Imagination, 181-4, 462 ; giving scientific basis to criticism, 404 ; on Good Sense, 214 ; on idealism and realism, 512 ; on Lowes, 181-4 ; on philosophic consciousness, 332 ; on poetic experience free from deadlock, 379, 394 ; on poetry

and mental health, 506-7. 518; on Primary Imagination, 125-6; on reconciliation of opposites, 518; on semasiology, 121; on standard poetic experience, 32, 517; on the theory of Imagination, 33-4, 167-8; his theory of satisfying impulses, 523; on Tragedy, 524-5; on the unconscious, 512, 515; on universal, 513, 517, 519; and Abhinava, 507-8, 511, 518, 541.

Rīti, 552. See *Gura* also.

Rossetti, D. G., 333, 477.

Saccidānanda, analysed, 276-7.

Sadāśiva, 100, 278, 320, 318, 456, 470, 472.

Sahridaya, 341, 546.

Śakti, 29, 76, 275, 286-7, 314, 319-20, 456, 470.

Śaktija, 456, 469.

Śaktopāya, 455.

Śāmbhava, 456, 469.

Saṁvit, 316.

Saṁcāribhāva, 337-8, 343, 352-3, 365, 522.

Śaṅkarācārya, the Vedantic standpoint, 270-1; and Abhinava, 284, 452.

Sartre, Jean Paul, 9.

Śāstra, 435.

Sāvikabhāva, 353. See *Anubhāva* also.

Savikalpaka, 456-7.

Schelling, and Coleridge, 46, 70, 555.

Schlegel, 555.

Self-consciousness, its centripetal and centrifugal forces, 74, 326; equated with eternal life, 81; the ground of knowledge and existence, 81, 114, 445-6; pure and impure creations from, 278-89, 311-24; synonyms of 75; as absolute intelligence, 83, 86; as *Brahma-pañcaka*, 277, 313; as focus, 120; as focus and mirror, 122, 202, 311; as form of percept, 257; as knower, 450, 465; as life, 83, 289; as *prakāśa-vimarsa*, 273-4, 286, 294; as *Saccidānanda* 276; as several types of unity, 310-1; as *Śiva-Śakti*, 76, 286; as *sphota*, 122, 307; as word and meaning, 290-309; Abhinava on, 271-81; Coleridge on, 72, 77, 81; Śaṅkarācārya on, 270-1; and *Aham*, 294-8.

See also Reason, *Prakāśa-Vimarsa*, I AM and *Aham*.

Sen Gupta, S. C., on *Hamlet*, 534.

Shakespeare, William, 39-40, 77, 159-60; and Ben Jonson, 168; Coleridge on *Othello* and *Romeo and Juliet*, 220-1; Eliot on *Hamlet*, 211-2; *Hamlet* analysed from the Indian standpoint, 533-6; Imagination and Shakespearean drama, 224; *Macbeth*, 529; and meditation, 150, 167; Shakespearean tragedy and *Dharma*, 531; *The Tempest*, 504; *Venus and Adonis* and drama, 526-7.

Shelley, P.B., 151, 159.

- Śiva*, 29, 76, 275, 277, 286, 300, 314-5, 319-20, 456-7, 470-1.
 Somānanda, 270.
 Southey, Robert, *Omniana*, 89.
 Spender, Stephen, 26-7.
 Spenser, Edmund, imaginative fancy in, 195.
Sthāyibhāva, 336, 338-9, 343, 349-52, 365; and *ethos*, 522; and *Rasa*, 363, 504.
 Substantial Knowledge, 77, 467-9.
 Sūśruta, 441.
Svabhāvokti, 198, 396-7, 424-6, 552.
 Symbol, defined, 154; symbolic word, 549; and allegory, 548; and idea, 159; and image, 166; and the suggestive word, 28; Coleridge on Imagination and, 28.
 Taru, 15.
 Taste, 32, 39, 190, 234-6; difference in, 355; and Beauty 238; and Imagination, 236; and other senses, 235; and *Rasa*, 31, 519.
 Taylor, William, 43.
 Tennyson, Alfred, 418.
 Tragedy, Richards on, 524-5; Richards criticized, 525-30; and *Dharma*, 529-31; and *Mithyācāra*, 529; and *Rasa*, 530-6.
 Trichotomy, 28.
Trika, *ābhāsavāda*, 270-1, 447; Absolute, 273-4; all objects living, 268-9, 498; the basis of *Rasa-śhvanī*, 431; idealistic realism, 269-89; logic of distinction without difference, 29; not pantheistic, 22, 277; philosophy of Recognition, 119; philosophy of word and meaning, 20, 122, 290-309, 442, 522; on poetry, 500-2, 522-3; summary view of, 326-8; view of creation, noumenal and phenomenal, 278-88; and Coleridge, 12, 30-1, 76, 93, 102, 486, 492; and Plato, 119; and Trichotomy, 28-9.
 See also *Vedānta*.
 Understanding, 65, and Good Sense, 211-5; and Imagination and Fancy 193; and *Māyā*, 102; as Mind, 90, 99; and Reason, 89-102, 445-6; and Reason and Imagination, 104-10, 139-40, 145, 167, 169-75, 184, 203-4, 211-4.
 Universal, distinct from empirical, 449-52; the noumenal, true, ideal world of, 107, 447, 466-7, 513-4, 517; perception of, 448, 451; universalization of experience, 326-8; as God, 86; and genius, 141-2; and *Suddha-vikalpa*, 447, 466-7.
 Upādhyāya, Gokulanātha, on the stages of poetic experience, 420-1.
Upaṇiṣad, 22.
 Urban, W.M., *Language and Reality*, 22.
 Urwick, 14.
 Utpaladeva, 270.
Vaiṣṇavī, 300.

- Vakrokti*, 198, 265, 396-7, 424, 552.
Vaiṣṇava philosophers, 93, 368, 503.
Vālmiki, 333, 407-8; *Rāmāyaṇa*, 503, 531-3.
Vāmana, 197, 265.
Vārtā, 424, 552.
Vāsanā, 349, 353, 519; and *Bhoja*, 286. See *Appetency* also.
Vedānta, 270-1; and Coleridge, 486, 492; and *Platonic philosophy*, 486;
 and *Trika*, 23, 270-8, 284, 452-3, 486, 492.
Vibhāva, 354, 389, 418, 508, 522.
Vidyā, *asā*, or *aśuddha*, 314, 318-24, 457-8, 474.
Vikalpa, 456, 471; *aśuddha*, 455.
Viśvanātha, 385, 395, 544.
Vives Ludovicius, 47.
Vṛtti, 457.
Vyabhiṇyāsa. See *Sancāribhāva*.
Vyāgya, 424-8, 434.
Vyāsa, *Bhāgavata*, 503; *Mahābhārata*, 504.
Wellek, Rene, on comparative literary criticism, 11; 555.
Whalley, George, on feeling and emotion, 132, 385, 521; on *Primary Imagination*, 126.
Whitehead, A. N., 530.
Will, Absolute, 85; as self-consciousness, 81, and *Rasa*, 106, 165, 202; and *Secondary Imagination*, 171.
Willey, Basil, 461.
Wimsatt, W. K., on scientific definition of poetry, 404; on theory of art, 521.
Word, Coleridge on, 120, 124; poetic, 410-1; powers of, 411-2; states of 19-20, 297-301, 485; used in three ways, 260-1; and meaning, 19-22, 120-4, 201-3, 213-4, 290-309, 409-10; how meaning is conveyed, 305-6; meaning verified ideally, 304; as concept, 302; as consciousness, 292; as divine concept, 307; as letter 296-7, 301, 486; as light, 123; as *mantra*, 453-4; as *Platonic idea*, 122; as *sphota*, 121-4.
 See also *Aham*.
Wordsworth, Dorothy, 121.
Wordsworth, William, criticized by Coleridge, 161, 206-9; defended by *Richards*, 209-10; defence of Coleridge's criticism, 210-1; definition of poetry, 165; influence on Coleridge, 41, 43, 65, 159-60, 406-7, 529; on the language of poetry, 245; philosophic consciousness and *Tintern Abbey*, 333, 477; on *Shakespeare*, 244.
Yoga, 286.

